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Abstract
Botswana is considered an exemplary democracy in Africa. It is imperative to
assess how an enviable democracy could flourish when the most widely
available mass media was not independent. The fact is, despite the fact that
media has been at the heart of development in Botswana, it has often been
ignored in local academic and popular discussions about democracy and
governance. A 1994 seminar on the media in a democracy organized by the
Mmegi Publishing Trust (Leepile, 1994), was one of the very few forums where
the role of the media in Botswana was given any attention. Even then, most the
presentations were not substantive, mainly providing basic information about
media institutions in Botswana and laws that protect and threaten freedom of the
media. Botswana's contemporary state - media nexus can only be understood
within the context of a long history of media dependence and domination by
neighbouring South Africa (Zaffiro, 1991) assisted by British colonisation. To
appreciate the challenges of cultural production at Botswana Television (BTV)
required a study of the problematic encounter between the quest for creative and
professional freedom within BTV on the one hand,·and the authoritarian gaze of
state power on the other hand. BTV operated under an ill-defined broadcasting
model, of a state bureaucratic arm, attempting to fulfil the ethos of public service
broadcasting. Through the lens of the Newsroom, in-house productions,
commissioning and procurement of foreign and local content, the study shows
the subtle ways in which state ownership of the media compromises freedom of
expression and freedom of information in Botswana. Yet, Botswana continued to
enjoy that status ofAfrica's exemplar of democracy. Good governance indicators
consistently gave media in Botswana cursory attention, thereby reinforcing state
authoritarianism in Botswana. With a media dominated by state power, Botswana
still emerged as exemplary. This complicated the quest for the ideal
communication environment towards democratization in the Third World,
particularly in a globalizing context. In situations such as that of Botswana, where
the institutions that should protect the media from government control are either
absent or weak, universal ideals on media freedom are often not enough. Media
practitioners are more likely to find support in the local discourses, repertoires
and cultures that call upon all, regardless of status, to tolerate opposition. A local
. tradition of the kgotla in particular, often heralded as Botswana's indigenous form
~ of democracy, is placed in this chapter, at the heart of much of the freedom,
_ limited as it may be, that BTV enjoyed.
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Introduction
James Zaffiro provides the most sustained effort to explain the development of
govemment-owned media in Botswana; 'Under the shadow of South Africa:
Failure of Commercial Radio in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1936 - 1966',1
Twin Births: African Nationalism and government information management in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1957 - 1966' (1989), 'From police network to radio
station of the nation' (1991), 'Broadcasting in post-independence Botswana: the
first 20years' (1988) and 'Broadcasting reform and democratization in Botswana'
(2000). In fact, University of Botswana historian, Brian Mokopakgosi said in 1994
that, "to review a book on media in Botswana authored by James Zaffiro presents
a difficulty of comparison, for. Zaffiro and media research in Botswana are
synonymous" (1994:643). Outside Zaffiro's work, Mokopakgosi knew no other
research on media in Botswana, published or unpublished. More than ten years
later, the situation was still almost the same.
The history of a media in Botswana, as Zaffiro correctly shows, is ridden with
contradiction. Zaffiro's early works were more forgiving to govemment-owned
media in Botswana, but by 2000, he was beginning to accept that media-state
relations in Botswana were undemocratic, although he was optimistic the
situation would improve (Zaffiro, 2000:89). In his earlier works, although Zaffiro
argued that broadcasting in Botswana "has not yet fully extricated itself from its '." . ..
?" .....
colonial beginnings" (Zaffiro, 1988:8), he saw Botswana as an exceptional- '.~
country in Africa. He applauded the continued struggle of managers of
govemment-owned media to apparently continue to serve the needs and goals of
an independent non-racial, majority-ruled state within a conflict management,
public relations based information strategy constructed at the eve of
independence. They had adopted a colonial government machine where colonial
administrators used the media to repress nationalist and anti-racialist political
, Botswana National Archives, 11, 033
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trends at the end of colonialism. The main point of departure between this thesis
and existing works on Botswana's 'exemplary' democracy is that, once media is
added to the matrix, the quality of our democracy is significantly altered.
Many of Zaffiro's work on the media in Botswana were written before the onset of
majority rule in South Africa in 1994. There was a clear intention in these early
works to contrast peaceful Botswana with the then apartheid neighbouring South
Africa. Zaffiro tended to give the government in Botswana undue latitude and
thus failed to problematise government-ownership of media in post
independence Botswana. As Kenneth Good (2004) rightfully pointed out, times
and situations change. The onset of democratic governments in the region,
particularly in Namibia and South Africa has made it possible to more accurately
interpret democratic institutions in Botswana (Good, 2004:4). Botswana was one
of the last countries in southern Africa to establish a 'national' television
broadcaster.
The 2003 Draft National Broadcasting Policy for Botswana contested that
government radio and television services were not really national because
reception was either poor or not possible at all in remote parts of the country.
When it was officially launched on 31 July 2000, BTV was to be inundated by
even more paternalistic state control than Radio Botswana, its precursor. Over
the years, BTV defined itself in a number ways; as something of a public service
broadcaster,2 an emerging commercial station,3 and sometimes simply as an
informational arm of government.4 Its precursor, Radio Botswana was heralded
by Zaffiro in 1988 as a rare situation in Africa where the national broadcaster
criticises government policies, furnishes airtime and coverage to opposition
parties and serves the needs of rural listeners with programming in tune with
2 This is according to the former director, Andrew Sesinyi,
http://www.BTV.gov.bw/BTV/from_the_director.html
: Outlined in the BTV web page: http://www.BTV.gov.bw/BTV/guiding_principles.html
Botswana government web page:
http://www.gov.bw/governmenUministry_oCstate-president.htmI
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their life problems (Zaffiro, 1988:3). By his own admission. the assertion was
based on an examination of government memoranda. parliamentary and press
debates, contracts and offers of technical assistance. national development
plans. and elite interviews with senior government officers.
Louise Bourgault (1996) identified several research agendas that have been
pursued in mass communication research in Africa. Research may adopt a
comparative systems approach on the structures of broadcasting and print media
operating within given nations. looking at the relationship between mass media
and the system of government within which it operates. Fewer studies look into
the operations and the practice of me~ia organizations and Newsrooms. Studies
may also look into the role of the media in the promotion of the thorny concept of
development. The way production teams go about their work and the way
programmes are structured has also been examined in a few studies. Notably.
research on the form and content of African television programming has been
scarce (Bourgault. 1996: 61-62).
In many ways this study was very ambitious. It was the first study on both
television in Botswana and BTV. Without an accumulated body of work on mass
media in Botswana to speak to. the study of necessity had set the ground for the
understanding of the various aspects of television in Botswana. rather than
focusing on a single aspect. It combined several aspects of media research. the
history of mass media in Botswana; place Botswana within the political economy
of communication of the region; media regulation in Botswana; organisational
subcultures at BTV; processes of cultural production at BTV Newsroom, in-house
productions and commissioned productions. For a situated appreciation'of the
, '
limits and possibilities for freedom of expression in Botswana, the theSIS finally
linked BTV cultural production to an indigenous discourse - the kgotla. Cultural
production here refers to the means of producing. cirCUlating and exchanging of
meanings and images through the media (Hall: 209).
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The thesis also decidedly attempted to move away from using Western lenses to
understand the media in Africa, but not by failing to engage with Western ideas
about mass media and its normative roles. In the same vein with Francis Kasoma
(1996) and Francis Nyamnjoh (2005), the author firmly believes th"at media
practice in Africa can have 'African ethical roots and still maintain global validity
and flavour' (Nyamnjoh, 2005:90). About half of this thesis was dedicated to the
historical roots of government control of the media, both before and after
colonialism in Africa and Botswana in particular. It illustrated the ways in which
British colonialism partly explains the media environment in contemporary Africa.
The other half of the thesis looked specifically into the birth of BTV under this
historical context.
The thesis is organized into eight chapters. The birth of BTV can best be
understood from the birth of its precursors, radio and print. Chapter One
juxtaposes Botswana's current success story, against a history of negligent
~
British colonialism, threat of annexation into the Union of South Africa and brunt
of apartheid. It is crucial to understand the history and development of
broadcasting in British Colonial Africa as determined by the BBC and the British
Colonial Office. In the specific case of Botswana, initially the British colluded with
the South African government as the eventual annexation was a foregone
conclusion. Seretse Khama, first President of Botswana, was to feel the full brunt
of apartheid for marrying British Ruth Williams. Grand apartheid starting in 1948
made South Africa somewhat unpopular and paved the way for Botswana's
independence. Around the same time, a nationalist awakening was taking place
in much of Africa including Botswana.. Bechuanaland colonial administration
found this a threat without a governme~t information ~ervice 'setting the record
,
straight', and on the eve of independence, government-owned media was
founded.
Chapter Two is on the theoretical framework, methods and methodologies that
were employed during this research. It sets the background for the specific
18
enquiry into BTV. Cultural Studies is under attack from other disciplines for either
encroaching into their 'turf or failing to learn from them. This study is both in
defence of Cultural Studies and a celebration of its multi-disciplinary approach.
Sandra Harding (1987) calls for a distinction between "methods" as particular
tools for research and "methodology" as theorizing about research practice.
Some elements of participant observation, focus group observations, face-to-face
interviews, meetings, spontaneous conversations, discourse analysis and context
analysis were employed. Maintaining a healthy distance from the subject of study
was to become the most challenging part of the fieldwork.
The study was purely qualitative, as it was not designed to measure phenomena,
but rather to put together the political economy of communication within which
BTV was born and the first six years of the station. The empirical data used for
chapters on the Newsroom, on in-house productions and on commissioning is
presented largely as narrative. This poses questions about what is traditionally
called internal and ~external validity. Internal validity refers to how well data
collected and presented was coherent and consistent with the research
conclusions (Tonkiss, 1998:259). While internal validity was not a problem,
narrative often poses a challenge of reliability or external validity, the extent to
which data could be generalized beyond the particular social setting (Tonkiss,
1998:259).
Beyond colonialism, Chapter Three sets the birth of BTV in the context of
regional and local politics in the post-independence period, towards a political
economy of communication that emerged in Africa in the post War period. It
demonstrates through the formation. of national press agencies, the challenges
faced by African countries, includi'ng Botswana, towards the establishment of a
New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) during the Cold
War. In southern Africa, there emerged at the turn of the twentieth century a
political economy of broadcasting, where South Africa became a regional
metropolis and the rest of the region became the periphery. The 1970s and
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1980s was also a period when the Frontline states and the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) made attempts to offset South
Africa's dominance. In the 1970s, African countries, including Botswana, under
the stewardship of the United Nations Education and Science Commission
(UNESCO) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) attempted to create a
News World Information Communication Order. The Botswana Press Agency
(BOPA), established in 1981 as a central Newsroom serving the Botswana Daily
News and the Radio Botswana News Desk was a product of this era. Rich
ethnographic details from the Botswana National Archives were used to illustrate
the Botswana government foreign policy during the Cold War, through the lenses
of its media politics. The example of the advent of BOPA is used. The rich
historical detail eventually illustrates the paradox that BTV emerged within, of a
celebrated African democracy that contrary to expectations, persistently sought
to control its mass media. History appears to have repeated itself, for, the birth of
BTV was to meet similar challenges to its precursors radio and print, but for
different reasons. BTV was born into an entrenched system of servitude to the
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), ruling since independence. From as early as
1968, the BDP government often used foreign consultants to legitimise its control
of the media, as will become apparent from the discussion of reports made by
Information Consultants A.J. Hughes (1968), and C.N. Lawrence (1978).
Chapter Four explores the mirage of autonomy that eluded BTV in its early years.
When the idea for television for Botswana was conceived in the mid 1980s, the
idea was that it would be separate from government, although wholly funded.
Wh~n the project started in earnest in 1998, the thinking was still that BTV would
b~ some kind of parastatal. However, within months of the commencement of the
,
projects, conservative sections in the Department of Information and
Broadcasting began to lobby for government control. As a result, between 1998
and 2006, BTV regressed from enjoying more editorial independence to at its
lowest moments, simply being the information arm of government. In the early
days, BTV defined itself as a public broadcaster funded by government. Yet it
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defied the quintessential model of a public service broadcaster, a public
corporation that entertains, informs and educates the nation, at the same time
keeping a certain independence from government (McDonnell. 1991:1,2). Later,
it was to shift away from this position, to ambiguous models like public
broadcaster, suggesting firmer belonging with the rest of the civil service. There
were instances of direct government interference, where content was altered with
instructions from outside the station's management. Government control was
often not carefully structured; it occurred sporadically, with pressure coming from
several conflicting sources and positions at the same time.
Chapter Five unravels the contradictory developments in BTV's journey towards
establishing a working definition for the broadcaster. At the BTV, journalists and
producers colluded with. resigned to or resisted state control. In-house
productions tended to be affected differently· by state power. Current Affairs
programmes, The Eye and Matlhoaphage suffered more episodes of overt state
interference than magazine, children, educational, sports and entertainment
genres such as Sedibeng, Manflwaneng, Mokaragana, Sports Hive and
TalkBack.
Chapter Six looks into spheres of cultural production through television in
Botswana, within and outside BTV. BTV could not fill up its schedule with 100
percent local programmes, and like most other television stations in the Third
World, had to purchase foreign productions. Through in-house productions,
licensing of local and foreign programmes, and commissioning of programmes
'frorn local producers, BTV attempted to straddle between the opposing forces of
. a nation-building exercise, and the expensive task of filling up a daily schedule.
Chapter Seven maps the wider media regulatory environment into which
Botswana Television was born, between 1991 and 2005. Many actors shaped
the regulatory environment within which BTV emerged, statutory and activist.
Since the 1990s, several Acts pertaining to communication and mass media
21
were passed. Among them were the Telecommunication Act of 1996 that
established the Botswana Telecommunication Authority (BTA), Broadcasting Act
of 1998 that established a National Broadcasting Board (NBB) and Press Council
of Botswana. In 2004, Broadcasting Regulations were released under the
auspices of BTA. Civil society also played a major role through initiatives such as
the Botswana Chapter of the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA),
Botswana Media Consultative Council (BMCC), Botswana Media Workers Union
(BOMEWU), Botswana Women in Media Association (BOMWA), Botswana local
independent producers associations, and numerous others, with varying levels of
success.
Chapter Eight concludes by indicating new directions in the study of media in
Africa and Botswana in particular from the. rich historical account of events
leading to the birth of television in Botswana. The thesis highlighted key
moments in the period after it was decided that a television service for Botswana
was necessary, to BTV's first formative years. The major question arising from
the advent of BTV was the relevance of government ownership and control of the
media towards democratization. The approach to the concept of democratization
adopted in this thesis is one propagated by both Claude Ake (2000) and Francis
Nyamnjoh (2005), that goes beyond majoritarian democracy, to consensual
democracy. "This is a political culture which demands the involvement of
everyone in promoting the common good...through ...active involvement in the
process of decision-making and community life in general" (Nyamnjoh, 2005:36).
On the one hand, deregulation of mass media would mean giving that very
important resource to profit making private hands. Democratic or civic
participation in the U.S is increasingly suffering as the media is used to
manufacture consent. Robert McChesney, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky
have also shown how in the U.S, the media was getting richer at the expense of
democracy. Citizens are increasingly addressed as consumers (Teer-Tomaselli,
2005). The alternative to private ownership, public s~rvice broadcasting, has its
own set of problems. It is increasingly difficult for public service broadcasters to
22
justify their supposed closer affinity to civic participation and nation-building. In
South Africa, the SABC mostly derives its funding from advertising, whereas the
BBC has a long standing tradition of staying away from advertising revenues.
BTV has often adopted the title of public service broadcasting, sometimes simply
to point to the fact that it was run by the public service or under government.
Other times public service broadcasting was evoked to suggest an intention to
provide editorially independent, universally accessible educating, informative and
entertaining content. Public service broadcasting is under fire both within
Botswana and in the global context.
Some historical accounts begin from the pre-colonial legacy of face-to-face
communication (Ziegler and Asante, 1992; Bourgault, 1995). In fact, Dhyana
Ziegler and Molefi K. Asante (1992) are adamant that no understanding of the
contemporary philosophies of mass communication in Africa can be achieved
without a full appreciation of the role of traditional aspects of communication..
While they appreciate the significant role of colonialism, they maintain that it is
not entirely true that the press-government relationships were due to the colonial
legacy.
As a way forward, the chapter ends by placing the kgotla indigenous democratic
discourse in Botswana on a pedestal as the strongest guard against the
possibility of more rampant editorial control by government on the media it owns.
If Siebert, Petersen and Schramm's 'four theories of the press' (Siebert, et al.,
1963) were to be applied, Le. the authoritarian theory, libertarian theory, Soviet
propaganda and the social responsibility theory, BTV would possibly transcend
all four. Yet Botswana has been heralded the shining example of a democracy in
Africa. Prima facie, this may lead to a conclusion that Botswana is an example
that it was not always true that to protect democracy, neither the state nor the
market should control the media. Botswana would be living proof that freedom of
the media was not always necessary for democratization. There can be no
democracy without pluralism - 'diversity in the media; the presence of a number
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of different and independent voices, and of differing political opinions and
representations of culture within the media' (Doyle, 2002a:11). In situations such
as that of Botswana, where the institutions that should protect the media from
govemment control are either absent or weak, universal ideals on media freedom
are often not enough. Media practitioners are more likely to find support in the
local discourses, repertoires and cultures that call upon all, regardless of status,
to tolerate opposition. A local tradition of the kgot/a in particular, often heralded
as Botswana's indigenous form of democracy, is placed in this chapter, at the
heart of much of the freedom, limited as it may be, that BTV enjoyed. The kgotla
can be compared to Jurgen Habermas' conception of a public sphere, a forum of




Broadcasting in Africa in the context of British
colonialism, apar:theid, and legitimization of the nation-
state .
Botswana Television in context
This study of television broadcasting in Botswana analyses the interconnection
between 'regulation' and 'production' moments of the circuit of culture I.
(Thompson, 1997:3) at the state-owned BTV. The single channel, fully
government - funded, 'public service broadcaster' (Hunt Report, 1999) was
officially launched on 31 July 2000 after several delays. The 1988 International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) report had recommended a fairly small scale
commercial station. Studio Hamburg and Croton reports also supported the ITU
proposal. For this reason, the early days of BTV were clouded with the possibility
of being created as a separate entity from the Department of Information of
Broadcasting (DIB). The project leader, Kevin Hunt and other expatriates appear
to have been looking into giving responsible positions at BTV to freshly recruited
younger people. Hunt was thinking of a government funded public service
broadcaster. It would also imply the broadcaster provides a universal service of
education, information and entertainment while retaining editorial independence.
Public service broadcasting informed by t~e example of the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) would suggest that the state and t~e media were separate.
entities. Very early on into the project, the longer serVing and conservative staff
of DIB began to lobby for government ownership and control of the station. In
that way, positions would be allocated according to seniority and long service
with DIB. Continued state ownership of the service was motivated by more than
internal power struggles. As the study will illustrate, there was strong resistance
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on the part of the state to let go of this potentially powerful media. BTV remains
unlicensed by the semi-independent National Broadcasting Board (NBB), while
the national radio service is. Reasons given were than BTV was a state
broadcaster.
An economic success story and a tragic hub of HIV/AIDS,
unemployment and poverty
Botswana is an economy of extremes; high HIV/AIDS prevalence, high rates of
absolute poverty, unemployment and yet phenomenal economic growth. In 2000,
it was estimated that over 35 percent of adults in Botswana had HIV/AIDS (Hope,
2001). The small population of 1.6million is one of the hardest hit countries in the
world by HIV/AIDS (NACA, 2002)5 but according to the 2003 World Fact Book,6
Botswana also had one of Africa's most progressive and comprehensive
progral1)s for dealing with the disease. At the 2006 national Budget Speech,7
e
Minister of Finance, Baledzi Gaolatlhe reported that
The Sentinel Surveillance study for 2005 has shown encouraging results
that HIV prevalence among pregnant women aged 15-49 years has
decreased from 37.4 percent in 2003 to 33.4 percent in 2005, while HIV
prevalence among the group aged 15-19 years, has decreased from 22.8
percent in 2003 to 17.8 percent in 2005 (Gaolatlhe, 2006).
In 1993/94, the number of people living below the poverty datum line in
Botswana was estimated at 47 p~rcent.8 The IMF 2006 country report for
5 National AIDS Coordinating Agency (NACA) (2002), Second generation HIV/AIDS surveillance:
A technical report, November, 2002.
~ttp:llwww.naca.gov.bw/documents/Dec%202002%20Surveillance%20Report.pdf
World Fact Book (2003) http://www.bartleby.com/151/bc.html
7 Budget speech 2006 Delivered to the National Assembly on 6th February, 2006 by Honourable
Baledzi Gaolathe Minister of Finance and Development Planning Website: www.gov.bw Printed
by the Government Printer, Gaborone
8 Government of Botswana/UNDP Natioanl Workshop on Poverty, 9 - 10 February 2000,
http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/docs/National%20Poverty%20Workshop%20Report.pdf
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Botswana noted that the improvement in Botswana's social indicators had not
kept pace with its strong economic growth. Poverty remained relatively high with
nearly a quarter of the population living below US$1 per day. Unemployment also
remained stubbornly high at over 20 percent of the labor force. The distribution of
income was also reportedly highly skewed.9
Although much improvement had been made since independence, (Tsie, 1996)
many parts of the country did not have electricity, good roads, good health and
education facilities, and information technologies such as telephones, internet,
facsimile and other communication facilities. It was estimated that in the 2003
World Fact Book that in 2002 in the whole country there were 252,720 radios;
142,400 2002 main telephone lines and 435,000 cell phones (mobile phones).
Internet subscribers were 60,000 and the daily Newspaper circulation at 7 000 or
29 per 1000. Television ownership was estimated at a mere 15 percent across
the entire population of nearly 1.6million (World Bank, 2004),'0 although in terms
of signal availability, according to the 2006 budget speech
Master Plan for the national Radio and Television Transmitter Network
coverage has been completed to establish current coverage of both radio
and television, and to propose additional facilities required to cover the
remaining parts of the country. Currently, about 81 percent of the
population has access to good quality Medium Wave and about 77
percent has access to Frequency Modulation radio signals; while
television is accessible to about 64 percent of the population (Budget
Speech, 2006).
9
IMF Country Report No. 06/66
~ottp://www.bankofbotswana.bw/files/attachments/2005%20imf%2Oarticle%20iv.pdf
World Bank, ICT at a glance, htlp://devdata.worldbank.org/icVbwa_ict.pdf
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United Nations Development Programme put the literacy rate of young adults in
Botswana at about 90 percent. 11 In 2003 alone, the July 2003 UN Economic
Report singled out Botswana as Africa's overall number one performer looking at
the legal system's ability to effectively enforce contracts, predictability of laws
and regulations, transparency, the quality of the ~ivil service, access to and
reliability of telecommunications, and transport and electricity. Botswana also had
made notable efforts to promote women's access to education and health, and
moving towards gender equality in employment. World Economic Forum Africa
Competitiveness reports have consistently ranked Botswana's public institutions
as the best in Africa in terms of their quality, low levels of corruption and respect
for the rule of law (see appendix 1).12
The Economic Freedom of the World 2003 Annual Report ranked Botswana
alongside Norway and Japan as having among the world's highest levels of
economic freedom. 13 Transparency International consistently rated Botswana the
least corrupt country in Africa and the developing world, and among the best in
the world. The 2005 rating also placed Botswana as the least corrupt country in
Africa, at least in so far as public perceptions.14 The 2003 United Nations Human
Development report ranked Botswana sixteenth in the world in terms of its total
percentage of "females serving as legislators, senior officials and managers", but
in 2006, the ranking had regressed to 54th out of 75 countries. 1S The Global
Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 ranked Botswana 81 st, second after South
Africa in sub Saharan Africa. Botswana had





13 Economic Freedom of the World: 2003:11 Annual Report, Exhibit 2: Summary Economic
Freedom Ratings, 2001, http://www.freetheworld.com/2003/1 EFW2003ch1.pdf
14 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005
AFRICA,
rsttp://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2005/cpi_2005_18_10_05
Human Development indicators country fact sheets 2006,
http://hdr.undp.orglhdr2006/statistics/countries/country_fact_sheets/ctLfs_SWA.html
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Succeeded in using its wealth from key natural resources to boost the
growth rate. Key to Botswana's success have been its reliable and
legitimate institutions, the prudence of government spending and public
trustworthiness of its politicians. The transparency and accountability of
public institutions have contributed to a stable macroeconomic
environment, efficient bureaucracy and market-friendly regulation (World
Economic Forum, 2006).16
Botswana has been labeled a shining exemplar of democracy in Africa,
particularly since the period of unrest in much of southern Africa when South
Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique were experiencing massive
internal conflicts (Meyer, Nagel and Snyder, 1993). When freedom of the media
was excluded, as in the 2000 democracy World Audit report, Botswana ranked
second most democratic after South Africa in Africa. However, when freedom of
the press was included, although still ranking quite high, Botswana was outdone
by South Africa, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia and Ghana. She was at the same place
with Benin at the fifth place in Africa. 17
Statutory protections of freedom of expression in Botswana
Media freedom in Botswana is not expressly guaranteed by the constitution, "but
is merely to be inferred from the general freedom of expression provisions"
(Fombad, 2002:654; SADC Media Law, 2004:21). Section 12(1) of the
Constitution provides that "Except with his own consent, no person shall be
hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to
hold his opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information
without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without
interference (whether the communication be to the public generally or to any
person or class of persons) and freedom from interference with his
~: World Economic Forum, http://www.weforum.org/en/fp/gcr_2006-07_highlightslindex.htm
http://www.worldaudit.org/press.htm
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correspondence". Immediately thereafter, limitations to this freedom are set out,
including interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, or
public health (section 12(2)). Besides the constitution, these freedoms are
reiterated in several other important documents such as the 'Long Term Vision
for Botswana for the year 2016, Towards Prosperity for AII'. "Botswana will have
developed its communication capacity, particularly in the electronic media, radio
and television. Batswana will be informed about the rest of the world. All
Batswana will have access to the media through national and local radio,
television and Newspapers" (National Vision 2016:7). It also says, "The society of
Botswana by the year 2016 will be free and democratic, a society where
information on the operations of Govemment, private sector and other
organisations is freely available to all citizens. There will be a culture of
transparency and accountability" (National Vision 2016:7).
Botswana: An authoritarian or developmental state?
Henderson made a list of progressively changing descriptions of Botswana
overtime: "a poor state; a client state; a hostage state; a Bantustan; a landlocked
state; a neo-colonial state; an administrative state; a model state; a small state; a
non-aligned state; a front line state; a democratic state" (Henderson: 1988:219-
220). There. are two opposing schools of thought pertaining to the nature of the
Botswana state; a positive one that it is developmental state, and a critical one
that it is a liberal authoritarian state. Due to its economic success and regular
and free elections, Botswana has been labelled a developmental state (Edge,
1998; Tsie, 1998; Maundeni, 2004a). Among others, Balefi Tsie, a Botswana
Political Scientist bases his position on the poverty that Botswana emerged from
at the end of colonialism, and the economic growth it has archived since. When
Botswana gained independence in 1965, it was expected at the time it would end
a Pan African outpost surviving on international aid and charity (Tsie, 1998:7).
Upon independence, the newly formed Botswana state immediately had a
mammoth task of turning around the second poorest country in the world after
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Bangladesh in 1966, with an estimated gross national product (GDP) of USD 60
million, (P300 million) consisting mainly of beef exports to Britain and South
Africa. Botswana was only able to eliminate its dependence on British grants-in-
aid by the 1972/73 financial year, a year that came to be known as the year of
Botswana's second independence. For Tsie, it was the strong presence of the
state rather than private capital that played a major role in creating economic
growth that has landed Botswana the status of a developmental state (Tsie,
1998:7-9).
Similar to Botswana, South Korea emerged from a war-destroyed improvised
economy in the mid-fifties and in 1996 became middle income economy. Tsie
attributed the changing fortunes of Botswana's economy and political stability to
being a developmental state compared to the soft/weak and or patrimonial states
found elsewhere in Africa. He also looked at sound management of resources.
Botswana's political elite such as Seretse Khama removed powers of chiefs and
C c
traditional leaders in land allocation, mineral rights, development planning, and
collection of stray cattle among other controls, to reasonably competent and
honest bureaucracy. Yet by the same token, he also attributed the effectiveness
of the same bureaucracy, in the absence of strong civil society on traditional and
tribal customs that provide a means of mobilising and expressing opposition.
Thirdly, Tsie attributed Botswana's success to a pattem of capitalist accumulation
that judiciously combined private capitalism with state intervention (Tsie,
1998:1,2,14). Wayne Edge (1998) also attributed Botswana's success to being a
developmental state, akin to other developmental Asian states of South Korea,
Singapore, Taiwan and China (Edge, 1998:333,334).
, .
As human development indices and other indicators celebrate Botswana as one
of the best run country in the world, some scholars have demonstrated that there
are reasons to be sceptical of Botswana's success story, particularly with regard
to freedom of expression. Kenneth Good (1992; 1996; 2000) and lan Taylor
(2002; 2003), particularly argue that Botswana is a liberal authoritarian state.
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Statutory protections of media freedom, direct or implied, have seldom stopped
states, particularly in Africa, from violating this very important right. Botswana is
no exception. Kenneth Good, persona non-grata in Botswana since 2005,18
described the Botswana state differently, as an authoritarian liberal state. Like
advocates of the developmental approach, Good acknowledges the strong
presence of the state in national development rather than private capital.
However, he does not see this as a positive and applaudable state of affairs,
particularly in so far as it negates the principles of popular participation and
openness (Good, 2004:4). The Botswana state historically has utilised legal
instruments to restrict information and control opinion (Good, 2004:9). According
to Good, as early as 1967, Seretse Khama was using the law to suppress
oppositional voices. Using the Penal Code, sedition, defamation and contempt
provisions, Khama ordered the police to raid the offices of the opposition
Botswana National Front (BNF) to seize copies of their Newspaper, Puo Phaa-
straight talk. Charges of sedition were <brought against founding member and
leader Kenneth Koma and four other member of the party. Under Presidents
Ketumile Masire and Festus Mogae, the situation of freedom of expression
further deteriorated. The independent press only began to appear in Botswana in
1982. This was following the recommendation of the 1978 C.N. Lawrence Report
that a Botswana Newspaper Trust be established because "it was both
undesirable and unnecessary for the government to be burdened with the
ownership and management of all the media of mass communication".l!LGood
also noted that by 1995, five journalists and two editors of a local Newspaper had
been deported. A South African refugee-journalist, Mxolisi Mxgashe was
imprisoned and then deported for reporting that the BC?tswana Defence Force
had responded slowly to a South African Defence Force attack in 1985. Zambian
journalist John Muleka was deported in 1987 after two months as editor of the
18 On Friday 18 February 2005, University of Botswana Politics Professor, Kenneth Good, was
given 48 hours to leave Botswana as a persona non grata. The reasons were not given, but it
was speculated that the government of Botswana took the action because of his strong attacks
on Botswana's perceived exemplary democracy
19 .
The Botswana Newspaper Trust, 1980:1
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same Newspaper as Mxgashe - the Botswana Guardian. The state used the
Immigration Act, section 7, which allows the President to declare a visitor or
foreign resident of Botswana a prohibited immigrant, without giving grounds of
the decision (Good, 2004:9). The Managing Director of the Newspaper, William
Jones came under immense pressure to ensure his paper was not perceived by
government as left-wing, biased and antigovernment, and 1986 forced his editor,
Kgosinkwe Moesi to resign (Good, 2004:11).
Editor of the Gazette, Malawian Alaudin Osman received threats of physical
violence and deportation for running a story on property speculation and self
enrichment in a future development of the government enclave among high
ranking officials, including Minister responsible for media P.H.K. Kedikilwe and
soon to be Vice President Peter Mmusi. Students were also sometimes
harassed. In 1994, campus residence of University of Botswana student Busang
Leburu was raided by the police acting on the penal code and criminal.
defamation for having formed an Anticorruption Campaign (Good, 2004:12).
As Joseph Diescho (1997:77) put it, ''the process of alienation that started with
colonialism continues today in Africa under the aegis of state security and
national patriotism" (Diescho, 1997:77). The National Security Act of 1986 was
used against government journalist Samuel Mbaiwa in 1987 for incitement,
following a Radio Botswana story on public unrest around the disappearing of a
young girl in Gaborone. Under the same Act, in 1994, freelance journalist of the
Mmegi Newspaper, Prof Malema was allegedly beaten and detained by
members of the Serious Crime Squad of the Botswana Defence Force and
editor, Titus Mbuya. was also questioned after the Newspaper revealed
confidential details about negations dUring a manual workers strike (Good,
2004:13-14). Yet the same government was passive, and even negligent when
in 1990, the then (South African Defence Force (SADF) established a weekly
Newslink Africa - an intelligence and propaganda publication in Gaborone, right
under the noses of government and its intelligence. The SADF managed to
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convince the government the publication was bona fide. It was investigative
journalism in Johannesburg that News/ink was funded and controlled from
Pretoria that led to its closure (Good, 2004:15-16).
The early history of broadcasting in Bechuanaland
As this chapter will show, attempts by the modern state in Botswana to control
media to legitimise its authority are directly due to the crisis of legitimacy that
besotted the British colonial administration on its last days. On the eve of
independence, Bechuanaland Protectorate colonial Information Officer A.H.
Donald began to see a government information service as a necessity,
presumably to interpret the policy and actions of the government to the people;
as a continuing service 'of information and public relation and campaigns and
concentrated publicity on particular subjects; to encourage and assist people of
the Bechuanaland Protectorate to take interest and responsibility for econpmic,
political, cultural development; to advice government on public opinion and public
relation; develop and exploit media to assist District Administration and
departments in performing duties; and to publicize the protectorate outside its
borders.20 Following the A.H. Donald Report of 1961, an Information Branch of
government was established as a tool for managing the nationalist political
awakening. Through careful management of media, authorities hoped to guide
. ~ ..
the territory peacefully towards independence and harmonious entry.Jnto the
Commonwealth family. They hoped to promote a stable, moderate politics and
market-oriented economic development (Zaffiro, 1988:7).
Raymond Williams (1974) explained how a unique set of circumstances ensured
the BBC started off independent when it could easily have become a state -
owned broadcaster as was typical in Western Europe. Before the 1926 BBC
20 Notes from Alan H. Donald - "Report and proposals for the establishment of an Information
Service in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. January 1961. Botswana National Archives, S.582/9
(1 c)
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Charter, all transmitters and receivers had to be licensed by the state Post Office.
The decision by competing broadcasting manufacturers, the Post Office and the
armed Services Committee, to set up an independent monopoly with guaranteed
revenues from the sale of licenses, was made partly feasible by the pre-existing
cultural hegemony of a compact ruling class. Also, unlike in the United States,
manufacturers of equipment had not become too powerful (Williams, 1974:27-
29).
The first radio signal was received in Bechuanaland in 1927. In contrast to
Britain, radio broadcasting in the then British Bechuanaland and the rest of the
British colonies, served mainly as a vehicle for colonial administration and
policing the protectorate from 1934. On 18 May 1934, a Bechuanaland
Prote~torate Resident Commissioner justified extension of this service to include
broadcasting in the Protectorate so the administration would be able to
communicate to and from Mafeking to various outstations in the Protectorate
including Ghanzi, Maun, Serowe, Tsabong and Lehututl1. 21 The service would be
kept at a basic minimum to avoid requesting funds from the Colonial
Development Fund.22 Soon after it was used by the Witwatersrand Native Labour
Association to solicit labour mainly for South African mines. During the Second
World War period, radio served to spread British propaganda about the war. Not
much development happened to enhance the output of radio for the benefit of
audiences (Zaffiro, 1991). After independence, it serves as a hegemonic state
apparatus for the ruling· Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).
British colonialism was imposed on the Batswana when the British declared
Bechuanaland their protectorate by Order-in-Council in January 1885, to keep
the territory from falling into German rule. Immediately thereafter, the British
could not care if Bechuanaland became part of the Union of South Africa or
dominated by mining concessions for Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa
21 Botswana National Archives. S. 370/10 (7)
22 Botswana National Archives. S. 370/10 (1)
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Company. During this time of uncertainty, diKgosi - traditional chiefs often bent
backwards to protect British Protectionism of Bechuanaland. The Protectorate
was forced into a labour reserve for South African mines through the imposition
of the Hut Tax in 1899, and diKgosi enforced the payments from their people.
The people of Botswana - Batswana were dispossessed of their land. In
accepting British 'protection' Paramount Kgosi Khama of the BaNgwato nation
was advised by London Missionary Society's John Mackenzie to offer large tracts
of land to the British (Ramsay, 1998:68). D. Kiyaga-Mulindwa (1987:103-106)
explained that World War 11 was seen by diKgosi as an opportunity to declare
their loyalty towards the Queen. They hoped that after the war, the British
Parliament would be less likely to sanction the transfer of Protectorate to South
Africa. Many BaTswana men in the Protectorate were against joining the war
effort and being listed into the African Auxiliary Pioneer Corps (AAPC). Tshekedi
and other diKgosi insisted that their men be involved in the war, as a
'Bechuanaland Protectorate Military Labour Corps', but for many months Britain
showed no interests. If diKgosi insisted on BaTswana men joining the war, the
colonial govemment told them they would have to enlist through the South
African Union Defence Force (SAUDF). As labour became critical, Britain
changed its position and by the end of World War 11, 10, 027 men from the
Protectorate, about 20 percent of the adult male population, were recruited into
the force, often brutally made to do so by diKgosi (Kiyaga-Mulindwa, 1987:105).
The Protectorate suffered debilitating droughts. In terms of social, economic and
institutional development, Bechuanaland was one of the most neglected of British
colonies, and it was the only colony ruled from outside its borders (Tsie, 1998,
Somolekae, 1998). Until 1963, license fees from the protectorate were paid to the
South African Postmaster and forwarded to the SABC. "Apart from a short period
during the 1930s, no recurrent expenditure subventions were received by the
protectorate govemment from Britain between 1912 and 1956" (Jefferis,
1998:34). Prior to the 1950s, almost no resources had been invested in its
political or economic development. Prior to the 1950s, almost no resources had
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been invested in its political or economic development. Not withstanding, British
colonialism was perceived the lesser evil compared to incorporation in to South
Africa and the full wrath of its capitalist interests. "At least until the last decade of
the colonial era, nationalist sentiment was commonly equated with the retention,
rather than rejection, of the British occupation" (Ramsay, 1998:101).
'Historical roots of South African domination on radio development in pre-
independence Botswana'
Bechuanaland Protectorate was effectively subjected to two colonial powers,
South Africa and Britain with South Africa domination out-pacing the British in
certain crucial· areas of policy and administration. Willie Henderson (1988)
characterized Bechuanaland Protectorate as some kind of anarchy, 'the
challenge of the chiefs was defeated, no treaty rights between the local rulers
and the Crown were accepted as existing, foreign policy was motivated by the
issue of incorporation into the Union of South Africa and domestically, the High
Commissioner was constrained by native law and custom (Henderson,
1988:224).
James Zaffiro (1989) examined the historical roots of South African domination
on radio' development in pre-independence Botswana. During this time, the
..ev~ntual annexation o! .Bechuanaland into the Union as part of the Cape Colony
was a foregone conclusion. The protectorate was reduced to a labour reserve for
gold and diamond mining, mainly of the British South Africa Company of Cecil
Rhodes. For many years before the South African Nationalists introduced 'Grand
Apartheid', racial discrimination 'in 1948, colonial administration was content t~
receive News coverage about the Protectorate from South African and
Rhodesian press (van de Veur, 1995:171). Colonial policy towards the other High
Commission Territories (HTCs) of Basutoland and Swaziland was also that they
would eventually become part of the Union of South Africa.
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When in 1936 the SABC was created from former independent African
Broadcasting Corporation, it was given a total monopoly of radio broadcasting
which included the High Commission Territories under the Broadcasting Act of
1936. Under the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, SABC became responsible for
collection of listener license fees through the Postmaster General of the Union.
Bechuanaland was also virtually a monetary/fiscal province of South Africa. She
was a member of the Rand Monetary Area. It was not until 1972 that Botswana
began to collect data on its own foreign trade. Interest rates, exchange rates, and
the level of foreign reserves were determined by the Reserve Bank of South
Africa. In 1976, ten years after independence, Botswana introduced its own
monetary policy (Tsie, 1998:7).
The 'Seretse crisis': Bechuanaland under the shadow of apartheid
South Africa
Seretse Khama, who was later to become independent Botswana's first
President, was the heir to the BaNgwato nation in Bechuanaland. He married
white British Ruth Williams in 1948, the same year that Dr Daniel Malan of the
Afrikaner Nationalist Party was voted into power by South Africa's white minority.
Malan instituted apartheid, formal separate development for the different races.
In her new book, 'Colour Bar', historian Susan Williams (2006) recounts a story
of deceit and racism by governments of South Africa and the United 'Kingdom
that surrounded Seretse's marriage to Ruth. Tshekedi Khama, holding the fort for
the expected r~turn of Seretse Khama to complete his Law studies and return to
be paramount Kgosi - Chief of his Bangwato nation, was deeply disappointed at. '
his nephew's decision to marry a white woman. When Seretse arrived with his
wife in Serowe, Tshekedi went into voluntary exile. The apartheid government in
South Africa used this to argue that, even natives themselves approved of
apartheid. In Bechuanaland, Ruth was warmly welcomed by the Bangwato
people, but barely accepted by the white minority. The couple was only allowed
38
into a Whites only cinema in Palapye, because Seretse was future Kgosi.
However, Seretse's impeding ascendancy to the throne posed a diplomatic threat
between the South African separatist government and the UK. If Seretse became
Kgosi, the South African government would have to officially recognise him and
therefore his marriage, which greatly offended the position of the government of
Dr Malan against mixed marriages. It was also likely to offend the many
separatist white South Africans. On October 31 1949, Seretse and Ruth were
declared prohibited immigrants in South Africa. A judicial inquiry was instituted by
the Colonial government to decide if Seretse could be Kgosi, although the
Bangwato nation had declared that they accepted him and his wife, and wanted
him as Kgosi, against the will of Tshekedi. Even an African National Congress
(ANC) founding member from Bechuanaland and editor of Bantu World, Selope
Thema, sat as key witness on Tshekedi's side against Seretse becoming Kgosi.
His argument was that Ruth was not of royal lineage, and that the colour of the
children born to Seretse and Ruth would not be appropriate for future heirs to the
throne. Ruth became pregnant and had their first child in 1950. To appea'se the
South African government, that same year the British government tricked Seretse
into going back to Britain, and upon his arrival, was informed that he was
banished from Bechuanaland for five years. Seretse spoke to the media,
Movietone, about being tricked by the British government. He was eventually
allowed a brief retum to Bechuanaland, whereupon he was reunited with his wife,
reconciled with Tshekedi, and moved to London with wife and new baby
(Williams, 2006).
Seretse and Ruth's marriage was not only a political spectacle, it was also a
media spectacle. Whereas Ruth said about the lack of activity in Bechuanaland,.
"there are few, if any, organised sports. No radios or gramophone..." (William,
2006:82), her own movements and family life attracted much media frenzy. News
of their marriage had been widely covered. In the early days of their marriage,
Ruth was often forced to be in disguise to avert the prying eyes of the media
(Williams, 2006:53). According to Williams, Seretse's statement to the media in
39
Britain about being exiled by the British government for marrying his white wife
on 7 March 1950, led to probably the biggest ever international media spectacle
in the history of Bechuanaland and present day Botswana. Ruth's friend Doris
Bradshaw wrote in a letter to friends in Britain, "You never saw such. comings and
goings...aeroplanes galore with hundreds of reporters and photographers from
all over world". A British correspondent for the British Daily Telegraph abandoned
a mission to Cairo and flew to Serowe (Williams, 2006:135).
The oppressive stance of the colonial government over Seretse's marriage only
served to strengthen the nation's love for their Kgosi, and to sow seeds of
distrust and disdain for British colonialism in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The
incident also eventually only served to intensify international pressure on the
British government to give its colonies independence. According to Neil Parsons
(1987), the Seretse 'crisis' helped change tribalists into nationalists - it spurred
younger, educated BaTswana to seek change. of governance from Colonial.
administration and traditional diKgosi. They found the courage to speak, and this
included women. Seretse appealed to the commoners when his own uncle
Tshekedi and other royal elites would not support his marriage. International
media attention on the story of an African 'chief that married a white woman also
sparked more open debate about race and colonialism, and when the Nationalist
Party official adopted racial discrimination, it became apparent to London that
Bechuanaland would have to gain independence. By 1960, Resident
Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate, Peter Fawcus had no option
but to prepare the Protectorate for independence after fifty years of political and
economic neglect (ZaffirC?, 1989:51).
From 1953, the colonial government came under increasing pressure from the
ernerging cadre of nationalists, especially following what historian Neil Parsons
(1987:132) referred to as the 'BaNgwato [Seretse] crisis'. The idea that people
had the right to form their own organisations to present their grievances to the
colonial government began to take root during this time. The earliest political
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parties were founded by some of Seretse's supporters. Leetile D. Raditladi
founded the earliest precursor to party politics known as the Bamangwato
National Congress - it was unsuccessful and largely ignored by the colonial
government (Parsons, 1987:130). Raditladi was also at the heart of the earliest
labour organising - the Bechuanaland African Workers Union in 1954. He later
formed the Bechuanaland Protectorate Federal Party in 1959. Raditladi was
opposed to the Legislative Council (LEGCO) because it favoured the old guard-
Europeans and diKgosi. More of Seretse supporters, K.T. Motsete together with
P.G. Matante and Motsamai Mpho formed the Bechuanaland Peoples Party, later
Botswana Peoples Party - the longest surviving political party in present day
Botswana. The BPP also opposed the LEGCO for reserving separate seats for
Africans, Europeans and Asians. It spoke out for immediate independence and
demonstrated against unofficial but prevalent racial discrimination that was
obtaining in the Protectorate. Co-founder Motsamai Mpho had recently been
deported from South Africa for ANC activities; Phillip Matante had affiliations with
the Pan African Congress (PAC) (Murray, Ramsayand Nengwekhulu, 1987:172-
176). The colonial administration was worried about the influence of Black
Nationalist movements from South Africa into the territory. Historian Neil Parsons
(1987) showed that until 1955, the colonial administration still wanted the rule of
traditional Chiefs - bogosi, and opposed democracy in the Protectorate.
The BBC, the British Colonial Office and Mass Media in Africa
The kind of mass media that emerged in many parts of Africa was in most cases
was determined by the colonizing powers of the countries. For Anglophone
Africa, the Plymouth Committee, set by the British government in 1936 under the
Earl of Plymouth, recommended steps on how to accelerate the provision of
broadcasting services in the Colonies. It worked closely with the BBC and the
Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA), The BBC concentrated mainly
on Anglophone Africa; and Francophone African broadcasting services similarly
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had links with the French Radio and Television Organization (Wilkinson,
1972:176).
The Second World War was to significantly slow down the roll out of
broadcasting services envisioned by the Plymouth Committee, but Wartime
reporting by the BBC had to an extent created a need for News among the few
Africans that had access to radio. For instance, during the war, a broadcasting
station was set in Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia to stimulate the war effort and to
convey orders to the native people in the event of a grave emergency (Armour,
1984). The secondment of Oliver J. Whitley of the BBC in 1946 to the Colonial
Office, working closely with Head of BBC Colonial Service John G. Williams was
the most significant step towards a clearer broadcasting policy for the colonies.
From the onset, there was disagreement within the Colonial Office and Colonial
governments, whether broadcasting was very necessary in the colonies and if it
should be run by governments or handed over to commercial companies. The
stronger sentiment was that government control of the mass media was the best
option for the colonies against private ownership of the media (Armour, 1984;
Wilkinson, 1972).
Up to independence, print and broadcasting services were geared towards the
white settlers and colonial administrators in Africa. With literacy levels still very
low and socio economic hardships during colonialism and early independence
days, very few Africans had access to mass media (Boadu, 1981 :197). BBC [~
programmes for Africa were mainly in English but in a few cases there were ~
limited broadcasts in indigenous languages. Hausa, Swahili and Somali services
were introduces in 1957 and were on air for one hour a day. The largest
coverage of Africa was provided by the English transmissions of the BBC World
Ii,-
Service. originally the Empire Service in 1932, then the General Overseas
Service in 1947 and was re-named the BBC World Service in 1965 (Wilkinson,
1972:182-183).
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Charles Armour (1984) noted that the Colonial Office favoured inter-territorial
organization wherever possible, although in most cases the colonial govemments
would decline to work in that way. A BBC broadcasting survey by a certain
W.E.C. Varley in1946 for instance, proposed to the Colonial Office that African
broadcasting in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland should be from Lusaka and
broadcasting for Europeans from Salisbury. East Africa would be covered from J
Nairobi. His consideration was based on the suitability of the climates on both
areas to Europeans - not too hot, population density and availability of trunk
telephone system, road and rail communications. For some colonial governments
such as Nyasaland, broadcasting was simply not a priority while others like
Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar preferred separate development (Armour, I
1984).
The set up of broadcasting services in the colonies was usually that programmes
were run by the government Public Relations of Information Departments, and
Posts and Telegraphs was responsible for the technical side (Wilkinson, It-
1972:177). The BBC trained African journalists, helped set up broadcasting
services and produced programmes for listeners in Africa. Head of the BBC
African Service in 1972, J.F. Wilkinson, estimated that by 1972, several hundred
BBC staff had worked in Africa and over 2000 Africans had come to the BBC for
training and experience. The BBC seconded many of its members to Africa to
develop broadcasting from the early days to the present. They served in many
capacities including senior positions such as director-general in countries like
Ghana and Sierra Leone. There were engineers, News editors, gramophone
librarians, studio operators, accountants, copyright experts and administrators on
secondment in African broadcasting services. They were also involved in
countries like Gambia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania: Somalia, Zambia, Malawi,
Botswana and Lesotho. Wilkinson noted that whereas in 1927 there was not a
single public service radio anywhere in Black Africa and no African owned a radio
set, by 1972, 44 years later, there were 43 national sound radio services 21,
television services and nearly 15 million radio sets and 250 000 television sets.
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The 15 million sets were however, shared among a population of 265 million
potential listeners. Demand for radio picked up during the Second World War as
'people everywhere wished to know how the war was progressing' (Wilkinson,
1972). The largest audience of the BBC any where in the world outside the
United Kingdom, to this day, as a percentage of the adult population is found in
Africa (Mytton, 2000:22). I v
Different cosmologies, different agendas: histories of mass media in
the west and Africa
After decolonization, the British interest in reporting Africa declined, in-depth
reporting became only sporadic and there was a lack of full time correspondents
in Africa. Editors became more reliant on secondary sources and News agencies
like Reuters and Agence France Presse (Kershaw, 1968). Africanist critics like
Richard Kershaw, former editor of Africa Confidential pointed out that, the target
audience was often the Whites living in Africa and to those outside the continent,
that Africa was a violent continent and that Africans were incompetent to govern
themselves. Francis Nyamnjoh (2005) asserts that colonies experienced 'next to / \c
nothing' (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 47) of the Western broadcasting models; the idea of
media as a vehicle of free flow of information was not until the end of colonialism
perceived as relevant for the colonies. Colonial administrators were found to be
far more heavy handed than would ~ave been tolerated back home in the
metropolis (Nyamnjoh, 2005:4;5).. Especially interesting. was the ways in which.. .' , - .-
Britain, a colonial power, conceived the role of broadcasting in its colonies
radically different from at home. The arrival of broadcasting in Africa was different
from either capitalist or communist Western media experiences.
As Francis Nyamnjoh points out, while literature on patterns of media control in
postcolonial Africa indicated a shift to centralised broadcast systems at
independence, state-control of the media was in fact a colonial legacy.
Postcolonial leaders continued with the highly centralized colonial model, using
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nation-building as an excuse (Nyamnjoh, 2005: 47-48). Along with Achille
Mbembe, Nyamnjoh also warns about comparisons of media experiences
between Africa and the west, that they must refrain from analogies. Such kind of , .
comparison only tells us what the African experiences are not, and not what they
actually are (Nyamnjoh, 2005; Mbembe, 2001). To better appreciate the skewed
flow information that existed between Africa and the rest of the world requires a
comparative history of the emergence of broadcasting between Europe, America
and Africa. Media at the metropole and the colony emerged out of different I f
contexts. It is thus necessary to Ralph Engelman's (1996) account of the history
of public radio and television in the United States shows that commercial
broadcasting has always dominated the media landscape in the US. \
Broadcasting started in the US at the turn of the 20th century but it was only in
1967 that the US enacted a Public Broadcasting Act. Engelman called it a
legislative victory, after nearly half a century of promising initiatives dashed by
political defeats. He likened the role of Former Commerce Secretary Herbert
4
4
Hoover, in the early history of American broadcasting to that of Lord Reith to the
BBC, in so far as defining the role of the state in the early days of broadcasting.
Lord Reith is considered the founding father of public service broadcasting in
'l.-
Britain. Yet the two men had opposing views about the role of the state. Where
Lord Reith saw the role of the state as of partially funding broadcasting but
maintaining a necessary distance to allow critical citizen engagement with
government, Hoover defined the role of the state simply as of regulating a free
market place for the media. This is not to say concerns about of public access in
the media were unknown in the US, but commercial broadcasters for a long time I .-
successfully lobbied against state funded media which they argued would
frustrate the advertising supported media and therefore frustrate democracy
j I
itself. In the US, for a long time non commercial broadcasting stayed marginal /
and experimental, with the few licenses being awarded to religious and
educational institutions.
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Pacifica Radio on KPFA-FM was established by a Lewis K. Hill in 1949 as the
first non-profit community-based radio station, strongly influenced by the BBC
model and often using BBC content. For the next ten years the station was to
remain the sole listener-sponsored station in the US. From the early 1960s, the
station came under vicious attack by govemment for promoting communism,
America's biggest enemy and the cause of the Cold War until the collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. The station had among other things aired views of leftist
thinkers like the black leader W.E.B. Dubois and had in 1963 invited a panellist of
gays for what was then considered the most open and extensive discussion of
homosexuality. With its turbulent history of law suits and investigations by the
Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI), Senate inquisitions, dynamite bombing of its
transmitters by some angered conservative members of the public and other
manners of harassment, the KPFA-FM in many ways inspired a broad
community broadcasting movement in the US (Engelman, 1996).
National Public Radio (NPR) became more visible and influential in the US from
mid 1980s and was later joined by the American Public Radio. Public television
was started with funding from philanthropic Ford Foundation and the Camegie
Corporation, first as non commercial television and later public television after the
1967 Public Broadcasting Act. Govemment funded the early days of public
broadcasting, helping expand the services so that by 1978, it could reach 80
percent of homes in the US. Censorship pressures were present. Oil interests in
Saudi Arabia led the govemment to pressure public broadcasters not to air Death. .
of a Princess, in 1980. It was a dramatized true story of the execution of a Saudi
princess who had a love affair with a commoner. The programme was eventually
allowed to be broadcast, but 19 public broadcasters did not air it. Public
I
television underwent a lot of criticism from inception, and a 1979 Camegie 11
report found it flawed, financially, organizationally and in terms of its creative
structures (Engelman, 1996:185). Public television in the US did not emerge to
provide cultural uplifting of the masses as was the intention of BBC. However, it
shared a similar view of audiences as citizens rather than mass markets. Both
46
public television in the US and public service broadcasting in Britain sought to
serve the individual and encourage active constructive participation; but in the
US, this was never nearly as successful as at the BBC.
When in 1927 Radio Act that institutionalized commercial broadcasting in the US,
that same year, the BBC was launched on non-commercial basis. A chronicle of
the history of the BBC by James McDonnell (1991) starts with the Crawford
Committee that conceived BBC as a national resource, a public corporation that
would nonetheless keep a certain independence from govemment. McDonnell
I( t
says of the first Director-General of the BBC John Reith, later Lord Reith, that he I
viewed broadcasters as having a moral duty to be instruments of enlightenment.
He found the public taste too fickle and uncertain to be taken as a guide to (
programme-making ...hence the moral du~ for programme makers to set
standards of informational, educational and entertaining programmes that the
public would acquire a state for over time. Through successive Director-
Generals, the BBC shifted away from avoiding broadcasting anything 'hurtful' as if-
Reith had wanted, to upholding tolerance as an ideal. Programmes began to be
designed to challenge, shock and provoke under the leadership of Hugh Greene
and later under Director-General Charles Curran, the BBC found a middle ground
to serve as unbiased, impartial and promoting choice - being creative but
remaining on safe ground. The onset of the Second World War created a need
for BBC to change from being a monopoly as the validity of News from a single
source came under immense pressure. The arrival of ITV in 1954 as a non state
funded public service broadcaster in the post-war period broke the BBC public
service broadcasting mo~opoly. The biggest challenge for the BBC however, was
new information technologies such as direct to home satellite technology and the
video cassette recorder in the late 1970s. The arrival of cable television begged
for a rethinking of the roles of the regulatory authorities and public corporations
as to whether television could be treated the same as its predecessor. Cable
television was more expensive and to recover costs, it was argued that BBC
should take a limited amount of advertising. On the side of the Thatcher
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government, the language shifted from broadcasting as a major force in national
cultural life to a major concern with the economic efficiency of broadcasting as an
industry (McDonnell, 1991).
A.H. Donald 1961 Report and Proposals for the Establishment of an
Information Branch for the Bechuanaland Protectorate
It was a nascent African Nationalism but more crucially the Cold War that was
decisive in firmly placing broadcasting under colonial governments. The
governments had not anticipated the pace at which Africans began to demand
self rule. From the late 1940s to the late 1960s, many colonies were to agitate for
and obtain independence. Initially some of the nationalist leaders were dismissed
as trouble makers. The 1951 elections in the Gold Coast giving Kwame Nkrumah
an overwhelming majority was to start a race against time among colonial
governments to ready colonies for self government. In 1949 the desire to take I.
speedy counter measures against Communism provided a powerful, immediate
inducement to enhance UK funds specifically for broadcasting developments
(Armour, 1984:362)'. The role of the media in colonial Africa was initially ,
envisaged as improving communication between governments and the governed
and to enlighten and educate the masses as well as to entertain them (Armour,
1984:360).
The late colonialism government information policy for Bechuanaland, between·... ,...
1955 and 1966 was designed by colonial administrators to check anticipated
popular unrest, communist subversion and nationalist agitation (Zaffiro, 1987).
FroFT'! 1961, each of the High Commission Territories (HTCs), Bechuanaland,
Basutoland and Swaziland, was allowed to establish their own broadcasting
services. This was after their Resident Commissioners issued a joint statement
calling for the immediate end of the policy of deferring to Pretoria in Broadcasting
matters (Draft National Broadcasting Policy, 2003). In a lengthy despatch to the
High Commissioner, Sir John Maud, Resident Commissioner Peter Fawcus
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wrote that the colonial government needed to be prepared on a broad front to
meet threats to racial harmony and security and prevent a situation where the
use of force might be necessary.23 However, it was the change in government in
South Africa in 1955, that led Britain to favour independence for the Protectorate.
Hardliner racist and republican J.G Strijdom took over from D.F. Malan. South
Africa began to weaken its links with Britain, and Britain began to see economic
opportunities on the beef and mining industries in the Protectorate (Parsons,
1987:130).
Twenty seven years after the introduction of police radio services, on the eve of
independence, the Colonial administration suddenly found an urgent need to
establish government-owned Information Services in 1961. Major Alan H. Donald
was r~cruited in 1960 for the position of Information Officer. He argued it
necessary that there be a government media that countered "intimidation,
distortion and downright lies". According to him, nothing the authorities did was
for the good of the African in so far as these African' 'racialists'. They were
preaching to the uneducated particularly rural Africans that everything from the
white man was untrue. The credulous rural Africans were taking the word of
these false prophets as true. If left to flourish, the colonial administrators feared
the increased activity of subversive organisations was likely to embitter race
relations. It was therefore, found necessary that in order to preserve racial
harmony, the government be in close touch with the people and provide an
adequate Information Branch. A government-owned mass media service for the
Protectorate was conceptualized (Donald Report, 1961).
On June 27 1961, Donald wrote from the Bechuanaland Protectorate
Administration offices in Mafeking in South Africa, to the Finance Secretary of the
Bechuanaland Protectorate High Commission in Capetown applying for a special
23 Dispatch dated 24 January 1961, Botswana National Archives S.582.9 (1 a)
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warrant for R16 00024 (P9 400) to establish Information Services for the
Protectorate.25 A government-owned media started in 1962, initially broadcasting
for two hours in the evening. The question of how a government-owned
broadcaster ought to handle News and or party News arose as early as 1963.
Colonial Government Secretary A.J.A. Douglas recommended after noting the
advantages and disadvantages of how to make News objective, that; government
should broadcast objective News of significant political meetings, policy
statements, resolutions, etc. He recommended that government refrain from any
political comment. He also decided against allowing parties to buy time to
broadcast their views and policies.
It was ironic that the very same British government, would, as early as the 1970s,
hardly a decade into independence of many African states, begin to view
government control of the media as a 'constant problem'. As the new African
governments began to control especially Newspapers, Head of the BBC African
Service in 1972, J. F. Wilkinson, for instance celebrated the fact that, at least the
African radio listener is in the happy position of being able to tune his own
station, his neighbouring African stations to Moscow, to Peking, to Deutsche
Welle, to SABC, to Voice of America (VOA), to the BBC - and then form his own
opinion as to the truth of any situation (Wilkinson, 1972).
The lesser evil between communism and apartheid: Post-
independence relations between South Africa, the west and its
neighbours
The post War period and the intervening Cold War tnat symbolically ended with
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Bloc 1n 1989 was dorninated by
24 All monetary values are given the Botswana Pula (P) and either the US Dollar (USD) or British
Sterling (GBP). For purposes of consistency, the exchange rate was fixed at 1:5 to the USD and
1:8 to the GBP. The fixed rate was derived from the average exchange rates between 2001 and
2006. The South African Rand was converted at 1:1.7 to the Pula
25 'Application for special warrant for R16 000 for establishing Information Services for
Bechuanaland Protectorate', Botswana National Archives, S.582/9 (17a).
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characterizations of the world into two bitterly opposed political positions;
communist or democratic/capitalists. Very often the communication environment
in both the US and Britain was characterized as libertarian, pluralistic and
'tolerant' while the media in communist countries was aggressively attacked by
the Western bloc as totalitarian, state propagandist and an enemy of democracy
(Bennett,1982:36), although scholars like Colin Sparks (1998) were to show that
such a characterization was very much propaganda more than reality. Just as in
the so called democratic environments, media workers in say Berlin and Prague
explored ways in which groups that were previously denied access were given
the voice; state media workers were often unable to toe the party line. Sparks
suggested that perhaps 'communist societies were not alternatives to capitalism
but an especially horrible variant of it' (Sparks, 1998).
J.G Boyd-Barrett (1982) argued that there could be no real understanding of the
media unless priority was given to an understanding of the fundamental
relationship between 'developed' and 'developing' economies. Barrett's position
was that it was not always very clear that mass media in developing countries
was a vehicle of cultural dependency on the more developed. Although not
determining, South Africa's apartheid policy was a significant factor in relations
among southern African countries and between each of the states and South
Africa, even after many neighbouring countries gained independence
(Sejanamane, 1994).
In the global balance of forces, South Africa was neither a former imperial power
nor a super power, it was a peripheral country located far away from its major
trading partners. It was of limited significance to the world's symbolic economy
and had to work hard at being internationally connected (O'Regan, 1998). Within
southern Africa, the situation is completely reversed. In spite of its apartheid
policy, because of the Cold War, South Africa was in a curious position vis-a-vis
Western superpowers and fellow southern African states. For the West, South
Africa was an ally against the perceived 'communist total onslaught', and yet
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increasingly embarrassing one as pressure mounted to impose economic
sanctions on it for racial discrimination. The Cold War led to the Suppression of
Communism Act of 1950 which resulted in the banning of left wing Newspapers.
The apartheid government enacted a number of Acts to curtail reporting of
liberation struggles, including the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956, and much
later the internal Security Act (No 74 of 1982) which prevented publication of
alternatives to apartheid policies, and the Protection of Information Act (No 84 of
1982) which gave Minister's powers to declare any information as forbidden and
any place as a prohibited area (Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1987:100). The end of
the Cold War in 1989, the release of Nelson Mandela and other political
prisoners from prison in 1990, the 1994 non racial general elections and the
taking over of government by the African National Congress marked a new era in
the political economy of the region. In the South African media environment per
se, the waves of change meant partial lifting of the emergency media censorship
(Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1987).
According to Khabele Matlosa, (1994) South Africa's apartheid policy was a
source of disdain for the region. Under two successive Prime Ministers, H.F.
Verwoerd and P.W. Botha, South Africa tried to form a Constellation of Southem
African States (CONSAS), intended to be an anti Marxist economic bloc of
'moderate' countries including South Africa, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and the Bantustans. CONSAS never
took off as the other countries were uncomfortable with apartheid. Instead, these
countries formed first the "Frontline States" in 1974 and in 1980 the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), later the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). South Africa did maintain and expand
j I
economic relations within the region through treaties such as the Southern
African Custom Union (SACU) involving the high commission territories of
Lesotho and Botswana and the Common Monetary Area Agreement (Matlosa,
1994).
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Statutory domination by South Africa during the colonial period was only part of
the problem. For a long time after Radio Botswana was launched, South African
and Rhodesian radio stations, print and later television were to continue to enjoy
much following in Botswana. This resulted in a situation where the government of
Botswana was more interested to make connections with international media
than with neighbouring South Africa. In 1974, a certain Tawana of the SABC
approached Information and Broadcasting to assist them in gathering material for
a weekly half hour report in Setswana on Radio Bantu. He would be bringing a
tape recorder to Gaborone from Mafeking once a week to talk to a few local
reporters. John Ewing of Information and Broadcasting thought such an
arrangement could help to keep informed the Setswana listeners of Radio Bantu,
both inside and outside the country.26 The reaction from P.C Steenkamp of the
Office of the President was an outright refusal,
Radio Botswana can be heard in most, if not all, of the Setswana speaking
,
areas in South Africa, and therefore, the 'Radio Bantu Newsreel' does not
fulfil any useful function as far as we are concerned. The tape recording of
stories from our reporters is, therefore not to take place.27
The launch of a state run commercial and youth orientated radio station RB2 in
1992, the licensing of the first two private commercial radio stations in 1998,
(Thapisa, 2003) increasing number of private Newspapers and the launch of BTV
have to a large extent improved the situation. However, South Africa continued to
dominate in television, leisure magazines and other forms of new media in spite
of successful efforts in local radio and print media to attract more of the local
consumer, as evident from the growing numbers of people subscribing to the
I
South African pay television, MultiChoice, and the proliferation of South African
popular magazines in Botswana. South Africa's predominance over the region
and Botswana in particular extended beyond the media. When Cable and
26 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (16)27
Letter dated 24 September 1974, Botswana National Archives, OP/25/7/1 (17)
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Wireless Communications Worldwide made proposals for the development of
extemal telecommunications in Botswana, one of the greatest concerns was the
predominance of South Africa in both communications traffic and commercial
activity.28
Government control of mass media in Africa today
Dyhana Ziegler and Molefi K. Asante (1992:29) explain the prevalence of
govemment control of the media as partly a historically necessary, protective
reaction to the existing pattem of multinational control of the economies of most
African states. Although it is true that few private citizens in most African nations
could afford to operate large scale media systems; in the area of mass media,
Africa was for a very long time not considered a viable market. It is only at the
tum of the 21 st century that Africa is emerging as an emerging global player.
Southem Rhodesia is one of the few instances in southem Africa where a
govemment justified state control of broadcasting media as restoring balance
with the country's 'monopoly' press. From 1891, the Rhodesian Herald and the
Bulawayo Chronicle were controlled by the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing
Company, a subsidiary of the conservative Argus Press of South Africa
(Windrich, 1979:523). Robert Mugabe's newly installed govemment soon after
independence was to also take issue with the South Africa ownership of
dominant print media. Although it was never successful, govemment acquired
majority shares in the Rhodesia Printing Company and set up the Zimbabwe
Media Trust with the intention that it would save the dominant press from the
South African company, other commercial interests and the state itself
(Chimutengwende29, 1997; Mararike, 1997:59). Govemment control of the media
was therefore by and large difficult to justify, beyond the fact that first the colonial
administration and next the new African govemments wanted to use it as an
28 Botswana National Archives, BNB 9089
29 Mr Chen Chimutengwende, former Honourable Deputy Minister of Information, Posts and
Telecommunication in Zimbabwe, as the guest of Honour at the Opening Session of the Media
and Communication Symposium at the University of Zimbabwe on 22 August 1993.
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ideological apparatus (Tomaselli, Tomaselli and Muller, 1987; Zhuwarara, Gecau
and Drag, 1997).
Bourgault argued that the slow development of a vibrant mass media can be
blamed on both the former colonial powers and later the emergent African elites,
who equally held indigenous African institutions and cultures in contempt, seeing
them as backward and primitive. Colonizers introduced separate developments
between them and the colonized and only later in the day of colonialism was a
small educated African elite allowed to emerge. It was some of these emergent
African elites that were to lead the newly independent African States. In
Bourgault's view, the African elites were often alienated both from the westerners
whose lifestyle they tried to emulate and the peasants of their own societies
whose plight they had hardened towards. African elite responded to postcolonial
encounter differently, hence some governments and individuals have contributed
more than others to the welfare of their fellow citizens. "It was up to Seretse and
the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to establish an internal validity of a
system of government that was after 1965 no longer to be based on the
hereditary principle and regional separation" (Henderson, 1988:225).
This chapter showed the continuing pursuit of control at the expense of the
ordinary citizen between colonial and independent Africa. Colonial administrators
repressed voices of dissent when Africans began to demand political
independence. Instead of nurturing the revolutionary spirit that brought in
independence, postcolonial African states had adopted a similar culture of
paranola against any sentiment even remotely perceived to challenge the status
quo, just as the colonizer had done. Official opposition came to be seen as a
luxury that the new nations could not afford (Moyo, 1992). In 1989, the President
of Botswana, Ketumile Masire told the nation that democracy would not suffer
due to a decreased number of opposition seats in Parliament (Nyathi-Ramahobo,
1999:99). In 2006, Vice President and President in waiting lan Seretse Khama
warned the nation that supporting opposition parties was tantamount to inViting
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civil wars (BTV News, 2006). In the West, as Eric Hobsbawm (1994) and
Anthony Giddens (1999) would have us believe, nations as imagined I
communities are losing their hold on the imagination, or that the era of the nation
is over. In Africa and indeed in Botswana, inventing a unified national identity
remains very much a preoccupation of the new states - as a direct result of
colonialism. The historical domination of Botswana by neighbouring South Africa,




Power and the research practice: Theoretical framework,
methods and methodologies of studying government-
owned Botswana Television (BTV)
In 1999, scholars of Cultural Studies in Africa began to ask critical questions
pertaining to the nature of Cultural Studies in the continent. Keyan Tomaselli
(1999) asked, U[d]oes an African [C]ultural [S]tudies exist? If so, is it a unified field
of study?" When attempting to answer the question, Tomaselli found that while in
the developed world, Cultural Studies theories and paradigms mutated, changed
and reconstituted initial emphases to suit the contexts, in Africa, even the works
that claimed to be about Cultural Studies in Africa failed to mention local
scholarship, philosophies or concepts. First World frames tended to predominate,
~
often unproblematically applied in unreconstituted forms to local contexts
(Tomaselli, 1999:10). In the same vein, Francis Nyamnjoh (1999) also found
Cultural Studies in Africa to be dominated by Western theories and practices.
Instead of an African Cultural Studies, what was emerging was at best Cultural
Studies in Africa (Nyamnjoh, 1999:26). Tomaselli took the position that there can
never be a single African Cultural Studies, just as there was no one Cultural
Studies internationally (Tomaselli, 1999:10). They both agreed however that,
there was need for Cultural Studies to appropriate a uniquely African perspective,
reflecting upon African culture(s). This need not be a total rejection of the colonial
encounter, but rather a coming to terms with cultural ~ybridity that resulted from
colonialism and local cultures (Nyamnjoh, 1999:28).
Lindsay Pentolfe Aergerter (2000) also found that much of the postcolonial and
feminist criticism reinscribed the very manichean oppositions imposed by
colonisation itself, by failing to recognize the larger historical context of cultures
of the oppressed, their traditions and languages. Observing works of writers in
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southem Africa, Aergerter found that, the stories told showed that the colonized
peopled did not live their lives only in response to oppression, they lived inspite
of it. In situations such as that of Botswana, where institutions that should protect
the media from govemment control are either absent or weak, universal ideals
were often not enough. Media practitioners were more likely to find support in the
local discourses, repertoires and cultures that call upon all, regardless of status,
to tolerate opposition. Before the onset of Westem type mass media and its
repertoire of pluralism and open debate, diKgosi - traditional leaders in
Botswana were already subject to public criticism, at the kgotla. First President
of Botswana, Seretse Khama, was able to appeal directly to the people at the
kgotla in Serowe, and also took advantage of the tradition the kgotla - of open
debate, to solicit popular support for his marriage to white British woman Ruth
Williams.
Similar questions arise about a Political Economy of media, whether or not there.
exists a unique African Political Economy of Communication or the media. The
case of Botswana at best shows that, while the origin of these disciplines is
undeniably Westem, they have found different geographical articulations and
fragmentations in different socio-historical and cultural contexts (Tomaselli, )
1999:8). Although not shy to draw on Westem definitions, theories and ideas
when necessary, Nyamnjoh called for recognition of cultural pluralism by a \
greater mobilization of African concepts. Disciplines must 'find suffrage in Africa'
(Nyamnjoh,1999:16).
In 2001, Tomaselli and Hopeton Dunn (2001), among others, called for an
engagement with the media in southem Africa that related to broader issues and
,
emerging trends of globalisation and localization. There is a dearth of works on
the media in Africa that are sensitive to context, history, geography and national
development periodisations in post-colonial contexts. Many of the works relied on
received Western theories of political economy, which over-emphasize structure
to agency. Tomaselli and Dunn challenged scholarship in the region to go
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beyond country specific case studies, and provide methodological and theoretical
contributions for the emerging regional and global context, thereby contributing to
a political economy of media communication in Africa. Mainstream political
economy of media communication would have it that, "in countries where the
market is strongly controlled by govemment interests, the tendency will be for
both private and public media to gravitate towards a careful and safe middle
ground from a content point of view" (Barker, 2001 :17). Botswana, in growing
contrast with new developments in the southem African region, is witnessing
increasing rather than relenting direct control of broadcast media by the state. In
August 2006, Minister of Communication, Science and Technology, Pelonomi
Venson-Moitoi, presented the draft National Broadcasting Policy that introduces
community broadcasting, to the Botswana Parliament. The model was met with
much furore and foray among most Members of Parliament, many arguing it
would incite ethnic tensions or even civil war, as happened in Rwanda. The draft
policy was subsequently withdrawn. 3O The situation is markedly different for print.
media compared to broadcast media. Private print media is often said to be
partisan (Tetty, 2001; Berger, 2002). In the case of Botswana, Patrick Molutsi
and John Holm (1990) noted caution even among private newspapers when
reporting about govemment, for fear of legal and financial sanctions. Not
Withstanding the problems of partisan or cautious media coverage, private media
has enjoyed more freedom of expression. Thus, what emerges from this study, is
not a coherent body of knowledge that may be called a Political Economy of the
media in Botswana, but a particular articulation or disarticulation of such a
Political Economy.
Power and the research practice
StUdies on power and the research practice often portray the researcher as
inherently an instrumentalist who builds social relations of friend, neighbour, or
30 Mmegi, 18 August 2006
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advisor with the research subjects, only to collect data that will then be used for
strictly personal, professional and academic gains. The researcher is a~so often
an outsider, coming in to render the unknown familiar (Amit, 2000:3). In this
particular research, the tables were turned. Researching a government institution
at home in Botswana was a reversal of conventional research where subjects
were willing sources of data, approached as individuals or small groups. Vis-a-vis
the researcher, BTV was an institution closely guarded by both state power and
gate-keeping by management and staff of the station. Historically, governments
have effectively kept ordinary citizens at bay, and except for Acts and Policy
documents, most of the information about the workings of governments, written
or verbal, is often categorized as 'confidential' and 'not for public consumption'.
This secrecy is often defended on the bases of national security, which Noam
Chomsky (1991 :2) observed rarely survives scrutiny. Gaining. access into a
government media institution was not easy; it was a process of constantly
negotiating power dynamics, discerning unwritten protocols and hierarchies and
observing them, being observant without seeming to spy, and being inquisitive
without seeming to judge. The chapter also explores the methodological tensions
encountered in researching BTV as a site of power.
This chapter is about both methods and methodologies. Sandra Harding (1987) 'f
and Ann Gray (2003) make a distinction between "methods" as particular tools
for research and "methodology" as theorizing about research practice. It details
the variety of methods that were employed during the research process.
However, 'Methodologies' rather than methodology is used here to highlight the
duality of methodology that the research encountered. The encounter between
BTV and the researcher was one of continuous negotiation and mutual
,
determination. Primary data collection, punctuated by writing and a visiting
fellowship, was carried out between October 2003 and July 2006.
A Cultural Studies approach was adopted to explore methodological encounters
experienced in researching government ownership and control at BTV. American
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anthropologist Richard Handler's (1993) review of Cultural Studies concluded
that, while anthropology and the new kid on the block, Cultural Studies, look at
similar kinds of issues, they remain distinctive disciplines that can learn
something from one another. He was wary of such works as John Fiske's on 'The
culture of everyday life' (Fiske, 1989) that, while borrowing from anthropological
works, he could have used a little ethnography to avoid romanticizing and
simplifying otherwise complex social categories such as race and nationality. The
rebuttal from John Fiske, in Gray (2003:17) and other Cultural Studies scholars
was that Cultural Studies explored meaning making in relation to the construction
of social and cultural identity. As such, "this requires periods of intense
investigation into meaning production, rather than extended periods of
observation" (Gray, 2003:17).
Methods entailed participant observation, semi-structured interviews, focus group
discussions and informal conversations. In a truly Cultural Studies tradition,
participant observation was approached not simply as spending extended
periods visually observing phenomena, but also included listening to people in
close conversational interviews (Gray, 2003:17). It was done in three main areas
of local content production at BTY; the Newsroom, in-house productions,
particularly TalkBack - an HIV/AIDS educational programme, and procurement
process for local and foreign programmes. Time was also spent in the
engineering section and the cafeteria. Interviewees were snow ball sampled,
depending on their roles in the construction of BTY, both from within and outside
STY. Questionnaires were in most cases given to participants in advance to
allow them to reflect on th~ questions asked. The focus groups were not selected
by the researcher. She strategically attended group meetings such as editorial
,
meetings at the Newsroom, TalkBack validation meetings, and Programmes
Selection Committee meetings and fit in her own questions within the
discussions. Individual interviews were done on the bases of the availability of
respondents in between assignments for the STY staff, and perceived interest on
particular areas as in the case of BTA, MISA, SMCC, and local producers. To
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locate local producers, a list provided by the BTV Commissioning Editor was
used to send emails and short message texts to would be interviewees. It was
noted that the few local producers that agreed to be interviewed were
predominantly the ones that had won Commissioning tenders.
The research process was not defined only by the researcher; it was also defined
by differing approaches to cultural production attempted at BTV. Television
production employed similar methods such as interviews, focus group
discussions, and also shooting of images and people. In the Newsroom, powerful
people in the country were often the subjects. Ordinary people only occasionally
appeared in News. For an HIV/AIDS edutainment programme such as TalkBack
the subjects were predominately school children and more ordinary people. The
use of the same tools such as the camera differed radically from the Newsroom
to TalkBack. The chapter also explores and theorizes these differences. It goes
beyond detailing the researcher's data collection processes, but also the data
collection processes of the host institution.
The key role players were followed up as far as the researcher could. Structured
and unstructured interviews were conducted with current and former managers of
BTV and production teams of BTV to obtain their views on issues such as
editorial independence, responsibilities and constraints of the media in Botswana
and BTV in particular, and their perceived role in local discourses of
democratization and nation-building. There were also interviews with
stakeholders in the broadcasting environment outside BTV, namely the National
Broadc~sting Board; The Director of the Botswana Chapter of the Media Institute
of Southem Africa, the Press Council of Botswana; The Botswana.
Telecommunications Authority; former and current managers of BTV, The
Botswana Media Consultative Council; the Botswana Women in Media
Association; local film and video producers; University of Botswana academics;
and the only independent television station, Gaborone Broadcasting Company.
Whenever possible, interviews were recorded on cassette-tape and transcribed.
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Some key people could not be reached. They include the first Project Manager
for the setting up of BTV, Kevin Hunt, the BBC team that came to help the station
launch, and the first manager of the Newsroom Chris Bishop could not be
reached.
Secondary data on media in Botswana and the setting up of BTV was obtained
from the Botswana National Archives (BNA), Botswana Press Agency (BOPA)
library, local Newspapers, Botswana policy documents and drafts, Parliamentary
Hansards, and unpublished dissertations done on television and mass media in
Botswana. Of great importance were reports furnished by former Director of DIB,
Ted Makgekgenene, without which some of the very important detail would have
been absent. Robert Gray provided important internal email correspondence that
was exchanged between him as one of the early project managers, and other
managers.
..
At the risk of failing to maintain a healthy distance from the subject of study, there
was an underlying effort during the research process, to locate the researcher as
constitutive of, and constituting the research experience and therefore findings l
(Gray, 2003:1). In the process of carrying out the study, both researcher and
subject matter of the research had to constantly navigate on-going disciplinery
wars. The most important challenge that this section reveals is the crises of
methodology for a multi disciplinary field as is Cultural Studies. The study was
based very much on experience in the field, a data collection process that
Anthropology claims as its quintessential hallmark (Walsh, 1998:218).
As such, although anthropological methods were very useful, this ,study
maintained a clearly Cultural Studies approach. Cultural Studies emphasizes the
value of direct observation of production within a media institution as essential for
an understanding of those involved in media production hence reduced reliance
on conspiracy theories (Deacon, et al 1999). Gaining access into a government
media institution was not easy. It was a serious undertaking that required as well
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as the researcher to constantly negotiate power dynamics, discerning unwritten
protocols and hierarchies observing them. It was about knowing when to probe
and when to stay away, observing but not being obtrusive, being inquisitive
without seeming to be judgemental. At the same time, one had to be careful not
to lose focus of the research agenda in the constant juggle with power relations.
The methodology was explored through encounters with the research site;
seeking and gaining access into the site of fieldwork and doing the actual data
collection.
At the personal level, the researcher undertook doctoral research in the hope to .
find a disciplinery home. At the beginning of the millennia, there was a concern in
the Department of Sociology of the University of Botswana where the researcher
is a staff member, that the department was suffering a crisis of identity. The
whole notion of multi-disciplinary studies was under question. Anthropology and
Development Studies in particular, were in some quarters perceived as the
undesirable elements in the department that needed to be weeded out as a
matter of urgency. One side argued that only people with a Masters degree in
Sociology should be considered for the department. With a combined Bachelors
degree in Sociology and Political Science, and a Masters degree in Social
Anthropology, it was felt by some in the department that without a graduate
degree in Sociology, the researcher was among those threatening the integrity of
both the department and Sociology as a discipline. For some, like Dr Monageng
Mogalakwe (in person conversation), the source of unease was Anthropology's
alleged role as the handmaiden of colonialism. Although Anthropologists such as
Adam Kuper (1973/1996) and Ernest Gellner have· vehemently defended
Anthropology from perceptions that it was a sequel to colonialism, a nagging
negative view of the discipline remains.
The ambivalence towards Anthropology among states in post-independence
Africa has been noted. In some instances, it was incorporated into Sociology as a
subordinate discipline, (Vawda, 1998:9). In defence of anthropology, Kuper
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showed instead, that colonial governments could not be persuaded to fund
Anthropological research or make use of the findings in governing the colonies.
In the case of Botswana, from the 1920s to the 1940s, Isaac Schapera worked
for many years with the colonial administration within Bechuanaland and in the
Union of South Africa carrying out censuses and advising on claims of
chieftainship (Kuper, 1973/1996:98). While Schapera's A Hand Book of Tswana
Law and Custom, compiled for the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration
(1955/1994) remains the most comprehensive work in that area, Anthropology
remains a marginalized and often disdained discipline at the University of
Botswana. By 2007, there was no department of Anthropology, or hardly any
courses offered on the subject.
Others argued that the department could benefit a lot from other disciplines,
especially Anthropology. The researcher was advised by some well meaning
colleagues to pursue a postgraduate degree in Sociology in order to avoid
< <
becoming a victim of the lack of definition. However, she chose researching an
institution that the department had historically ignored; mass media and cultural
communication. When the final proposal was presented to the department, many
analysed its methodology section to judge if it was 'sociological'. Or Munyai
MUlinge, one of the colleagues actually commented by saying, "having read your
methodology, I am now convinced that your study is sociological, just under a
different discipline". Mogalakwe's fatherly advice was that the researcher
consider going to the US to study 'proper' Cultural Studies.
Researching government in Botswana: Politics of access into
Botswana Television
"Observation, inquiry and data collection depend upon the observer gaining
access to the appropriate field and establishing good working relations with the
people in it" (Walsh, 1998:221). Access into BTV was difficult at three levels;
obtaining permission for entry into the facility; gaining acceptance to be able to
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carry out the actual research and getting into and comprehending television
speak and technology. Deciding the physical geographic site for fieldwork, once
a study area has been identified was deceivingly the easiest part of research. In
the case of the relationship between the media and nation building in Botswana,
deciding on BTV was easy. For its iconography, BTV was hard to resist. It was a
new significant landmark. BTV was the latest addition to government-owned
media. The Mass Media Complex, which housed BTV together with the
government-owned printing press and Radio Botswana was the largest new
development in Gaborone at the tum of the century in Botswana, occupying
about 1km2 of land. The whole complex was built in reconstituted stone and
glass, which invented an immediate aura of history juxtaposed on modemity.
. A library search on studies on govemment in Botswana revealed that they mostly
assessed the impact of govemment policy on livelihoods; education, health, land
rights, land use, economic production, gender relations, poverty, welfare, and. .
access to resources. Very few studied the intemal functioning of govemment
departments or sections that made and implemented the policies. The majority of
studies on the insides of govemment were consultancy reports commissioned by
govemment itself under the auspices of various philanthropic organisations. With
specific reference to BTV, in January 2005, the Thomson Foundation was
commissioned for an 18-month joint training programme with the US-based
International Center for Joumalists.31 They submitted an evaluation report at the
end of the period. Findings of the report, which apparently led to the dismissal of
4. _. • ~_ •
former acting General Manager Kesholofetse Phetlhu, have not yet been availed
to the public.
I
A preliminary visit to BTV was made in December 2002, before the actual
research in November 2003. Researching BTV from within required obtaining
access to enter facilities, observe the production processes and interview
workers (see appendices 2 and 3). Government and especially management of
31 http://www.thomsonfoundation.co.ukldocs/newstf/archive_home/archive2005/jan05.htm
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the station reserved the right of admission. It was necessary to establish contact
with the gate-keepers even before formulating the actual research design. If it
turned out that researching from the inside would not be permitted, the research
design would have to be adjusted accordingly.
The first gate-keeper to be approached was the then General Manager, Simon
Moilwa. The Capital and largest city of Botswana, Gaborone had a small
population of about 200 000 (Botswana Population Census, 2001). It also had a
very small elite circle. An unknown student seeking an appointment with the
General Manager of BTV was unlikely to obtain it. It was necessary to establish
connections so as to 'get in'. It became necessary to seek assistance of an older
friend holding a senior position in the civil service. He called the General
Manager and although they were not personally acquainted., the General
Manager found it necessary to oblige the senior government officer. Although the
General Manager could not honour the appointment, he granted provisional
access by asking one of the senior reporters to give the researcher a guided tour
of the facilities. The tour presented a new set of issues about access, access into
television technology, television language, and politics of the broadcaster in the
Botswana landscape. The tour guide inquired about the purpose of the research.
The initial verbal proposal was that the research would to assess how 'fairly' BTV
allocated different voices air space and the degree of editorial independence the
station enjoyed. There was clear reluctance on her part to be party to uncovering
of embarrassing information about the functioning of the government facility she
was sure the research would reveal. Reassurance was necessary to explain that
the purpose of research was not to reveal scandals, while at the same time not
promising that the research would not be critical of the station and its workings..
She expressed reservations about the decision by the General Manager to
permit a researcher into a government establishment. To play it safe, she
focused the tour on the equipment rather than the politics of the station.
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Eleven months later in August 2003, with an approved research proposal, the
researcher came back to Botswana for the actual data collection. In Botswana,
no research can proceed without a written research permit from the government.
Bureaucratic red-tape delayed the research considerably. It took from August to
October 2003 to locate the right office to process the permit. Permits used to be
granted by only one office, but around that time, a new system had just been put
into practice where every Ministry provided research permits for topics relating to
its jurisdiction. Ministries had not yet put structures in place for processing
research permits. Eventually the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of
Communication, Science and Technology, Marianne Nganunu issued her first
ever research permit to the researcher (see appendix 4). She had delegated the
Director of Information and Broadcasting, Habuji Sosome, to check the proposal.
Of gaining acceptance and surviving the gate-keepers
A research permit did not guarantee unimpeded access. Simon Moilwa who was
General Manager2 had since died, and a new Acting General Manager,
Kesholofetse Phetlhu had just assumed office. She was not keen on the research
and hoped to fend the researcher off by demanding official paperwork for the
proposed research. She had not expected that the research permit would have
been obtained and was evidently surprised that it was. The next attempt was to
question if the permit had been given in consultation with the Director of the
Department of Broadcasting. The Director had been delegated by the Permanent
Secretary to read and approve the research proposal. Sosome confirmed
knowledge of the research, which made the next encounter with the General
Manager dramatically more positive. From dismissive disinterest, the Acting
General Manager switched to immediate availability for an interview that lasted
two hours.
32 Simon Moilwa, may his soul rest in peace, died after a short illness in August 2003.
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During the interview, reasons for Phetlhu's reluctance to assist became apparent.
She felt that there is a misconception that because the station was government
funded, it was therefore government controlled. Nonetheless, she would have
preferred for BTV to become a parastatal - government funded but run by an
independent Board of Directors and management. She argued that, television
worked in a dramatically different way from radio and print, and could not function
efficiently under government. She also felt BTV could not handle all local content
by itself; she saw the need to promote local film production, although she was
sceptical of the availability and standards of local producers.
From this interview on, more gates into BTV were opened. The researcher was
introduced to the Head of News and Current Affairs, Felicitus Mashungwa, who
in turn introduced her to the News and current affairs team as a kind of intern.
This was not exactly true but it helped the researcher to find a space that was not
awkward to observe from. As an intern, she would be assigned someone to
understudy who would show her the ropes. Research started in earnest at a BTV
Newsroom daily editorial meeting on 29 October 2003. About twenty reporters,
producers and editors and a few members of the technical crew were attending
on this morning. Several of them were familiar from the preliminary visit the year
before. As best as possible, under immense pressure not to be understood to be
there to police their work, the research topic and methods were explained. The
explanation was received with curiosity and suspicion. It became apparent that
the ethnographic method was going to be very useful. There was no hurry; there
was enough time to 'get into the field'. Cultural Studies is critique of everyday life
- an inv~stigation ...of what is available as culture to people inhabiting particular
social contexts, and of people's ways of making culture (Lefebvre, 1990; Morris,.
1997:43). Michael de Certeau (1974/2001) in 'Culture in the Plural' advised
correctly that "culture needs to be understood not as a monument celebrating
hU?1an mastery of nature but to the contrary, and more modestly, as collective
ways or manners ...shared by people", and for that matter, that the principal task
of Cultural Studies entailed elaborating codes that develop specific ways of
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inventing life as it is lived from year to month to day and hour and minute (de
Certeau 2001: 151 ).33
It was locating a space to observe from, that was the most important yet most
daunting aspect of the fieldwork. The Newsroom was an open space, with
workstation demarcated by personal computers. The researcher had to be as
unobtrusive as possible, yet visible and accessible. The most logical place to
start at was with assignment desk and the acting assignment editor's office. The
assignment editor could not even spare a moment as she juggled transport
arrangements and organized equipment for reporters to go on stories. It was
clearly a bad time. The researcher then went to make small talk with some of the
reporters, producers and editors. Outside the formality of the boardroom, a
number of the members of the News and Current Affairs approached the
researcher with issues that they thought she needed to know. Most were
personally known to her from years as a student at the University of Botswana.
Interestingly, a severe lack of editorial independence at the station was the first
thing they shared about their conditions of work under govemment. One
mentioned that on occasion, the Minister had himself personally come to the
station to get a programme cancelled. The producers of the programme had to
write numerous letters of apology and it took several months for the matter to be
laid to rest. Self-censorship was therefore found a necessary precaution to avoid
similar experiences at BTV.
As a result, interviewing people who worked for govemment was most
importantly about breaking through the wall of self-censorship they constantly
strengthened between them and outsiders. Outsiders were often treated as other
journalists looking for a scoop. No one wanted to be quoted in the papers about
the problems facing BTV. As the then Head of Graphics later said to the
researcher when asked for an interview, the fear of participating in interviews
was because there is much scandal happening at BTV that nobody wanted to be
33 de Certeau, M., (1974/2001) Culture in the plural, University of Minnesota Press:Minneapolis.
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the one responsible for making it public. The sentiment was very prevalent at
BTV. Often this left the researcher feeling totally inadequate and uninformed
even as she had chosen a method that she hoped would get her into the inside.
The 'inside' proved to be an illusive space that could only be reached by BTV
staff and which an outsider could only get a glimpse of, but could never get to.
While there was much talk of scandal at BTV, the actual daily work at the station
seemed most of the time mundane and lacking in controversy. Journalists spent
much time listless and seemingly bored by their work. Scoops were few and far
between. There was always someone hinting that things were not as they
seemed. This only served to make it more acutely clear the almost impossibility
of participant observation as a way of 'total immersion' into the environment
(Harding, 1987). As result, the researcher had to continue with a full awareness
that only a partial understanding of BTY could ever be archived.
Ethnography and research oriented relationships: maintaining
boundaries
Ethnography, by its emphasis on establishing relationships, is inherently about
impression management (Walsh, 1998:226). Reporters, managers, producers
and technicians were to become 'friends' and acquaintances, perhaps for life.
Relationships forged for research purposes were at once real and artificial. Many
ethnographers would have difficulty using terms such as informant, respondent
or research subjects for people they have come to be confidantes with, friends,
neighbours, advisers (Amit 2000:3). Anne-Marie Fortier (1998) observed also
that relationships in the field are artificial for the fact that they were established
for interests external to the subjects of inquiry - career oriented, economic
I
concerns, interests of those sponsoring the study and so forth. "To put it crudely, I
deception and role playing are part and parcel of participant observation" (Fortier,
1998:55). Some ethnographers argue on ethical grounds that deception should
be avoided if possible, but telling the whole truth about research may not be wise
of feasible (Walsh, 1998).
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Two months into the almost daily visits to BTV, the researcher came to be an
accepted face of the News team. In fact, her absence rather than her presence
came to be the unexpected. She was even included in the 2003 Christmas gifts
exchange. Yet, during the same December, the researcher was one of. the key
suspects in a witch hunt for the originator of a malicious email copied to
management. The email provided ratings of ability among BTV journalists. It was
generally perceived to be accurate, although disconcerting for those painted as
trouble rnakers. People named in it were afraid that management would take the
allegations seriously and use it as a yardstick. Some had been labelled anti-
government. Many suspected that it was an undercover job instructed by
management to spy on its reporters. The informer would have to be a member of
the Newsroom, or at least someone who had been around long enough to know
the character of all the reporters so accurately. This is where the researcher
came in as a suspect, along with two other 'outsiders', new managers recently
,
appointed.
In time it became clear that, the more the researcher became part of the routine
of the television station, the more time spent there, the more difficult it would be
to separate the roles of researcher from that of colleague. She was introduced
into the Newsroom as a kind of intern. Occupying the category of intern helped
find a more comfortable position to observe from. An intern would at the end of
their stay be able to do things like covering stories on their own. She would be
assigned to one of the more seasoned journalists to take her through the practice
at BTV. In addition, the observed could appropriate the researcher on their own
terms. As interpersonal relationships with the News team developed, the
researcher shifted gradually from strictly being an observer to being a
participating observer. She had to confront the ambiguity of participant
observation, her own idea about what she was doing and how the others
perceived that role.
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In spite of every intention to maintain position of observer rather than intern per
se, in order to 'fit in', she was often expected to perform the role of reporter. One
close episode was at the Office of the President. An unexpected situation
presented itself. It was 17:30 and there was a 18:15 meeting on the same day
between the President and an international lobby group for laws that protect
media freedom. BTV had for some reason not been able to get a notice about the
meeting ahead of time until the President's Press Secretary called to confirm
they would be covering the event. All reporters on duty that day were either
finaliZing their stories for the Setswana bulletin at 19:00, or out in the field.
Having been undergoing 'training' for a while, the researcher was approached to
cover the story on her own.
Despite the clear conflict of this kind of request with the methodological position
of observer, and practitioner, it felt selfish to refuse to help out after the News
team had so welcomed her into their daily routine. The assignment required very
< <.
little journalistic practice. The camera person would get there and shoot the short
welcome and introduction of visitors, after which the visitors would go for a
private meeting with the President. The researcher would then write a short piece
about the purpose of their meeting with the President. Fortunately for the
researcher, they arrived at the Office of the President too late. With this
experience also came the clarity that the Office of the President of Botswana was
of highest priority at BTV. Failure to appear even at short notice to a call from this
office was the highest neglect of duty. In researching the rich 'cultural script' that
was BTV, the researcher was an active participant in the construction of the
social world that was the subject of her research, which Walsh right notes, is- -
often overlooked in the pursuit for 'objective truth' (Walsh, 1999:219).
I I
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Organisational subcultures, cultural production and power: cultural
production and power: The Newsroom vs TalkBack.
It is now widely accepted that it is impossible and even futile to study I
organisations outside the cultural context within they emerge. This includes the
internal 'cultures' and 'subcultures' that facilitated relations among employees,
between them and their supervisors, and between them and other organisations
and society at large. In the broadest sense, culture refers to different 'ways of
life' of among others factors people of different countries, ethnic groups, tribes,
social classes, counter-cultures and sub-cultures. du Gay, Hall et al., (1997) have
suggested that, in order to gain a full understanding of any cultural text or
artefact, it is necessary to analyse processes of representation, identity,
production, consumption and regulation. These are key moments in the circuit of
culture. Organisational subcultures rather than cultures was used to distinguish
the micro level personal interactions with the workplace that are the focus of this
study, to the more institutional or macro level studies on organisational
behaviour. Wright stressed both the ideological and everyday individual lived
experiences of the workers as important in understanding their productive
process.
To compare if issues of editorial independence and control affected all sites of
production at BTV the same way, processes and politics of production at the
Newsroom were observed and compared to another site of in-house production,
TalkBack. Television production at BTV employed methods such as interviews,
-focus group discussions, and photo journalism. It was to come out from
I observation of TalkBack that sites of cultural production at BTV encountered the
state - power - media nexus differently. Where the Newsroom was constantly
watching its back and at pains to steer away from trouble with politicians and the
state, TalkBack enjoyed a more relaxed production environment. TalkBack was
an interactive programme aimed at bUilding teacher capacity to educate students
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on HIV/AIDS and related subjects (UN Botswana Report, 2004).34 The United
Nations Development Program (UNDP) sponsored programme won an award for
innovative use of the new media at the 2004 Highway Africa New Media Awards
annual ceremony held in Grahamstown, South Africa (Mmegi, 22 September
2004). It initially involved expertise from Brazil under South-to-South
Cooperation. It is a collaborative project between the government of Botswana
through the Ministry of Education and BTV, working with the United Nations Fund
(UNF), UNDP and the Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP).
TalkBack was live and interactive, broadcast weekly on BTV and said to be the
brainchild of Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator. UNDP provided the
project management. It employed technology by using short message service
(SMS) of cellular (mobile) phones by viewers to interact with the presenters in the
studio during presentation. TalkBack was very .popular in Botswana, particularly
among teachers and students (UN Botswana Report, 2004). In an interview,
senior producer for TalkBack, Solly Nageng explained that the programme was.
initially just for one year but the main stake-holders, Ministry of Education and
ACHAP were still keen to continue with it. It started its third year in March 2006
(Interview with Nageng, 2006).
By the time the researcher sought permission to observe TalkBack, issues of
access were no longer cumbersome. A letter was written to acting General
Manager, who then communicated the request to the Head of Productions and a
senior producer of TalkBack. The researcher was invited to attend 'validation
meetings', where the faces behind the programme came to discuss weekly
programmes. In comparison to News, where most of the stories were on official
events, TalkBack was more about ordinary people negotiating life skills in the
,
age of HIV/AIOS. The team was also much smaller and very closely knit. The
Validation Committee, comprised of the BTV TalkBack production team, local
script writer Linda Pfotenhauer, and representatives of the outside stake-
holders, the Ministry of Education and UNDP. TalkBack shared camerapersons,
34 http://www.unbotswana.org.bw/undp/news_230904.html
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picture editors and technical support with the rest of the other productions at the
station, although ideally the production would at least have a designated
cameraperson. This was impossible due to shortage of staff (Interview with
Nageng, 2004).
When interviewed, one of the producers of TalkBack, Morwalela Kesalopa
explained that from the beginning, they went around schools doing a situational
analysis of teachers needs towards handling HIV/AIDS in the school curricula.
Different schools were found to be challenged by HIV/AIDS differently. A school
in a poor Remote Area Dweller (RAD) community like Sojwe, inhabited mostly by
Basarwa - the San had different challenges compared to a school in a city
suburb. Sojwe had boarding facilities. The problem according to teachers in
Sojwe was the culture of early marriages among girls, often to much older men.
This forced them to drop out of school. Early sexual activity among students in
the hostels was also reported. The teachers needed help on addressing the
perculiarities of the cultural contexts within which they disseminated HIV/AIDS
education (Interview with Kesalopa, 2004).
One of the assignments that the researcher observed was at a school called
Moeding College in Otse. The topic of the production was "delaying sex".
Moeding College had a group of students calling themselves the ABC Club,
whose main objective is to abstain from premarital sex. They intended to delay
sex until they were financially, spiritually, -emotionally, physically and socially able
to face the implications of sex. The production team included a producer and an
assistant_ producer, the cameraperson, the researcher and a driver. A teacher
that was the main contact person at the school had assembled the Club
members to showcase a 'normal' weekly meeting. TalkBack had a studio
segment which normally invited 'experts' to comment on views expressed from
the field. The proceedings of the meeting would be used as a background for the
studio discussion. To supplement the face to face interviews, the producer and
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cameraperson went around making 'cutaways', scenes of the school
environment.
There was nothing 'natural' about the Club meeting that day. For television, it
was observed that students were forced to repeat comments and questions
several times. A dummy session initially arranged in the staff lounge but due to a
power cut in the school, the meeting had to move outside in the garden. Once
outside the students had to redo discussions until the very enthusiastic and
uncompromising cameraperson and producer were satisfied that the issues were
well articulated. After the group session, some students were interviewed
individually. The producer, in a firm teacher like way, instructed the students to
answer all questions looking directly at her, for she represented the viewer at
home. The camera was set up behind her. For the benefit of viewers, students
were asked to start their answers with the questions asked so that when the
producers' prompts were later edited out, the viewer could follow what was being
addressed. Inevitably, many of the students would keep forgetting to start with
the question, which meant starting all over again. Students began to get
agitated, and one young girl complained that they were not used to 'acting' for
television.
It was also observed that the photography of TalkBack was radically different
from that for News. The cameraperson was enthusiastic and uncompromising in
the angles and shots he wanted for the clip. He went to every length to get an
interesting and creative shot. By comparison, camera work for News was much
more reserved and conservative. Mostly, a BTV News cameraperson simply
located the best place for a tripod stand and tried to get out of the way as ~uch
• I
as possible. At the Newsroom, a cameraperson's subjects were often figures of
authority. A figure of authority was unlikely to repeat statements for the sake of
the camera, although there were instances when a speaker did agree to be
interviewed in both Setswana and English for the two bulletins. Authorities could
be more forgiVing to a reporter who asked uncomfortable questions, but they
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were more unlikely to cooperate with a cameraperson who came up close,
shooting from behind their back, below their chins, under their arms. They would
almost definitely not take kindly to being asked to stand still for up to five minutes
to give the cameraperson that creative shot. At TalkBack, the cameraperson and
the producers appeared more uninhibited, and in control vis-a-vis their subjects.
The cameraperson could crawl and bend and in the opinion of the researcher
even sometimes downright make subjects uncomfortable if it benefited the
excellence of the shot. It seemed that he often took advantage of the fact that
most of the subjects were younger and excited about the prospect of being on
television than about invasion of their personal space. Some of the subjects in
TalkBack however, were not students, but ordinary people from the community.
One of the occasions the researcher observed was the cameraperson shooting
images of women digging a trench. He was on a special assignment for a
programme on women and work. On the way back to the station from another
assignment, he spotted the women. Although he was exhausted from the last
job, when he saw the women, he felt the pictures would be too powerful to miss.
Seeing women with shovels digging up earth re-energized him, and he
approached them for a possible shooting. One the women was nearly successful
in encouraging others to refuse to be captured. She insisted that it would be
foolish of them to be captured doing demeaning work which was not befitting for
women. Her argument was that the well paid cameraperson was going to make
f!:Jn. of ~heir pitiful situation. 'What is in it for us, earning a dollar a day under the
scotching sun, to allow you to use us for your work? What will the country benefit
from laughing at the foolish women of Molepolole who dig trenches when better
jobs could be created for them?" Some of the other wom~n weighed this against
the once in a lifetime possibility of appearing on television and so agreed to be
shot. The cameraperson went into his job with reckless abandon, going down on
to the earth they were digging out in his Versace Jeans and sun glasses, and
designer shoes. He crawled, bent, squatted, stood, run, and faced his camera in
all possible angles, and used every available resource to improve his shots. One
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woman was asked to hold still to a shovel while he shot from between the handle
of the shovel. Another stood still as a beautiful shot was taken from under her
chin, and yet another was given playful chase for another amazing shot. Their
work temporarily stopped as they watched and became part of the spectacle. He
was engrossed like that for almost half an hour. From the session, he was so
energized that the team went into the next small village for another possibility of
a woman doing unusual work. He spotted two young girls pushing barrels of
water in wheelbarrows. This encounter was less obtrusive as the girls were
asked to keep pushing the barrows, and followed them from close behind along
the winded footpath, going home. The researcher observed that a production like
TalkBack nonetheless did not happen in a power vacuum. Whereas in the
production of News, the people covered were usually powerful figures compared
to reporters, editors and producers, at TalkBack the power relations were often
reversed in favour of the producers, thus allowing them more leverage to unleash
their creativity.
Production, the researcher and the panoptic
Helena Wulff (2000:150) speaks of 'layers of acceptance, zones of access', by
which she means the physical panoptical tools found on sites of fieldwork, such
as security and research permits, and the more intangible openings and dead
ends permitted by subjects of research. Researching a govemment institution
that was involved with gathering data entailed not only a constant pursuit of
access and acceptance on the part of the researcher, but also a constant play of
ease and strain around the researcl:ler on the part of BTV producers. At the
Newsroom, there was a greater concem to 'impress' the researcher and do and
say 'the right thing', parallel to the manner in which the joumalists tried to
impress the govemment by saying the right thing. The power relations vis-a-vis
the govemment were projected to other encounters with outsiders. With
TalkBack, there was less 'production correctedness', the camera work and
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interviewing in the presence of the researcher, tended to reflect a similar lack of
concern with the panoptic or surveillance (Foucault, 1977).
Data Analysis: 'Personal narrative as Sociology'
This study did not attempt to establish patterns or measure prevalence of any of
the emergent themes as is the case for most social science research. The thesis I
does not have a specific chapter for 'data analysis', because there were no rigid
boundaries between 'data collection' and write-up. Analysis was continuous as
was data collection, and it occurred at every stage of the research process. A
conscious decision was made by the researcher to move away from what David
Walsh (1998) refers to as 'scientific' methods of social science research. These
"are based upon a universalistic model of science, emphasize its neutrality and
objectivity, attempting to generate data untouched by human hands" (Walsh,. .
1998: 217). Although qualitative research methods emerged to address this
positivism of quantitative methods, in the end, it seems ethnographers and other
users of qualitative methods remain uncomfortable with their data. "Perhaps the
fTlost important response issue concerns the accuracy of data obtained from
interviews" (Bemard, 1994:233). Qualitative researchers still go back to 'counting
fieldnotes' and turning 'quality into quantity' (Johnson and Johnson, 1990).
Surveys are especially popular because they establish 'significant' trends based
on 'representative' samples (Laslett, 1999). A study of television from the inside
in Botswana required what Ruth Teer-Tomaselli in personal conversation with the
researcher loosely identified as a kind of 'critical narratology'. However,
narratology would imply that the subject of inquiry was a taxonomy - the many
layers within the structure of narratives (Darby, 2001). which is not the aim here.
Here is an attempt to claim the autobiographical or even anecdotal, as legitimate
methodology. Many people were interviewed. not to identify general patterns as [
in a survey. but to recount and put together in a theoretically meaningful way.
their individual accounts about the birth, and these the early days of a national
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television broadcaster. It bordered between oral history and what Barbara Laslett
(1999) calls 'personal narrative'. In her essay, Personal narrative as Sociology',
Laslett claimed the place of personal narrative as legitimate social scientific
inquiry (Laslett, 1999). Narrative or conversation often suffers from a perception
that it is trivial or anecdotal - merely talk (Silverman, 1998:261), vis-a-vis the
number crunching surveys. However, as Laslett argues that, "personal narratives
provide unique perspective on the intersection of the individual, the collectivity,
the cultural and the social" (Laslett,1999:392). While the sample of oral histories
and narratives included can in no way be considered representative statistically,
much can be leamed about how individual actors, within institutional and
historical contexts, (Laslett, 1999), in the case of BTV, to survive cultural
production under the gaze of state power. Personal narratives are most
commonly used for testimonio and life history - biographies or autobiographies
(Beverley, 2000). Using oral narratives for the study of organizations is relatively
uncommon.
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Limitations of the study
This study did not cover all aspects of broadcasting arising from the birth of BTV.
Further research is needed particularly on media economics of BTV. Although
the actual impact is yet to be felt, commoditization of culture represents
enormous challenges for a latecomer into television broadcasting in the region
and globally as is BTV. Although BTV started with state - of - the - art digital
technology,35 historical dominance by South Africa with regard to broadcasting
policy (Zaffiro, 1991), and the competition from other up and coming players in
the SADC region, threw Botswana and BTV at the deep end of competition. In its
early days, BTV concentrated on improving its quantity of local content to
appease local viewers. The intention was simply to fulfil the 60 percent local
content mark set by the NBB. As it grows beyond the novelty era, BTV will have
to look into both cultural regulation - protecting its cultural production from being
swamped by- foreign competition, as well as de-regulation - breaking into the
cultural global market. According to Kenneth Thompson (1997:2), modem t
governments battle to balance between protecting identity representations within )(
their borders, and opening their economies to open market economics that
threaten local cultural industries.
The 1978 Lawrence report resulted in a merger between the units of Information
Services and Broadcasting into the Department of Information and Broadcasting
(DIB) in 1981. BOPA was established as the central News pool for both the
printing press and radio. In 2003 DIB was down-sized into two separate
departments once again. Media economics took a backseat to internal power
struggles within the management of the departments. Broadcasting and
Information operate under a weak economic logic. They lacked definition of their
core tasks and they lack skilled manpower. They were failing to take advantage




of the economies of scale and scope in their favour. More research is necessary
to draw up the economics of a government-owned media industry.
Further research is required on the consumption of television in Botswana. A few
indicators exist. Audience reactions to some of BTV's programmes has caused
the station to either reschedule or altogether remove certain programmes. A
certain Lucky Phillip Ramotlhabane sent 'a big thank you' to BTV for removing a
cheap American soapie, 'Passions', in an opinion letter to Mmegi. "In fact, BTV
Channel Controller Kitso Mosiemang said that it would be more expensive to
continue airing the programme looking at the fact that they would have to buy the
rights from the current holder etv than directly from the United States where the
programme is produced" (Mmegi, 23 February 2006). The online edition of The
Voice Forum, an interactive. opinion forum, revealed some viewers concerns
about BTV programmes. They complained about multiple re-runs, stale
programmes like Sesame Street episodes from as long ago as 1994. They felt
that the Channel Controller, Kitso Mosiieman should go back to teaching as she
was failing to turn around BTV (The Voice Forum, 2006).36 It appeared however
that, although viewers were unhappy about the foreign content procured, they
were much happier about in-house production. After its first anniversary, Thapelo
Ndlovu of the Mmegi Newspaper compiled 'audience ratings' that showed that
viewers rated programmes as follows; The Eye - excellent, The Echo - very
good, Sports Hive - very good, Sedibeng - very good, Worship - average,
Mokaragana - average, Flavourdome - excellent, What's the score - excellent,
and only Mmualebe was rated below average.37
The only sure way to establish the value of BTV to the nation of Botswana would.
be to perform audience reception analysis. Audience research is beyond the
scope of this study. According to its Strategic Plan for 2006-2016, BTV was still
in a process of performing a comprehensive audience survey by the end of 2007,
36 The Voice Forum,
r7ttp://www.thevoicebw.com/phpbb2/viewtopic.php?=246&sid=94f54b9655b53c9c2968...
MmegiIThe Reporter. 7 August 2001, Arts page 3
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in order to 'provide quality and informative content on issues of national interest',
(PMS Strategic Plan 2006-2016:11). In 2002 Professors APN Thapisa and ER
Megwa did a study which among other things sought to find out what Batswana
thought about BTV. The Terms of Reference for a 2002 Thapisa and Megwa
study were,
how the public view, read and listen to the Department of Information and
Broadcasting products and services; a survey based on personal and in-
house interviews; how those products and services are utilised if at all; the
expectation of the public of the Department of Information and
Broadcasting; data should also indicate public ratings of DIB products and
services, versus the private media.38
The audience survey targeted 'critical areas', (Thapisa and Megwa, 2002:6)
major cities and towns along the most populated eastern margin of the country,
including Lobatse, Gaborone, Mahalapye, Francistown, Selibe-Phikwe, Serowe,
Molepolole and Kanye. It also included 'non critical areas' (Thapisa and Megwa,
2002:7), big 'rural' villages of Gantsi, Gweta, Hukuntsi, Kasane and Nata. The
study showed that radio ownership was very high across the country, over 90
percent in rural villages, urban villages, town and cities. Television ownership
was high in cities at 79 percent, but could be as low as 33.5 percent in rural
villages with populations of over 5000. Most small villages and settlements in
Botswana did not have a single television set.
Television viewing
More than 64 percent of respondents in the Thapisa and Megwa study said the
watched television daily, and there was no significant difference across gender
38 .Department of Information and Broadcasting, Final Report. Report on the national survey on
prrnt and electronic media in Botswana. TB2/5/19/2001-2002 By Profs. APN Thapisa and ER
Megwa, 9th July 2002.
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and age for groups between 15 - 45 years. Sixty percent of men compared to 68
percent of women watched television daily, suggesting a bias of television
programming towards women. BTV was watched by 72 percent of those with
access to television. They also watched other channels including Gaborone
Television (GBC), South African SABC 1,2,3, BOP TV and e.tv and channels
provided by the MultiChoice pay-television subscriber bouquet, DSTV for sports,
music, documentaries, cartoon/children programmes, News channels including
CNN, BBC, SKY and Euro-News. In fact, for those with access to other television
stations, especially South African, they preferred them over BTV (Thapisa and
Megwa, 2002:72). Eighty percent of those that did not watch television had no
access to it. A third of BTV viewers watched it because it was their national
television station, and about 20 percent did so because it showed local
programmes not shown on other channels. About 16 percent were forced to
watch it as it was the only television station they received. Only another 16
percent watched it because they liked its programmes. Fourteen percent did not
,
like BTV programmes (Thapisa and Megwa, 2002:29 - 35).
At its inception, the station was greeted with what amounted to a national
euphoria - feeling that it was the first national television, a national
resource reflective of the diversity of the nation. Expectation was that it
was fair, impartial and objective and independent of government
interference. Most people knew that it was funded by public funds but did
not appear to kow-tow to government officials. Public attitude towards BTV
at its inception was very positive because of the perception of
independence particularly free from governmental control. There was also
general perception that because it would serve as a public broadcaster fair
j
to all, its staff should not be treated as civil servants in the way they were
appointed, promoted or remunerated. However, and regrettably, this
positive perception, it seems, has begun to wear off. This is a result of
BTV sliding into what a participant described as a 'government-say-so'
station. This has been a source of concern to most of the participants who
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feel strongly that Botswana needs an independent broadcaster, be it
commercial or public...There should be more educational programmes
and fewer soaps and more youthful presenters...BTV should have a
channel similar to CNN or BBC dealing with News as they happen and talk
shows. Broadcasting times should be increased. There should be
cartoons as well. There should be more live coverage of Parliament and
more coverage of local issues (Thapisa and Megwa, 2002:67-68).
According to the study, Batswana did not favour government ownership of the
media. Some of the comments from the respondents were, 'we like our BTV of
old' and 'we want it back, referring to the first year of BTV's existence before
Chris Bishop left BTV News and the station. There was also complaints that BTV
did not represent· local communities, "create space for issues affecting
communities and giving people opportunity to talk about these issues and how
they should be dealt with ...and to provide information about what is happening in
c C
rural areas, de-urbanise its News...assist the nation and the government to deal
with the discontent and disaffection apparent in the country...provide balanced
coverage of all political parties and their activities" (Thapisa and Megwa, 2002).
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Chapter Three
'From police network to radio station of the nation' to
television station of the nation: The birth of television in
Botswana
The eve of independence and the idea of a government-owned
Information Branch
Kenneth Good (1992) says of the decolonization of Bechuanaland that it was "as
firm as it was brief' (Good, 1992:72). When the independence of Bechuanaland
b.ecame eminent, Colonial administration began to lobby for a govemment-
owned Information Branch. Initially there was strong support for a government
controlled but commercially operated broadcasting service. London had agreed
with" Pretoria to preserve a regional monopo1y for SABC. An uneasy
administrati.ve situation emerged between the High Commission's office in Cape
Town, Resident Commissioners in the HCTs and entrepreneurs seeking
permission to set up commercial broadcasters. Attempts within the HCTs to allow
commercial broadcasting were perceived by the government of the Union to
violate SABC sovereign right to determine all broadcast content for South Africa.
Complicating matters further for Bechuanaland was that it was administered from
within the Union in the Imperial Reserve at Mafeking. Resident Commissioners
felt they should be able to issue broadcasting licences. The High Commissioner
on the other hand tried to maintain conformity in communication policy matters
between the Union and HCTs. Beginning 1957, requests for ~private radio
concessions were' viewed by London, the High Commission in Cape Town and
the Resident Commissioner in Mafeking. In 1958, local colonial authorities of the
protectorate were allowed for the first time to collect license fees, although 90
percent still went to the SABC. In January 1960, changes were made to the
Bechuanaland Posts and Telecommunications law section that covered radio
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licensing, authority and collection of receiver fees. It was not until 1963 that full
authority for collection of fees was at last given to the Bechuanaland authorities,
and not paid to the South African Postmaster and forwarded to SABC (Zaffiro,
1989, Zaffiro, 1991; van de Veur, 1996).
It appears however that, the struggle by Resident Commissioners to obtain
authority to licence commercial broadcasters was more about protesting against
domination by Pretoria than a real concern for the welfare of the Protectorate. As
independence for the Protectorate approached, the language of the colonial
government began to justify government monopoly of broadcasting than
encouraging other players. As heir apparent to the Khama III dynasty, had he not
married a white woman, Seretse's support from the colonial government was
almost always guaranteed. The fall-out between the British government and the
Union of South Africa and the imminent independence for Bechuanaland
changed Seretse's fortunes. He was preferred over the radical nationalists of the.
older party, the Bechuanaland Peoples Party. Good insists that, the Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP) under Seretse became the colonial government party. It
was given the monopoly of resources and apparatus of the state, and allowed to
disseminate its policies using government resources (Good, 1992:73). Major A.H
Donald, recruited specifically to start off the government information service in
1960, was opposed the introduction of privately owned commercial radio,
although a number of interested parties had approached the colonial
administration. The newly elected SDP government continued this colonial
legacy, no commercial radio service was allowed for 32 years after
independence. The first commercial radio station, RB2 was introduced in 1992- -
and was government-owned. Private commercial stations emerged for the first.
time in 1998 with the licensing of two Gaborone-based commercial stations;
Yarona FM and soon after Gabz FM.
Mass media was perceived as necessary to present the government's case to
the people through carefully designed strategy of political information
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management. In 1962 a BBC team was sent to facilitate the launching of the
radio service operating from Lobatse, the first administrative capital of the
protectorate. In 1965 on the eve of the first general elections of the soon to be
independent Botswana, the radio service was moved from its pilot location in
Lobatse to the new capital, Gaborone. The following year in 1966, it was formally
re-launched as Radio Botswana after a record sixty hours coverage of the
independence week (Draft National Broadcasting Policy, 2003:10). This was the
beginning of government-owned media for independent Botswana.
Government-ownership of media started just before the end of British colonialism
in 1962, and was to become the most dominant to the present, with government
owning both the national print and broadcasting services. Since the Donald
report of 1961, a key function identified as central for the government-owned
mass media was 'to encourage and assist people of the Bechuanaland
Protectorate to take interest and responsibility for econornic, political, cultural.
development'. In 1962, the colonial government's newly founded Department of
Information started a monthly culture and feature magazine, 'Kuflwano', which
survives to the present (Rantao, 1994). After independence, the sentiment that
government control of the media was necessary for the development of the
country was reproduced in a 1968 A.J. Hughes and the 1978 C.N. Lawrence
reports on the functions of government-owned media. Information consultant A.J.
Hughes' "Report on the Information Functions of Government" presented to the
government of Botswana in 1968 pretty much reproduced the same sentiments
about functions of a government-owned media as conceived by Alan Donald in
1961. Hughes quoted from _the Development Plan covering 1968 that "the
government recognized that the traditional attitudes and practices of the most
majority of Batswana will have to change before a real break-through in the
development of the rural economy is possible" (Hughes, 1968).
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The 1968 A.J Hughes Report: Entrenching government control in
post-independence Botswana .
Sociologist Daniel Lerner wrote in 1958 that it was required to bring on board the
"isolated and illiterate peasants and tribesmen" (Lerner, 1964: 411). The post war
period saw a surge of international campaigns on the role of various mass media
forms in the process of making Africa modern (West and Fair, 1993). The
govemment of Botswana also sought the advice of media consultants Hughes
and later Lawrence, on how mass media could assist towards modernization of
Botswana. The two consultants, and others after them, saw role of the media as
to introduce modernity to the illiterate, backward, unsophisticated, simple minded
peoples of Botswana on matters such as health care, hygiene, better farming
methods
I believe that a blanket coverage of the country with cheap cyclostyled
- <
materials of basic information and education attractively .. .leaflets would
be in Setswana.. .distributed freely... ideally a leaflet on baby care should
reach every woman of child-bearing age - if she cant read it, someone
she knows will read it to her (Hughes, 1968:21).
In 1968, RB was on air for a total of fifty hours a week, and two thirds of the
programmes were in Setswana. The Hughes Report on the information functions
of government was commissioned by the government of the Republic of
Botswana through he auspices of the Ariel Foundation. It covered many aspects
of the role of government-owned mass rnedia including the type of content,
expectati~:>n on staff to realize their duty was first to the government, the need for
Botswana government propaganda, newsworthiness, evils of advertising and
popular culture, policy direction and quality and training of staff. Hughes' official
terms of reference were
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To make a comprehensive survey of the present information functions
within government, including all ministries and media; to assess the
impact that the information functions are making on the people and to
make recommendations for the improvement, expansion and future
orientation of information work, bearing in mind the need to make the most
economical use of the available resources.39
The Hughes report, dated 7 March 1968, began by a quote by the first president
Sir Seretse Khama. Perhaps then, it was not by coincidence that the tone of the
whole document became very authoritarian and except at the very end, read like
a directive from the President himself. It mainly attacked the "unfortunate"
tendency among staff in broadcasting to regard themselves as an independent
body operating on public service corporation lines instead· of functioning in their
role as part of government's publicity machinery (Hughes, 1968:17). It soon
became evident that the unwritten terms of reference were that he should
reprimand government paid journalists of the Department ~of Information and
Broadcasting. He was to inform them in no uncertain terms that the
establishment firmly belonged under government, that it was an instrument not
only of the state, but of also the ruling party. Their job was not journalism, but
government propaganda,
There are misconceptions among some civil servants that they should not
push government policies too vigorously because this amounts to
involvement in politics. The fact is that to fail to promote the government
line represents an attempt to dabble in politics. Civil servants must in
activities support and promote official policies (Hughes, 1968:8).
Furthermore,
39 A.J Hughes (1968) Report on the information functions of government. Commissioned by the
government of the Republic of Botswana. March 1968. Gaborones. Botswana National Archives.
BNB 2005
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The government of Botswana is a political government elected by a
political process to carry out political measures. No - one, least of all
those that are its civil servants, should do anything to divert the political
direction of government. In fact, public relations and the spread of
information should be a continuous process for which any Motswana in a
position of responsibility ...must consider himself responsible at all times.
A circular should be issued under the highest authority pointing out the
need for Permanent Secretaries and senior government officers to be
continuously aware of the public relations aspect of their work (Hughes:
1968:11 ).
Hughes arrived in Botswana on Jan 22 ·1968 and submitted the report by March
7, 1968 - spending most of his time in Gaborone - but he made visits to Lobatse,
Kanye, Palapye, Mahalapye, Serowe, Francistown and Mochudi. He interviewed
more than 200 persons individually and as groups. He met the President, all
government Ministers and permanent Secretaries, many heads of departments
and all senior officers in the Ministry of Home Affairs which at the time housed
the government mass media, Department of Information and Broadcasting. He
also spoke to MP's, civil servants, town and district councillors, officials, tribal
authorities, chiefs, headmen, farmers, businessmen, traders, trade union and
party officials, teachers, clergymen and representatives from women's
organizations. The voice of the elite was given more priority.
Hughes quoted from the Development Plan covering 1968-that "the government
recognized that the traditional attitudes and practices of the most majority of
Batswana will have to change before a real break-through in the development of
the rural economy is possible". Although Hughes advocated for the public service
broadcasting ideal of universal broadcasting coverage in Botswana, he found
universal access of print and film in 1968 a luxury and qUite unnecessary for the
sparsely populated regions apart from the eastern belt with most of the
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populations. He totally obliterated the role of indigenous minorities in governance
and development. He saw no need for government to extend its resources to
them compared to other ethnic groups. They were not perceived worthy of the
expenses on mass media because they lived in smaller groups; were not so well
educated; were less amenable to persuasion; their land did not have the same
potential for development and furthermore, the full participation of these citizens
was not seen as vital to the state as the need to create a national consensus and
spirit of development in those parts of the country where most people lived.
Hughes, however, advised that the medium that could be economically exploited
in the under populated areas was radio. No chances could be taken with people
living in large groups which he said were more volatile and more vulnerable to
destructive propaganda. They were on the other hand also more amenable to
change and would ·be more amenable to information and assist their own
development (Hughes, 1968:6).
c
The threat of external media on the internal nation-building project of Botswana
was ever present. Characteristically, since nation-building is also an inherently
ethnicity-centred project, Hughes could not steer clear of ethnic politics. He
advised that there be a limited broadcast in Kalanga, for the country's largest
minority group listened to Rhodesia Radio, something that could be a setback to
the creation of a solid national identity (Hughes, 1968: 8). He recommended that
reporters who worked in that area had a command of the Kalanga language.
Lydia Nyathi-Ramahobo (1999) undertook an important study on the
implementation of the Language Policy of Botswana in 1988 where she revealed
that the government of Botswana mainly communicated to the general public in
English except on radio (Nyathi-Ramahobo, 1999:99). Job advertisements were
•
mainly in English, emphasized a good pass for English, even when the job did
not require language skills. In contrast, more radio broadcasts particularly of the
Ministry of Agriculture were in Setswana. Media communication in Botswana
today continues to fail to adequately represent local languages, particularly
minority languages.
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In 1968 there were no technical facilities for professional film production.
Television on Botswana ground was in 1968 limited to rare visits by foreign News
teams. Hughes was caught between totally disregarding the possibility and
usefulness of visual media for Botswana and appreciating it. So limited were
Botswana's external publicity and public relations resources and so influential
was television in the West that, according to Hughes, a single thirty second
appearance by the President on a syndicated network programme could be a
most important contribution to the country (Hughes, 1968:13-14). On the other
hand he saw filmmaking as an attractive but extravagant pastime. He approved
of the idea of dropping expenditure on a film unit, because, to serve a useful
purpose, it would have to produce four or five major films a year and a regular
News reel. Together with the cost of cinema vans operating filming could easily
swallow the whole of the information budget.
.
Besides expenses, was the question of consumption. Hughes argued that there
was evidence to show that unsophisticated audiences took several years to
grasp the conventions of cinema such as distortions of time and space; and often
missed the point of the film (Hughes, 1968:24,25). At the same time, projecting
images required facilities. There were a few halls showing British, American and
other feature film. Information Services had two mobile cinema vans, the Ministry
of Agriculture had one. Some schools had projectors. "Apart from two or three
outdated productions and some amateur agricultural filmlets, any material shown
were foreign and with a few exception were of doubtable relevance or suitability"
(Hughes, 1968:9). He was also worried that the films that people in rural areas- -
were exposed to by embassies and religious groups seeking to put forward their
, I
own propaganda could make them less willing to watch government slide shows.
Although Hughes was adamant that film/television if done by government would
be frivolous, he encouraged the government to persuade filmmakers to come to
Botswana especially considering that the then apartheid government in South
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Africa had tightened and limited access. Botswana could put in place only
minimum controls on filmmakers. Botswana according to Hughes had the same
climatic and scenic advantage as South Africa. Botswana would gain some
publicity through the feature films and documentary productions. Two years after
Hughes report, the Government of Botswana put in place the very same controls
through the Cinematograph Act of 1970.
By 1968, there had been a notable and rapid build-up of the technical facilities
and output of Radio Botswana, although Botswana had not at the time secured
membership with International Telecommunications Union. Localization of jobs in
government media was well advanced. Training and quality of staff was still very
low, there was no training plan - training occurred on an ad hoc bases. Hughes
suggested a training plan. He found the quality of especially th.e field staff
extremely low
<
There appears to be little awareness among the staff of Radio Botswana
as to what they are there for, they seem, on the whole, to be happy if they
can fill the hours of transmission with programmes. Those who do have
some wider ideas of what their job is have the wrong ideas. Radio
Botswana is not a public service broadcaster like BBC. It was a
government department and its job was to assist the execution of their
various functions. Under no circumstances was it to be used to
embarrass, frustrate or oppose the government which it is a part (Hughes,
1968:30).
Hughes could be said to be to Radio Botswana what Lord Reith was to the BBC,
, ,
its gate-keeper. He had little regard for entertainment generally, hence he called
for a re-assessment of the role of radio and to give it broadcasting a clear policy
where it would be used as medium of information and education. Entertainment
programmes, such as music, he felt had no place in the programme schedules
as of right but rather should justify themselves to the extent that they captured
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and retained an audience for information and education programmes. He was
even sceptical about the use of soap opera for education. Classical music, of
minority interest even in Westem Europe, with no widespread appeal was also
not necessary. He found broadcasts of no information function to a drastic
negative effect in listenership and therefore not to be broadcast by Radio
Botswana. Hughes approved of quiz contests - with schools and other
institutions competing and cultural magazine programmes to encourage local
musicians, poets and writers.
On foreign content, Hughes found very few of the feature tapes supplied by
foreign organizations and used by Radio Botswana relevant to the country's
needs, save for international News particularly provided by the BBC. Advertising
to Hughes was likely to result in consumption of apartheid from neighbouring
South Africa. Although advertising and commercial radio could be justified on
revenue grounds and in publicizing Botswana externally, it had its dangers.
Unsophisticated people could be unduly susceptible to radio adverts. Whatever
checks and controls enforced, the basic fact was that advertisers sought to
induce the buyer to purchase their product, not to make a rational choice. In a
country with a high standard of living this may not be a problem. But for people
living at a subsistence level, the purchase of less useful, less needed or less
nourishing goods could be a matter of life and death or at least good health and
poor health. Hughes also maintained that simple people could also believe that
adverts on government radio had the approval of government (Hughes, 1968).
Hughes was worried that apartheid propaganda could come into Botswana
through adverts prepared in South Africa. The content could contain an implicit
,
acceptance of the racial structure of the then separatist society there. He
however conceded that marginal backing of apartheid could be considered a
lesser evil looking at the financial rewards - and that if commercial broadcasts
were in Setswana, the racial issue would perhaps not arise. On the definition of
News, Hughes warned that there was no such a thing as impartial News
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broadcasting. BBC contained British propaganda. Voice of America contained
American propaganda. Radio Moscow News contained Russian propaganda, but
it was all the more effective for being covert. The selection of News order and
juxtaposition of items and the style and vocabulary used all have propaganda
effect. Botswana equally had to have News broadcasts which reflected the
needs, the interests, the achievements and the aspirations of the people and
their govemment.
It was only at the end of the report that Hughes was to express his reservations
about govemment control of the media that his terms of reference required him to
endorse. For example he expressed the needs for a Newspaper that would offer
altemative News to that of the Botswana Daily News. Although he accepted that
to a large extent the funds would have to be sourced from govemment, he
recognized that as literacy increased, there would be a growing interest in what
he called public affairs. These were matters outside narrow daily lives and
independence the govemment News engendered (Hughes, 1968:45). An <
independent paper would not undermine the govemment efforts, but unlike the
Botswana Daily News, would not be dedicated to the govemment line. He
suggested a few possibilities; such as intemational Newspapers being
encouraged to set up in Botswana such as the Bantu Press or Argus Group, both
South African. He also suggested a purely local commercial company - perhaps
with govemment holding some equity or other interest. Tswana African
ownership' of the media, which would be 'genuinely public' according to Hughes
was made practically impossible by the company existing condition [of poverty].
He also suggested that perhaps one of the existing institutions - a political party,
cooperative movement, trade union, could own the paper. Only as a last resort
I
would he want this Newspaper to be govemment owned, but if that be the case,
he appealed for occasional criticism such as readers' letters. To this day, the
Botswana Daily News does not have an opinion column.
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Most importantly, government mass media, by Hughes, was perceived as a tool
to inform citizens of the new nation of Botswana, and that only the BDP
government was their trustworthy source of information that knew what was best
for them. Resources including the police service were to be used to sell both
party and its govemment - the party flag and that of the country must be used
side by side, he said, (Hughes, 1968:14). Ten years later in 1978, another report
by C.N. Lawrence reiterated similar sentiments. Lawrence was brought in to
guide the department in establishing a News agency. From this report, again
there was the salient voice of disapproval from the political leadership regarding
the conduct of civil servants at (Department of Information and Broadcasting) DIB
who thought job was journalism. It however, appeared that despite the best
intentions by government to control it, media in Botswana could never be totally
controlled by the state, hence the need for constant threats under the guise of
external expertise.
It appears that not even Hughes could totally conceive of a mass media service
that was only accountable to the government. Upon his recommendation, to
promote a broader sense of public ownership and accountability, a radio
Botswana Advisory Committee was established in 1968, as a non-statutory body
to advise the Minister responsible on matters relating to content and language.
This body included prominent members of the opposition and other independent
activists" (Draft National Broadcasting Policy, 2003:11). Another recommendation
that was taken from him was that the r.department of Information and
Broadcasting be transferred from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the office of the
President, after a separate proposal to create a new Ministry of Information was
rejected.
The 1978 C.N Lawrence Report
Ten years after the Hughes report, another inquest was instituted known as the
1978 Christie Lawrence Report for the Commonwealth of the Republic of
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Botswana by the Consultant on Infonnation and Broadcasting Services.40 Much
of its findings were to define the course of the Departments of Information and
Broadcasting for the next three decades. It set out what was for the next three
decades to become the core business of the Department of Infonnation and
Broadcasting (DIB); an infonnation service for government whose mandate was
"to win and retain the consent of the people to the policies, aims and actions of
the government," (Lawrence, 1978:20). In 2005, the official website of former DIB
still defines its mandate in the same tenns.
The report sought to advice on policy options for government media; assess the
effectiveness of the organisational structure of the then DIB; assess recruitment
of staff; assess training needs; assess possibilities of merging infonnation units
of other ministries with the department and to assess how the department could
perform better at projecting a positive image of Botswana. It solicited views from
government Ministers, Members of Parliament, government officials, non-
<
governmental organisations and members of the public on the services of the
government-o~ned radio and print media.
The public complained among other things, of the poor Radio Botswana signal,
lack of News about other parts of Botswana other than Gaborone, low command
of Setswana, the official vernacular among presenters, and poor and late
circulation of the much sought after Botswana Daily News, government's free
daily Newspaper. Lawrence- rated 30 percent of the staff at the time untrainable
and lacking in motivation and professional example. When BTV turned five years
on July 31 2005, reporters still complained not only of lack fonnal training in
journalism, but also lack of on the job training. In an interview with the
,
researcher, an editor said, "we need an experienced person to teach us basic
journalistic skills such as script writing and exactly how a Newsroom operates"
(Interview with BTV reporter, 2006).
40
Lawrence, C., (1978) Report for the Commonwealth of the Republic of Botswana by the
Consultant on Information and Broadcasting Services, Commonwealth Fund for Technical
Cooperation. Printed by the Botswana Government Printer, Gaborone.
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By and large the Lawrence report endorsed a top-down one way model of
communication, which persists to this day in both the departments of Informat~on
and of Broadcasting Services. Lawrence recommended regular meetings
between the Director of DIB and the Minister of the Office of the President. The
meetings were deemed necessary to help 'Cabinet to have prior advice about
public opinion and likely public reactions'. This suggested that Lawrence was
aware that one of the roles of the department ought to have been to solicit the
public's opinion on issues of national concern which could then be utilised by
decision-makers (Lawrence, 1978:29). The report never spelt out very clearly
what the public ought to expect from DIB. It never articulated the relationship
between the media and the public.
A lack of clarity about whether media and state power should be separate is
perhaps the most enduring and most far reaching of the limitations of the
c '
Lawrence Report. The Lawrence report at some moments suggested DIB could
do with less interference from government Ministers and ministry officials and be
an agent of change of the people's modes of thought. Yet again in 1978,
Lawrence did not see the possibility of Botswana's national media becoming
independent of government for a foreseeable future. He saw no likelihood that
DIB could be able to generate sufficient independent income. He argued that it
was also not certain that financial independence from government would
~ ".:.' . .
....... necessarily .prevent interference. At the time, the only p'ossibility in sight that
Lawrence saw feasible in the future was for DIB to one day become a separate
Ministry. This would be ideal, he said, because it would make tighter political
control easier on this very important se,rvice. At that time though, he found the
I
department too small to run as a separate Ministry. He thus thought it useful and
beneficial for the department to remain under the Office of the President. The
arrangement he argued accorded it prestige of direct Presidential authority,
placing it within the core of the administration as well as giving its director a voice
at Cabinet level (Lawrence,1978:29). Such reports as the Hughes report of 1968
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and the Lawrence report of 1978 did become policy. Zaffiro (1988) found that
nearly all of the basic recommendations contained in the Hughes report were
accepted by the President and, in an important Cabinet Directive, Ministers were
instructed to report within one month how they planned to implement them
(Zaffiro, 1988:13). The Lawrence report was also to make major waves in the
broadcasting policy environment. "Language taken from the Lawrence report
found its way into the relevant pages of the National Development Plan for the
1979 - 85 period" (Zaffiro, 1988:45). Consultancy reports such as these
dominated the early history of government media policy in Botswana. Foreign
experts, changing government Ministers and Permanent Secretaries responsible
for the Department of Information and Broadcasting, and the senior management
of the department shaped this early period, which from the language of the
reports, was a period of institutionalising a BDP hegemony.
Beyond colonization, domination by South Africa and BDP hegemony
The history of government-owned media in Botswana can be understood through
colonialism, domination by South Africa, and the invention of a BDP hegemony.
While very determining, they were mitigated by other factors, including the
sections of Information and Broadcasting's own internal politics and growth, and
at a world scale, the Cold War. The UNESCO, the Non-aligned Movement, the
OAU debates on the Western-bias of information and communication, as well as
the on-going Cold War sparked a lot of interest among News agencies to offer
better reporting on Africa, sometimes at a fee.
,
Botswana's media policy during the Cold War
The Botswana government appears to have had adopted a somewhat neutral
stance during the Cold War where it allowed News agencies from both the
Eastern and Western blocs. In 1971, a Moscow based News service, Telegraph
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Agency of the Soviet Union, (TASS) expressed interest in offering a News
service and all required radio-teletype facilities for direct reception of the TASS
English language transmission. They also offered technical assistance in
installing equipment and training technical personnel at a charge of 3-4000 in
local currency a year.41 The Chinese Hsinhua News Agency expressed interest in
covering Botswana from about 1973. At the end of 1975 they proposed to
allocate a permanent correspondent to Gaborone and was granted permission by
the government. Chen Yi-fei was accepted as the resident correspondent on
April 1976.42 1n 1974, Head of Foreign Relations Department of the Swiss
Broadcasting Corporation wrote to Information and Broadcasting in Botswana,
seeking that a correspondent of their French speaking radio in South Africa,
South West Africa, Rhodesia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and Angola be
accredited as a correspondent in Botswana.43 The Swedish D~velopment
Authority (SIDA) also assisted some journalists from the country to visit
Botswana in 1974.44
Cold War politics could not always be ignored. A TASS correspondent, A.
Rachkov, requested permission to cover Botswana for the Soviet News agency.
He wanted an interview with the President, to visit the Orapa diamond mine, the
Selibe-Phikwe copper-nickel plant and the Lobatse abattoir as economic
progress stories.45 The Administrative Secretary of the Office of the President,
L.M. Mpotokwane, referred Rachkov's request to the Head of the government
Intelligence unit.46 Rachkov was based in Zambia and had sought access into
Botswana through the country's High Commission in Lusaka. The view of the
High Commissioner was that Rachkov's story would improve on the limited- -
coverage of Botswana within the Socialist world. 47 The Intelligence unit found no
• I
41 Letter to A.M. Mogwe, Permanent Secretary to the Office of the President from L. Zamyatin,
TASS General Director. Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (2)
42 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (47)
43 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (12)
44 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (18)
45 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (60)
46 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (61)
47 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (63)
102
security objections,48 and Rachkov was granted permission. This however, did
not settle well with Western economic interests in Botswana. The Mining
Commissioner, D.G. Minnes strongly objected to the proposed visit to Orapa,
citing security reasons. He argued that no useful benefits would be derived by
Botswana from the TASS visit except to compromise the security of the country's
main source of income, diamonds.49 The Group Secretary of the Anglo American
Corporation and the local subsidiary De Beers Botswana Mining Company, H.F.
Rose also objected strongly, calling the TASS correspondent a non essential
visitor. De Beers preferred that the TASS correspondent only meet with the
Resident Director of the company in Gaborone and be shown a film on Orapa.50
The government took an unexpectedly stubborn position on the matter,
considering that diamonds were then becoming. the country's most important
export. Large Kimberlite diamond deposits had recently been discovered and fast
becoming Botswana's highest foreign exchange earner (Tsie, 1996).
Mpotokwane maintained that Rachkov's visit was indeed necessary. The TASS
correspondent was not a tourist on a sight-seeing excursion, but offering an
important service of covering mining, an essential aspect of Botswana's
development. On the question of limiting numbers of people entering into the
mines, Mpotokwane reminded the mining executives that very few journalists
requested to visit the mines. He reminded them also that, only a year ago in
1975, they had without difficulty granted the National Geographic magazine
permission into the mine.51 Perhaps Minnes had not expected the government to
take on such a strong position on a visit from a side they assumed was an"
obvious enemy, as they quic':!y withdrew their objection to the proposed visit.
They claimed the initial refusal was motivated by technical considerations, which
I
were never specified. It was therefore quite bold of the Botswana government to
strongly oppose mining interests in favour of media freedom.
48 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (67)
49 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (74)
50 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (75)
51 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (76)
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A price tag for coverage in foreign media
The African Directions News Agency (ADNA) in 1977 offered Botswana to
correct distortions of Africa in the Western press for a fee of USD600 per
annum.52 Africa Guide in England also proposed to sell Botswana to the outside
world of businesses and diplomats at a fee.53 An Italy-based Wright International
offered to produce film, photographic and News propaganda material for
distribution in the US.54 Third World Media Limited approached the Office of the
President with a proposition to supply Botswana with a weekly package of five to
seven articles on a wide range of social, political, economic, educational and
development subjects at a cost of USD 2000 (P10 000) per annum.55 Doremus
and Company International was another interested party, offering to assist the
Third World in communicating to the publics that are important to them in
America.56
Major events like Botswana's independence anniversary in 1976, sparked
increased interest from foreign journalists to do stories on African countries. A
Cape Town based advertising agency, Bernstein, Kennedy and Associates,
claimed that a word association test conducted in South Africa about what image
sprung to people's minds at the mention of Botswana was the word 'casino'. The
company offered to promote a better image for Botswana that would encourage
trade interests to Botswana such as ten years of independence, a new currency
and the annual international trade fair. 57 Often the Botswana government
declined these offers, citing I~ck of money for these kinds of advertisements.58
The Times -of London offered to do a special report to coincide with the 1978
52 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (151)
53 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (133)
54 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (131)
55 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (178)
56 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (179)
57 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (90)
58 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (136, 92)
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independence anniversary for GBP 4 032 (P32 000). Government declined
because the report would not be of substantial benefit to Botswana.59
Foreign reporters in Botswana
Journalists from within the region sometimes also showed interest to cover
stories on Botswana, but were often prevented from doing so by poor planning, a
lack of resources and not being taken seriously by governments. C. Chipanda of
the Times ofZambia made a request in 1976 to do an article on Botswana for the
10th independence anniversary. Chipanda had hoped to interview the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. He agreed in
principle but made a long list of work responsibilities that would prevent him from
meeting Chipanda. Poor planning also worked against him;. he wanted to visit the
dominant economic sectors like the Botswana Meat Commission and Mining and
meet with senior management, but because an itinerary was not provided in
advance, many had difficulty committing to interviews with him. Chipanda had
also hoped the Botswana High Commission in Zambia would organize funds for
accommodation and food and Air Botswana would provide a free return ticket to
Zambia. His company was only prepared to provide allowances while in
Botswana. In the end he could not come.50
By contrast, a correspondent of the Times of London, Nicholas Ashford, received
a warm reception and was able to meet the President and top government
officials in August 1976.61 This often led to accusation from local journalists that
their own-governments preferred foreign journalists from major News agencies.
One incident in 19?5 caused much discontent within the Department of
Information and Broadcasting. The Chief Information Officer, Emphraim Lepetu
Setshwaelo, complained to the Office of the President that the Ministry of
59 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (168, 169)
60 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (126,121 107 128)
61 ' ,
Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (100)
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External Affairs had failed to inform the Information Branch about an impending
meeting between Presidents of Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique
to discuss Rhodesia. The department only got the information from Reuters
wires. "It is most frustrating and demoralizing to the staff of the Information
Department and Radio Botswana ...and the people of this country to learn about
foreign travels and engagements of the President of Botswana from foreign
News agencies".62 External Affairs responded by castigating Information Services
for having "an insatiable appetite for News", so that they took as fact every
speculation from Reuters.63 In response, Setshwaelo maintained that it had
become common knowledge that the BBC, Reuters and South African papers
obtained information about affairs of the Botswana government before the
govemment's own information service had been informed.54
The Non-aligned movement, UNESCO and efforts towards a balanced
flow of information: Formation of the Botswana Press Agency
The Botswana Press Agency (BOPA) was established in 1981 to provide News
of the government-owned print media and radio - the free Botswana Daily News
paper, Radio Botswana, and later its offspring, RB2. It emerged out of the Non-
aligned Movement's efforts to establish a New International Information Order
(NlIO), directly linked to the New World International Economic Order (Servaes,
1999:135). The Southern African News Agency (SANA) was initiated in the late
1970s in Cape Town as a loose association of freelance and fulltime reporters
and photographers in southern Africa. The feeling was that "those foreign
correspondents resident in South Africa relied heavily on South African
government communiques and copy from the South African Press Association
(SAPA). Few of them established their own contacts in the field and few put in
62 Letter dated 8 September 1975 forwarded from Information and Broadcasting to External
Affairs through the Office of the President. Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (40)
63 M.C, Tibone, Permanent Secretary, External Affairs responding to complaint from Information
and Broadcasting via Permanent Secretary of the Office of the President, L.M. Mpotokwane.
Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (41)
64 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (42)
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the necessary legwork to check accuracy of the News put out by government
spokesmen or the local white press. SANA was a very leftist, black supporting
agency. SANA at some point approached the government of Botswana to open
office in Gaborone. Initially the government was relucta.nt citing insufficient
information about the agency. They were later permitted to do SO.65
International media reporting bizarre and truly horrific about Africa
There were always different sentiments regarding the place and form of mass
media that was relevant for newly independent African states. More independent
players like the Thomson Organisation were sympathetic to the needs of the new
African statesmen - men like Julius Nyerere, Tom Mboya, Sir Abubakar Balewa,
who needed at that critical time in their history a means of mass media to keep
their people fully informed, to integrate them, to encourage and to in spite them
to new efforts. At a 1986 symposium of the African Studies Association of the
United Kingdom on 'The Media and Africa since Independence: past trends and
future prospects, it turned out that two decades into the decolonization of Africa,
media coverage on Africa was continuing to ~ecline. Reporting Africa had
become narrower and more distorted. Local media was weak and vulnerable to
-excesses of political and bureaucratic control. In film production, most westerners
saw Africa as merely a field for documentaries and the little independent
production depended on donor funds. International News agencies and
broadcasting organizations had reduced the number of resident staff
correspondents; and only the spectacular, bizarre and truly horrific stories on the
likes of Idi Amin and 'Emperor' Bokassa were found Newsworthy (Palmer, 1987).
Part of the NIIO strategy was to support the birth of national News agencies. The
idea of a Pan African News Agency (PANA) is as old as the formation of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). It was given a
65 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (162, 165)
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fresh impetus by the debate that began to take place within the United Nations
Education Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) about a New World
Infonnation and Communication Order (NWICO), but particularly the 1975
General Conference in Nairobi. The conference among other things debated if
UNESCO was meeting its central mandate to actively assist the free and
balanced flow of infonnation and ideas among peoples of the world.
The Nairobi conference also found the flow of infonnation between developing
and developed world to be hampered by among other things, the fact that News
dissemination agencies of the developed world virtually had a monopoly on News
gathering and infonnation; the monopoly was made secure by the fact that
between themselves, these agencies had the financial, technological and
management resources to continue to exercise this power; and that with this
power, News and infonnation from the developing to the developed world tended
to be treated as frivolous and somewhat in sensationalist fashion to suit.
expectations of what the News agencies of the industrialized world interpreted as
their readers tastes. NWICO would redress this situation. At the 20th UNESCO
General Assembly, developing countries demanded control of information
through national News agencies. The 1978 2nd meeting of the Coordination
Committee in Jakarta of Ministers from the Non-aligned Movement
recommended national News agencies. UNESCO provided the financial and
technical assistance.66
At the second session of the conference of African Ministers of Infonnation in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in April 1979, governments of member states of the OAU
adopted the convention establishing PANA. In the spirit of Pan Africanism, the
convention sought to promote unity among African peoples. Eve~ though the
ideal was to make the voices of the African people heard, the convention had
clearly paternalistic overtones. The sources of the 'objective and accurate
66 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (176) Letter dated 9 September, 1978, from the High
Commission of India in Lusaka, Zambia.
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information' were to be News agencies of member states, which at the time were
often state monopolies. Countries would have had to consent to the information
given about them. News reports would provide favourable News about sub-
regional and regional integration in Africa. Concerns about imbalances in the flow
of information between the developed and developing nations grew into attacks
on the cultural dominance of the West, and could have led to the withdrawal of
both the United States and the United Kingdom from UNESCO in 1984 and 1985
respectively (Tomlinson, 1997:123).
Botswana was not represented at the meetings on the NIIO and NWICO, and
only belatedly entered the debate through OAU at the Second Ordinary Session
in Addis Ababa in April 1979. At this meeting, the draft convention establishing
PANA as a specialized agency of the OAU was deliberated upon; the budget,
structure, modus operandi, location of headquarters and institutions of the
agency. Linguistic divisions between Francophone and Anglophone Africa nearly
< c
brought the meeting to a deadlock, but finally Senegal was appointed by the
technical committee after voting failed. The southern African region agreed on
Lusaka, Zambia for the regional office.67 PANA began to take shape from 1980,
and began to seek subscriptions from OAU member states. Each country was to
contribute 1.97 percent of the total national budget.58
In February 1980, B.M. Setshogo, Director of Information informed the Office of
the President that in the wake of the NIIO and the formation of PANA, it had
become imperative to set up a Botswana National News Agency (BONNA).69
This was after the Inter-Governmental meeting of PANA held in Lobito, Angola in
~ ~
January 1980. Botswana had not paid up subscriptions as it ,had not yet. .
established a News agency. The Zambian National News Agency (ZANA) had
been formed, having exclusive control in receiving and transmitting foreign News.
67 From the report on the meeting of Ministers of Information of the OAU, Addis Ababa or Africa,
4-5 April 1979. Botswana National Archives, OP/25/7/1 (185)
68 Botswana National Archives, OP/25/7/1 (182)
69 A sa~ingram from t~e Director of Information, B.M. Setshogo to the Administrative Secretary of
the Office of the PreSident dated 12 February 1980. Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (185)
109
In Malawi, the Malawi National News Agency (MANA), did not prevent individual
subscribers from owning individual receiving machines for foreign News in their
own premises and therefore, the News agency had no 'editorial control' on the
use of foreign News. In Mozambique, because of the civil war, many journalists
had left. From about twenty journalists, the national News agency - Agencia
Informa980 M09ambique (AIM), was operating with only four in 1980. PANA was
requested to offer financial and technical help to Botswana, Lesotho and
Swaziland to establish their own agencies.
Inherently, the approach of reversing Western-biased information and
communication by way of establishing state controlled national News agencies
legitimized state censorship and threatened editorial independence. Lawrence
was at pains not to appear to encourage this trend. He proposed that the national
News agency should not concern itself with international feed. This would remain
under the print and radio sections. If the News agency was to do editing and
, '
dissemination of international News, Lawrence argued it would be tantamount to
censorship - something that only happens in countries that exercise rigid press
and media censorship, and whose governments wished to deny the inhabitants
access to independent News sources. It was for these reasons that the US fell
out with UNESCO and the NWICO.
Chief Press Officer A.S Osman and Ted Makgekgenene represented the
Department of Info"rmation and Broadcasting (DIB) at the first 1st meeting of the
southern African pool of PANA in Zambia, March 1980. At this first meeting, the
Zambian Minister of Informati~n, M.M. Tamba!amba bemoaned foreign News
agencies' imbalanced and distorted reports of, events taking place in Africa.
, I
PANA through national News agencies would therefore correctly interpret Africa's
stand on local and international issues.7o
70 Botswana National Archives, OP/25/7/1 (188)
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Delays to the birth of BOPA: International concerns, internal
.. wrangling
Internal politics of power between Chris Lawrence, the new Chief Information
Officer and other local staff was to delay the birth of BOPA Lawrence had
suggested that the BONNA or Botswana News Agency, (BNA) as it was initially
interchangeably referred to, should start with two expatriates; a chief press officer
and a senior press officer. He envisaged a working relationship between three
formerly disparate sections where the managing editor of publications and the
assistant Director of News and Current Affairs were clients of the Press section.
The heads of sections would work in close cooperation, exchanging ideas,
requests for assistance, material and even staff when necessary, and would
exactly equal status, pay and prestige.71 The full output of BONNA or BNA
would be sent to PANA
< James Zaffir6 (1988) characterised the early years of broadcasting in Botswana
as dominated by expatriates. "Language taken from the Lawrence report found
its way into the relevant pages of the National Development Plan for the 1979 -
85 period" (Zaffiro, 1988:45). AS. Osman and Lawrence appeared to have an
interpretation of the project, different from that of locals. In a memorandum to the
Administrative Secretary of the Office of the President (OP) dated 4 September
1980, Osman deferred the implementation of the press agency because he felt
submissions coming from the department were not in harmony with the concept
of the "press section" as had been envisaged by Lawrence. He felt that that' the.
News agency would have to be "considerably diluted" to meet the tastes of all
parties that would be affected by its implementation. "I should like to stress that
the BNA [Botswana National Archives] cannot initially be a conventional News
agency. It is modelled by conditions and circumstances prevailing here" (BNA,
OP 25/7/1).
71 Botswana National Archives, GP 25/7/1 (189)
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On the same day, 4 September 1980, Lawrence wrote two contradictory
memoranda to OP. First he sent in the Proposal for the Establishment of the
Botswana News Agency. It was proposed as the Press Section, where all
government News is assembled, processed, checked and issued, serving all
media outlets; Radio Newsroom, Information Services publications, Botswana
diplomatic missions abroad, the private sector press (if and when it is
established), overseas press, News agencies and their local representatives. The
facility would mainly cover the government and its agencies, but also offer a
similar facility to parastatal organizations and corporations where government
has a shareholding. It would provide reports of events in Gaborone and the
vicinity that were sponsored by or of interest to the government, Ministries and
departments. Headed by the chief press officer, it would draw from the best staff
from all the other sections. He recommended that the chief. press officer be- an
expatriate because the novelty of the agency requires that the staff posses
qualifications, skills and experience and a sense of improvisation to ensure its
success.
For the local staff, a national News agency proffered new prospects of positions.
A memorandum from Setshogo to OP in March 1980, requested that the
establishment of the News agency be treated as urgent, "by all means get the
Lawrence report implemented or forget the News agency if it will interfere with
·the- report in anyway". He however reminded OP that they had a commitment to
PANA to establish th.e. News agency.72 It appears the department tried to take
advantage of the fact that the Lawrence Report had called the press section the
heart of aflY government information service to justify proposing a large staff.
Lawrence reported to OP that he was misunderstood, what he had in mind was
•
an efficient staff. He thus proposed the following chain of command:
72 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (189)
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·
Chief Press Officer (Expatriate)
Senior Press Officer (local)







Lawrence backtracked the same day, reducing the position of chief sub-editor to
just sub-editor because it gave the impression that he would be at the same level
with the chief press officer. Locals would have preferred to take over expatriate
positions within the shortest possible time, but expatriate consultants, whose
voice had more weight within government, had very little faith in them. In the
case of the new position of chief press officer occupied by Osman, Setshogo and
other locals in the department proposed that he be understudied by a local for
twelve months, after which the local would take over. Lawrence wrote on 4
Septe~mber. 1980 that twelve months was too short, that in fact the expatriate
needed one or two full contracts to pass on skills. So that, if Osman was to
terminate his contract before the end of its term, Lawrence advised-,that he be
replaced, not by the local understudying him, but by one of the expatriate sub-
editors.73
Expatriate dominance was often coupled with frustration of locals. For example,
the first local Chief Information Officer, Dingaan Mokaila was forced to retire
within a very short time by the expatriate BBC broadcast advisor, Bernard
73 Botswana National Archives GP 25/7/1
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Palmer, Chief Engineer lan Kennedy and Alan Donald who had moved from
position of Information Officer in 1961 to Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs
(Zaffiro. 1988:16-18). The wholesale acceptance of the findings and their rapid
translation into official government broadcast and information policy dramatically
underscored the influence of outsiders on policy formulation and implementation.
Lawrence's most important legacy was the establishment of the national News
agency. The Department of Information and Broadcasting decided they
preferred a consultant's report before they could proceed, arguing that News
agency journalism would be a new and demanding form of journalism for
Botswana. A letter dated 9 September 1980 signed by B. Setshogo of the
Department of Information and Broadcasting read. "As you will recall. Mr Osman
was recently promoted to the Chief Press Officer in accordance with the
Lawrence Report. He has now come up with a blue print on how the section
should operate. Basically it will be the launching into the News agency area
<
which is long overdue in view of our regional and continental weight in News
perspectives. I recommend that these ideas be accepted as a basis for the
Botswana National News Agency". 74
Locals did try to assert their own power. When Lawrence showed disapproval of
the manner in which the department was handling the establishment of a national
News agency, the then Chief Information Officer. B.M. Setshogo wrote. "Mr
Lawrence has commented on the proposals but his observations do not affect
the subject of the presentation ...once the News agency is launched we will
contact UNESCO to garner any additional help we can get from that quarter".75
'From police network to radio station of the nation' to television
station of the nation
74 Botswana National Archives, OP/18/3
75 Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (3)
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In 1984, thirty two years after the advent of Radio Bechuanaland in 1962, the
Botswana govemment began to seriously think about expanding information
services 'From police network to radio station of the nation', (Zaffiro, 1991) to
television station of the nation. As will become evident, there were strong
paralles between the birth of Radio Botswana (RB), the Botswana Press Agency
(BOPA), and BTV. With regard to radio, South African's domination of colonial
Botswana was direct and statutory. With BTV, the domination is less direct, it is
by technology and experience. Satellite and terrestrial transmitters permit
viewers in Botswana to watch content from most parts of the world. BTV is still
new and inexperienced, and where viewers have a choice, BTV is unlikely to be
their first choice yet. Expatriates, including from the BBC, were brought in to help
set up BTV. Just as it was with radio and print, the next section will show that,
loca1 African managers and expatriates at BTV were often at loggerheads. With
the Cold War behind us, the new politics in the broadcasting arena are about
protecting local cultural capital both and entering global markets. This section. .
focuses on the idea of television for Botswana, and later chapters will look into
the manner that BTV tries to strike a balance in a state-media-market nexus.
] 15
The idea of television service for Botswana
President Ketumile Masire said in 1984 that the broadcast media would be
incomplete without television (Botswana Daily News, 16 February 1984, BOPA
Library). The Botswana Daily News of November 30, 1984 carried the headline,
"Broadcasting incomplete without TV". That same week, the independent Mmegi
wa Dikgang of November 24, 1984 alleged that a "new television network for
Botswana" was under consideration. Fourteen months later in February 17, 1986,
the Botswana Daily News revealed a sentiment within government that,
"television too expensive to maintain".
1988 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Feasibility Study
The 1988 International TelecomlJlunications Union (ITU) Feasibility Study
Report76 was the first report ever done specifically on the feasibility of television
for Botswana. A paternalistic and condescending mentality, similar to the colonial
legacy, was exhibited by this report, as did all the other consultancy reports on
mass media in Botswana before it. It maintained the same recommendation as
that of Hughes. The report was done in consultation with Radio Botswana,
various ministries of government and the University of Botswana. The terms of
reference of the report were to determine the marketing, technical, financial,
economic, social and political feasibility of a television facility. The report
concluded that the problems of television would far outweigh the benefits.
Television would foster national identity, act as .a tool for educc;ltion, increase
public awareness of health and modem farming. However, the perceived social
dangers were portrayal of violence, sexual permissiveness at a time of HIV/AIDS,
76 It was not possible for me to get hold of the ITU report. Information about the report, the
government's response to it and the subsequent Croton Report was adapted with permission
from an unpublished MA thesis by Bishy Mmusi (2002), entitled "The Development Assumption of
Botswana Television: An assessment".
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portrayal of affluent lifestyles, and increased extravagant consumer cultures as a
result of advertising. Television was also said to promote passivity. These would
not be beneficial to Botswana's unsophisticated would-be consumers. If
government were to insist on television, the ITU recommended a public service
television rather than a service run by a commercial company. Mmusi (2002)
revealed that the Ministry was worried nonetheless about locals watching
television from the then apartheid South African, which they viewed as containing
in-built apartheid propaganda (see appendix 5).
According to Bishy Mmusi (2002), the Ministry of Finance found in 1989 that the
case for a television service in Botswana was extremely weak. They argued that
only 1.5 percent of the population would be able to afford a television set and
licence fees. A television set alone was the same as the average annual income
at the time, an investment of USD 40 million (P2 billion) in the first four years.
Government would have to subsidise users at USD 2000 (P10 000) per person.. .
Only the richest, 20 percent of whom were expatriates, would enjoy the subsidy,
and according to the Ministry of Finance, they were not a priority (Mmusi, 2002).
The ITU report suggested setting up community television-viewing centres, but
the Ministry declined to do this on account of the costs of maintenance for such
centres. Yet, the Botswana National Development Plan (NDP) 6 clearly stated
that a television service would be erected within the 1985 and 1991 planning
period. This was the earliest firm public mention of a television service for
Botswana. Interestingly, for the 1992 to 1996 planning period, NDP 7 only noted
that there were significant developments in private television services and that
more consumers were buying television sets to' watch video tapes and take
advantage of the overspill of South African television (NDP 7:398).
• j
The discussion of television was going on at various levels, within and outside
government. James Zaffiro (1988) found that by 1988, top people at Radio
Botswana and in government privately expressed mixed feelings about the
wisdom of a national television service, as some felt it was mostly a prestige
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project for the urban elite. In 1991, the Institute of Development Management
(IDM), held a two week television management and production course for senior
government officials at Radio Botswana (RB). Ephraim Lepetu Setshwaelo, then
Director of IDM, advised RB management that a television service must only be
provided if it will not be a burden to the taxpayer while benefiting only the urban
elite. In his view, television was only viable if it would cover more than half the
national population, contain imaginative home-grown material rather than depend
on foreign content, and be an instrument of truth, objectivity and abstain from
partisanship (Botswana Daily News, 10 October 1991).
Ted Makgekgene, at one point the Director of DIB, confirmed in an interview that
within DIB, there was always a quiet but persistent push for government to
introduce either film or television. Throughout the 1980s, the Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning was to continue to preach that television was not
justifiable from an economics point of view, and that other reasons would have to
~
be advanced to justify it. It appeared that Makgekgenene did not lose hope, after
the discouraging recommendations of the ITU report. He approached the Office
of the President (OP) to re-consider the report which he queried did not evaluate
all possible options (Mmusi, 2002:21). He argued that the development of
satellite technology as opposed to terrestrial microwave programme distribution
had greatly reduced the cost of television. Makgekgenene requested another
feasibility study to review and update the ITU report and provide fresh
recommendations, exploring the possibility of utilising satellite technology. While
the tendering process was going on, incidentally the BBC showed interest and
sent its Head~ of Training, Gor.9<m Croton on a fact-finding mission to Botswana.
His report dated March 1992 showed that the few people he had met wanted a
, '
teleyision service for Botswana. He found the ITU report's recommendation on
content not fitting the facts of modem broadcasting and audience viewing
patterns. He suggested a much cheaper option to one suggested by the ITU, a
phased television station starting with a small News and Current Affairs service
(Mmusi,2002).
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1993 Studio Hamburg Media Consult Report
It was Studio Hamburg Media Consult that won the tender for a consultancy
report requested by Makgekgenene. The 1993 Studio Hamburg Report, unlike
other reports before it, was designed to make a strong case for the establishment
ot' a television service. As a result, it was optimistic, based on expected
expansion of infrastructure, population growth, increased urbanisation, and
economic growth. By 1991, two thirds of the population of Botswana still lived in
rural areas, in small settlements of under 1000 inhabitants. The capital city had
about 135 000 inhabitants and a growth rate of 13 percent per annum (Studio
Hamburg Report, 1993:15). The report put forward four options for a television
service that they proposed could start in 1997. These were, a government
department; a parastatal corporation owned 100 percent by government; a joint
venture with government owning shares not exceeding 49 percent or a private
company. The Hamburg report postulated a significant growth in the ownership
of television sets, from an approximate 28 000 in 1993 to anything between 180
000 and 260 000 sets by the year 2012. The 2002 survey done by Thapisa and
Megwa estimated that by then, nearly 60 percent of households in cities of
Botswana owned a television set, and half of all households in urban villages had
sets (see appendix 6).
To increase the numbers of beneficiaries of the service, like ITU, Studio
Hamburg suggested television viewing centres, starting with secondary schools.
Licence fees would initially only be P10 (USD 2), affordable for the average
television ,set owning household. It was expected that advertising would over a
fifteen year period increasingly cover the costs of the service, assuming
advertising revenues would increase much faster than the GDP (Studio Hamburg
Report, 1993). Satellite technology evolved much faster than the report
envisaged, in 2000, and not the postulated 2007, BTV commenced straight away
on direct satellite broadcasting (DSB) (Hunt Report, 1999).
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Government of Botswana tended to be sceptical of many of the consultancy
reports it commissioned. The Studio Hamburg Report was rejected (Mmusi,
2002). A Television Reference group composing of Permanent Secretaries of
various government Ministries found the report lacking in the technical and
financial arguments. The capital costs were too high. The parastatal scenario
was found more attractive. The Reference Group tried to work out a different
alternative; of a production house constructed by the government to produce
programmes that could be aired through existing small booster stations in
Gaborone, Jwaneng, Morupule, Selibe-Phikwe, Francistown and Orapa. DIB
rejected the idea because it would be inadequate to fulfil requirements of public
broadcasting of universal access. The department also did not want to be an
embarrassment considering that Botswana viewers had access to superior
broadcasting programmes from SABC and M-Net. Viewers would not have
patience with the department's teething problems (Mmusi, 2002).
According to Mmusi, the Television Reference Group concluded that, "If
Government decided to go ahead with this television project, the justification
would have to be based on other considerations rather than economic viability",
in a Savingram dated 19 June 1996 (Mmusi, 2002:28). They recommended that
Cabinet advise the President to direct that the recommendation of the Studio
Hamburg on the establishment of a fully fledged television service in Botswana
be rejected. It appears the elected political leaders and the bureaucrats differed
on the matter, for, in July 1996, P.H.K Kedikilwe, then Minister of Presidential
Affairs and Public Administration, told Parliament that his Ministry was only
looking at the possibility of introducing a pilot television project. Makgakgenene
had finally convinced the Ministry that satellite technology would ensure 100
percent national television coverage around the year 2000. This would form the
basis of a future national television station. 77 To get government to make a
77 Botswana Daily News, 18 July 1996, BOPA Library
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commitment, according to Makgekgenene, was the most crucial part of lobbying
for any project. Then one could change specifications like scale and scope.
Resistance against television
Resistance against television continued in some quarters. Botsalo Ntuane, then
the Youth Information and Publicity Secretary for the BDP was also of the opinion
that television had adverse "corrosive effects on the collective psyche and sense
of nationhood of a people".76 Those in support, saw the benefit of people being
able to hear and see that national leaders and development projects. Some
members of the public, including a certain Lorato Mongatane of Ramotswa
expressed disappointment at the Minister's position that television would
generally be a misuse of government funds. Although she acknowledged that
television would initially not benefit rural populations, she felt Botswana needed
to start somewhere.79 Local government authorities of the Central District Council
also urged the government to introduce television to help educate people about
such issues as voter apathy.60 Residents of the squatter settlement of Old Naledi
in Gaborone added their voice to the call for the introduction of a television
service. They made their submission to the National Vision for the year 2016
Presidential Task Group. Their concern was that the exposure of the youth to
foreign television programmes was causing a slow death of Setswana culture.
Even people in rural Botswana supported the idea of television. Residents of
Mabutsane felt that television would promote culture and curb crime.61 It may
however be that, in order to give the impression of popular support for television
against government's reluctance to introduce it, DIB purposively reported only
the stories that supported their cause and under reported opposition to television.
76 Botswana Gazette, 16 October 1996, BOPA Library
79 MmegilThe Reporter, 2 August 1996, BOPA Library
80 Botswana Daily News, 10 December 1996, BOPA Library
81 Botswana Daily News, 21 April 1997, BOPA Library
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Kedikilwe stood firm, and announced again in October 1996 that the govemment
was actively considering to establish a television station in Botswana, at the
launching of a two - month intensive television production course by World View
Botswana. At the same launch, he announced that his office was drafting a Mass
Media Bill to provide operational gUidelines for mass media, including
broadcasting.82 On March 26th 1997, the Cabinet decided that Botswana should
have its own television service and the project would be implemented by the
Department of Information and Broadcasting. No debate was supplied by Cabinet
as to why the state scenario was the preferred model (Mmusi, 2002:29). Between
April and May 1997, Cabinet approved a proposal presented by Kedikilwe to set
up BTV during NDP 8, expected to broadcast by 2000. He told Cabinet that the
television service could have been done during NDP 7, but that feasibility studies
did not support its establishment.53 Interestingly, besides mentioning that two
feasibility studies were conducted, NDP 8, covering the years between 1997 and
2003 was conspicuously silent about the commencement of the television
4
project, although it started the very next year.
As the next chapter will show, as soon as the television service commenced,
politics shifted from whether or not it was a necessary service, to whose interests
it served. BTV came to be censored more than both radio and print. Opposition
parties found it biased to the ruling party, and the ruling party found its
management deeply divided among Botswana's political parties, as former
Communications Minister Sebetela told the researcher in an interview.
82 Daily News, 18 October 1996, SOPA Library
83 Midweek Sun, 17 May 1997, SOPA Library
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Chapter Four
Public Service Broadcasting under duress: Botswana
Television, the mirage of autonomy and the onset of
government control
Govemment-owned BTV started in July 2000 as Africa's most advanced digital
technology television station at the time. The early history of BTV from the mid
1990s to 2006 was to follow a similar path to that of its precursor, Radio
Botswana (RB). BTV emerged as part of the Republic of Botswana Public
Service, funded by the govemment and run by civil servants. Thus, from the
outset, the broadcaster was in the ambit, and under the control of the national
govemment. It fell under the Ministry of Presidential Affairs, Department of
Information and Broadcasting (DIB)~ BTV, however,~ unlike RB, missed a small
chance of starting off independent from govemment. The idea of a semi-
autonomous television station was sown right from the first feasibility study by
ITU in 1988, even though the recommendations of the report were never
adopted. Subsequent consultancy reports also favoured the parastatal option.
Particularly Kevin Hunt, the first project manager for the establishment of the
service, tried to pursue autonomy for BTV (Hunt, 1999). BTV would be something
of a novelty, a govemment-owned public service broadcaster,84 with a vision to
become a commercially viable station.85
BTV, a government-owned public service b~oadcaster?
The Editorial Guidelines proclaimed News, Current Affairs and Programming that
is free of political, commercial and any other interference at BTV. The Accuracy
84 This is according to the former director, Andrew Sesinyi.
http://www.BTV.gov.bw/BTV/fromthedirector.html
85 Outlined in the BTV web page: http:Hwww.BTV.gov.bw/BTVlguiding_principles.html
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Checklist insists on journalists among other things, presenting all sides to a
controversy (See appendices 7 and 8).
As employees of the Department of Broadcasting Services and the
Department of Information Services we recognise the fact that the state
media organs - Botswana Television, Radio Botswana, Botswana Daily
News, Kutlwano and the Botswana Press Agency - are funded by the
public and therefore exist to serve the public. We also believe that to
effectively serve the public we need editorial independence backed by a
high degree of responsibility and accountability. This calls for the adoption
of editorial guidelines and codes of ethics (BTV Editorial Guidelines).
Botswana journalists have a responsibility to practice ethical joumalism.
The three tenets of journalism: accuracy, balance and fairness, should be
adhered to, in each story pu.blished or broadcast (BTV Accuracy checklist).
On the BTV official website, former Director of the station Habuji Sosome once
wrote,
Although Government owned, Botswana Television operates in
accordance with the conventional norms of a public service broadcasting
organization. BTV enjoys a reasonable degree of editorial independence
that allows it to portray Botswana's political and socio-economic fabric as it
is.
On the same website, a former Head of News anQ Current Affairs of the station, 'I
Felicitus Mashungwa also wrote,
Striving for the truth: We at BTV News are committed to giving you fair,
accurate and balanced reporting. In line with the country's Vision 2016,
BTV News aims at ensuring that Batswana are properly informed,
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educated and become innovative. To those who wonder about editorial
independence and integrity we say, watch us and judge for yourself for
indeed the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
A content analysis of Radio Botswana News bulletins by Tefo Ray Mangope
(1998) revealed that per week, only 1.2 percent of the bulletin covered ordinary
members of the public. Most of the News was on figures of authority. The same
was true for BTV News. BTY News was mostly about government's efforts to
address Botswana's development questions. The reports were often biased, not
by lack of facts, but by failing to be critical on the government position. Accuracy
was achieved simply by relaying almost verbatim, positions taken by government
officials interviewed. BTY could have started off independent from government,
but a series of events prevented this. Interview accounts about events leading to·
the firing of project manager Hunt, problems with training, internal politics about
positions and ;;alaries, the BBC intervention, and eventually Makgekgenene's
retirement, show why it is that autonomy for BTY became a mirage. It was
conservative voices from within DIB that demanded the reinforcement of
government control. The fall-out between locals and expatriates during the
crucial and defining moment of the television station made government control
justifiable.
The station subsequently went through four different Directors of DIB the first six
years. Makgekgenene was replaced by Andrew Sesinyi when he retired from the
position of Director of DIB in 2001. Sesinyi left to direct URTNA in 2003, and was
replaced by H~buji Sosome. Sgsome retired in 2006 and was replaced by Bapasi
Mphusu. With regards to General Managers, the station went through five, .
substantive and acting General Managers within the same period. Months of
interviews with BTV staff revealed that, the birth of BTY was a process of identity
negotiation that was both spatially and politically embedded. It started with power
struggles between foreigners in the 'Project Team' that started the television
project against the local old guard of the Department of Information and
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Broadcasting. When the project team was gone, it became a contestation over
space utilization; differing expectations between 'those in television' and 'those at
radio', government general orders for civil service against an aspiring new
'corporate image'; the young against the old; new way versus only way of doing
things; the 'traditional' versus the 'progressive'.
BTV editorial independence under stress
By 2003, when this research commenced, BTV's claim of editorial independence
was under severe challenge, and the station was losing some of its best
journalists as a result. Political parties were complaining about the domination of
BTV by the ruling party at their own expense. On the other hand, the Director of
the station, Sosome was saying the exact opposite of what he was quoted saying
in the BTV official website above. On government control Sosome said, "there is
no media that is not controlled by certain interests". To him, editorial
independence was "just semantics, a relative term which can mean many things".
Sosorne made parallels between BTV and other media institutions; at CNN, the
buck stopped with the owner. The reason that Dr David Kelly committed suicide,
he said, was because at BBC, final control rested on the British government,
[AJt the end of the day it is the financier who has the final control. So the
buck stops with whoever pays whoever funds! Government may not
constantly breathe on our shoulders but when it comes to a push they will
say, enough is enough, this is not right! (Sosome, 2004)
,
The crucial question in the early history of BTV is, why did the British and South
African consultants that tried to mentor BTV meet such resistance weaning BTV
from government control? The foreign experts that came to start the television
project had a totally different orientation and agenda about television from the
local staff of the department. To them, government ownership of the media was a
thing of the past. Several reasons are explored; the timing of the birth of BTV in
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the political history of Botswana, co-option of the media through the bureaucratic
state machinery and BDP's success in inculcating a politics of fear and rule
among media workers, especially middle management. Lessons from the
formative years of BTV help to understand contemporary broadcasting dynamics
in Africa. Susan Wright (1994) argues that, beyond the ideological context of the
organisation, everyday individual lived experiences of the workers were important
in understanding their productive process. Steven Lukes (1974) also said,
[T]o use the vocabulary of power in the context of relationships is to speak
of human agents, separately or together, in groups or organisations,
significantly affecting the thoughts and actions of others. In speaking thus,
one assumes that, although the agents operate within structurally
determined limits, they nonetheless·have a relative autonomy and could
have acted differently..." (Lukes, 1974:54)
Raymond Williams (1974) wamed against technological determinism in thinking
about television. Television was not predestined to be, it was a result of a set of
particular social decisions, in particular circumstances (Williams, 1974:16). To
understand the impediments and inroads that BTV has met is best approached
by studying how organizational subcultures at the television station shaped and
were shaped by the politics of cultural production. This section focuses on the
everyday realities of journalists, producers, and managers of government-owned
BTV as the colluded with, resigned to, and resisted state power, to the degree
permissible within their context.
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Kevin Hunt and Ted Makgekgenene: State - of - the - art-
technology, nothing to air
The Botswana Television project, started in earnest in 1998, with intentions to go
on air on April 1999 (Makgekgenene's Briefing notes for new DIB, 2001). It was
hoped that BTY would be on air in time for the 1999 general elections
(Mmegi/The Reporter, 09 January 1998, BOPA Library). Thomas Nkhoma of the
BOPA wrote a headline story January 1998 announcing that the nation could
expect to view their television station in 18 to 24 months. The first member of the
television project team, Kevin Hunt, had started work on 19 January. A British
national, Hunt was commissioned to co-ordinate the starting up of the station.
Hunt was a 1960s graduate of Bournemouth Film School in the UK and claimed
a wealth of television production experience with camera, being a producer,
director, manager, setting up of television facilities and post-production. Hunt's
first comments were to inform the nation that the television service would
broadcast mainly News, and that more programmes would follow. Top on his
priority list was to train a small team of television experts that would help in the
initial stages of the project, both on the technical and production side.86 He was
hired for a monthly salary of about P26 000 (USD 5000), as the highest paid 'civil
servant'. After six months, Hunt had sourced Paul Famsworth as the senior
engineer for the project, and David Millard for training of staff for production and
programmes. Farnsworth would lead the local engineers in of DIB, working
closely with Habuji Sosome on transmission and States Batsalelwang on
operations (Interview with Robert Gray).
By the time the BTY project reached completion, it had met difficulties from
several factors. It was intended to go on air by the end of 1999.87 The
construction of BTY was commissioned in September 1998 by the Department of
Architecture and BUilding Services (DABS). In April 1999 some 500 workers
86 Botswana Daily News, 21 January 1998
87 The Botswana Daily News, 23 April 1999, http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=19990423
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engaged in the construction of BTV went on strike. By November 2000, even as
BTV had gone on air, DABS was extending the completion period of the Mass
Media Complex to the last half of 2002. Theko Fako of DABS cited multiple
problems of tendering, structural engineering, land surveying, and design. They
projected that the costs would go from the initial P155 million (USD 31 million) to
P329 million (USD 66 million) by November 2000.88 According to Makgekgenene,
the final estimated construction cost of BTV and the rest of the Mass Media
Complex was P308 600 million (USD 78million), with cost overruns to the tune of
P 80 million.89
BTV started with state - of - the - art television technology. The engineers
informed the researcher that BTV used Pan American Satellite (PAS) 7 satellite
technology, one of the best technologies in television broadcasting. The servers
and ports were Quantel Digital. They had fully automated editing and script-
writing by Omnibus and Associated Press' ENPS. ENPS had only been launched
4 4
in 1997.90 OmniBus technology automates ingest of all media, provides browse
and on-line full-resolution editing functionality, manual-assist and fully-automated
playout as well as sophisticated access to archive media via the Internet for
remote users.91 ENPS provided features including program rundowns, scripting,
planning, contacts, messaging, archiving, third-party device control, publishing,
News wire management, full text searching, tightly integrated resilience
capabilities and language support.92
..
A guided tour of the BTV studios and the master control rooms. Equipment
included brand names such as the latest JVC Video Tape Recorders (VTRs) and
professional monitors, Soundcraft B800 audio mixers, Ikegami Cameras, Sony
88 The Botswana Daily News, 20 November 2000, http://www.gov.bw/cgi-
bin/news.cgi?d=20001120
89 'Briefing notes for the new OIB' handing over notes provided to the researcher by former OIB
£irector, Ted Makgekgenene just before he retired.






Tascam, Phillips, Cyteck Back. They had fully equipped broadcast television
production vehicles, flyaway kits, and other technology. They delivered in state -
of - the - art digital video production; betacam SP, digibeta, digital video (DV),
digital video cameras (DVCAM). BTV conformed to 625 50Hz in the PAL 1
system. The entire studio production was serial digital inserter (SDI) data
encoder. This was a highly flexible digital video platform which carried out
encoding, insertion, reception, bridging and multiplexing of data in the vertical
blanking interval (VBI) and active video of any component serial digital television
signal. 93 BTV engineers were however quick to explain that technology became
obsolete very quickly, and that four years into the running of the station in 2004, it
was impossible to maintain that they still had state - of - the - art technology.
They agreed that the station was perhaps one of the most technologically
advanced in Africa, but that engineering required for stations to always be right
where technology was; updating their soft and hardware in tandem with the ever
evolving technology. Besides delays in construc!ion, according to Habuji
<
Sosome, aformer Director of Broadcasting, the project was 'technology and not
content led'. The engineering technology was ready in place way ahead of the
content side. Management of BTV all agreed that the infrastructure was there,
but there was nothing to air.
On 25 July, 2003, BOPA announced that DIB would soon be divided into two, the
Department of Broadcasting Services (DBS) and the Department of Information
Services (DIS). DIB would comprise of BTV and Radio Botswana while DIS
comprised of BOPA with its 22 district offices and the Publication Section
comprising the Botswana Daily News, Kutlwano t;10nthly magazin,e, and the
Photography and Publicity/Graphics sections. Minister Sebetela was reported
I '
saying that the split was as a result of an Organisation and Methods (O&M)
exercise undertaken by the Directorate of Public Service Management (DPSM). It
93 http://www.norpak.ca/Tes5.htm. website visited on May 11,2006.
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had been recommended that DIB was too large and needed to be split to bring
more focus into the services offered.94
The split of the department however, was initially television project team leader
Hunt's idea, and was intended to remove BTV from the control of govemment.
Hunt made most of the most important decisions. Batswana were invited to
compete for the name of the station. Names like IGoora motho', 'Sedibeng
Television Station', IKatlego', ILebone la Botswana', Tswelelo', ISeipone sa
Botswana', Tshupetso Station', Waledi ya meso', IMasa TV' and IBona 0 reetse'
came up from the contest. Hunt did not pick any of the suggested names, he
decided that the name shall be Botswana Television rather than Botswana
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) or Botswana Radio and Television (BRT). He
chose the broadcast technology, and the design of the station. He wrote in a
report entitled 'The Future of Television in Botswana" in May 199995 that he had
been given to understand that BTV was to be along BBC lines - to which he. .
strongly concurred (Hunt, 1999:2). He therefore wanted to 'set it up at arms
length from govemment; with editorial and operational autonomy enshrined in
some kind of 'charter' or Act of Parliament, akin to the BBC Royal Charter, which
guarantees its independence. If the Botswana govemment took such a step he
argued, it would only further the country's enviable reputation at home and
abroad (Hunt, 1999:2). BTV would then be free to be a "worthwhile, cost-effective
and pro-active broadcaster" (Hunt, 1999:4). Without a strong independent
foundation he said, BTV would lack credibility, be weak and ineffective (Hunt,
1999:3). To keep govemment running costs to the minimum, Hunt thought f?TV
could carry advertising commercials and rent out its facilities - studios, editing,
~ -
camera crews, outside broadcasting units and satellite services to the private. .
sector. This would "make it something of a hybrid - a state funded, public service
broadcaster with revenue earning capacity" (Hunt, 1999:3).
94 BOPA Daily News Archive, http://www.gov.bw/cgi-bin/news.cgi?d=20030725
95 Special thanks to the former Director of BTY and DIB, Ted Makgekgenene who graciously
made available to me this report and other reports on the early days of the television station that I
could otherwise never get access to.
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It appears that, in principle, local staff of DIB supported Hunt's idea of 'de-
coupling' BTV from government (Hunt, 1999:3), and perhaps Radio Botswana as
well. Government would keep the control of a separate Department of
Information. The Department of Information would then be responsible for public
information material of health, road and domestic safety, farming etc (Hunt,
1999:6). It was the request for "sufficient organizational and financial autonomy...
[not having] to comply with civil service payment schemes or with the
procurement regulations necessary for government departments" (Hunt, 1999:4),
that started to cause problems for Hunt. The same recommendation was made in
the 1993 Studio Hamburg Feasibility study into Botswana Television Service.
Interviews with Makgekgenene, Sosome, Tsiang, Phetlhu and other senior
managers of BTV at the time show that it was this vision that was to cause the .
termination of Hunt's services to DIB and the BTV project.
Ultimately, many that were there when BTV started felt that it was Hunt and
Makgekgene who could have given the birth of BTV a different history. One BTV
reporter said that the one man who failed BTV in achieving autonomy was
Makgekgenene, as the man who was the Director of DIB when the station was
born. Makgekgenene did not deny this; he accepted that when the television
project started, not one person in the country comprehended the demands,
magnitude and scope of the project. He succeeded in mobilising government
commitment to the project and financial resources, but did not have the
competence to draw a master plan that would to see the project to a successful
end. In retrospect, Makgekgel1ene saw that BTV did not become a parastatal
because OIB started the projectwithout a very clear conceptualisation of how this
I
I
would happen (Makgekgenene, interview, 2006).
Hunt's era was very short-lived. He was never to see the station take-off. BTV
failed to go on air on schedule. The construction company was unable to finish
on schedule, exacerbated by a strike by its employees. Pressure was mounting
132
on government to get the station off the ground. 8TV had failed to meet the initial
1999 General Elections deadline. The project was also delayed because
although the technology side was advancing very well, the production side was
lagging far behind. Hunt's management was also to be quickly seized by politics
of power and control. It became evident very quickly that the project
management, both local and expatriate had not fully understood what the job
would require before getting into it.
In trying to steer the station away from government control and other divisions of
018, it appears Hunt angered the old guard of the department. Their position,
presented by Sosome in an interview with the researcher was that the Cabinet
Directive that established the station was very clear that it would fall under 018,
and therefore that whatever obtained at Radio 80tswana would apply at 8TV.
Sosome, who had been with 018 since 1980 and said about himself, "ga ke tswe
hanD.. .! come from a long way with this department", was among those who
wanted Hunt gone. He did not sympathise with Hunt's frustration with the
government procedures for procuring funds. To Sosome, Hunt wanted to flout
due process, and that could not be permitted. Government standard procedure,
according to Sosome, must never be undermined. It appears Hunt had his own
ideas about who he would prefer to work with, rather than building on staff from
Radio 80tswana as the core of the new station. Under government, Sosome was
happy that, as Project Co-ordinator, Hunt would be able to implement his own
staffing agenda; he could only make recommendations to be sanctioned by the
Permanent Secretary at Ministerial level.
According to~Sosome, 8TV was nearly granted autonomy by government, until a
concern was raised by the old guard of 018. Calling themselves 'the concerned
group', the old guard instigated an auditors inquest to be made against Hunt's
rnanagement. As Sosome put it when interviewed, "Kevin Hunt had nothing to
offer for when the station went on air". Director of 018 at the time, Makgekgenene
himself admitted that when the television project started, not one person in the
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country comprehended the demands, magnitude and scope of the project. When
interviewed. Makgekgenene claimed BTV as his baby in many ways. He lobbied
for its establishment during his tenure. Initially it would be a small project
focusing specifically on News and Current Affairs. At a time when the
government was inundated by development projects for more basic necessities
such as schools, roads, health facilities, it was hard to convince government that
television was necessary. Once he had solicited financial commitment from
government to build BTV, he lobbied for a much bigger facility. There was a
problem of land. He managed to secure the land that the Mass Media Complex
now occupies after he received inside information that the projected that the land
had been earmarked for would not take off.
Makgekgenene failed to stand by Hunt and prove to government that he was
ready to run the station with autonomy. He had worked tirelessly to influence the
decision that gave birth to BTV. When the project became a nightmare, he was to
be overwhelmed and increasingly frustrated by a series of publicly embarrassing
problems. The project became a succession of crises management and damage
control episodes. In interviews, Makgekgenene's subordinate did not express
sympathy with his situation. He had approved the hiring of Hunt, and so was
partly blamed for all of Hunt's perceived failures. As the project met more delays,
Makgekgenene was put under pressure to do damage control and give progress
reports to the public. He posted a full colour centre page on the Botswana Daily
News in February 2000, showing images of progress in construction and
equipping of the facility. He also posted a sketch programme to 'wet the appetite'
of the public despite the fact that, there was no 'Production' or 'Programmes'
section to speak about (see appendix 9).
Towards the end of 1999, the government started to demand answers from DIB
on why BTV was falling behind schedule, instigated in part by the older and more
conservative section of DIB (Interviews with Tsiang, Gray and Sosome).
PriceWaterHouse & Cooper auditors probed into why Millard left, and the supply
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of equipment. 'Scores of British suppliers' were apparently arbitrarily been
awarded tenders to supply equipment that some local suppliers could have
supplied.96 Auditors reported over-expenditure, negligence and passing wrongful
information to government on the part of Hunt.97 The then acting Permanent
Secretary to the President, Samuel Rathedi, alleged that equipment estimated to
have cost the government hundreds of thousands of Pula had gone missing.98
Responding to the NewsFlash report, the project's senior engineer, Farnsworth,
called the PriceWaterHouse & Cooper audit report a farce. According to him, the
supposed negligence reported in it had been refuted by Hunt with full supporting
documentation. As far as the missing equipment, he reported that two pairs of
speakers had been stolen during the construction phase, costing GBP 1600 (P12
800) a pair, hardly hundreds of thousands of Pula. He explained the delay in the
launch 'as having been largely due to the building running a year behind
schedule. It was due to be handed over in April 1999 but was not finished until
April 2000.
Hunt and Farnsworth also began to exclude other managers from design making.
Millard dumped the project team b~fore the end of the year. He later said in an
interview with a local private radio station that he left because he did not share
the same vision with Hunt and Farnsworth, the senior engineer'for the project on
the appropriate technology for BTV. Millard found digital broadcasting
inappropriate for a developing country with no experienced human resource. It
was also at the time still in experimental stage even in developed countries.99
Hunt was forced to resign from his job in March 2000.100
96Botswana Guardian, 12 October 1999, BOPA Library
97NewsFlash, 22 May 2000
98 http://www.africafilmtv.com/pages/newsflash/nf681.htm).
99 Mmegi Monitor, April 25 2000, pg 3, Courtesy of the Botswana Press Agency,
100 Mmegi Monitor, March 03 April 2000, pg 3, Courtesy of the Botswana Press Agency,
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Simon Higman and the BBC Intervention - April to August 2000
At the end of February 2000, BTV was still under construction. 101 According to
Mosiieman and Tsheko, staff had very little to do. Higman later noted in October
2000 that the project team was in disarray (Higman Report, 2000). The citizen
staff, with the support of expatriates like training coordinator Robert Gray, rallied
government support to oust Hunt, but the project was increasingly becoming a
public scandal. After what Sosome aptly labelled the 'Hunt experiment',
Makgekgenene was pressurised to bring in BBC to salvage the project. Gideon
Nkala and Modirwa Kekwaletswe of the Mmegi Newspaper reported that towards
the end of Hunt's stay at BTV, he and Makgekgenene were 'trading bile in
public'.
People began to ask Why it was not the BBC that was contracted to lead the
project seeing that they have historically provided technical and human resource
assistance to the government media in Botswana. The BBC expressed interest to
• 4
help BTV to the launch. At the end of April 2000, Makgekgenene brought in two
BBC Resources consultants, David Manning and Liz Duckworth to make a needs
assessment for BTV; the station strategy, financial management, programming,
and all operation so that BTV could go on air in July 2000 (Manning and
Duckworth, 2000). They were to assess the project and come up with solutions.
The team was further commissioned to look into technical and operational areas
and come up with short and long term solutions and identify training needs. The
BBC consultancy found that there was 'little readiness for the lauf)ch in critical
areas'. In May 2000, BTV had no strategy. The very few and demoralised staff
that had been recruited and trained did not have clear job descrip!ion and
therefore clear functions, roles and responsibilities. It was still to be decided if it
I
was going to be an entertainment channel, a News channel or a distinctly
Botswana channel with local in house and independent content not available in
other stations in the region. If it went the entertainment route, it would have to
rely on acquisition of expensive high quality foreign programmes and be able to
101 Botswana Daily News, 31 March 2000
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compete for audiences with SABe and M-Net. It could become a News channel
like CNN and SKY, or a distinctive and original channel (Manning and
Duckworth,2000).
The Manning and Duckworth report identified several key areas where BTV most
needed attention in order to launch. The station needed to define its identity -
editorial remit, target audiences, branding, promotion and publicity, advertising
sales. It also needed to set up channel management that would take care of
programme content, programme sourcing, scheduling, set design, presenter
training and appearance. Human resource management would have to be put in
place to match staff numbers and skills to output requirements, recruitment,
appraisal, ongoing training, operational deployment, working practices. Finally,
the station needed financial management to put in place accounting procedures,
systems for monitoring and controlling expenditure, for maximising income and
for reporting results.
One of the recommendations was that a seasoned broadcasting manager be
appointed on a temporary based and they recommended Simon Higman to
replace Kevin Hunt. BBC Resources signed a GBP 500 000 (-+P4million) deal
with the govemment of Botswana to bring in teams of experts to take the project
to each next stage towards launching. First, The BBC categorically sought full
government support for the project. The BBC needed assurance that its plans
would not be compromised by the slow bureaucratic revenue procurement
processes of government, which was part of the reason that the project had
failed. They had a reputation to protect.102
The BBC had a very specific mandate, to get BTV to launch and save the
Botswana government growing public embarrassment. The team leader, Simon
Higman, who acted in the capacity of General Manager for the station,
announced in the middle of July 2000 that the station would go on air on or
102 The Botswana Guardian, June 02 2000, pg 2, Courtesy of the Botswana Press Agency.
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before July 31 2000 (Higman report, 2000). Higman committed the station
announced that for a start the BTV schedule would be about 60 percent local.
During the week, the programmes would run from 19:00 to 22:00 and at
weekends from 14:00 to 22:00. BTV would run advertisements and carry
sponsorship for some but not all programmes. News would not be sponsored in
order to guarantee it is independent and seen to be independent. He expected
that BTV would take advantage of its late-coming to learn from lessons of older
television stations to ensure it gets most of the programming right. BTV would, as
most of the developing world, be a combination of government and American or
British programming and be funded by government. He however, hoped the bulk
of BTV programmes would be produced locally. Initially local programmes would
be done exclusively by BTV, but all Batswana would be encouraged to produce
as the station grew. They needed to guarantee that their News was independent,
or seen to be independent.103 Higman, was in October of the same year
describing BTV as .a station that wO.!Jld 'promote the values, the influence and the
democratic stability of Botswana throughout the SADC region. The initial
emphasis was on sports, music and talk shows; Setswana being the dominant
language.104
Around the same time as the BBC was coming into the project, Chris Bishop was
recruited in 2000 to lead News and Current Affairs. According to then Senior
Programmes Manager, Robert Gray, Bishop came during the transitional period,
just as Hunt was leaving, and stayed until after the BBC 'rescue team' (Interview
with Gray, 2006). As the core mandate of BTV was initially to be News and
Current Affairs, it was given a hea,d start over the productions section. The BBC
gave Gray a new position of Head of Productions. Head of Operation was Martin
, I
Hillman. It appears however that soon after offering him this new appointment,
Higman changed his mind about Gray. In a report Higman gave in October 2000,
he wrote, "the management team was in disarray with some seriously inadequate
103 Botswana Daily News, July 14 2000, pg 1, Courtesy of the Botswana Press Agency.
104 Higman S., (2000) Botswana Television Progress, Problems and Opportunities. BBC
Consulting and Projects.
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members, others in the wrong jobs, and no job definitions...one of the expatriotes
has proven not up to the standard required and moved on" (Higman, 2000).
The firing of Hunt made other expatriates increasingly worried they would be
dismissed in the same way. Although Makgekgenene told the local papers at the
end of March 2000 that other expatriates did not have to fear for their jobs,105 one
month later senior engineer Farnsworth put up notices at BTV that he would be
leaving in three months. He quit four months after Hunt in July 2000, after a two
year contract. 106 South African Robert Gray was brought in after David Millard to
head training, but also left soon after the launch of the station. More of the
expatriates left within the first three years, including Chris Bishop who was Head
of News and Current Affairs, Martin Hillman who was Head of Operations, and
the head graphic designer. On 27 July 2000, the Botswana Daily News reported
that BTV would launch its programmes with live coverage of a charity football
.match between. Super League sides, Mochudi Centre Chiefs and Extension
Gunners at the national stadium. The station went on air 29 July 2000 and was
officially launched on 31 July, without much spectacle.
In 2003 when this research commenced Habuji Sosome, then Director of DIB,
continued to blame the existing uneasy relationship between the state and BTV
squarely on Kevin Hunt. Referring to the mood of the newly hired television staff
under Hunt, Sosome said, ''There was a cultural disorientation among people.
"Re ne ra bona gore batho ba a timela, " we saw that people were losing
direction, and we just set back and watched". What is meant here is that the old
guard of the d~partment very Dearly lost control of the television station and
therefore possible new avenues of power. "The government discovered it nearly
, '
made a mistake and decided to halt the process of making television
independent, so that it sorts itself out and matures". Sosome felt that, although
Hunt left before the launch, he had already successfully sowed the sentiment
105 Botswana Daily News, March 31 2000. pp 5. Courtesy of Botswana Press Agency library
106 Botswana Daily News, April 28 2001, Courtesy of the Botswana Press Agency.
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even among the local former employees of Radio Botswana that television was
best placed outside government.
Once the BBC had accomplished the assignment of seeing BTV to the launch,
they practically left the station to its own devise, to swim or drown. Once again
locals had to make do with their limited experience and scrutiny and criticism
from both the government and the public. In the end, the general feeling among
staff about the BBC Consultants as captured by outgoing DIB Director at the end
of 2001 was that,
The BBC consultancy is not affordable and we do not seem to be gaining
much out of their current involvement. They are a typically British
occupying force - their advice plus attention is not genuine as usuaL
Please pay attention to what they say but do what you think is best.
Oshinka Tsiang, Simon Higman and Makgekgenene could provide more
information when time permits (Makgekgene briefing notes for new DIB,
2001 ).
Makgekgenene retired at the end of 2001, saying "my departure could not have
come at a better time because relationships are no longer strained like in the
past", (Makgekgenene Briefing notes for the new DIB) but his departure in many
ways signalled an acceptance that he had failed the struggle for editorial
freedom. This section focuses on the everyday realities of journalists, producers,
and managers of government-owned BTV as the colluded with, resigned to, and
resisted state~ power, to the degree permissible within their context.
Of collusion, apathy and resistance: BTV, the picture of a nation
divided
Challenging about the arrival of BTV at this point in the life of Botswana's
democracy, was that nation-building project started during colonialism was
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undergoing tremendous strain. From the mid 1990s, ethnic politics were at the
forefront more than ever before in our postcolonial history. Locating and
representing a national identity in the context of the ongoing contestation over
citizenship and belonging makes the politics of representation key to the
commissioning process. Contestation over ethnic identity, belonging and land
rights for indigenous minorities were challenging the invented homogeneity of
tribes in Botswana that started at the eve of colonialism and more aggressively
implemented by Seretse Khama, first President of Botswana. As already
discussed, Khama was preferred by the outgoing colonial administration for his
liberal democratic position compared to the more African nationalist opponents
like Phillip Matante and Motsamai Mpho in the early days of party politics.
Seretse Khama saw mass media as a tool for forging legitimacy for his Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP) government and its policies, as became evident in the
language of the Hughes and Lawrence consultancy reports commissioned dUring
his tenure. He also, being the first leader of a newly formed republic, critically
needed to use mass media to forge a collective mass of people identifying as
citizens, no longer diverse groupings at different levels of political organization.
An imagined community of Batswana was targeted that together could participate
in the development of their country.
Khama's government solidified an ethnic hierarchy through sections 77, 78 and
79 of the Constitution that established the House of Chiefs, and allotted chiefs
from the so-called eight major Tswana tribes, ex-officio membership into the
House. All the other tribes could have elected and specially elected membership
into the House. Over thirty years later, with a lot of pressure from the
inadequately represented tribes, the BDP, now under Mogae, had to submit an
Amendment Bill to the Constitution in 2003. Parliament adopted a motion on 17
February 1995, "to promote Nation Building by amending Sections 77, 78 and 79
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to render them tribally neutral".107 A heated debate ensued at each village and
town where the President addressed the nation about the proposed changes;
with tribes favoured by the status quo against the changes, and others for the
changes. At a village of Molepopole of one of the 'major' tribes, the President
was verbally abused by those that felt he was meddling with issues that were
above him, labelling him as of inferior stock. As illustrated in previous chapters,
Botswana had her own share of the colonial encounter, often under the shadow
of apartheid, as James Zaffiro accurately characterized it. "...when people do not
share historical memories of the past, it is difficult for them to weave together a
common future which is respected, cherished and adhered to by all" (Diescho,
1997:77).
The greatest challenge so far to Botsw~na's invented homogeneity, was the
battle by the Khoisan peoples of the Central Kgalagadi Game Reserve (CKGR)
for their indigenous land rights. Sidsel Saugestad (2001) says about the position
of the Khoisan Peoples in Botswana, or Basarwa as known in popular discourse
in Botswana, that it is widely regarded as "a very sensitive issue" (Saugestad,
2001 :36). This was evident even from the fact that until some time in 2006,
'Relocation of Basarwa' was the only issue given specific mention on the official
government website. 108 In the name of development, government sought to move
the peoples out of the reserve under the pretext of preserving wildlife, shifting the
lives of the people from dependence on natural resources and bringing them
closer to social amenities such as health and education.109 The CKGR was
allocated by the colonial government in 1961 for the protection of traditional land
use patterns of the San. The United Kingdom based Survival International (SI)
led an international campaign to assist First Peoples of the Kalahari (FPK) to
107 His Excellency Mr. Festus Gontebanye Mogae President of the Republic of Botswana
independence day message to the nation, 29 September, 2003. Embassy of the Republic of




109 'Water, health and education services',
http://www.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=65&ltemid=80
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resist government; in order to force government to reconsider, they targeted
Botswana's diamonds. SI mounted aggressive campaigns against the
government of Botswana by targeting the country's most important source ot'
income: diamonds. One Khoisan was quoted as having said, 'These are conflict
diamonds because diamonds are the root of our sorrow and pain. They caused
us to be moved from the land of our ancestors. We say these diamonds are
killing us the Bushmen".11o SI sought for a reclassification of Botswana's
diamonds as blood diamonds. In the latest turn of events, with the aid of SI, Roy
Sesana, leader of FPK, appealed to Hollywood actor Leonardo diCaprio to
support their campaign against relocation. DiCaprio stars in a movie about a
blood-diamond dealer in Sierra Leone, The Blood Diamond.111 President Mogae
had to make a number of international trips, the latest being in October 2006 in
New York, to defend Botswana diamonds (Lesley Wroughton and Maggie Fox,
Reuters, 11 October 2006).112 After a long protracted legal battle, on 13
December 2006, the High Court of Botswana ruled the Botswana govemment
" 0
had illegally evicted the San people from their ancestral lands in what is now the
Central Kalahari Game Reserve. 113
Francis Kasoma (1995) has said about government-owned media in Africa that it
is never free, for governments invariably control what the media mayor may not
publish. There were moments when the BTV acted purely the role of the
government such as before and during the March 2004 CIVICUS World Summit
which was hosted by Botswana and the 2004 general elections. Botswana was
the host of the CIVICUS Summit, and it was expected that the international
community of civil societies would put the host country, on the spot for forcibly
relocating San peoples from the CKGR and limiting its use for wildlife (Interview
with BTV reporter, Kefilwe Mokgaotsane). The Office of the President sponsored





113 Mmegi online, http://www.mmegi.bw/2006/DecemberlThursday14/index.html
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across the spectrum. According to Kefilwe Mokgaotsane, one of the BTV
reporters who took part in the tour, this was done to 'give them the facts', so that
they would support the view of govemment and 'protect' the image of the
Botswana govemment against any 'foreign' attacks. A voice over (VO) she wrote
for the News bulletin on 3 November 2004 (see appendix 10) on the relocation
was neither objective nor impartial, and lacked in facts,
Govemment's campaign to tell its side of the story on the Relocation of
Basarwa [Khoisan] have been long, and more often than not, set back by
statements made by Survival Intemational. However, they continue to
- .
explore avenues in which they can win this campaign. In 2002 they
launched a Website mainly set to address the issues of the relocation and
to counteract statements by Survival Intemational. Govemment's efforts
are beginning to bear fruit.
<
Clip - Maribe [Govemment spokesperson]
In the latest of their approach to this problem, they recently took a group of
Joumalists and Members of Non Govemmental Organisations to both the
old and the new settlements. Observations made by the Joumalists and
the Civil Society could make a difference to the Campaigns.
Clip-VOX
The reality on the ground has seen many change their stanye on the
matter, including the head of NGO's.
Clip - Moletsane
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Government does not undermine the impact of statements made by
Survival International, especially that they link the relocation to the
Backbone of Botswana's economy, diamonds.
Clip - Maribe
As the campaign continues, perhaps with support from NGO's and all
those who tell the truth the way it is, this issue will finally fade off, and let
Basarwa enjoy the services given to them by Government without anyone
spoiling it for them (Mokgaotsane, BTV News bulletin, 3 November
2004).114
Elections were also a tightly managed affair in the government media. At the end
of 2003, as election campaigns heated up, at the instruction of Minister Sebetela,
BTV was stopped from airing political rallies except those where the President,
< <
the Vice President and Cabinet Minister, were attending. Effectively this meant
that only the ruling party got to use the national television for its campaigns. The
opposition parties noted that while their important events went unreported on
national television, BTV reported favourably major BDP events (Botswana
Guardian, 23 April, 2004).
The Public Service Act and ideological state control
Botswana has earned international accolades as having one of the best
bureaucracies in Africa, but as fan Taylor (200~) argues, if Botswana still
emerges the best, given quite a 'number of probiematic state - bureaucracy -
civil society relations, then perhaps this is "as good as it gets" (Taylor, 2003:215).
Partly through disabling Public Service employment statutes and with specific
reference to the short history of BTV, through politics of favouritism and witch
114 Courtesy of STV Newsroom
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hunting, the BDP was able to successfully legitimise its control of the television
station. At the organisational level, the state did own the media. The ruling BDP
succeeded in utilising mass media to reinforce its hegemony among the public as
the only viable political alternative as evident in its win of successive elections
since independence in 1965. lan Taylor (2003) labelled the BDP 'adept in co-
option, the ability to minimize the threat of counter-hegemonic politics. Even "the
various parastatal and statutory bodies in Botswana are largely controlled by a
small group of politically trusted senior bureaucrats" (Taylor, 2003:218).
Elsewhere, Taylor also argued that the ruling party particularly used prolonged
control of the media to co-opt and integrate potentially opposing forces (Taylor,
2002).
Monageng Mogalakwe dates the first trade union in the then Bechuanaland
Protectorate, to 1948 when the Whites only European Civil Service Association
was formed, followed a year later in 1949 by the African Civil Service Association
< 0
(Mogalakwe, 1997:99). Although by 1995, government employed about 42
percent of the labour force in Botswana,115 until 2004, the workers did not have a
right to form or belong to a trade union. They could only belong to staff
associations such as The Botswana Civil Service Association (BCSA), the
Botswana Unified Local Government Staff Association (BULGASA) and the
Botswana Federation of Secondary School Teachers (BOFESETE) (Mogalakwe,
1997:92-93). They were barred by law from getting into collective bargaining with
the government, their employer because they were employed under the Public
Service Act. As civil servants, they were excluded from the definition of
employees in the Trade Unions Act, Trade Disputes Act and Employment Act.
~ -
Government was also excluded from the definition of employer, except for
, .
industrial or casual labour employees (Briscoe, 2000). It was only in April 2004
that the Acts were amended in line with International Labour Organization (ILO)
conventions no 87, 98, and 151 which Botswana had ratified since 1997. It took
115 M · . fF'lOlStry 0 mance and Development Planning (1996), Annual Economic Report cited by Mogalakwe
(1997). '
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seven years for the ratification to become law. Unlike in countries like South
Africa where ratification of international conventions automatically gave them
precedence over local laws unless local laws were more up to date, in Botswana,
Amendments must first go through Parliament for domestication. Consultations
among stakeholders, preparation of Bills and Parliamentary debate delayed
ratification. Government involved the Botswana Confederation of Commerce,
Industry & Manpower (BOCCIM) and the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions
(BFTU) in the consultation processes.116
Amendments of Section 48 of the Trade Unions Act allowed government
employees, including BTV staff to unionise, with the exception of the Botswana
Defence Force, Prisons Department and the Botswana Police. Assistant
Commissioner of Labour, Valerie Seemule, expressed disappointment at union'
activity in Botswana, "They are still only concerned with bread and butter issues.
They are lagging behind compared to unions in other parts of the world that are
also tackling issues relating to globalisation and HIV/AIDS in the workplace."
Government however, still showed a lack of commitment of the welfare of its
workforce. The Department of Labour could previously mitigate in disputes
relating to unions. Workers associations campaigned against statutory state
intervention in union activity disputes. As workers unions and associations go
through teething stages of the processes, the department was too happy to take
a back seat. "We gave them a long rope to hang themselves", said Seemule.
According to Seemule, for many years before the Amendment of the Acts,
government "Yorkers associations complained bitterly about this state of affairs,
especially after ratification. By February 2006, 18months after the Amendment
I '
government workers associations had only made inquiries; there was not a single
government workers union registered with the registrar of unions. Clearly newly
found Statutory freedoms cannot erase many years of systematic instillation of
116 Valerie Seemule, assistant Commissioner of Labour gregariously agreed to be interviewed
and provided this very information about labour relations in Botswana.
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fear by state among govemment employees. It will take time for many of the
workers to shed the culture of self censorship. The Public Service Act and the
Government General Orders are likely to continue to terrorise the civil service.117
For the first group of locals to work for Botswana national television broadcaster,
it all started with an advert in local Newspapers in May 1998 (see appendix 11).
Wayne Levy (2003:233) reports that over 3000 people applied and only 100 was
selected for training. In May 1998, the Department of Information and
Broadcasting, through the government Central Tender Board invited proposals to
tender for a series of six week television foundation courses. It would be entry
level training for all staff recruited for the Botswana National Television Service,
held on a rolling basis. Six batches of twenty students with no previous television
broadcast experiences would within six weeks be given a general introduction to
broadcast television, and those that could not cope eliminated.118 The training
programme would develop student's skills and knowledge quickly from nothing to
a level of being able to run the television station when it opened. Several
television training centres responded, including the Sony Training Centre, in
Basingstoke, United Kingdom. The project team had meetings with the Sony
Training Centre team in Gaborone on 27th and 28th April 1998. Sony was also
interested to provide the second stage of training which would be hands on.
Students that would have successfully completed the first six-week course would
get on to a six-month training course, based at the Basingstoke Training Centre.
Course content included cameras and outside broadcast work, post production
and effects, audio and audio production for video, studio and outside broadcast
lighting, computers and computing for television, the digital environment, first line
maintenance of television equipment, transmission and vision mixing. There
would also be elective modules in journalism and news presentation, programme
production and studio management, and archiving and research methods.119
116 The Botswana Daily News, May 151998, No. 90 pg 6.
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Starting a television on no experience, 1998·1999
Tender proposals were received from several television training schools in the
UK and from a few local centres. It became apparent from proposals such as one
above by SONY - PrimeSkills, SONY Broadcast and Professional Europe that
training would be a very costly exercise. For each student, Sony - PrimeSkills
quoted at GBP61 865 (P500 000) for just over seven months of training (see
appendix 12). A local training centre, Dipolelo Video Arts, directed by John
Clement and Renee Gilbey was awarded the tender to do the crash course for
significantly much less. Clement told the researcher when interviewed in 2006
that both he and Gilbey were Canadians, and first came to Botswana in 1992 as
volunteers under the World University SerVice of Canada (WUSC), attached to a
local NGO, Worldview Botswana. Their job with Worldview Botswana was to
provide twelve week foundation level courses for local video artists. Some of the
local video producers they trained were George Eustice credited for producing
the first BTV commissioned drama, Re bina mmogo and Botswana's first local
filmmaker, Moabi Mogorosi who produced Hot Chilli. During this time, they
became very disgruntled with the tendency among some NGOs to be 'images of
government'. They were told at Worldview Botswana to avoid political issues,
thereby serving the NGOs and providing skills for personal growth among local
artists. At the end. of their two contracts with WUSC, Clement and Gilbey
established Dip~lelo Video Arts.
The BTV Training Workshop took place at the University of Botswana, Gaborone.
The four week course was in two parts; part one lasting one and a half weeks
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introduced them to the very basics of television production, concepts and
definitions. For the last two and a half weeks, they went through a series of
productions related exercises, where their strengths in the different aspects of
production were also identified. It covered directing, field production, studio and
field camera work, lighting, presenting, editing and reporting. Most of the training
was done by the two of them, but there were guest lectures by local broadcast
engineer for the Department of Information and Broadcasting, States
Batsalelwang, a member of the project team, South African Mooiji Parshotam
who was to teach journalism and David Millard who was briefly in the project
team, in charge of programming and training of staff (Interview with Clement,
2006).
Clement was aware that employees from the existing government-owned radio
and print media were also allowed to apply for jobs in television. Following
successful performance in interviews, the first crop of BTV staff first und~rwent
this crash course. Asked what they thought of this course, for most of the BTV
staff that attended it with no previous television training, it was the four-week
crash course in Gaborone was the most useful. It was perceived as much more
'rigorous', 'intense', 'gruelling', 'through', 'organized' compared to the next level
course at the BOP TV studios in Mmabatho, South Africa. It gave them a clear
idea of what production entailed, but was compromised by a lack of television
equipment. They would makeoomini-productions in make-shift studios, where they
learnt how to direct, do interviews both at the field and on studio, write scripts
and train to work the long hours television required. They were also talk how to
treat footage although they could not do picture editing for lack of edit suites.
They would review the footage to see if the initial idea had been successfully
,
executed, whether or not relevant questions were asked and that sort of thing. It
was during this training that people were told where their strengths were; and for
most of the 'would be' producers, this is when this strength was identified.
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Part of the course was also to eliminate trainees who lacked the aptitude to leam
and work for television. Clement recalled that two senior and experienced people
from Radio Botswana had to be eliminated from television production. Gasenna
Moloi, one of the few people eliminated during this process took the matter to
Court.120 Moloi queried her elimination when she held a Bachelors degree and
some people without any qualifications were selected. The advert had put the
minimum qualification as diploma or above. Reflecting on the elimination part of
the training, Clement said in interviews with the reasercher in 2006 that he felt it
should not have been done so hastily, that four weeks was too short to decide if
people were cut out for television or not.
Much of the information about the training in Mmabatho was obtained from
Robert Gray, in an interview and through correspondences he shared with the
researcher in 2006. For a period from 23 November 1998121 to June 1999,
trainees arrived in Mmabatho on what .was called a 'rolling bases'. Robert Gray,
an experienced South African television broadcaster, was hired to replace
Millard. He .was approached by an Irish recruitment company called PARC Ltd to
apply. He was selected and offered a three year contract from December 1998,
just in time for the second level of the training. Gray started from an engineering
background and grew into production as primary an outside broadcast planner,
which was his last job at SABC. He had multi-camera expertise. Gray had
extensive experience in radio and television broadcasting. He had helped to set
up SABC's TV2 and TV3, both of which were targeted at black South African
audiences. He had also founded City Varsity in Cape Town, one of the renowned
television colleges in South Africa. By December 16~ 1998, Gray hac! 'covered
lectures in television an electronic medium, signal transmission, move to digital,
, .
formats, the grey scale, contrast ratio, colour temperature, camera filters, editing
120 MmegilThe Reporter, February 26, 1999. pp 14, Courtesy of the Botswana Press Agency
~BOPA) library.
21 Date acquired from a letter dated 3 December 1998 from Robert Gray to Richard Makgotlho
SABC Regional Manager for the North West. '
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aesthetics, building a screen event, post production editing, live edits, and other
techniques.
BOP TV was a national broadcaster for the former Bantustan of
Bophuthatswana. When the ANC govemment took over power from the white
minority govemment, Bophuthatswana was incorporated into the rest of South
Africa, and of necessity, BOP TV had to become part of SABC. SABC was
reluctant to adopt BOP TV and the station had to close down. Workers had to be
laid off, and only a few were retained by SABC. This caused a lot of intemal
strife, which unfortunately came to affect the training of BTV staff. BOP TV failed
to avail facilities on required time. The necessary on the job technical training
. seNices were often lacking. Although some of the staff was very helpful, the
training program was disrupted by irregular staff availability for training.
Gray was indirectly instrumental in the decision to use BOP TV facilities for
training, even before he was officially contracted. He had been communicating
with former Head of BTV training and programming, David Millard, and had
suggested to him to approach BOP TV as a possible option. BTV project
management started the process of hiring BOP TV studios. Before he came, the
Botswana govemment entered into a contract with BOP TV that the latter would
supply equipment including lighting kits, cameras, microphone kits, field
monitors, an audio facility, sound recording equipment, ENG kits and an
operational crew for P5 million (USD 1 million). Compared to the P500 000 per
student for six months that the Sony Training Centre in Basingstoke had quoted,
this was very cheap. For the sixty_ five trainees, govemment would have paid
Sony P32. 5 million (USD 7 million). Because BOP TV failed to meet some of,
I
their contractual obligations (see appendix 13), Gray was able to get the overall
charge reduced to only R3 million (P5 million or USD 1million) for the seven
months of training (InteNiew with Gray, 2006).
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Gray arrived into the scene soon after the training started and was to have to
face many logistical problems although he had little knowledge of the exact deal
between the govemment and the SABC. He pointed out to Peter Matsetse,
Administrative Secretary to the Office of the President (OP) that it appeared
negotiations with the SABC "were conducted with persons with little or no
understanding of training needs and related logistics within the television
environment".122 He challenged Hunt's competence as Project Management
leader. Gray's earliest correspondence regarding the difficulties he was facing
was dated 3 December 1998. He wrote a letter to SABC North West Regional
Manager Richard Makgotlho and copied to Project Leader Kevin Hunt, Ken
Masupe of the OP, States Batsalelwang who was the DIB senior engineer and
Moolji Parshotham who at the time was doing the general housekeeping. Gray
reported that students morale was lowering as the promised BOP TV operational
crew that was supposed to give them practical training was failing to meet its
obligation. There were intemal politics at BOP TV about compensation of staff for
, .
the exercise that resulted in some of the crew not appearing on scheduled
activities. Three days later on 6 December, Gray called a meeting inviting Hunt,
Masupe, and Parshotham. Agenda' items were transport, staff attitude, monthly
report, contract signing, tapes, training in hotel, secretary for January, information
regarding equipment and invoices (see appendix 14). For the months following,
Gray said there was very little support from Hunt in so far as resolving training
problems despite the many letter of complaint Gray wrote. BOP TV equipment
was either not available on time or in poor condition. Gray had to tackle
engineering problems for which he was not paid.
Gray started by .organising Newsroom facilities from BOP TV, that had been
I '
omitted from the list of hired facilities, despite the fact that News was the core
mandate of BTV. Although many of the trainees argued that Mmabatho training
lacked focus and clear guidelines, Gray called his method of training the
122 Letter dated 6 January 1999 to Mr. P Matsetse, Administrative Secretary, Presidents Office,
courtesy of Robert Gray.
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'producer-learning' criteria. Students were to specialise soon as it was possible.
Gray was unhappy about the capabilities of most of the trainees. The television
project consultants had instructed a policy of multi-skills training, but Gray
preferred to create actual job functions for students within the training process.
Instead of giving students the impression that after the training, they would
eventually choose the job they wanted, Gray sought to categorise the
prospective employees according to their aptitudes in the broad categories of
Production, Operations and Engineering. He did not think the trainees needed
structured modules like in a classroom; it was a time to get television
broadcasting off the ground. Within a few months of heading the training, Gray
was considered for the position of Senior Producer. Office of the President, which
was the Ministry in charge of broadcasting in Botswana, sent a team of two
including Administrative Secretary Phillip Matsetse to interview Gray and he was·
offered the job. The idea was that he gets other content besides News and
Current Affairs off the ground.
For what would become BTV News, Gray started by organising Newsroom
facilities from BOP TV. Although news was central to BTV, a newsroom and
news studios had been omitted in the hiring of facilities. The newsroom became
the focal point of all other training needs; camera, lighting, sound, directing,
producing, editing, graphics, operations, engineering and all other aspects
television broadcasting. Gray led hands on training of about sixty-five locals for
news and current affairs which was priority, technical operations and
engineering. At the beginning of January 1999, Gray evaluated the performance
of trainees anc! proposed the first job allocations (see appendix 15)
Gray was keen to start on dummy broadcast exercises by mid January and
needed an operational structure. It appears that there were complaints about the
first allocations he proposed, hence the second option of applying for posts. This
also seems not to have gone well with the trainees. Trainees had issues with the
training, posts, rank and salary structures. On a letter dated 11 January 1999,
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Gray furnished them with yet another job allocation schedule, after further
discussions with the Botswana Television Project Management. He was informed
that all delegates were on probation with the Department of Information and
Broadcasting and that final allocation would be made by the department on merit.
For News, and temporary allocations were made with Oshinka Tsiang as Acting
Managing Editor News. Assignment Editors were other locals, Simon Moilwa and
Norman Patlakwe. The first to be selected to be BTV journalists were Reginald
Richardson, Doreen Moapare and Kefilwe Mokgaotsane. Newsreaders would be
Tsiang, Moilwa and Amilia Malebane, with Tsiang also hosting Current Affairs
with Moilwa and Patlakwe. The weather would be presented by Richardson and
Moapare (see appendix 16).
BTV has become the newest space for of. cultural production in Botswana.
Cultural Production is the production and consumption of representations that
affects the construction of identities - national, ethnic, religious, occupational,
familial, sex and gender (Thompson, 1997:1). It is yet too early to declare BTV
one of the largest culture-producing institutions in Botswana, in the way that
Graham Murdock (1982:120) says of the BBC in Britain, but there is strong
indication that it is making an impact. It is also too early to say that its products
are cultural products in the sense of adequately reflecting class, gender,
ethnicity, religion, age and family in Botswana. BTV News, Current Affairs and
local programming is still in infantile stages. What is true is that BTV does make
certain representations, and that these occur within a cultural context. Cultural
production at BTV is an encounter between television technologies and
conventions and the cultural socio-political context, articulated through the
human resource working behind the technology. Once BTV was successfully
launched onto the airwaves after the many delays that began to embarrass
government, it had to broadcast back to back images to the nation, despite







Of Africanisation, improvisation and and control: BTV,
the early years
A.H.M. Kirk-Greene asked in 1972, a decade into independence of many African
countries, "what Africanisation was all about"? He was suggesting that perhaps
the change of colour of the bureaucracy in Africa, or Africanisation, while
welcome, may not. have yielded intended results. This he said was because, of
necessity, Africanisation involved "'crash' training and accelerated promotion to
the top of the best local talent, in such short a time as was safely - rather than
reasonably possible" (1972:94). While arguments as these generally tend to
undermine tremendous efforts by underpaid and suppressed government
<
workers across Africa, it fairly represented the history of government-owned
mass media in Botswana, as demonstrated in chapter one. It ~as true of the
establishment of RB and it remained true in the establishment of BTV.
The following section shows how the earliest formations of BTV, particularly the
BTV Newsroom were created through improvisation, 'Africanisation', and control,
sometimes for the best of the station, but sometimes to its detriment. Oshinka
Tsiang, for example although 'fast-tracked' rather qUickly to position of General
Manager for BTV, demonstrated superb leadership skills right from the
conception of the Newsroom. On the other hand, government control of BTV led
to the frustration and resignation of Head of News, Chris Bishop, which caused
BTV a major loss towards a creative, objective and impartial News agency.
Robert Gray, a South African who replaced British David Millard as supervisor of
training of the first crop of BTV, was to also later be sidelined and he too later
resigned. Gray's resignation was interesting because, as he told the researcher
in an interview, it came as a result of collusion between the locals and the BBC
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consultants. As will come out in the proceeding discussion, while he teamed up
with locals to oust Kevin Hunt, they later teamed with BBC consultants to oust
him.
Oshinka Tsiang and the formation of the BTV News and Current
Affairs
News and Current Affairs was identified as the core mandate of BTV right from
inception. The nucleus of BTV News and Current Affairs was the earliest
structure of station to form. An account provided by Oshinka Tsiang when
interviewed in 2004 and 2006 showed that, BTV News and Current Affairs began
to take shape at the hired studios of the now defunct South African BOP TV
studios in Mmabatho. In Mmabatho, Martin McGhee was responsible for training
the people that were to become the first journalists of BTV. Although Robert Gray
said he would have preferred three women, Lor~to Tshipinare,. Neo
Mosimanyana and Amilia Malebane at the top, the Department preferred to give
the most senior position to Oshinka Tsiang, as the most senior civil servant
among all trainees. From January 1999 until he resigned from BTV in 2002,
Tsiang worked at various leadership position at BTV. He was very central to the
nuclei of this most important section of BTV.
One of the first things that Tsiang wanted to change, in his new role as the man
in charge of BTV News, was for reporters to do actual reporting; going to the field
to collect a story, writing it and presenting it. He had always been frustrated by
the role of Radio Botswana (RB) 'reporters'. Tsiang had been Head of News and
Current Affairs at Radio Botswana. 'Reporting' at RB was different fro~ normal
reporting in the sense that, the radio reporter did not gather and compile his or
her own story. RB receives all its local stories from the Botswana Press Agency
(BOPA). They come in news print format, and the job of the RB reporter is to
simply adapt and translate the print copy into for the radio English and Setswana
bulleti.ns. This way of doing things, although not unique to Botswana, had long
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been dropped in many other parts of the world. Raymond Williams (1974)
recalled that,
In the early days of radio, there was virtually absolute dependence on
existing press agencies for the collection of news. Techniques of
broadcast presentation were at first at simple transmission of news
agency dispatches read by 'announcers' who were assumed to be at once
authoritative and neutral, though real 'authority' and 'neutrality' were those
of those agencies.
Right from Mmabatho, Tsiang was especially keen to shorten the distance
between the author of news and the audience. A Radio Botswana news item
usually originated from a junior reporter from the different districts in Botswana. A
more senior BOPA reporter re-wrote and edited the script for the 'Daily News'
government newspaper. It then went to a pool of translators who usually wrote a
< 0
Setswana version as stories were usually written in English. A copy was sent to
Radio Botswana to be repackaged for radio. A radio reporter shortened and
adapted the script for the bulletin. It was finally given to a newsreader. By the
time a story reached the audience, much had been lost from the original story.
Tsiang wanted a different meaning for what a reporter was for BTV, not an
'announcer' who was part of a chain that added to distortion of news, but
someone that actually went out to the field to collect news and give it to the
audience. He wanted stories to come fresh to the audience and "a functioning,
effective and planning ahead newsroom" (Interviews with Tsiang, 2004; 2006).
When Simon Higman of the BBC left, BTV manag~ment was 'Afri~~mised',
Oshinka Tsiang became the first local General Manager.
Around the same time as the BBC was coming to rescue the BTV project in mid
2000, a White South African Chris Bishop was recruited to lead News and
Current Affairs. According to then Senior Programmes Manager, Robert Gray,
Bishop came during the transitional period, just as Hunt was leaving, and stayed
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until after the BBC 'rescue team' (Interview with Gray, 2006). As the core
mandate of BTV was initially to be News and Current Affairs, Bishop was to give
it a head start even before other Productions. Interviewed by Maggie Mabechu
(2001: 48-49), his idea was to make BTV a confident News service that will make
a confident nation, even considering the shortage of staff and equipment.
Despite the promise by Tebelelo Seretse of the then responsible Ministry of
Presidential Affairs and Public Administration at the launching of BTV that it
would enjoy freedom of its editorial policy (Interview with Gray and Tsiang), by
April 2001 Chris Bishop had been caused to resign. This was in protest against
what he alleged as censorship by government when he was refused permission
to broadcast a documentary on the execution of Mariette Bosch, a South African
woman found guilty of murdering a lover's wife.123 Bishop was quoted in a
telephone interview with the Southern African Press Agency (SAPA) in April 2001
that "Bosch brought out what had been there all along... there has been previous
harassment and interference. The journalists at BTV and myself have often been
, .
harassed by officialdom. It has rendered the running of TV News impractical". He
also alleged in the same interview that the Office of the President had said if the
management of BTV could not control the station, it would send a government
official to control the News department. The explanation from government was
that it was the view of the Attorney General's Chambers that the documentary
would have resulted in litigation against the department (Mabechu, 2001 :52).
Soon after Bish.~p resi~ned, it was also alleged that Tsiang, at the time the acting
GenEfral Manage';' bf the' station also temporarily resigned, because of unjustified
~ :,.., ...
government interference with BTV administration. 124
123US .Department of State, Botswana: Country Report on Human Rights Practices -
2001 (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/af/8265.htm)
Committee to Protect Journalists, Botswana - Attacks on the Press in 2001. (http:/
/www.cpj.org/attacks01/africa01/botswana.html)
124Committee to Protect Journalists, "Botswana - Attacks on the Press in 2002
http://www.cpj.org/attacks02/africa02/botswana.html·
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Former Director Sosome's assessment was this,
Normal practise would suggest that television starts with trained people
from radio, but the department risked its credibility and gave young people
with no relevant experience or training on media a chance. The young
people however quickly forgot this and bought into Hunt's agenda. They
naturally did not want to have to compete with those from radio with more
experience. This is the main reason that the first Head ·of News and
Current Affairs, Chris Bishop left because '0 ne a sa bate go laolwa', he
did not want to be under control. '0 ne a bata go supa bosula ja ga
goromente' - he wanted to portray government in bad light (Interview with
Sosome, 2004).
Tsiang, at the time the General Manager of the station also temporarily resigned,
citing unjustified g9vernment interference with BTV administration. According to
him, the only reason he went back to BTV after resigning the first time, is that
government was reviewing retirement packages for the civil service. If he had
resigned in April 2001, he would not have earned anything for the many years he
worked in DlB (Interview with Tsiang, 2006).
African journalism under siege: State ideological apparatus and
media freedom
Whereas it was at one time said 'about government interference on media in
Botswana that it was subtle and in~idious, in 2004, a government Savingram was
•
issued by the state to DBS, through the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of
Communication, Science and Technology. The Savingram stated that "whenever
introduction of new programmes and/or a review of programmes is effected,
proposals should first be referred to the Ministry...to get concurrence of the
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Minister" to avoid the airing of programmes "out of tune with Government policies
or viewerllisteners expectations" .125
African joumalism is also faced among other challenges with undoing an evil
commonly referred to as 'Afro-pessimism'. An example of pessimistic writing
about Africa that in the Economist in May 2000, labelling Africa the 'hopeless
continent', a predictive piece without much supporting basis that painted Africa
as regressing. In contrast, the National Geographic recently published more
optimistic pieces with headlines such as "Africa, whatever you thought, think
again", and "What right with Africa" (Garman, 2005: 1). However, it is hard to
invent a uniquely African yardstick for media and democratization for Africa.
Media technologies were invented in the West. Africa is yet to produce its own
technologies. There is pessimism even about African journalism itself. Francis
Nyamnjoh found it to lack "both the power of self definition and the power to
cshape the universals that are deaf-and-dumb to the particularities of journalism in
and on Africa" (Nyamnjoh, 2005b). There was also some optimism about the
practice; Nixon Kariithi (2005) commended African journalists for cutting their
teeth in some of the harshest conditions and contexts in modern history, but did
acknowledge there was room for improvement. It is increasingly difficult to be
objectively critical of African media without seeming to feed into Afro-pessimism
or placing unrealistically high expectation on African journalism that are based on
media-state relations in North America and Western Europe.
Cultural production under the state in Botswana was often pulled apart by
. .
_ opposing forces of state power, the public good and professional journalistic
ethos. The goyernment expected of BTV to serve as its information service being
part of the civil service. It was to become clear as the station grew that
government had never intended the medium to serve for two-way
communication. BTV was to experience constant reminders by different
government Ministers, Daniel Kwelagobe, Margaret Nasha, and Communications
125 Mmegi Online, 16 August 2004
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Minister Lephimotswe Sebetela that they could not to be critical of government.
While he was Minister of Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, and BTV
was under his control, Kwelagobe demanded that BTV should sanitise their
content. He felt a News item containing 'insults' to the President levelled by an
opposition leader at a kgotla meeting at the village Molepolole, should have been
further edited (Mmegi May 6, 2002).
Nasha could not permit the broadcast of a panel discussion where the opposition
demanded that she accept responsibility of problems in her Ministry. Though
Minister Sebetela claimed innocence,126 an episode of a weekly studio Current
Affairs programme, The Eye of 16 August 2004 was recalled and repackaged.
Dumelang Saleshando of the opposition Botswana Congress Party (BCP) had
demanded that Nasha shoulder responsibility of irregularities over land
allocations contained in findings of the Lesetedi Land Commission Report.m
Sebetela championed a reign of terror as Minister of Communications, Science
and Technology, which is discussed later.
If the bias of BTV News towards 'what's right with the government of Botswana',
was a contribution towards Afro-optimism, then it was an uncritical Afro-optimism.
Even optimists about media in Botswana like James Zaffiro cannot escape the
fact that, African media is under duress, ''from undemocratic media-state
relations, insufficient media training, experience and professionalism, small
media markets, weak civil society groups and unsupportive political cultures"•..
(Zaffiro, 2000:88). Both Radio Botswana and BTV News bulletins failed the
'African Journalism' test, popularized recently by the Highway Africa community.
African Journalism has been defined in a number of ways; often in relation to
how media of other parts of the world portray Africa. It has to be more than just
the opposite of other media, or mimicry of such media, and be a 'syncretic',
overarching and encompassing media that is true to the continent. It has to be
126 Monitor, Monday 23 August 2004:2
127 'Cover up at BTV'; 'BCP man muzzled' in The Botswana Guardian Friday August 20 2004:1-2,
'Nasha is so intolerant' in The Midweek Sun, Wednesday August 25 2004
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more than African joumalism merely filling in the positions that were formerly
occupied by Westemers without transforming the practice, and more of a
transformative and embracing force (Strelitz, 2005:2).
Understanding of editorial independence at the BTV Newsroom
The meaning of editorial independence and its value to the BTV Newsroom were
found to be varied among the News team. For a start, the title of the research of
the current work, initially entitled "State control, nation-building and
commercialisation as determinants of Botswana Television", sparked much
constemation to some managers at BTV. From Habuji Sosome, then Director of
DBS, to Kesholofetse Phetlhu, then acting General Manager to Head of News
and Currant Affairs, Felicitus Mashungwa; they found the research question
problematic since it appeared to imply BTV did not enjoy editorial independence
from the state. All of them were long serving members of the former DIB, having
served the department for periods going beyond twenty years. According to
them, lack of training and lack of commitment among the younger staff rather
than editorial independence, was what was threatening the future of BTV. They
all insisted that BTV was independent; the Minister did not have to approve
content first before broadcasting. Ministers did not constantly monitor the day to
day work at BTV. They did not perceive themselves as civil servants like all other
civil servants in other government departments. They distanced themselves from
the state, and hence saw themselves as operating generally under freedom from
state - control (in interviews, November, 2003).
On the other hand, many of the reporters, editors and producers at the BTV
Newsroom, were all new to television broadcasting and journalism. Every single
one of those interviewed agreed that there was no editorial independence or
freedom of the media at BTV. Yet, upon observation, in the day to day carrying
out of their work, they revealed very little concern for editorial independence.
Attempts towards critical journalism were generally very few at BTV. Many
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claimed that they protected their jobs by reducing chances of an encounter with
the wrath of state control. News items critical about government or positive about
other political parties were best avoided, they said. BTV was generally perceived
to be the wrong place for those who wanted to take a critical position on the
government and its policies. Stories on corruption among government officials
were avoided. An anonymous email ranking BTV reporters, circulated in the
Newsroom and also copied to BTV management summarised the thinking about
journalism at BTV (see appendix 17). The email revealed the usual workplace
competitivesness; communication skills, command of the English language,
passion, shyness, confidence, grasp of issues, intelligence, analytical skills, hard
work, interpersonal relations, talent, presentation, and leadership skills. An
important aspect that was also highlighted by the email was that, there was a
need for BTV reporters to realise they were not working for the private media. Of
the thirteen reporters ranked, only three were found to be 'fearless', 'trouble
seeking', 'manipulative', and 'risk taking', Le. they sometimes dared to challenge
~ ~
government policy. One of them in any case was said to be 'losing his fire'. The
few that had dared to cross the line were made to write many letters of apology
for their 'misconduct', and be labelled dissidents, as was the case with Joshua
Ntopolelang with the production of Matlhoaphage, discussed in detail later on.
Although these were legitimate reasons for self - censorship, by failing to push
the boundaries of state - control however, many of the BTV News team
conspired together with the state to rob the nation of critical, informative and
uncompromising journalism.
Only a very few, usually those that had worked in the private media before joining
the television station saw the lack of editorial independence disturbing enough to
attempt more critical journalism. Alpheons Moroke, producer of The Eye, was
one of the very few that took the issue of editorial independence seriously. The
Eye was a Current Affairs programmes attempted to critically analyse activities of
government and civil society organisations. He saw the major difference between
BTV and the private media house he used to work for, as the fact that, there he
164
had never seen a Minister walk into the premises to demand a change of the
content of a programme. At BTV, he reported that it was not uncommon to see a
Minister walk into the station to personally handle matters of an editorial nature.
The political leadership of the ruling party was known to instruct pulling out of
some 'offensive' content.
Assignment Editor Montlenyane Baaitse, having previously worked at Radio
Botswana, was of the position that many of the BTV reporters were not
competent to execute editorial independence. Attempting to be critical of
government or civil society needed better journalistic skills than many of the BTV
reporters possessed. They often confused partisan anti-government reporting
with editorial freedom. She felt that many that had burnt their fingers in the
course of their reporting did so because they failed to make their reports fair and
balanced. They were guided not by the public interest, but by a yearning to
impress their 'comrades' in opposition parties. By failing to be professional in
< <
their criticism of government, in the view of Baaitse, it was reporters that
rendered government control justifiable. The response to Baaitse's position by
other reporters was that, although it was true that mistakes had happened, the
reaction from government was often much more drastic. Obliterating opposition
political parties from the BTV screen because a few news items exhibited bias
towards one party is unjustifiable. To prove that coverage of political party was
not a no go area if one was competent, Baaitse decided against the newsroom
~
practice in 2004, to include resOlts of political party primary elections in a bulletin.
No one, not her immediate bosses or anyone from outside, lodged a complaint
about the bulletin. She made the point very well that, !he immediate cballenge
that BTV faced towards editorial independence was lack of training compared to
I j
state - control.
The overemphasis on stories about government officials by BTV, could also not
always be seen as a direct result of state control. Former Director Habuji
Sosome, showed the news team that they had become dependent on
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government and political figures as easy sources of news that they had failed to
pull off local news during the Christmas holidays of 2003. Most senior
government officials were on vacation, and that was a chance for BTV to cover
alternative stories, which they often complained they were prevented from doing
by having too many of their assignments coming from above. The BTV
Newsroom is therefore not simply a room of like minded people with similar
aspiration, but a mix of mainly young people of different levels of inspiration,
training, ambitions, maturity, conformity, interests, interpersonal relations and
cliques.
The State and its journalists: Between allocative and operational
control
The extensive research on organisational culture of major Newsrooms like News
Corporation, the BBG and CNN often looks at whole workplace environment
rather than individuals differing levels of professional abilities among staffers vis-
a-vis the· workplace (Marjoribanks, 2003). Lucy Kung-Shankleman (2003)
compared BBC to CNN. The BBC's culture in its own words is a commitment to
serving the public good. Its employees felt compelled to live up to the expectation
of licence fee payers, which in turn resulted in making their institution the best
public service broadcaster. Getting the best public service broadcasting made
the subscribers more discerning, thus putting pressure on the BBC to improve all
the time. CNN was committed to breaking News across the globe while making a
profit. Even less attention has been paid to organis~tional subcultures within
state-owned broadcasters to analyse exactly hoW this perceived lack of
independence occurs in the daily operation of the organisation.
A study on Ugandan journalists, their role perceptions, professional attitudes and
beliefs, as well as the major constraints on journalistic freedoms by Peter
Mwesige (2004), is one of the very few that looks into Newsrooms in Africa. As
the next section will illustrate, BTV journalists, like Ugandan journalists enjoyed a
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modest amount of professional autonomy and freedom. The organisational
subcultures, individual and group dynamics at play at BTV; the informal concepts
and attitudes of those working at the station together as they find their way
through its formal organisational values as contained in such documents as
strategic plans and vision statements tell the wish of the station to be
professional. In the daily performance of their duties; the reporters, producers
and management of the station, aspired to universal journalistic ethics of free and
fair reporting and representing the nation, not merely advertising government
policy. Countless brushes with state power compromised their ability to realise
their aims.
It became apparent after several months observing in comings and going at BTV
that finding a neat category for the station would be impossible. Without an
independent broadcasting regulator that ensured the necessary distance
between a broadcaster and the state, their claim to a 'reasonable degree of
< <
editorial independence' and to be guided by public service broadcasting (BTV
official website, 2003) was hard to sustain. History of more astute public service
broadcasting models such as the BBC and the SABC with independent
broadcasting bodies has shown that even they could not remain immune from
the state's relentless efforts to overtly influence broadcasting (Tomaselli, et.al.,
1987:32; Mpofu, 1996:12; Murdock, 1982:121).
• ••••.,._~"-.•~"f". . .. _ •.: ~ '. .
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The state denying BTV editorial independence: Sebetela era
The year 2004 was an election year in Botswana and the BDP made it very clear
that it sought singular use of the power of television. By the first quarter of the
year, opposition parties were beginning to complain. Akanyang Magama, former
Secretary General for the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) complained
that Sebetela's Ministry had systematically denied opposition parties routine
coverage through BTV. It did not cover their major events such as launching of
their parliamentary candidates. Magama recounted the ways in which the BDP
had turned BTV's editorial policy towards building a positive image about the
ruling party by keeping its mistakes away from the public sphere. BDP high
ranking officials such as Ministers dominated the screen through public functions
they attended.128 Although BTV had drawn objective editorial guidelines and an
§lccuracy checklist, there were on the other hand ad hoc reminders and
reprimands from government Ministers, senior civil servants and sometimes the
State President, that the ultimate unwritten editorial policy lay with the state
power.
Former Minister of Communication, Science and Technology, under which is the
Department of Broadcasting Services, Lephimotswe Boyce Sebetela, between
. -
2003 and .2004 fast made a name for himself as the face of government
"-.: .- . .. "' ...
interie~~nce 6n the media in Botswana. An Internet search of his name
generated Newspaper articles that attested to his efforts to control government
~media. Most of the articles were on his lack of respect for journalistic
. independence ,of the state-owned media. Titles included; 'freedom of expression
in jeopardy'129 'Botswana: govt pulls plug on radio call-in show,'13O 'media bill
under scrutiny'.131 In aI/Africa.corn, they included; 'Setshwaelo warns Sebetela on





media meddling', 'The transformation of Boyce Sebetela', 'Sebetela defends his
media meddling antics', 'Boyce, Boyce Oh Please Boyce!', 'The Sebetela show
rolls on', 'Ministry orders stringent measures on programmes', 'Dictatorship in a
democracy'. and more.
Only one article by a certain Eddie Mdluli, said 'the Minister of Science,
Communication and Technology, Boyce Sebetela is the bomb',132 and that the
media should not think it can control him. One leader of the opposition, Ephraim
Lepetu Setshwaelo characterized him as not understanding the guiding principles
of journalism as a profession.133 Sebetela was labelled a liar by the Mmegi
Newspaper for claiming that he had not interfered with the editorial independence
of the Departments of Broadcasting Services and that of Information Services.
Some inside informers from these very departments told .the Newspaper
otherwise. The same publication labelled him "Super Editor Sebetela!"134
A former Director of the Department of Information and Broadcasting described
Sebetela's meddling with editorial content as nothing compared to some former
Ministers responsible for the department. In 2000 the Government criticized BTV
management for reporting on the eviction of squatters by the Ministry of Lands
and Housing. A Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President responded by
convening a press conference on the private Yarona FM radio station and stating
that it was important for BTV to broadcast News that promoted government
policies and not reports that "encourage trouble and criticize the Government".
The opposition Botswana Congress Party criticized government for its control
over national media and urged that they be privatized or turned into
- parastatals.135
132 The Midweek Sun, December 3,2003
133 MmegifThe Reporter, August 23,2004




All of the controversial decisions Sebetela took, he confessed in an interview with
the researcher, were under instruction from Cabinet. In order to allow BTV some
amount of freedom, Sebetela often acted without consultation with Cabinet.
Sometimes he got away with it, other times he did not. The most widely
condemned action he took was to order Radio Botswana to pull off the call-in
segment of a morning show, IMasa-a-seJe'. Sebetela acted under instruction from
Cabinet because he had failed to make sure that the programme was sufficiently
internally censored by Radio Botswana. The public used IMasa-a-seJe' as a
forum to air their discontent with the governrnent and specific political figures.
BTV, Radio Botswana and the Botswana Daily News are run by public funds, and
ideally should serve all regardless of class, race, gender, religion or political
persuasion. The public has a right to demand more than just what the
government is comfortable ·with. Cabinet, with Sebetela as its mouth piece,
claimed the segment was used to verbally abuse to some members of the public,
but critics argued it was because callers were very critical of government. He was
<
also ordered to instruct BTV to refrain from showing file material of heavy plant
bringing down homes in illegally occupied land in a village of Mogoditshane just
outside the city of Gaborone, instructed by government in 2002. Under Sebetela,
BTV management threatened producers and reporters that it would put in place a
censorship mechanism where all material can be approved by management
before going on air. Fortunately, this would be difficult to put into effect. BTV
management was constantly strapped in numerous meetings and official
functions that it rendered such close monitoring of daily production improbable.
On the positive side, Sebetela was proud that, in his tenure, BTV was able to
successfully start commissioning programmes to local independent producers.
He had also without seeking a go ahead from Cabinet, sanctioned BTV and
Radio Botswana to broadcast live debates among all political parties contesting
in the 2004 general elections.136 Sometimes, his actions did not appear to be
guided only by furthering the dominance of the Botswana Democratic Party.
136 See story 'Live tv debates limited', The Botswana Guardian, Friday October 15 2004
170
There were isolated efforts to protect viewers, particularly children, although even
this should not have been for him to directly instruct what action BTV should
take. He called off a promotional sting for a coming episode of an AIDS
education programme, Re Mmogo (Sebetela in interview, 2006). Pictures of used
condoms were shown at primetime, thrown all over the place near a small
settlement of Mmantshwabisi after the international Kalahari 4X4 Desert Race.
The condoms were shown being blown out like balloons by local children. It was
irresponsible, he argued, for the national broadcaster to show shots of used
condoms at prime time. However, it appears that viewers had a different position.
An interactive short message text sent to BTV's TalkBack in June 2005 exposed
a positive reading of the sarne images, "some people dispose used condoms
carelessly, like the ones shown in last week Remmogo, how dangerous is this to
people esp children who' play with anything".137 According to BTV reporters,
Sebetela had also previously requested BTV to stop airing of images of
demolitions of a squatter settlement in Mogoditshane, just outside Gabor?ne.
The.~e imagines were apparently banned for the bad light in which they portrayed
government as merciless and ruthless towards the poor, with general elections
approaching.
When asked about the mandatory requirement on BTV to cover the President
and Vice President and most of the public appearances by government Ministers,
Sebetela found it difficult to understand what the problem was with that. He
argued that, in the US, the private media followed the President wherever he
went (Sebetela, in research interview, 2006). This is a view also shared by a
former Director of DIB, Sesinyi, but being a journalist by training, Sesinyi gave a
much more careful reason,
First I think people who say the President and Vice President are being
unnecessarily given too much attention only need to look at the American




House houses journalists from all over the country whose main role is to
report on the President. ..but the problem is if the government journalists
are specifically being ordered to follow the President around. I think media
professionals can make those decisions and they don't need them to be
imposed by a non-professional. Also I take it that when journalists follows
a public figure, they are really after his-or her interaction with the people.
So let us see the people's reaction to what the public figure is
presenting. 138
The 2 August 2004 Editorial of the Mmegi Newspaper resorted to asking the
President, Festus Mogae, to save the media in Botswana by changing to a
different Minister in the next Cabinet. On his last few weeks as Minister, in
August" Sebetela undertook to make a national tour to educate the nation that the
radio and television stations were ordinary government departments controlled
by a Minister and that any expectation that these shquld operate as public
&
service broadcasters was misguided. He was responding to the "public outcry
that his 'unprofessional influence' in the state media was highly prejudicial to the
growth of media in Botswana". He told the public at one of the meetings in
Gaborone that "just like any other government department, the government
media should be similarly monitored". Such monitoring included the state
unilaterally deciding that the public did not need a call in segment in one RB
programme 'Masa-a-sele', for, "the public had ample opportunity to communicate
feedback to government'~.139
Matlhoaphage: of self-censorship and gate-keeping
As lan Taylor has often argued (Taylor, 2002; 2003), power and position in the
civil service in Botswana were often secured by declaring allegiance, in overt and
138 MmegilThe Reporter, August 2, 2004,
~3~p:llwww.mmegi.bW/2004/AU9USVMOndaY2/6887503611306.htmI
Botswana Daily News, 19 August 2004
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covert ways, to the ruling BDP. Nowhere in the civil service in Botswana was
self-censorship more pronounced than in government-owned media. Overt
government control was also often exacerbated by self-censorship. To survive,
many government journalists said they needed to learn to balance what they
learnt in the classroom about professional journalism, and their terms of
employment under government.
Former BTV acting General Manager Kesholofetse Phetlhu,' once argued that
she saw it fitting for the government and politicians in particular to keep the
journalists in check. To her, the disapproval by the ruling elites of some of the
content of the station should be seen as more gate-keeping rather than
interference. They had a right after all, like any other citizen, she argued, to have
a say on the content of the station (Interview with Phetlhu, 2003). Gate-keeping
is undeniably an essential function of any editor, and conformity to official and
unofficial guidelines a!e a prerequisit~ for promotion or continued employment
(Hood and Tabary-Peterssen, 1997:12). Ideally, gate-keeping should be guided
by public interest and ethical journalism. At BTV, self-censorship, rather than
gate-keeping, was embedded in stages in the process of production, from peer
review pre-productions to presenting tapes of packaged productions, as the case
of production of one Matlhoaphage episode illustrated.
Matlhoaphage a BTV Current Affairs programme produced by Joshua
Ntopolelang, was illustrative of the extent of self-censorship rather than overt
government interference, on the editorial freedom of BTV. Matlhoaphage, was
not pitched for in a manner similar to other programmes where the idea came- -
from producers within the station. It was bom out of an effort by then Director of
I '
DBS, Sesinyi to address bitter complaints from opposition parties that the BDP
monopolised BTV. Sesinyi was perhaps the most progressive of all former DIB
Directors when it came to the public service broadcasting ideal. He decided that
BTV must intrude a studio debate that would give different political parties a
platform to debate their positions on issues before the nation. The editorial policy
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for the programme was that, participants of the studio programme would always
include a member of the ruling BDP and representatives of the opposition and
other interest groups. Matlhoaphage was expected to remove some of the
pressure off the News section, which received many complaints from opposition
parties that they were not adequately covered.
The ideal production process set out for BTV Current Affairs in-house
productions such as Matlhoaphage, was that first, the producer provided
information about the angle that the week's discussion would take, who would be
invited to the studio and why, according to Ntopolelang. One of the aspects that a
BTV Current Affairs producer had to be careful about was that the angle was
favourable to govemment. Ideally immediate supervisors would pronounce on
whether they approved or disapproved of the proposed synopsis before
recording. The third stage of gate-keeping was when a recorded ta'pe was sent
for approval by middle management; Channel Controller, Head of Productions,
~ ,
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the General Manager and sometimes the Director of the Department. Often,
management delayed or never gave the final go ahead, so it was not unusual for
producers to work on a 'silence means consent' bases. It worked most of the
time. After consultation with fellow producers, Ntopolelang had submitted a
synopsis to Head of Productions, and as per normal practice, went on with the
production while waiting for their response.
However, a recorded Matlhoaphage episode scheduled for 13 November 2005
was prevented by management of BTV from going on air because they said it
was biased against the ruling party._The topic was high packages for Members of
Parliament and Cabinet Minister~, including huge housing allowances. A local
I
Newspaper had listed the allowances that political leaders received, and BTV
sought a response from them. An opposition Botswana Congress Party (BCP)
panelist, Dumelang Saleshando argued that all workers on the govemment
payroll were under-paid and that salaries should be restructured across the
board. The BDP panel/ist argued that all workers could not be at the same salary
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scale, that there would always be differences. According to Ntopolelang, his
mistake was to ask a follow-up to the SDP panellist Kentse Rammidi, asking if
his government was happy to increase income disparities between low and high
incomes, when the economy was already skewed. Ntopolelang decided after
being called to not air the tape tDat he no longer wanted to present the
programme. He was quoted saying in the papers, "these are just some of the
things that are making it difficult for presenters to do their job as you will never be
sure of what you are expected to do and whether you are asking the right
questions" (Interview with Ntopolelang, 2005). Sosome refuted allegations of
state interference and said that the programme was not aired because the gate-
keepers were not happy with the end result. "It had mistakes that were too hard
to ignore and was not fit for airing. It was an internal decision that had nothing to
do with any Directive. In fact, I haven't seen the Directive that you are talking
about". 140
Lack of editorial freedom at STV was therefore, often more as a result of self-
censorship by STV middle management than by instruction from the state. Even
when the SDP did not complain, middle management did not want to take
chances. The SDP panellist Rammidi later told Mmegi Newspaper that he did not
notice any unfair questions levelled against him nor did he feel that he was being
victimized. "I just answered the questions that were asked and it was just like all
, the sessio.ns that I have been called to give my input. It was not biased in any
way but was just the same grilling that these guys always do to the SDP".141
~t appears though that no amount of self-censorship at STV, whether at a
personal or in~titutional level, could ever satisfy the ruling SDP. In an opinion
letter to a local Newspaper, Comma Serema, Executive Secretary of the SDP
castigated Ntopolelang for allocating opposition parties more participants in the
studio programme. Comma alleged that, this gave the impression that the
140 Mmegi, November 15 2005, Vo!. 22, No. 175
141 Mmegi online http://www.mmegi.bw/2005/Novemberrruesday15/2192825961607.html
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opposition was more dominant that the ruling party.142 Mmegi Newspaper of 15
November 2005 quoted Ntopolelang saying "I quit this morning," meaning 14
November 2005. Ntopolelang said he later received a warning letter from the
Director of DBS, Habuji Sosome, for his statement to the press and for
insubordination, having refused to continue producing Matlhoaphage until a new
presenter was found.
When self-censorship and interference is not enough: The downfall of
Sebetela and Phetlhu
Francis Kasoma (2000) found self-censorship to be prevalent in Newsrooms
across Africa. He explained that, the reality was that, while editors and managers
proclaimed editorial independence and often' preached it to' the journalists,
privately, they often took instruction from the echelons of state power, either not
to report certain stories, or to provide the official line. It appears that sometimes,
even this was not enough. Sebetela was excluded from Cabinet after the 2004
general elections.143 It was not clear if the loss of the Ministerial position by
Sebetela indicated disapproval at the highest office in the land that he failed to
completely control government-owned media, or a disapproval of his
'interference', in the media. Pelonomi Moitoi-Venson took over the Ministry. In a
1997 publication entitled 'Civil Society and Form of Political Participation in South
Africa'Venson-Moitoi celebrated the power of resistance. Her paper pointed out
the ways in which community organisations or civil society in black l!Mt>an'
communities in South Africa passionately resisted apartheid statutory bodies and
, defined their own development. It was hoped that in her new powerful position in
Cabinet, she would not lose sight of the power of the people to resist oppressive
governments. There was jubilation when she took over the Ministry, but it would
appear that the jubilation was premature. The independent Botswana Gazette
Newspaper of 02 April 2005 ran a story entitled 'The mystery of the missing cattle
142 Mmegi, November 172005, Vol. 22, No.177, Opinion Letters
143 Mmegi, 12 November, 2004
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- and the disappearing bulletin!' According the Newspaper report, a BTV
Setswana bulletin at 19:00 had ran a story of stolen cattle being found in the farm
of the biggest cattle baron in Botswana, Derek Brink, but was not included in the
English bulletin at 21 :00 later that night. Venson had allegedly personally gone to
BTV and directed that the News desk remove the story from the rest of the
bulletin. She denied instructing BTV staff to pull out the story, but added: "I know
where my authority starts and where it stops. There are times when our 'gate
keeping' has to be put into practice, especially when our reporters, who we are
still training, may broadcast News that might seem discriminatory".144
Ziegler and Asante have characterized the mass media in Africa as Thunder and
Silence', referring to the stark contrast between moments of tremendous freedom
such as happened in Nigeria where the media grew to become a proper fourth
estate; and 'periods of silence such as in Ethiopia where the press spoke ever so
timidly (Ziegler and Asante, 1992:vi). A comparative analysis is risky -
,
postcolonial and feminist studies have pointed to the tendency to measure the
subject of study, not by what it is, but what it is not. Studies of the media in Africa
have tended towards this (Nyamnjoh, 2005). The environment in which the media
emerged in Africa was that of colonization, radically different from say the
emergence of the media in the United States or the United Kingdom.
When Jacques Derrida and Bemard Stiegler (2002) speak of 'echographies of
television' - referring to the contradiction or double postulate of the idea of
'actuality', unfettered 'truth' that television claims to achieve through such
conventions as going 'live', or reporting in 'real time', they are speaking about a
different kind of television in a context radically different from television as we
know it in many parts of Africa. The expectation of the Western consumer of
television 'actuality' like News is that, the medium must as far as possible provide
an actual transparent and neutral account of an event. More often than not, the
144 Botswana Gazette, 02 April 2005.
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African viewer, who can hardly be called an audience for his and her lack of
direct access in the medium has come to accept top-down 'the Minister said' kind
of reporting.
Towards an African media
Africanist scholars such as Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss (2000), saw the
problem with African mass media as the fact that African cultures were
broadcasts via conventions influenced by broadcasts of other cultures. For
critical African postcolonial scholars like Francis Nyamnjoh (2005), the similarities
between Western and African broadcast cultures was only prima-facie.
Nyamnjoh maintained that broadcasters in Africa today appeared to operate
under unlversalized values, attitudes and practices identifiable with the West
because media workers in post-colonies were very often recipients of uncritical
Westem biased 'professional' training. This, however, did not make the media
experience in Africa at all similar to that of the West. The use of the media in
Africa during colonialism was for the metropolis to consolidate its position; not to
celebrate African cultures or promote equitable access to the public sphere. It
was only towards the end of colonialism that the West began to campaign
against state control of the media. This was the same control during colonialism
they had vehemently protected. Just as colonialism had used mass media to
further its own agendas, the newly independent governments quickly turned state
control to their advantage in the name of nation-building (Nya·mnjoh, 2005).
Pessimists like Professor of Law and Journalism at the University of Westem
Ontario, Canada, Robert Martin (1992) have concluded about the predicament of
mass media in Africa that
The global economy is becoming more integrated and more
interdependent, and most of Africa is simply left out of the process...not as
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underdevelopment-dependency theorists once argued, .. .the misery of
being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not
being exploited at all (Martin, 1992:332).
Foreign News feeds in Botswana
While like the rest of the continent, Botswana was receiving very little'
international media attention, or 'not being exploited at all', she has received
international News feeds since the inception of radio broadcasting in the 1930s.
The BBC was probably the earliest source of foreign feed. After independence,
many foreign News services; Chinese, Swiss, Soviet, South African, and many
other offered their services to the newly independent and unknown state.
Preference however, was given towards Western News wires, particularly as the
Cold War years coincided with a period when Botswana relied heavily on
Q
expatriate expertise from the West. From' about 1972, discussion started on the
possibility of establishing a Reuters link in Botswana. The Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning was eager to finance the installation of the service.145
By June 1973, Information and Broadcasting sections were expecting that the
equipment for receiving Reuters News would be operational.146 After a number of
delays, Reuters News wires were installed in Botswana in the early 1970s.
Mostly the Botswana government's policy towards international media
communications and journalism issues was lukewarm, if not totally ambivalent
until the early 1990s. Botswana showed no interest in· the invitation far the
African and Arab press agencies directors' conference-in Tunis in 197q. The
country was never a member of the African Journalists UnionJ47 High
Commission offices around the world made efforts to get Botswana linked to
145 Letter dated 26 June 1972 from the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning to the
Chief Information Officer. Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (3)
146 Letter from Press Officer to Office of the President, Botswana National Archives, OP 25/7/1 (4)
147 From letter dated 20 January 1975 from J. Ewing, Acting Chief Information Officer to
Permanent Secretary to Office of the President OP 25/7/1 29/31
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many News services in their host countries and the Department of Information
and Broadcasting turned most of them down. John Ewing, Acting Chief
Information Officer in the mid 1970s, argued that the department was already
under utilizing the Reuters News service.148 To this day Botswana continues to
pay for foreign News. In November 2005, BTV paid USD 80 031.00 (P400 000)
for a two year license to the Associated Press (AP) for (Electronic News
Production System) ENPS Broadcasting Services. The next month in December,
the station also renewed contracts with its existing News agents.
Towards a working definition for BTV
When referring to national broadcasters in Botswana, including BTV, the
concepts of government or state or public ownership have been used
interchangeably. Although BTV management have often claimed it operated
along public service broadcasting ideals, even as it is under government, the
brief history of the national television broadcaster has shown that, not only would
that be a misnomer, but it is also impracticable. At best, BTV is a public
broadcaster, in the sense that it is wholly funded by resources the public has
entrusted to the government. Even then, labelling it a public broadcaster could be
misleading because it would imply a service akin to national public radio (NPR)
that started in the US in 1970. NPR is funded largely by philanthropic foundations
in the US, with some programmes funded by state grant. Currently, BTV is not
licensed because according to the management of the station, it is a state
broadcaster. With very limited local productions on its schedule and News that is
biased in favour of the ruling party al'ld the bureaucracy, it is clear that under
direct state funding and management, media cannot 'be free: On the one hand,
editorial independence is compromised, and on the other hand, a civil service
mentality among employees precludes professional journalistic conduct that
148 Botswana National Archives OP 25/7/1 (38)
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could be expected of a corporate entity. Government ownership of mass media,
even under the most benevolent of governments, is far from ideal.
] 81
Chapter Six
Television and development in Botswana: Between ~ ¥
nation-building, cultural production and the market
A brief history of visual communication in Botswana
Visual images as media for public communication have an older history than
radio communication in Botswana. Botswana Cinema historian Neil Parsons
(2004) traces the first use of visual images for mass communication in present
day Botswana to 1879 when Jesuit missionaries showed giant paintings of Christ
and the saints to local Christian converts in a village called Shoshong. This
apparently offended local Christians, with Congregational or Protestant ideas that
such icons were heathen idol-worship...
A lecture in January 1896 by Kgosi Khama III of Bangwato using photographic
slides of places and of the people he met in Great Britain projected onto white
sheets strung up in the church at Old Palapye has to be the most significant early
use of pictures for public communication in Bechuanaland. Because the crowds
could not fit inside the great church, the lecture was repeated three more times. -.
that same week (Parsons, 2004:1). Kgosi Khama Ill, grandfather to Botswana's..
first president Sir Seretse Khama was perhaps present day Botswana's most
powerful statesman. Together with two other Batswana Dikgosi, Sebele of
Bakwena and f3athoen of Bangwaketse travelled to Great Britain to solicit
support against British South Africa (BSA) Company diamond magnate Cecil
Rhodes's efforts to transfer the area covering present day Botswana, Zambia,
Zimbabwe and Malawi to BSA administration. William Charles Willoughby of the
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London Missionary Society had organized the campaign.149 Rhodes lost
credibility with the British government in events leading to the second Anglo -
Boer between 1899 and 1902 and so plans to give his company control of
Bechuanaland were dropped. After the formation of the Union of South Africa in
1910, the question of incorporation into SA came up again. The British and the
South African governments could not agree about the modalities of the transfer,
and it never took place (Colclough and McCarthy, 1980:13,14).
On this visit they encountered media at three levels: of journalists, of use of mass
media and of becoming media spectacles. Khama was to label journalists
'hunters of words' during the many press interviews and public discussions they
had while in London. They were also to become acutely aware of the difficulty of
translating meanings as they had to communicate through translators. Apparently
on landing in Botswana they told of the difficulty of relating Setswana language to
the new technology of steamships, steam trains, electric lighting, telegraphs and
telephones. Willoughby was to work ceaselessly to encourage the otherwise
astute and eloquent politicians to relax around the foreign crowds that they were
met by.150
Parsons dates the first known actuality movie made within Botswana borders
between 1906-07, a comprehensive documentation' of Southern Africa
conducted by a team of cameramen from Charles Urban's company in London,
who travelled up the Bechuanaland railway to Victoria Falls in 1906-07.151
Bioscope was to become a regular spectacle after the Fillis Imperial circus with
_ its own cinema or 'bioscope' travelled annually by rail through Botswana to
j • BUlawayo and back from about 1896-97 onwards (Parsons, 2004). Parsons
149http://www.mundus.ac.uklcats/4/248.htm. from Mundus: gateway to missionary collection in the
United Kingdom. Willoughby, William Charles. Identity statement. Reference code(s) GB 0102
CWM/LMS Africa Personal Boxes 4,6. Held at School of Oriental and African Studies library.
150 Neil Parsons, excerpt from King Khama, Emperor Joe and the Great white Queen: Victorian
Britain though African eyes. http://www.press.uchicago.edu/misc/chicago/647455.html
151 Botswana cinema & film studies 1st Edition by Neil Parsons © March 2004
(http://ubh.tripod.com/cinema/bots-cinema-studies.htm)
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suggests that over five hundred titles of feature films and documentaries
(relatively few), ethnographic and wildlife films (many), and Newsreel clips
(numerous) have been made since 1906 - 07.
According to a Botswana film historian Neil Parsons (2004),
"the American anthropologist Tom Larson made two documentaries on the
lives 'of HaMbukushu people in north-western Okavango, beginning with
Rainmakers of the Okavango (1948, 38 minutes & 1950, 40 minutes).
Another American, John Marshall, began filming the Zhul'hoansi or !Kung
people (Northern San) nearby on the Botswana-Namibia border in 1947...
Between 1947 and 1997 he and his family and assistants were to shoot a
million feet of film on both the Namibia and Botswana sides of the
Zhul'hoansi borderland" (Parsons, 2004).
Parsons explained that the Bushmen of the Kalahari burst on the film and
television world in 1957-58 with The Hunters by John Marshall (71 minutes),
which has been called the 'classic ethnographic documentary', and The Lost
World of the Kalahari, a famous BBC television travelogue hosted by Laurens
van der Post (5 parts, 177 minutes). Comparing The Hunters to the more popular
The Lost World, rather than reconstructing the lives of the Bushmen themselves
as Marshall did, Van der Post concentrated on himself and his prejudices.
Perhaps it was the patronizing portrayals of the Kalahari and its Bushmen in
ever-popular U.S. television series, Mutual, of Omaha's Wild Kingdom wildlife
series by American producer/director Marlin Perkins in the 1960s and 1970s
(Parsons, 2004) that made the BDP government wary of films about the people
of Botswana, especially the San. That the Botswana would have been concerned
about anthropological films could be as a result of what Tomaselli referred to as
orthodox anthropological interpretations of the San, and other Africans as
isolated and pre-modern people. Ironically, Marshall films, which the
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Anthropological Act and the Cinematograph Act of Botswana must have affected,
did show that the San had greater interlinkages with their Tswana neighbours
than orthodox anthropological works acknowledged. This is important information
that could feed well into the nation-building agenda of government. In fact,
Tomaselli explains that Marshall's film on the '!Kung, Death by myth', was made
as a formal way of contesting Jamie Uys's portrayals of the Bushmen - San
peoples, in romantic anthropological stereotypes in The Gods must be crazy'
(Tomaselli, 1996:43). Uys' film was allegedly filmed in Botswana, but was
actually filmed in the Northern Transvaal and Namibia. "To avoid international
sanctions against South Africa, Uys claimed that his company, Mimosa Films,
was Botswana-based. Hence many filmographies today repeat the lie that the
film originated from Botswana" (Parsons: 2004).
BTV and the mirror of the nation
BTV arrived with a specific mandate to be 'the picture of the nation and reflect
the nation to itself. A guiding principle when BTV commenced was that, "with all
our advantages of investment, the latest technology and skills, we must not be
satisfied until we have created the best television service in Africa that is admired
by the rest of the world".152 Habuji Sosome, former Director of BTV wrote,
The most basic benefit in introducing the nation's own television service is
simple really:- people of Botswana had never really seen themselves in
the manner they perceive themselves. BTV has overnight virtually,
become a symbol of nationhood. Its nascent stages have not dampe'ned
the mood of the people of Botswana to take pride in watching a television
screen that reflects the people they know, the thing of familiar salience,
the depiction of Botswana culture in its pristine form, and the joy of
152 http://www.BTV.gov.bw/BTV/guiding_principles.html
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visualizing objects of functional salience. A BTV screen has become a
picture of Botswana.153
BTV was not to become an 'overnight' success at being the symbol of
nationhood or 'the picture of Botswana' as the former Director would have
wished. BTV needed to provide both representations of nationhood for Botswana
as well as enter global capitalism. On the other hand, consumption of images
from more advanced sites of cultural production like the SABC threaten nation
building projects that small industries of cultural production are trying to achieve.
A late start for BTV also meant an unforgiving audience. A satellite earth station
at Kgale, near the capital Gaborone enabled urban populations for many years to
consume good television productions from more established broadcasters from
neighbouring South Africa. SABC and the MultiChoice Africa pay television
bouquet, Digital Satellite Television (DSTV) exposed locals to quality television
programmes and round the clock News c~annels like Sky !'Jews, CNN and BBC
World. There were also private initiatives in the form of small television owners
associations to set up television boosting relays in larger towns like Gaborone,
Francistown, Selibe-Phikwe, Orapa and Jwaneng.154 The Botswana cultural
production industry had to show the region and the world "the meanings,
messages and stories that it has to offer - its intellectual property" (Doyle,
2002b).
Between nation-building, cultural imperfalism and-the market
Young nation states in Africa such as Botswana continue to struggle with,what
i •
Benedict Anderson (1983), Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawn (1983) have r
-L
correctly identified as the imagining and inventing of national identities. At the
same time, the youthful states are in a struggle to appropriate markers of
~: Habuji ~osome, on the off!cial website of BTV, http://www.BTV.gov.bw/from_the_director.html
Republic of Botswana Natronal Development Plan 1991 - 1997, Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, Government Printer, Gaborone.
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development such as democratization and good governance, free and
independent media, in order to receive donor funding and benefit from
international development banks. Donor agencies like the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank are increasingly seeking the right to review, accept and
reject audit reports for the development projects they fund (McAuslan, 1996).
This is all happening at a time when the international flow of capital has put
pressure on the Third World to enter and compete in global markets, or perish
(Guyer and Hansen, 2001). Cultural production and the cultural industry are
threatened more than at any historical epoch. The case of BTV is useful for the
conceptual difficulties it presents, particularly towards the broader debates about
the political economy of communication for the Third World in the age
globalization. It was important to also observe how BTV fared in the area of
local content production, particularly considering "increasing stress in the
Information Age which ~elentlessly seek
4
s to commodity anything and everything
that previously escaped the global function of capital" (Tomaselli, 1996b:2-3).
BTV had to negotiate imperatives of the market, of local content, technology and
democracy in a context of an infantile independent local production industry. In
2004, BTV started a slow painstaking and problem ridden process of
encouraging a local film and television production industry. In the Information
Age, nothing escapes the global function of capital (Tomaselli, 1996b:2-3).
Convergence, globalization, and commodification of meanings in the media
•
scene are a big challenge for television in Africa and Botswana in particular. BTV
was something of a paradox, a new b~oadcaster startir:!Q with state - of - the -
art digital technology, and yet stuck in antiquity in so far as trappings by the state
, I
and its bureaucratic machinery. The original station management had hoped BTV
would become a parastatal with a semi-autonomous budget and a semi-
independent board. It was yet too early to say that the role of the state in
Botswana would eventually hand over BTV to the interests of business, which
according to Robert McChesney (1998) was a feature of globalization. Protected
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by government funding and therefore not under pressure to be financially viable,
BTV is run as if it exists outside of grips of capitalism. In fact, at this point in its
young history, BTV is focused more on bringing faces of government leaders and
to lesser extent local politicians in the opposition to the nation. Finding a market
niche in the regional economy of communication is yet to be big the agenda of
BTV. At the moment Botswana is at the margins of the global impetus towards
commodification of cultural meanings. It is not clear for how long BTV can
postpone its entry into market economics. It has to find a balance between the
essential but expensive local productions, entering the global market of cultural
products and serving the nation-state's nation-building agenda.
(
James M. Coltart, once a managing director of the Thomson Organization, felt
that, Africa needed more than anything else television; 'for with such high
illiteracy she must have a visual media which will open up the whole world to
literate and iIIiterate',~ (Coltart, 1963:202). Coltart warned against wrong motives
~
for developing broadcasting in Africa, fearing that there might be a tendency for
help to come, in anticipation of future markets. Other countries, possibly referring
to the Communist bloc, he contended were developing mass media in Africa to
spread their own propaganda. Television he argued, was necessary to enlighten
Africans on better farming practices, motherhood, hygiene and vocational
training.
Coltart, very much like his contemporaries in the early sixties was very
paternalistic in his view of Africa and other Third world audiences. He
remembered an eve_nt where in Karachi, about 2000 people gathering to watch
television at a community centre \;V0uld get rowdy so that tough policing and
I
sometimes the use of barbed wire was necessary,
Sometimes it is difficult for people in this country to realize how absolutely
essential it is that they must have television, but I would ask you this -
how can the Governments of these countries, with anything up to 90 per
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cent illiteracy teach and train any adult population, except through a visual
method (Coltart, 1963:206).
Appropriateness of television for Botswana
Cinematography is a fascinating past time and anyone contemplating
making film at government expense must ask the question, 'Is there really
no cheaper way of getting the message across?'(Hughes, 1968:26)
Doubt about the appropriateness of television for Botswana existed from as early
as 1968, when consultant, A.J. Hughes was brought in to make a blue print for
government-owned mass media in Botswana. At the time there were no technical
facilities for professional film production, but it appears some of the government
journalists were interested to start up a film unit. At the same time, Hughes also
4
noted that in 1968, appearances of Botswana in television were limited to 'rare
visits' by foreign News teams. He wished for more coverage of Botswana by
foreign television media, but on the use of moving images as a line of
communication between government and citizens, Hughes emphatically stated
that cinematography was not the cheapest way of getting the message across
(Hughes, 1968:26). He thus recommended that the idea of a film unit be shelved
for a while. Dietrich Berwanger (1976) found the question of whether film and
television were necessary, financially acceptable and developmentally
meaningful to developing countries as outdated.
Yet in Botswana" even in 1978, Information Consultant C.N. Lawrence
• I
discouraged the introduction of television. Information consultants Hughes and
Lawrence emphasized more the role of mass media in the Third World especially
in the post colonial period as to inform and educate. Even those that supported
the idea for television in Africa often perceived it in terms of its possibility as a
visual medium to enhance development communication for the largely illiterate
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continent. Berwanger argued that experience had shown that visual media were
a useful and cost saving instrument of development policy. By 1976, there were
already 26 television systems and at least 2.5million sets in Africa (Berwanger, 'I
1976:11). Education, rather than entertainment, was the only scope that
television was found relevant for, in so far as the needs of the Third World. Later
studies showed a trend among most viewers to prefer television as entertainment
rather than an educational tool. In fact, educational television systems that were
installed in many parts of the Third World ended up being used for entertainment
shows (Melkote and Steeves, 2001 :139). '
While media was long recognised as a powerful tool for the distribution of
political, economic, and cultural benefits, according to Jan Servaes (1999),
countries like Tanzania still delayed the advent of foreign content dominated
television. Because Tanzania appreciated the power of visual images, they
instead opted for the inexpensive horizontal communication videos for relaying
information between the people taking part in Ujamaa villages and Julius
Nyerere's government (Servaes, 1999:169). Melkote and Steeves (2001 :360)
heralded Ujamaa an example of grassroot participatory movements, but
incidentally, the failure of experiments such as Julius Nyerere's Ujamaa villages
in Tanzania was often blamed on both inappropriate technology and for not being
rooted in a cultural context. Zaki Ergas (1980) found that, besides the fact that
Ujamaa was top-down, designed by bureaucrats rather than the peasant farmers
themselves, it was also jeopardized by the fact that, very often the equipment to
execute these projects frequently came from outside and the peasants were
_expected to conform to modem agricultural implements determined by the food
j 1ransnationals and mediated by the international organizations (Ergas, 1980).
The appropriateness of television and any other new technology for the
developing world was often much contested for several reasons, including ability
for developing countries to maintain equipment in sound working condition
(Hughes, 1968). When the Ujamaa villagization project collapsed, it left a trail of
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rotting farming technology such as tractors. When interviewed, engineers
reported that already at BTV, maintenance was proving a problem. They cited a
growing inventory of expensive equipment; cameras, lights, monitors, needing to
be repaired while the bureaucratic process of procuring funds for maintenance
was slowly taking its course. Television and film are necessary but very
expensive forms of cultural production. The establishment of a vibrant film
production economy by the state had to compete with more basic needs of health
and education, given the small population of consumers of television the country.
Traditional debates around technology transfer and development in Africa were
often critical of the importation of Western technologies into contexts that barely
understood such technologies. E.F. Schumacher, author of Small is Beautiful
(1973,1999) and well-known champion for alternative technology in the Third
World advised countries to invest not in primitive technology of bygone ages, but
simpler, much cheaper technology that used local materials. Technology should
be suited to the prevailing socio-economic conditions (Webster, 1990:186,
189).155 Servaes (1999) warned that "when one has to import foreign technology,
which is not available inside the country, a major criterion should be whether this
technology can contribute to autonomous and sustainable development"
(Servaes,1999:168).
If television .technology remained foreign, content could be modified to the local
consumer: According to Kenneth Thompson (1997), this seldom happened
because broadcasting has often been transferred to developing countries in
organisational models of the countries of origin, usually of the West. The high
cost of production of local television programmes was also prohibitive. It has
been observed that for many television stations in less developed countries,
resources are often lacking to produce extensive programming of their own,
hence they import American serials at relatively financially attractive and lower
prices to fill their broadcasting schedules (Thompson,1997). Hughes advised the I 'r
155 Webster, A., (1990) Introduction to the Sociology of Development (2nd ed.) Macmillan: London
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Botswana government against the introduction of television because it was a
desirable but unnecessary expense that would only benefit a very few. This was
considering that most places in Botswana did not have electricity and very few
people could afford the service.
Successful technology transfer would mean looking first at domestic or
indigenous technologies over imported ones to avoid dependent technology
(Servaes, 1999:169). To many Third World countries such as Botswana,
television primarily came as a 'ready made' foreign technology whose
manufacturing was never domesticated and adapted to local technological
capabilities. Yet, the fact that although the whole BTV project experienced long
delays, the technology side of things was completed on schedule, was according
to the local.engineers, because they were able to work to the standard of their
counterparts brought in from BBC and SABC. Local engineers often had received
Western education and training. They said in interviews that they realized during
4
the project that they were as good as others from the developed world. The
problem with BTV however, was that it was not conceived with a strong do-it-
yourself approach in so far as maintenance. It relied on maintenance contracts
with the proViders of the high technology from the First World. Just in two months
between June and July 2005, BTV paid GBP 69 411.99 (P556 000) towards
maintenance and support to UK based companies.156
Today talk is about the digital divide which further widens the income and
development disparities between Africa, and the developed West. Internet is
rendering national boundaries less relevant. It is also creating large parts of
Africa, South America and Asia into a Fourth World that is completely excluded
from the global network economy (Melkote and Steeves, 2001 :64). Africa is
lacking behind on the Information Super Highway. A developing country invested
in a state - of - the - art digital television broadcaster. It is yet too early to
determine if this marked a step towards closing the information and digital divide.
156 Information obtained from http://www.ppadb.co.bw/jul05_awards_tab.html
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BTV and media economics
tJ-
Gillian Doyle (2002b) provides useful insights into the understanding the politics I I
and economics of television production. The US is the leading producer in
international audiovisual trade, mainly to Europe. This is largely because English
in an international language, and few television audiences will put up with
programming in foreign languages, especially minority languages. The UK is the
next successful producer, followed by other English speaking countries of
Australia, Canada and Ireland. The BBC is the largest exporter of programmes in
Europe. Spreading production costs across as many different release windows
and territories as possible is the fundamental recipe for success for any media
content-producer. US suppliers have also been accused of dumping their
productions into smaller markets like the European Union (EU), selling them at
below production cost, which makes it even more difficult for emerging local
producers to compete. Europe respondep by putting in. place a number of
collective policy initiatives and funding schemes intended to support indigenous
producers. More importantly, a compulsory quota system was introduced to
compel European television station to broadcast productions made in the EU. "As
far as culture is concerned, the 'invasion' of foreign television content is
perceived by some as posing a threat to indigenous languages and values" ~
(Doyle, 2002b: 93).
Television stations can choose to either be strictly broadcasters, to produce
some of their own programmes or to acquire transmission rights or else
commission production of new programmes. New channels, such as BTV -often
started out by relying heavily of relatively inexpensive !mported programming,
and even second hand programmes with a known record of attracting audiences.
As they matured, they would switch from imports to domestic acquisitions or
even original programming, especially at primetime (Doyle, 2002b:80, 88).
Advocates of free market access argue that any artificially support measures to
encourage local production of a commodity - cultural or otherwise - which can
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be created more cheaply or cost-effectively elsewhere will lead to less efficient
use of resources. Encouraging high cost 'indigenous' productions may serve
interests of domestic producers, but it was a misallocation of resources (Doyle,
2002b:99).
It has been observed that for many television stations in less developed
countries, resources are often lacking to produce extensive programming of their
own, hence they import cheap foreign content to fill their broadcasting schedules
(Thompson,1997). Simon Higman of the BBC initially thought BTV would from
the start be able to meet the 60 per cent quota of local content set out for
broadcasters by the National Broadcasting Board (NBB) (Higman Report, 2000),
but this was never possible. Canned foreign content were cheaper to buy than to
produce local content. BTV had to negotiate a balance between cheap
inexpensive foreign content, the essential but expensive local production, and
real or imagined risk of cultural imperialisom (Schiller, 1976; 1996).
BTV in-house productions
Much of the failure of BTV to meet expectations was often blamed on Kevin Hunt
and the project team that was hired to start up the station. It would appear that
Hunt not only failed to successfully and timely launch BTV, but his
overzealousness on unnecessarily sophisticated television technology, was a
significant set back to the emergence of a vibrant local production industry. His
only vision was to build state-of-the-art broadcasting facilities that would be
envied by even the most advanced television stations. B1V should have been the
,
hub of an emerging local production' industry. The feeling expressed among
some people involved in the project like John Clement and Robert Gray (in
interviews) was that it should have been designed to offer the very best facilities
to creative minds outside the station that did not have the equipment. Part of the
reason that Hunt was finally forced to resign was the fact that many people did
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not think BTV needed to be designed in the way that it was. Clement who did the
crash course or boot camp for applicants that would become BTV's first
employees, also did not share Hunt's idea of BTV. For him, BTV was built as if
there was already an independent production industry. There was a dichotomy
between the outside and the inside. It was not designed as a walk in facility that
local producers could come into to lease equipment from or use. The problem, in
the words of Robert Gray, a South African brought in to do on-the-job training of
staff, Hunt did not have much broadcasting experience to oversee a project of
the magnitude of BTV. For a small group 'of BTV employees collectively called
'Production', who were neither in Operations nor part of News and Current
Affairs, their future with BTV was uncertain until the arrival of two BBC
consultants for in-house production in June 2000, Ann Umbina and Mary
Gregory. In just under two months before the station went on air, BBC turned
around a desperate situation into the core of the station. Local content was to
occupy more airtime that News and Current Affairs, initially the core mandate of
<
the station. The BBC brought 'Production' back on board as relevant and
important to BTV's cultural production. Busi Butale, one of the producers, said
about the BBC consultants that, the most important contribution was that they
gave them confidence. The BBC consultants would go with them to the field and
come and sit with them though the steps of pre and post production. "They taught
us as you would a child, it was quick but very good", said Butale. Gray had an
exact opposite view of the BBC. The BBC disempowered him. The BBC took
away discipline away from the trainees. The BBC denied locals the chance of
determining the look of their own station. The BBC came to launch a station he
had worked very har~ to put together. and that he was ready to launch, and did
not add any value to BTV (Interview }Vith Gray, 2006).
I
Among the first generation of in-house local programmes were Mmualebe
produced by Kitso Mosiieman. There was Focus, later called The Eye and
Matlhoaphage resulting from pressure on management to give all political parties
coverage, all first produced by Norman Patlakwe. Gregg Lesibe had to produce
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four programmes at one point, Flavourdome, Mokaragana, What's the score?
and Worship. Sport Hive was created by Solly Nageng, and a sports window
Tshamekang by Raymond Tsheko. Susi Sutale, Oesi Thothe working with
Kesholofetse Phetlhu co-produced Sutale's creation, 'Sedibeng'. Sutale
proceeded to bring another programme, Mantlwaneng. There were also two daily
News bulletins in English and the local major language - Setswana.
STY programmes were intended to be of the highest standards of
professionalism, impartial, diverse, relevant and informative. They would cover
most genres, but emphasis would be on sports, news, music and talk shows.
Languages would expand from the initial emphases on English and Setswana
(Levy, 2003). The synopses of local programmes posted on the STY official
website often exhibited a vibrant tone that belied the chaotic environment under
which they emerged (see appendix 18). Many of the first in-house productions,
besides News, were not to survive the first five years. Mmualebe, was to die
when it should have grown after about two years of running. Worship also died
along the way and was replaced by other Christian productions. Current Affairs
and political debate programmes, The Eye and were to suffer perennial intemal
censorship as the reality that free and fair debate under a government
department was impossible hit home. Some programmes became resounding
successes. Mokaragana and Sedibeng became favourites to local audiences, but
they were initially beset by lack of adequate human resource. Sedibeng was later
to scale down from two shows a week to only once a week. Through the sports
programmes, Sport Hive and Tshamekang especially football was to become a
n~tional sensation,. leading to the formation of the first fan's association for the
national football te~m, the Zebras. Flavour Dome was the first local in-house,
programme to get a private broadcast sponsor, making it the first STY production
to help towards cost-recovery.
Jeremy Tunstall (1993:20) noted the tendency for public service broadcasters
and stations that aim to provide a substantive dose of informative and
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educational programming to often concentrate on factual programming, because
it is cheaper and represents good value for money that could be partly
contributed by taxpayers. Most of the BTV programmes were factual, in studio or
with a studio segment, and sometimes a brief field clip. There were occasional
outside broadcasts for events like big football matches, opening of Parliament,
State of the nation addresses by the President, and Independence celebrations.
According to the first local Head of Productions, Kesholofetse Phetlhu, there
were always good ideas for documentaries and other types of formats that were
never executed because of lack of human resource, equipment and budget
constraints. The first generation of BTV in-house productions was therefore,
were understandably 100 percent factual programming, and very often
comprising of 'talking heads', as one former producer, Kitso Mosiieman later
reflected (Interview with Mosiieman, 2006).
Between budgets and development communication
With the exception of Re Mmogo, and later TalkBack, BTV-Ied productions would
not fare very well in the development communication category either, which
emphasises a participatory approach to working on videos with beneficiary
communities, so as to give them more control over their own representation
(Toma~lIi, SACOD FOfum report 2001:10). Of the first eleven local productions,
;. ~.' :; .
three were studio'political debates, one was a children's educational programme,
one for HIV/AIDS education, and the rest lifestyle, sports and entertainment. In-
house producers and commissioned private local producers can learn much from
rSABC commissioned productions like Tsha Tsha! Here, access means more
j t~an just media enabling audiences to debate public policy. Producers of Tsha
Tsha!, a drama on young people living in the HIV/AIDS era used post-broadcast
discussion on radio talk shows and the Internet to facilitate discussion and input
into the programme (Ford, 2005). At BTV, TalkBack is the only local programme
that viewers can interact with, live. A BTV commissioned drama, Thokolosi,
generated much public debate on radio, television and print media for playing on
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an 'actual' myth about the village of Bobonong in Botswana, that the people are
masters of witchcraft and turn corpses into Thokolosi, superhuman slaves.
There was no deliberate attempt to improve public input and access into the
production of the programme by the producers.
BTV fails development communication from obvious scarcity of manpower within
the station, from the high cost of television productions, and for being a mirror of
Botswana's politicians. Studio programmes are cheaper and easier to produce,
and considering little training that BTV personnel had in the beginning, 'talking
heads' have been better than nothing. BTV content schedule, compared to that
of Radio Botswana even in the early 1970s, contained very little that can be
called development communication. Radio Botswana had programmes for
women, farmers, health education, and programmes on distance, vocational and
tertiary education. A study by Onalethuso Makgoeng on 'Health education
through radio in Botswana' in 1977 showed that the Ministry of Health had a
radio programme since 1975 - covering topics such as tuberculosis, nutrition,
sexually transmitted diseases, sanitation, family planning, and road safety. The
government also used radio drama for social change through dramas like (Sethito
le Boitumelo J, which people preferred to lecture like formats (Makgoeng, 1977)-
Schools Broadcasting Unit (SBU) of the Ministry of Education was established in
1966. Initially it used tapes provided by the BBC, but over the years they
introduced locally produced material. Although it was daunted by disrepair of
radio sets, poor signal reception, lack of batteries, and a small production staff,- .
only two in 1978, SBU survived to the present (Nleya, 1987).
Besides content that is informative, Radio Botswana was used for (Lesedi La
Puso
J
, Radio Listenership Groups campaigns (RLG) as a tool for participatory
development in 1973, 1976 and 1978 (Jere and Youngman, 1977;1978). The
campaigns were to explain new government polices to Batswana, especially in
rural areas. Local village teams, headmen, family welfare educators, school head
teachers, village development committees, councilors and villagers were trained
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for a five week period to listen to radio broadcasts, with a study guide, to assess
polices such as the National Development Plan in 1973 and the Tribal Land
Grazing Policy in 1976. The objective was to get participants to understand their
rights and responsibilities as citizens. Initially the RLGs were organized at
national level, but the 1978 version was adapted to the individual districts.
BTV buying canned foreign and local content
An observation made by a former employee of BTV, Seamogano Mosanako was
that, though in quantitative terms, BTV had many local programmes, the actual
air time they occupied was much less. This, Mosanako attributed to financial
constraints ~md the fact that the television industry in Botswana was still in
infancy (Mosanako, 2004). Besides the few in-house local productions and News,
the BTV programme schedule was dominated by canned foreign content. In
<
2004, Mpho Kgosidintsi of BTV marketing said in interviews with the researcher
that it was by far much cheaper to buy foreign content than local content. In 2005
alone, govemment paid over USD 1.5 million (P7.5 million) for foreign
programmes and only about USD 25 000 (P1.5 million) on canned local
programmes (see appendix 19). The figures from approved tenders provided by
the PPADB for the year 2005 proved this. For 260 episodes of the American
soap opera The Bold and the Beautiful, BTV only paid USD 78 000, USD 300 (P
1 500) per episode, compared to USD 1600 (P8 000.00) for one documentary
from local Ditiragalo Media. It was also cheaper to secure programmes that ran
longer than for one or two seasons, the latter were more expensive per minute.
Another reason for low spending on local canned productions was BN's
unrealistically high quality standards considering the infantile stage of film 'and
television production in Botswana. At the beginning of 2004, the local television
station GBCTV bought rights to air the drama, Flat 101 by a local production
house, Flave. BTV was the first to be approached, but they apparently flatly
rejected the 13 episode drama. The production had cost the local company
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around P 500 000 (USD 100000).157 Yet as was pointed out by Press Secretary
to the President Jeff Ramsay at the African Francophone Film Festival held by
Alliance Fran~oise at University of Botswana in March 2005, although Flat 101
was turned down by BTV as being too poor quality, it was found good enough for
SABC Africa to broadcast to the continent. l58
Many distributors, mostly from South Africa with holding rights of international
best-selling programmes, approached BTV to sell non-exclusive free terrestrial
television broadcasting rights. They offered renewable contracts for an average
of 12 to 18 months (see appendix 20). BTV being a new station, it attracted many
distributors, from South Africa and places as far as Lebanon, Mauritius, Monaco,
USA and Australia. The international distributors approached the station, mostly
with second-hand re-runs of popular series' .from mainly the US, but also the UK,
Australia, Canada and other English speaking countries. Very few non English
international programmes that used sl::lbtitles were bought. Sometimes
representatives from the international distributing companies came personally to
sell programmes they had obtained holding rights for. BTV only bought
broadcasting rights. Local producers had not created a common distribution
system. They approached BTV with unsolicited canned programmes on an
individual bases. Very few of the submitted local material were purchased by
BTV. On the other hand, BTV had never attempted to sell any of its in-house
programmes," a'ccording to Kgosidintsi. The Marketing section was very still very
small, understaffed and inexperienced.
157 Mmegi online, http://www.mmegLbw.l2004/JanuarylTuesday20/6734203981534.html
158 ~fri~an Francophone Film Festival held by Alliance Fran9aise at University of Botswana library
auditOrium, 19-24 March 2005, Discussion panel, Film making in Botswana, 24 March 2005.
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Deciding what the nations wants to see
In selecting which programmes to buy for the schedule, initially BTV was to put
together a Programme Advisory Committee, "representative of the Botswana
society - age, background, education etc. as possible" (Hunt Report, 1999:8).
This never happened. The best they were able to achieve towards representing
different target groups was to extend selection of content to any member of staff
at BTV that was interested in programme selection. A semi-permanent
programmes committee had emerged, led by a BTV Marketing officer. It included
the Head of Programmes, producers of in-house programmes, Transmission
Controller and the Channel Controller (Interview with Kgosidintsi, 2004). At the
end of May 2004, the programmes committee met to view screenings of some
local and international canned production. Altogether, eleven people participated
in the three day session, with eight coming on anyone day, three men and seven
women. It became apparent to the researcher that selection was a relatively
unpopular process. It entailed skimming through demonstration videos sent by
either international distributors or for local content, submitted by local producers
themselves.
In one of the sessions attended during this research, a certain Peter Spammer of
Berjaya Distributors came to sell some products. While he recognized that the
selection committee did not make final decisions on purchases, he did express
that he would be happier if they did. To put some pressure on the committee, he
reminded them that taking a long time to make decisions could cost them some
programmes. He could not guarantee that by the time the six week purchasing
process was complete, that the selected programmes would still be available.
South African SABC and M-Net on the other hand bought programmes on the
spot, and could then secure monopoly broadcast rights and prevent BTV access
to the purchased programmes. In 2004 at BTV, the procedure was that after the
selection, the marketing officer filled in 'CTB Form 3' - an evaluation and
recommendation form, to the then Central Tender Board (CTB), now PPADB.
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They waited about two weeks for the CTB decision to approve or reject the
application. Once approval was granted, the marketing officer completed a
Government Purchasing Order (GPO). The GPO was a guarantee that the
government would pay. The GPO was made by the Supplies section of DIB, and
could take up to three weeks. Once made, the GPO was taken to the accounts
section of the Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology. Once the
Ministry accountants approved, it was signed and submitted to the Ministry of
Finance and Development Planning for the final cheque to be made. An
electronic transfer would then be made from Finance to the Bank of Botswana,
where sellers collected their payment cheques and tapes could be released. Very
few programmes were obtained free, or through the barter system. According to
Kgosidintsi, People TV gave broadcasters 'free' programmes such as Initiative
Africa and Business Africa. The programmes came with pre-canned commercials
(InterView with Kgosidintsi, 2004).
<
In May 2004, the procurement process of canned productions at BTV was
observed by the researcher. Kgosidintsi, the f0arketing officer brought in several
tapes that were screened according to the time-slot and target audience they
were intended for in the schedule. For instance, a slot after the 21 :00 English
bUI.letin was not considered appropriate for documentaries. For that reason,
• international award winning South African documentary, Tobias Bodies was not. ...!": .
'accepted to fill up that slot. Another time slot that had to be filled up was the time..
after the seven o'clock Setswana bulletin. Mutant X a sci-fi series was one of
those considered. The women in the committee, most of them being thirty or
older, did not like M~tant X. Perhaps as a result of the selection committee
comprising more women than men, there was more support for family romantic
J
comedy type of genre compared to action movies. On one of the three days, only
one man was present, and he complained that there was a deficiency of action,
and that the male audience was not being considered. The women were however
adamant that they would not vote for action as it contained a lot of violence. One
of them actually said that men had had it for too long. Women argued that Mutant
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X had too many violent scenes, especially considering that children would still be
watching television at the time slot in question. It was interesting that, the oldest
and most conservative male in the committee, and the youngest woman, in her
early twenties, both did not find anything wrong with Mutant X. The younger
woman found the content similar to that of an American soap, Passions, that
went on at 18:00.
A local producer, Billy Kokorwe had submitted a documentary of a visit to
Botswana by South Africa President Thabo Mbeki. It was not accepted on the
basis of the quality of the footage. Forgotten voice an American documentary
distributed by Be~aya on Africa was accepted on the grounds that it had positive
images of Africa and included a wide range of African countries. A concern was
raised that it would have been nice it it was produced by Africans, and Ali
Mazrui's name came up. Disappearing world warriors: black slaves for sale was
given the thumbs down. An immediate reaction from Kitso Mosiieman, the
Channel Controller, was the programme depicted Africans in what she
considered bad taste. There was a picture of a toothless woman breastfeeding a
baby with her breast exposed. "The western gaze is a problem, as a station we
have decided to accept a certain reality about Africa. The guiding principle and
editorial practice of the station is putting positive images of our people". Elephant
Orphans, set in the beautiful Okavango Delta in Botswana was perceived the
right choice. To the delight of the Channel controller, a Botswana man shown on
elephant back safari was not an emaciated figure of African poverty, but healthy
looking. Josef Gugler (2003) reminded the Western audience that the great
majority of African countries never made it to their screens. The little News that
there was focused on disasters, droughts, epidemics, and war. Films .produced
I •
by Africans like the Burkina Faso based Yaaba produced in 1989 by Idrissa
Ouedraogo, according to Gugler, distinguished itself from Western films set in
Africa by the unique character setting, pacing, language, music, and finance
(Gugler,2003:30).
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The wildlife documentary genre was the most favoured by the BTV programme
selection committee. A foreign documentary The Whole Story sold by Zee TV
was given the green light because as Lorato Ntuara put it "you can't go wrong
with wild animals". The view was that, wildlife tended to escape the trapping of
IOthering' representing non Western cultures as exotic and inferior common in
films about Africa especially produced from the West. In the animal world, there
was nothing wrong with a mother killing offspring of another animal to feed its
own young ones.
Several tapes from Seed Entertainment were screened. Political Assassinations
was found relevant, although the main issues were hatred, intolerance and
brutality. It was seen as very good because it was about assassinations of
important political leaders, even outside Africa.' Seisa, then Commissioning
Editor, was of the opinion that the choice of content should not only be based on
the appeal of a programme. The developmental stage of BTV should also be
Q
taken into account. He found some of the content, like Zambezi Sharks on shark
diving in the Zambezi a luxury suited for more established stations. Being
creative about seeing things through the creatures' eyes, by their rules and in
their turf by Fairmead Consultancy was successfully sold.
From Botswana, Golden.Bafana of the African Media Warehouse was selling a
drama entitled Tentacles. It was shot down as substandard. It was apparently not
the first time he was submitting substandard programmes to BTV. There was
already little expectation around the table that this one would be any better. A
producer of many BTV in-house productions expressed a need for the committee
to avoid being prejudiced against local producers that had submitted poor work
•
previously. They needed to be given a fresh chance with every submission. In
fact, he suggested that perhaps screenings for local producers could be blind so
as to counteract a tendency to judge them by earlier good or bad impressions.
He however did find the camera work and lighting very poor. Seisa found the
production and the script also very poor. The decision to not take Tentacles,
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appeared fair, from a quality point of view. From a political point of view, the
committee was concerned that local producers could put political leaders under
pressure to force BTV to buy their productions even if the station did not fit in with
the image of the channel BTV was trying to create. From a point of letting local
viewers be the judge of the state of local production, it would be worthwhile for
BTV to procure product of a poorer quality. Here, there was a lesson to be learnt
from commissioned family game shows Chalk and Cheese and even worse, Obi
Erobu's Dreams come true. Because the shows were commissioned by BTV at
around P1 million (USD 200 000) each, they were included in the schedule.
Viewers called and wrote to the station and in the local media that both shows
were very poor.
Divorce Court a popular American reality courtroom series sold by Be~aya
Distributors divided the committee along gender lines. The only two men in the
committee that day, Seisa and Gregg Lesibe found the judge prejudiced against.
men. Seisa, a devout Christian also thought the viewers might see Divorce court
as encouraging divorce. He was also of the opinion that the court was not
conducted professionally. The women in the committee liked it and so it was
selected. Seisa represented a conservative, family oriented aptitude, whereas
the younger members of the committee focused more on aesthetics and
entertainment value. International distributors did not supply much in terms of
African films, and according to Spammer, many African producers could not
maintain a steady supply of good quality programmes that attract high audience
ratings. Distributors were not willing to shop around for that once off good
production - they preferred to buy In bulk.
I
Many tapes selected that day were mostly from one distributor, Berjaya, and
there was a concern that the purchases approving body, PPADB might have a
problem with that. Because of the number of tapes that the committee needed to
sample, a question was raised about how much time of screening was sufficient
to make a valid decision to pick or discard a programme. There was a concern
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that distributors could mislead buyers into a poor programme by ensuring a good
introduction, middle and end of a programme.
Generally, the selection committee appeared to hold the view that audiences in
Botswana were unsophisticated. For example, it was felt that a programme of
Rip/ey's Believe it or not, or Maximum Exposure with their focus on the
paranormal and unusual could confuse viewers. A more straight forward
programme like Believe it or you don't was preferred. Gender however, also
played a role. The men found Rip/ey's Be/ieve it or not entertaining. One of the
sentiments expressed during selection was that viewers in remote parts of
Botswana like Gumare would not understand or appreciate cartoons. Nudity,
vulgar language and homosexuality were not entertained because the view was
that the Botswana society was conservative. BTV edited out parts of.
programmes with such scenes, or altogether abandoned the programmes.
In South Africa, the Broadcast Complaints Commission of South Africa (BCCSA)
handles all written complaints about content found offending among stations that
have signed the Code of Conduct of the National Association of Broadcasters of
Southern Africa. In Botswana, it was reported that BTV mainly received
complaints through telephone calls from the public. According to Channel
Controller Mosiieman, many of the callers were male. However, it was clear that
viewers in Botswana were varied and could not be packaged together into a
single unit. Mosiieman remembered that at one point, due to pressure from some
viewers and the Ministry, they pulled off an American soapie Passions. Six
weeks later they had to bring it back on. Many of the callers that demanded it
- -
back were meo.
Of a state-led local film and television production in Botswana
When the television project commenced in 1998, there was virtually no local
television or film production industry in Botswana. A brief history of the Gaborone
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Broadcasting Company television (GBC), later GBCTV, was drawn together
through an interview with General Manager Cyrus Mahmoudi, and a GBCTV
Information package, on 02 November 2004. GBC was the only Free to Air
terrestrial station in Botswana since 1988, until BTV came in 2004. Initially 100
percent British owned, at the beginning of 2004 it came to the hands of a local,
Mike Klink. GBC received funding purely from advertising and sponsorship. At
the beginning, GBC was a small television viewers association, they had a small
voluntary license fee, and very few people paid. Viewers used to receive signal
and channels from South Africa using analogue aerials and booster masts, and
were very reluctant to pay license fees. GBCTV joined TV Africa as an affiliate in
1998, and went up to more than forty affiliated television stations. It started with a
signal radius of five kilometres, but by 2004 was broadcasting in the city and
surrounds, their signal was within a 240 degree arch and running 18hours a day.
The population coverage was at 450 000, and they had an estimated active
viewership of 160 000. Their programming in 2003 mainly contained re-.
broadcasting canned SABC, BBC and international sitcoms, dramas, sport,
documentaries, News and a few children's programmes, including 'Oprah
Winfrey', 'Gillette World Sport', 'Studio 53', 'Voice of America', 'Idols', and
'Crossroads cafe'. Among their popular programmes were also the South African
soaps, Generations and Isidingo. They aired the first ever local drama, Flat 101.
GBCTV also did News, reading pre-packaged stories from local and international
sources such as Voice of America and the BBC. They also bought broadcasting.. ,
rights for LIVE sports tournaments such as the Euro Cup, FA Premier League,
Africa Cup of Nations, Wimbledon and the Miss World pageant.159
Raymond Tsheko of BTV noted that especially since 2002, many young
I
Botswana citizens arrived home from abroad with diplomas and degrees in
television and film production and directing, photography, graphic designing and
associated fields. They hoped to make a living from the expected spin offs of a
159 Interview with General Manager Mr. Cyrus Mahmoudi, and GBC TV Information package
dated 02 November 2004,
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television station. Production companies were set up with funds borrowed from
the Citizen Entrepreneurial Development Agency (CEDA), spent on expensive
edit suites, cameras and video production equipment. Many waited in vain for the
trickle down from BTV. In 2003, BTV had complied a list of about forty listed local
production houses including Red Stone, Creative Liquid, AV Communications,
Tsa Motshikinyego Pictures, Africa in Motion Productions, Boma Productions,
Soul Power, Matinee Media, Counter Attack, Camel Thorn Media, Flame Power,
Sequence, Spectrum Multimedia, Dipolelo Video Arts, Econ Network and free
lancers including Phil McCowen, Spencer Moreri, Ben Ngwato, Morati Molosiwa,
Ndipo Mokoka, and Feni Gasennelwe (see appendix 21). A number of
immigrants also opened up shop, but until the first six commissioned projects that
came out in mid 2003, there was not much happening or much of an independent
television and film industry.
There was a very small video production industry which mainly did corporate
communication videos and private weddings. Most of the work was done on part-
time bases. Obi Erobu, a Nigerian Managing Director of Econ Networks, which
later won a commissioning tender from the Botswana Television, considered
himself one of the pioneers of video production in Botswana in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. He came to Botswana in response to a job offer for a video
producer at the University of Botswana, Department of Educational Technology.
While working there he did a lot of freelance work. He worked with production
outfits mainly for government. The Department of Town and Regional Planning in
1996 commissioned him to do a promotional video show casing planning. He
was working with other local producers, mainly doing the camera work and
picture editing. Erobu considered himself one of the pioneers in this country in
the production industry. In 1996 he was part of the production team of a first ever
locally produced and televised talk show, 'Dume/a', which was broadcast by the
GBCTV. It was a six episode programme covering issues such as alcohol abuse,
single parenting, fashion, and multi level marketing that was used by GNLD, a
very popular group at the time for direct selling of domestic ware in the country.
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He has also done a documentary for the AIDS Sexually Transmitted Diseases
Unit Unit and videos for the Institute of Development Management (IDM), the
Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC) and others.
Lack of funding for film and television production in the Third World
Dietrich Berwanger (1976) warned that, "Iow production budgets and limitations
on equipment are no excuse for inflicting low-class films and television
programmes onto the public", (Berwanger, 1976:63). He advised film makers and
television producers in developing countries to try old programme forms that
were different but no less effective compared to newer more expensive ones.
Local content produc~d by or commissioned by BTV is not in anyway
independent in the way of avant-garde 'alternative' cinema discussed' in Chris
Holmlund's introduction to the book 'Contemporary American Independent Film'.
Admittedly relation~1 and referred to by a variety of concepts, this genre of
cultural productions were traditionally low budget but critical films that challenged
the status quo.
Haile Gerima's 'Sankofa', a black movie about slavery - the African holocaust,
was refused by film distributors and theatres, denied press coverage at
screenings, and refused funding, for its subject matter (Reid, 2005). Nor can
BTV-Ied productions be labelled 'Third Cinema', a cinema that is not ,the•..
imperialist, bourgeois and capitalist First Cinema, nor the nihilistic and
mystificatory Second Cinema, but democratic, national and popular. Third
Cinema includes works such as that of Ousmane Sembene, that "refuses to
oppose a simplistic 'notion of national identity or a cultural authenticity to the
values of colonial or imperial predators, Instead, they started from a recognition
of the many-Iayeredness of their own cultural-historical formations, '" that
inhabiting one's culture ... is neither myopically nationalist nor evasively
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cosmopolitan" (Willemen, 1989:4-5). BTV did not produce any feature films or
video.
Compounding the predicament of independent local producers was the fact that,
in many developing contexts, film and television production often did not count as
needs; especially in countries like Botswana, hard hit by HIV and AIDS.
Elsewhere in the southern Africa, where cultural production is more mature, the
industry is' not totally dependent on governments. The Southern Africa Film
Festival held in Harare, Zimbabwe in September 1996 encouraged co-production
within the region and internationally because of the cost-sharing in production of
a film; sharing of talents and skills and wider marketing possibilities for the film.
Carl Fischer, then with a Canadian film production company, Toron named
several possible ways of accessing funding for film. This included· expected
returns from box office, pre-sales guarantees from local broadcasters, donor
funding and incentives from government such as tax holidays, hard and soft
loans.16O
There exist numerous other non governmental efforts to assist independent
producers in the region. The Southern African Communication Forum (SACOD)
promotes the production and distribution of developmental films and videos in
southern Africa. The Southern Africa Media Development Fund (SAMDEF) was
. .
established in 1998 as a media development arm of the Media Institute of
Southern Africa (MISA), to provide finance, training, and development support to- .
emerging media enterprises in the region. In 2001, it was restructured and a new
ins~tution, the Southern Africa Institution for Media Entrepr~neurship
Development (SAIMED), focusing on entrepreneurial development, research and
I I
training was formed. SAMDEF retained the core business for the provision of
160 Africa Film And TV Magazine, Edition 11 November - December 1996.
210
media finance. 161 It was not clear at the time of this research how many local
producers in Botswana were aware of and taking advantage of these resources.
Until mid 2005, when the first of the commissioned programmes went on air, BTV
had to fill up its local content slots with its in-house productions for much of its
early years. This was not easy. As was noted in the 2004 Strategic Plan for Local
Content Acquisition, by the day of the launch in 2000, there were no locally
canned programmes on the shelf, hence BTV continue[d] to" shoot and go on air,
thus compromising quality control measures. It relied heavily on in-house
producers with little experience and in-depth knowledge of the television industry
(BTY Strategic Plan, 2004:4). By 2004, Botswana was still awaiting a major
feature film drama with a full complement of actors and film crew (Parsons,
2004:1 ).
Very few documentaries and films were licensed to air from local producers. The
~
only 16mm film ever procured from a local was a one off drama, Hot Chilli by
Moabi Mogorosi. Over the next few years, there was a occasional licensing -
purchasing of broadcasting rights of local unsolicited programmes. Among the
few licensed by 2004 were a gospel production by AV Communications, Econ
Network's Tlatlana - a documentary on nutrition for HIV positive people and a
one off drama, Lasaro. Billy Kokorwe of the Television Training Institute sold
broadcasting rights of a documentary on Ruth Khama and the Khama family.
BTY also procured an AV Communications documentary on Youth and Alcohol,
Pina ya Sefswana, a traditional dance docu-drama, and an informational
showcasing the Mokolodi Education Centre. Accord!rig to Commissioning Editor
Raymond Tsheko in an interview in 2004, BTY used per minute rates that were
•
negotiated according to technical inputs that went into the production such as
travel, equipment, research, capital expenses, and whether the production was




BTV and Commissioning: the emergence of government-led local
'independent' production
By the time the commissions came out, many of the local independent production
houses were at the brink of collapse. Commissioning heralded a new era of
hope, those that did not get jobs in the first round would get future jobs. With the
establishment of BTV many of these young people expected that, as with
countries with a longer history of television, BTV would bring infinite job
possibilities. This was particularly because BTV had also intimated that it would
outsource some of its production, because it was "important that the full range of
television genres are produced here in Botswana, everything from games and
quiz shows to drama...as part of [BTV] remit to the development of an
independent production industry in Botswana (Higman Report, 2000)". BTV
would then focus on its core business, News and Current Affairs.
Production of media content is expensive because of the need for specialist •
capital, human, and technical - cameras, studios, recording, and editing
equipment (Doyle, 2002b: 80). Costs of local content are prohibitive even in
neighbouring South Africa, even with more players, slicker technology and more
experienced local producers. According to 'The Media: Independent Industry
Intelligence' magazine, SABC 2 had the highest level of local content with over
75 percent of primetime dedicated to local programming. In more developed
television production economies such as South Africa and the West, audience
ratings proved that locally scripted and produced television dramas and soaps
did just as well or even better than Jnternational productions. Even in South Africa
it was still too expensive to broadcast only local productions. South Africa
followed by Nigeria was the largest film market in sub-Saharan Africa, but local
drama was 20 to 25 times more costly to make than to purchase internationally,
according to Carl Fischer of M-Net. Bronwyn Keene-Young of ETV also showed
that the local industry on the other hand had not yet developed to a point where
costs could be recouped from distribution of local material in the international
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market (Keene-Young, 2006).162 Their productions were still considered poor by
international standards (Gugler, 2003).
In October 2003, a BTV Local Content Commissioning and Procurement
Strategic Planning Document was produced by a South African company,
Underdog Productions (pty) Ltd.163 They successfully tendered for a
commissioning workshop for local producers. The terms of reference required
consultants to assist the broadcaster to fully utilize existing local talent to fulfil its
mandate of developing Botswana's cultural industry,
The Terms of Reference asserted that there is a pool of upcoming,
creative television producers who can assist in the creation of local
programming through the process of commissioning, and that there is a .
lack in local content in terms of programmes and genres covered by the
broadcaster (Commissioning Strategic Document, 2003:1}.
The beginning of 2004 saw the finalization of another stepping stone towards
outsourcing of local content, the Botswana Television Strategic Plan for
Acquisition of Local Programmes, January 2004. It contained more acquisition
methods besides commissioning; namely programme exchange, licensing, co-
production and barter system. Commissioning was defined as hiring of local
.,- . independent production companies to produce according to briefs provided by
the broa.9~.aster, programmes fulfilling specifications of local content. In the
particular case of BTV, commissioning was defined as 'where BTV is a' sole
financer for a J5rogramme yet to be produced', (BTV Strategic Plan, 2004:11).
Local content - in Botswana was defined in the 2003 Draft Broadcasting
j ,
Regulations as "the sum total of all television or radio programmes, both music
or talk programmes, that have been produced using material gathered in
162 http://www.themedia.co.za/article.aspx?articleid-270025&area-1media insightfeaturesl surfed
on 17 March 2007
163 Underdog Production obtained the consultancy through a successful bid for the Republic of
Botswana Government Tender: TB 2/5/16 - 2002 Commissioning Workshop
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Botswana and using personnel and services the bulk of which are Batswana and
Botswana registered; and unless otherwise stated in the specific license
conditions, the Licensee would broadcast a minimum local content of 20 percent
for television and 40 percent for radio, spread across the genres excluding News.
In April 2004, BTV began a process of commissioning some local production
houses to fill up on local content and therefore relieve the station of some of the
responsibility. Prior to this time, there had been close to no industry nor market
for locally produced work, scarce as it was. As the industry and market were
being created, it was already clear that demand would far exceed supply. BTV
was not very optimistic about the quality of the scarce productions. This was only
part of the problem. The other problem was that, BTV, as the commissioning
body, had defined its mandate as that of nation-building or 'mirroring the nation'.
In the selection of proposals, would assume' they would also be guided by this
mandate. Mirroring the nation was a tall ord~r that has eluded even the bigger
and more established public service broadcasters such as the BBC and the
SABC. Cultural production was often pulled apart by opposing forces of state
power, profit and the public good. Minorities, women and the poor are likely to be
the least visible on the mirror, both as producers and as productions. BTV is
already struggling for a definition, passing for the time being for a state media
with some public service broadcasting responsibilities besides disseminating
government propaganda,
Experience of state a subsidized production industry from neighbouring South
- Africa, showed how the more critical producer appreciated state aid on the one
hand, but wished on the other not to have the film's ~ontent influenced or
prescribed by the state (Tomaselli, 1988: 29). Keyan Tomaselli's important work
on the 'Cinema of apartheid' shows how the prize that South African feature film
producers paid by surviving off state subsidy often limited them to productions
that legitimised apartheid to the local white audiences, ethnic separatist
solutions, the racially tiered triacameral parliament and military preparedness
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(Tomaselli, 1988:219). Many innovative and critical South Africa filmmakers were
forced into exile, and their work never shown in South Africa. The limited state
commissions and licensing was the only outlet for an ailing local production
industry. It was also the impediment to a truly independent and even subversive
industry that could offer altemative reflections of the nation of Botswana. The
need to survive and not go under was in the early stages of local production in
Botswana overriding professional and ethical consideration. When a state-
sponsored local film production industry tried to produce altemative
representations to those favoured by the South African state and Afrikaner
Nationalism, it was brutally harassed by the govemment. On the positive side,
this created an incentive for a truly independent industry that did not hope to
miraculously escape editorial control by the state.
The commissioning of programmes from local producers began in 2004. This
process arguably marked <the beginning of a local television and film production
industry in Botswana, decades after fellow African countries like South Africa,
Nigeria, Senegal, and Ghana had made their mark in the globa.l visual media
scene. It was a start fraught with allegations of corruption, unrealistic budgets,
very little real concem for developing locals, and unrealistically high expectations
from the local industry. The major problem however was that, only one round of
commissions was done between 2004 and 2006. This section chronicles this
effort; of 'independent' producers, dependent on govemment resources and
working on terms defined by the government, to contribute to the beginnings of a
new site of cultural production.
Initiating BTV into the discourse of'broadcast rights: Tshamekang
and the commissioning process
In procurement of foreign content, the issue of broadcast rights was fairly straight
forward. Distributors normally sold non-exclusive free terrestrial television
broadcasting rights, usually on renewable contracts for an average of 12 to 18
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months (see appendix 21). It was the procurement of local content, where the
question of rights was problematic. According to producer Raymond Tsheko,
besides presenting local content, the most important contribution that
Tshamekang made for Botswana was introducing the concept of broadcast
rights. A Football match between two local teams, Mochudi Centre Chiefs and
Extension Gunners graced the occasion the launching of BTV on 29 July 2000,
two days before the official launch (Higman Report, 2000). It was decided that
part of Tshamekang, would be to air live football matches of the country's Super
League. Tsheko said in 2000, sports associations were not aware of the value of
their product. They knew that they could somehow make money by selling their
product to television but had no way of measuring the worth of their matches.
Initially, football teams were simply happy to get television coverage. This was to
change within a matter of weeks (Interview with Tsheko, 2006). The first big local
football tournament that BTV aired was the Coca Cola Challenge Cup in July
2000. I~itially BFA permitted BTV to air the matches for free. It became evidently
Q
very quickly that this was a bad decision. The novelty of being able to watch
matches on television had an adverse effect on turn out at match venues.
Supporter turn-out reached its all time low. Teams lost out on gate-takings. BFA
was forced to stop BTV from airing the Cup Final and begin negotiating for
broadcast rights (Interview with Tsheko, 2006).
For seven months between July 2000 and February 2001, the battle for
broadcast rights ensued between BTV, BFA and OP. In the beginning, even th~
government, did not understand the concept of broadcast rights. Football, like
other sports, was hea'lily subsidized by the government through the Botswana
National Sports Coun,cil (BNYC). OP argued that paying broadcast rights would
be charging the tax payer twice for the same product. According to Tsheko,
Simon Higman, then General Manager, warned all parties to proceed carefully
around rights to avoid inflation of broadcast rights that had happened in other
parts of the world that made procuring local content too expensive. Around
November 2000, the National Executive of BFA put a P5000 (USD 1000) per
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match price tag for broadcasting of their games. This would be for all the 50
matches in the fixture for the 2001 season of the Super League. Half would be
paid up front and the last half at the end of the season. All the money would go to
individual clubs. More than that, BFA sought a separate deal for special games
such as cup finals, and matches of the Confederation of African Football (CAF).
BFA and BTV finally reached an agreement for P3000 (USD 600) for Super
League games. By 2006, the figure had grown to P8000 (USD 1600) per match
(Interview with Tsheko, 2006).
On top of increasing the price of their product, BNSC and BFA also tried to
influence content. They wanted the games to start with each of four speakers
from the association being given four minutes worth of commentary. Producers
on the other hand felt that 16minutes of 'talking heads' did not fit very well into
programme layout. It would become a corporate video, which they suggested
BFA could commission to other producers. Also, the association was apparently.
pushing BTV to relinquish broadcast rights of events and matches such as their
annual Sports Awards so th~t they could sell their product to the highest bidder
(Interview with Tsheko, 2006).
Sponsored football events were a major source of battles over terms and
conditions of broadcast rights. The annual Orange Kabelano Charity Cup was
one of those tough negotiation events. Negotiations are made tougher by the
number of parties"'involved and the profile of the parties involved. Orange is a big
international-owireless telephony network company; then there was the Botswana
Football Association (BFA) and BTV. Each side has expectations and seeks to
m~ximize returns. BTV seeks to attract sponsors and viewers, Orange seeks to
,
take advantage to market itself and BFA wants to make money and gain
publicity.
Tshamekang also included negotiating broadcast rights with international
sporting associations. According to Tsheko, BTV bought broadcast rights for the
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2000 - 2001 season of the English Premier League for Tshamekang. Because
they had satellite footprint coverage of the whole of southern Africa, Tsheko said
they attracted a lot of viewers for this yet unknown television station. This caused
M-Net to move fast and secure broadcast rights of the league for a five year
period. Locally, they used outside broadcasting facilities to record and broadcast
mainly football and other sporting games. Their main local client was the BFA.
This caused a lot of complaints about limited coverage from other sporting codes
such as volleyball, netball and others.
Right from the report of the 2003 Commissioning Workshop to the 2004 BTV
Strategic Plan for Acquisition of Local Programmes, a major concern among local
producers was the question of rights. This most crucial element, was then, little
understood both within BTV and among local producers. Commissioning was a
learning process for both the broadcaster and the emerging industry. BTV
management knew very little about models of procuring content, licensing,.
commissioning, joint ventures, or how to do requests for proposals. The station
did not have a business plan, there was no clear channel strategy, programming
and scheduling strategy, audience research, or budgeting competencies. There
are different models of financing production, which in turn confers different rights
of ownership. Deficit financing, prevalent in the USA, entails cost and risk sharing
between programme-makers and broadcasters, so that producers may retain
greater secondary rights. In the UK, broadcasters tend to pay all the production
costs, protecting producers from financial risk but also reducing their secondary
rights (Doyle, 2002b). It has been argued sometimes that, it made better sense to
invest in local productions where the broadcaster obtained residual value in
several alternative windows (Doyle, 2002b). Yet the trend in the UK has been for,
broadcasters to not exploit the secondary rights, while denying creative owners
the chance to further exploit the product. The 100 percent government funded
commissioning process nonetheless was a euphoric and most significant
development for the budding local film and television production. Besides availing
funding for commissioned productions, BTV sought to perform capacity building
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of production houses to develop the cultural industry. This was to become a
paternalistic development for obvious reasons that there was no industry to talk
of in Botswana. BTV was advised at the 2003 Commissioning workshop to
clearly define the primary rights it required for broadcasting, and to separate
those from secondary rights. The onus was upon BTV to give producers the
opportunity of retaining an equitable share of their intellectual properties (2003
Commissioning Strategic Document).
BTV retained full editorial control of commissioned programmes they financed
100 percent. For co-productions, where BTV was the dominant financier, they
could insist on full editorial control. ..where BTV was not a major financier, they
could expect to be consulted with respect to all editorial matters; scripts,
treatment, performers, the creative team, offline and online approvals (BTV
Strategic Plan, 2004: 13, 16). BTV would have 100 percent rights to air within
Botswana for the first 3years, with possibility of negotiation with the producer
within the same period. The commissioning editor doubted there would be a big..-
outside market for the commissioned works since most of them were quite
culturally specific. The Commissioning Editor's personal assessment was that
African producers generally produced poor quality work,
They come right out school, never having worked under an experienced
director and claim to be producer/directors. Just because the world
recognizes their disadvantaged position that they therefore are often given
opportunities that many producers from the developed world of their level
would never get, they start to think they can get by with mediocre work.
They forget that that the worJd standards are much higher.
,
BTV management and preparations for commissioning
Government ownership of BTV brought with it cumbersome bureaucratic
institutions such as PPADB. Like the distributors of foreign content such as Peter
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Spammer, local producers would prefer that BTV be exempt from the
government tendering process and allowed to draw transparent and accountable
commissioning procedures. The need to establish local producers associations
was realised right from the 2003 BTV Commissioning workshop, and it was
recommended that BTV assist in helping the industry organise. Several local
producers interviewed, including Pascar Proctor and George Eustice felt that that
commissioning would be best guided by an industry code of conduct drawn
through a voluntary and self regulating, free and independent process.
Commissioning Editor Tsheko said that, they had to learn the ropes of
commissioning as they went, drawing up a commissioning strategy and
implementing it. One of the first eye-openers for him was attending the 2004
symposium for broadcasters on international development at the World Bank in
Washington. Before the end of 2004, he was busy finalizing commissioning
briefs, later putting together material for the evaluation processl and doing the
actual evaluation. Once tenders were awarded, he had to finalize contracts, and
start working on the next commissioning briefs. He also worked closely with the
Ministry of Finance to make block payments to the contracted producers. All of
the producers would need financial advances as all of them were either new or
really financially struggling. The financing would be made per milestone
accomplished. Producers w~uld only get the next advance upon showing that
they have successfully used up the budget for the previous tasks they obtained
money for. They would have to provide a week by week schedule and a budget
for each stage. The claim forms for more money would be co-signed by a
production m0!1itor and a production controller from BTV. Where possible,_
sponsors would, be found. Efficient cost management if not cost recovery would, .
be pursued as much as possible (Interview with Tsheko).
In the evaluations of proposals, citizen skill development was a necessary factor
in the evaluation score sheet of the RFPs (see appendix 22). However,
apparently many local producers that tendered for the commissioned works did
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not include a budget for skills transfer or human resource training aspect of the
commissioning brief, although it was clearly indicated as a key requirement. BTV
did not sympathize with the fact that the budget they offered, P3000 (USD 600)
per minute, would not adequately cover both skills transfer and production. There
was no allowance for extension of original budgets. It is not clear how f)luch
actual citizen skill development was achieved from the commissioned
programmes.
The Commissioning Editor confirmed that most of the successful pitches were
from local companies that entered into what he called strategic partnership with
South African companies. He hoped their product would be of better quality and
that they would learn a lot from the more 'experienced South Africans during
production. He argued it was necessary to maintain high standards as the local
audience was already tuned to superior productions of the SABC and other
foreign content through BTV, GBCTV, the fy1ultiChoice pay per view channel
DSTV. He did not expect viewers to be forgiving of local producers.
BTV commissions and unrealistic expectations ..,
Perhaps because of the normative language of 'strategic plans', that compels
organizations to set themselves 'ambitious' goals, BTV set unrealistically high
quality standards for the commissions, while expecting training and development
to occur during the production. The language in all BTV commissioning strategy
documents is of high quality programmes, meeting high professional standards,
and making productions that would be a point of reference for quality. The
insistence of BTV on quality while there was hardly any television production
experience in the country was misguided. John Clement, a long time video
production trainer in Botswana of the Dipolelo Video Arts felt commissioning
could have been done differently if BTV did not start off pretending there was an
industry. They should have been prepared to start the industry from scratch.
Instead of throwing money at individual inexperienced producers, Clement felt
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BTV should have spent the funds on a collaborative media development
programme. BTV should have brought together producers to work together on
projects. Creative and cultural industries depended on individuals with skills, not
names of production houses. The two commissioned dramas for exampled,
touched on HIV/AIDS. Health Communication is a specialized field that should
not have been left in the hands of amateurs without the necessary professional
ethical training. Having been a judge at the annual Artist of the Year Awards,
Clement was adamant that local producers in Botswana still had a long way to
go. Most produced corporate videos and not art. The emerging infantile industry
was still caught in politics of careerism and survival over professionalism. Many
went around boasting what brand of the latest piece of equipment they had.
Although it was quite understandable that people had bills to pay and families to
support, it was also apparent that even the more financially stable still chose
careerism over creativity. As a result, by going the tendering route, BTV entered
into a zero sum game - BTY lost, it mostly got poor productions, and the industry
also lost, no critical mass of trained producers, technical personnel, directors,
actors emerged from the commissions. In the end BTV was ju.st happy that
commissioned productions did actually go on air.
Instead of BTV introducing an initiative that benefited only a few locals, some
voices in the industry like BB Lethola were of the opinion that money spent on
commissions would have been better spent on a shopping spree of the many
existing productions that were gathering dust in shelves of production houses.
Mediocre as the production would be, they nonetheless would be a useful gauge
of the state of local production, and whic.h way it needed to grow. The nation
would be exposed to its own creativity ~r lack of. By demanding non-eXisting
quality standards, they argued that BTV was inadvertently forcing local producers
to front for South African talent, and so commissioning was missing its mark.
Within the station, the commencement of commissioning was received with some
apprehension. Asked what they thought were its implications, staff feared for
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their jobs if the station started outsourcing production. On the other hand, one
local producer who won a commissioning tender for a drama, was that because
BTV had the only cadre of locals working on television production, the station
could second some of its staff to local producers for no extra pay since they are
already on government payroll. Local producers would cut down spending on
technical crews and improve on the quality of their productions. BTV staff would
gain invaluable experience working with other creative minds outside the station.
The Commissioning Editor did not see that as a possibility. He saw no likelihood
that any of the staff would be prepared to work with the outside producers for no
extra pay. He however predicted that local producers would poach personnel
from BTV. Commissioning was likely to open new opportunities for BTV staff to
set up their own production companies and work for government as consultants
for better remuneration.
In the 2p04 - 2009 Strategic Plan, BTV committed itself to becoming 'a high
4
performance organization that can compete regionally and globally. BTV was
challenged for a number of reasons; whereas Brv was a new single channel free
to air government owned station, BBC and SABC were both much older, multi
channel, multi genre stations with vast resources and massive audiences within
and without their borders. They were also public service broadcasters; with
independent regulatory bodies with a mandate to ensure viewers and listeners
interests were well served. "The BBC is financed by a TV licence paid by
households. It does not have to serve the interests of advertisers, or produce a
return for shareholders. This means it can concentrate on providing high quality
programmes and serviGes for everyone, many of which would not otherwise be
supported by sUbscrip~ion or advertising."164 BBC commissioned on a per nation
and regional bases, there were separate commissioning strategies for BBC
Scotland, BBC Wales, BBC Alba, BBC Northern Ireland and BBC Cymru Wales
and BBC English Regions.
164 http://www.bbc.co.uklinfo/purpose/
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SABC had its own unique priorities in the commissioning of independent local
producers. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) was one such,
Programme commissioning and acquisition are assessed using the
following dimensions: Company ownership; company employment equity
profile; and empowerment profile of the key personnel used on the
production. Empowerment of black South Africans (African, Coloured and
Indian) and women in general is considered for all three dimensions.
SABC Ltd will increase its investment on black-empowered companies by
giving weight to the black empowerment criteria in the sourcing and
selection of proposals, ring-fencing budgets for empowerment companies,
and by sub-contracting parts of long-running commissioning contracts to
-small, especially black companies. 165
Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (2004) reported a concern among stakeholders in South
o
Africa about the possibility of 'quota quickies' emanating from a lack of clear
guidelines regarding the use of black independent producers and others
previously excluded from the mainstream production industry. The Strategic Plan
identified developing the local production industry as a priority, to help the
industry to reach a level where they can compete internationally. The evaluation
score sheet for the 2004 round of commissions weighted skills development at
10 percent (see appendix 22). However, perhaps because local content
production is so new in Botswana, and presumably the field is 'level', there were
no provisions that target specific disadvantaged social groups. While BTV
intenps to support especially producers that are willing to work from different
pa~s of the country, there was no special mention of women, indigenous,
minorities, youth, disabled and other marginalized groups (Strategic Plan, 2004).
165 http://www.sabc.co.za/portaJ/site/menuitem.260bcfc84003e70637487e675401 aeb9/
224
Of commissioning and corruption
Allegations of corruption appear to always follow commissioning. South African
Broadcasting Company which has been commissioning content for longer than
all other broadcasters in the SADC region has been inundated by corruption
claims. SABC awarded R390 million (+-USD 55 million) to independent
producers, of which 60 percent of that, a value to R234. million (+-USD 33
million), was placed with Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) companies and
production companies that have black shareholders in their 2001/2002 fiscal
year. In 2002, Joyce Ndamase, an independent producer submitted a document
to the media and the SABC Chief Operations Officer alleging corruption,
maladministration and fraud in the commissioning. Commissioning editors and
senior executives were alleged to .have given tenders to friends and family in
return for kickbacks. Separate investigations by the Scorpions investigation unit
and accountants Deloitte and Touche- were conducted following these charges.
New commissioning procedures and policies had to be put in place as the old
ones were not tight enough, wide open to fraud and corruption. 166
BTV commissioning provoked critical questions around cultural production under
. .
the stewardship of government. It was not surprising that BTV's very first
r co.mmissioning process was marred with allegations of corruption. Some citizen
film and television producers, notably Billy Kokorwe, secretary of the Citizen Film
and Television Producers Association alleged corruption in BTV'S local content
procurement procedures. In 2004, Billy Kokorwe, t~gether with other local
producers such as Tebogo Modiwa were going to petition the government
through DIB over the 'Tender Notice TB 2/5/10 -2001-2002: Supply of a
Television Programme for Government of Botswana - Department of
Broadcasting Services - Botswana Television' (see appendix 23). The tender
invited local producers to submit proposals to provide BTV with a number of
166 http://www.news24.com/News24/AnanziArticleIO..2-1659_1257711.OO.html
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programmes. Producers had a problem with the provision that the tender may be
awarded in all or in part by the PPADB because it was not clear whether
companies that focused on specific projects rather than tendering for all genres
would not be put at a disadvantage. Kokorwe and others also doubted the
competency of BTV staff, including then acting General Manager Phetlhu, calling
many of them teachers with no broadcasting experience.167 In a dramatic turn of
events, the same Kokorwe, together with three other local producers who bidded
for the second round of commissions, Golden Bafana, Eunice Wadikonyana and
Basadibotlhe Lethola were the target of allegations of questionable liaisons with
BTV manC:lgement. A group of other local producers wrote an open letter to
Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Communications and Technology,
Andrew Sesinyi, recounting instances they felt he acted above his professional
duty to accommodate some of the mentioned four producers, while the
evaluation of proposals was going on.168
As is often the case with commissioning briefs and strategies, on paper the
Strategic Plan for Acquisition of Local Programmes of BTV appeared transparent
and open. The strategic goals of the plan were to establish a vehicle that would
'enhance the acquisition of local content; create an environment for creativity and
innovation; and to fulfil a public serve mandate, guided by the National
Broadcasting Policy, the National Vision 2016 and the Department of
Broadcasting Services' Performance Management System. The evaluation of
«. ..... ,,-"
Requests for Proposals (RPFs) looked for audience appeal, unique value, -quality
assurance, track record. of producer, skills development for the future of local
independents, and a realistic budget:
,
A lack of independence of BTV prevented the stations' management from going
on to the next level of commissions. What started off as unfounded allegations of
corruption on the part of BTV, very common in tendering processes, was to
167 Mmegi online, http://www.mmegLbw/2004/AugustlMonday23/24718141451html
168 Mmegi online, http://www.mmegLbw/2005/December/Friday9/2052803251713.htmI
226
paralyse not only BTV, but the emerging local production industry. Although
DCEC could not establish corruption with the awarding of tenders, political
pressure from government caused the Ministry of Science, Communication and
Technology (MSCT) to halt the next commissions, presumably to put anti-
corruption measures. Newly appointed Deputy Permanent Secretary in MSCT
responsible for government media, Sesinyi openly attacked commissioning
officers and received a standing ovation from local producers for promising them
that he had come to clean up the mess that BTV had made of the last round of
commissioning. The Acting General Manager that saw to the success of that first
commissioning was redeployed altogether from government media.
Local producers demanded that BTV Commissioning Officers not take part in the
next round. They demanded an 'independent' team of evaluators. BTV
management approached the Media Studies department at the University of
~otswana to setup a team to carry out the independent evaluation, (Interivew with
Prof. David Kerr, University of Botswana). According to the BTV officers in
charge of commissioning, local producers could not trust that all the names
submitted for the team were not sidekicks of the commissioning officers. At one
point, proposals were kept locked in the toilet of the General Manager, Banyana
Segwe. There obviously could have been more professional ways of raising the
profess'ion~1 integrity of the Commissioning exercise, without causing the station
total disrepute in the eyes of produc~rs. The next round of commissions was. ., - .
significantly delayed. Many production companies that set up hoping to get jobs
from BTV faced collapse.
By the end of 2006, most of the content of BTV was still procured from overseas. ,
distributors. Local content at BTV was still to meet the 60 percent the National
Broadcasting Board (NBB) target that BTV hoped to meet, although not under
license of the NBB. Comparing the programmes schedules without the
commissioned programmes and when commissioned programmes were on, it
showed that commissioning significantly increased the share of local content on
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BTY. Outside commissioning, on good days like Tuesdays and Wednesdays
where with the most number of local programmes, four of the sixteen hours of
broadcast time could go to local content. The daily average of local content was
only about 2 and half hours of the daily schedule. Saturdays were the best days
for local content, because of repeats of some midweek programmes. Local
content could take up about seven hours of the 13 hour day (see appendix 24).
In 2005, the first crop of commissioned local programmes went air. For the first
time during the last quarter of 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, local content
reached an all time high of seventeen programmes per week, excluding the daily
News bulletins (see appendix 25).
Alternative to foreign content: towards a television for Africa
Lyombe Eko (2001) approached the hope of a truly African mass media from an
optimistic Pan-Africanist angle, showing ho'{\' cinema was one of the key
weapons against colonial conquest. 'Black' cinema aggressively reacted against
paternalistic and .overly racist colonial cinema. Colonial cinema through
experiments such as the Bantu Cinema and the Colonial Film Unit, was used to
get Africans to accept their lot, making them accept the political and cultural
domination of the colonial powers (Eko, 2001 :367). In fact, in the view of Keyan
Tomaselli, "apart from the work of Regnault, Griaule, Rouch, and a few others,
most early films about Africans were patronising" (Tomaselli, (1996a:5). Manthia
Diawara (1992) also described the Anglophone colonial African cinema
experience as one of neglect. The Bantu Cinema Experiment of 1935 sponsored
_ by the Colonial Office of the British Film Institute sought throu.Q·h film to educate
- adult Africans how to adapt to new conditions while con~erving the best of
African traditions. It was almost single handedly produced from beginning to end
by Major Notcutt. Within one year he had produced thirty-five short films with
commentaries in English, Swahili, Sukuama, Kikuyu, Luo, Ganda, Nyanja,
Bemba and Tumbuka, in East and Central Africa. The production 'was given very
minimal technical and equipment support, which fortunately forced Norcutt to use
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more locals in the production processes. Another saving grace for the experiment
was that it was entirely produced in Africa. The Colonial Film Unit was set up to
make war propaganda in order to get Africans to participate in World War 11. A
film school was initiated in the Gold Coast - present day Ghana in 1949
because, according to a John Grierson report to UNESCO, African audiences
could not identify with films produced by the Bantu Cinema Experiment and the
Colonial Film Unit. He recommended that colonial subjects be trained to produce
the films for their own people (Diawara, 1992:3). The attempt to use film to
control Africans was not successful, for in the 1950s and early 1960s, Africa
witnessed strong anti-colonial movements and finally the end of colonization.
Black cinema was to take on a Pan-African approach, starting with the First
Festival of Negro Arts and Culture in Dakar in 1966 which was a reaction against
the cinema of the colonizers/whites. More 'Black' film festivals were to follow
within the continent and abroad such as the World Black and African Festival of
o
Arts in Nigeria in 1977, the Festival Pan-Africain du Cinema de Ouagadougou
(FESPACO) and Vues d' Afrique which has been organized in Mont~eal, Canada,
since 1985. Within the continent, the most concrete effort towards Pan-African
cultural cooperation in television and radio programme exchange was the Union
of National Radio and Television organizations of Africa (URTNA) created in
1962. The rationale for URTNA was to respond to the European colonial legacy
and subsequent historical phenomena such as the Cold War, and to eXRose
every region of Africa to other African countries (Eko, 2001 :372). Advocates for
wider distribution of Third World television and film in the North like Manina
Lassen-Grzech, former director of Friedrich Naumann Foundation in New York- ,
hoped that URTNA and other Third World, programmes exchange centres would
be strong platforms for Africans to deliver their own self-representations to the
North. Lassen-Grzech maintained that, "the argument frequently offered by film
and television buyers from the North about the lack of useful Third World
television and film productions was based more on ignorance that on fact"
(Lassen-Grzech, 1989:x). Lassen-Grzech listed URTNA and FESPACO among
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places where African productions were both available and accessible. However,
Eko showed in 2001 that, URTNA still had a long way to go towards its mandate
of increasing exposure of African programmes to other Africans across the
continent; the volume of programmes exchanged in Africa was modest. The .
majority of programmes submitted for exchange were rejected for technical
reasons and some did not pass the political propaganda test. The largest
category of programmes exchanged were African documentaries (Eko,
2001 :376). By 2004, URTNA was experiencing a serious financial crisis.
Between opposing forces of a nation-building and the expensive task
of filling up a daily television schedule.
Kwame Karikari (1994) aptly points out that the value of radio for its affordability,
but also ·television is indispensable and no longer a debatable issue in modem
state entities. They are crucial among other things, for effective communication,.
education, social awareness, cultural enlightenment, and commercial activity
(Karikari, 1994). However, as Denis McQuail also shows, it is virtually impossible
to separate between the 'objective' and 'normative' relationship between media
and society (McQuail, 2000:142). More difficult, as this chapter has shown, it to
put both the objective and normative roles of the media into practice. Public
service broadcasting in the context of globalisation, is already a challenging
enterprise, particularly in the developing world. Even in Europe, safeguarding of
independent, appropriately funded public service broadcasting institutions was
identified as essential to the functioning of the media in a democratic society..at
the Fourth European Mi~isterial Conference on Mass Media Policy in Prague in
1994 (Raboy, 1996). In Africa, and particularly Botswana with its small consumer
I
market, alternative funding for national television is almost inconceivable for the
time being. BTV attempts to fulfil a public service broadcasting mandate, which is
both enabled and compromised by government control of ownership.
Government ensures the financial capacity for BTV, albeit limited, to purchase
foreign content, make in-house productions and more recently to commission
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independent producers. It also allows it in its own terms, constraining BTV's
ability to make instant purchases for programmes, which frustrates both sellers
and the stations' management. Continuing state ownership and control of BTV




The media regulatory environment in which Botswana
Television was born: 1991 - 2005
Regulating and de-regulating broadcasting in Botswana: The
Botswana Telecommunication Authority and the National
Broadcasting Board
Until the post Cold War period, often referred to as the second wave of
liberalisation, govemment or state or public ownership and control of radio and f J
television where it existed in Africa. was accepted, tolerated or even taken for I
granted as normal (Ansah, 1994). The 1990s marked in Africa more than ever
before, a striving for structural reforms, and a new order of liberalism, openness,
accountability and popular participation among govemments. Kwame Karikari
(1994) noted that with regard to mass media per se, the process was marked by
expansion of ownership, control and output to serve purposes which expressed
wider interests than state monopoly provided. Demands for the privatisation of
radio and television led by civil society organisations intensified, and
govemments responded by setting up regulatory frameworks that provided for a
greater diversity of broacttasting models. However, he found that in many
countries including Ghana, the optimism and euphoria that met the process of
decentralisation and/or liberalisation of the media, quickly tumed into
despondency and cynicism (Karikari, 1994). Tl:le Ghana Broadcasting
Corporation decentralized and set up FM radio stations in all regional capitals, to
promote a measure of diversity particularly in linguistic expression. This did not
necessarily ensure that the public had a say or that diverse political opinion is
freely expressed (Karikari, 1994). Private ownership of the media, as the US
example has consistently shown, does not necessarily ensure pluralism.
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Until 1996, the communications industry in Botswana was both very small and
under regulated. The Botswana Telecommunications Act of 1996, established a
Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA) as the vehicle to liberalize the
communications industry in Botswana. It marked a historic and progressive era in
Botswana's media environment. The tension between regulation and de-
regulation also became better illuminated. This BTA was highly ranked in a best
practices case study as perhaps one of the most liberal in the region and a
possible model for the continent.169 Since 1996, BTA drew up and implemented a
telecommunications policy that placed Botswana teledensity amongst the highest
in Africa. By December 2001 the fixed telephony teledensity was 9.5 percent,
and the mobile cellular teledensity was 20 percent. The telecommunications
industry grew from a turnover of about US$30 million (P1.5 billion) in 1998 to
around US$130 million (P65 billion), in 2002. In 2004, the communication sector
it had grown tremendously,
o
Fixed telephony lines have grown to 133 740 resulting in teledensity of 8%
or 8 lines every 100 people as at the end of April 2004. Mobile lines have
grown from 0 to 518 013 as end of April 2004, representing 31 % or 31
lines for every 100 people. Fifteen (15) Internet Service Providers have
been licensed as of end of Aril 2004. Total telecommunications turnover
has grown from an estimated P200 million in 1996 to 1.3 billion as end of
financial year 2002/2003. 170
In 1998, BTA changed the monopoly of the telecommunication market enjoyed
the Botswana Telecommunication 80rporation (source). More competitors were
introduced into the market such as Vista and Mascom Wireless for the provision
of cellular networks and more licenses were awarded to Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) in 1999, using Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT). They
provide national and international data services. Government, non-government
169 Botswana Telecommunications Authority, http://www.bta.org.bw/botswana.html
170 Botswana Telecommunications Authority, http://www.bta.org.bw/background.html
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organisations as well as private companies benefited immensely, and more work
is on going to improve individual Internet connection, which is still slow and quite
low.m In 1999, BTA successfully resolved its first interconnectivity dispute
involving BTC and the two major cellular operators in Botswana, Mascom
Wireless and Vista Cellular in BTA Ruling No. 1 of 1999.172
Section 2 of Botswana Telecommunications Act 15 of 1996 was amended to
remove broadcasting from the rubric of the Telecommunications Act. 173
Subsequent to that, a Botswana Broadcasting Act of 1998 (Cap. 72:04) was
established which in turn established the NBB. As stipulated by the Broadcasting
Act, BTA works with the NBB as the secretariat and in an advisory capacity for
the development of broadcasting policies, strategies, regulations, legislation and
standards.174 The duties of the Board, first appointed in August 2000 included the I.~
evaluation of applications for television and radio broadcast licenses. They I
monitor programme schedules and content to ensure compliance with license
Q <
conditions, broadcasting codes of conduct and standards of broadcast material
consistent with the development of a policy of competitive, pluralistic, community
and public broadcasting in Botswana and the promotion of national aspirations
and vision in the areas of entertainment, information and education. They also
supervise broadcasting activities, including the relaying of radio and television
programmes from places in and out of Botswana to places in and outside
Botswana; to allocate available spectrum resources in such manner as to ensure
iRe". ~idest· possible diversity of programming
spectrum resources and monitoring and
broadcasting sta!i6ns.
and optimal utilisation of the
handling complaints against
m Botswana Telecommunications Authority http://www.bta.org.bw/pubs/Ruling%20no%201%20-
%20Interconnection.pdf
172Botswana Mini-Case StUdy 2003,Recent Experience in Interconnection Disputes, International
Telecommunication Union.
173 Broadcasting act, 1998: A.34
174 Broadcasting Act, 1998, 'secretariat of the board' pg A.30
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The Board recognizes three broadcasting models; public service broadcasting,
private broadcasting and community broadcasting. Their definition of public
service broadcasting is that it is a broadcasting service provided by any statutory
body which is funded either wholly or partly through State revenues. Private
broadcasting is defined as a broadcasting service operated for profit and
controlled by a person who is not a public or community broadcasting licensee.
Community broadcasting would be a service fully controlled by a non-profit entity,
carried on for non-profitable purposes, serving a particular community, working
with the identified community and deriving funding from donations, grants,
sponsorship or advertising or membership fees, or by any combination of any of
them. 175
In accordance with the Act, the NBB consists of 11 members appointed by the
Minister responsible for broadcasting. In a focus group interview with the Board
and their BTA technical support in January 2904, they reported that, from the
government side, there was an officer from the Office of the President, one from
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and one from the Department of Culture
and Social Welfare. There was also a member of the BTA and seven others from
a list of 10 nominated by a Nominating Committee. The fact that BTA still acts as
its secretariat and 35 percent of the board's members are governmental
representatives presents a challenge on the public's perception of the
independence of the Board and its integrity. They were quick to point out that in
" ""
spite "of:the closed process "of appointment by the Minister; the board had
" "
reasonable professional integrity. Masego Mpotokwane, the first NBB
~ Chairperson and Mogwera of BTA used the fact that since apRointed, the Board
", had not had incidents that caused for their independent to be 90ubted.
Making Botswana one of the most liberal in Africa and at the same time
protecting the local production industry, particularly in the age of satellite
technology is already proving a challenge for both the NBB and BTA.
175 See Broadcasting Act of 1998
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Broadcasting Regulations released in 2004,176 the most comprehensive
legislation on mass media in Botswana give powers to the NBB to ensure
compliance among local broadcasters. Licensees may not broadcast material
without the authority of the Board. Regulations provide legal definitions of
categories such as advertising, children, licensee, broadcaster, signal, and other
such concepts. They also spell out license requirements. They expound on the
existing licensing categories recognised by the 1998 Broadcasting Act to include
cable broadcasting. At the end of 2005, following the Broadcasting Regulations,
the NBB wanted to license the pay-television subscriber network, MultiChoice
Botswana, which has been operating in Botswana since 1993. MultiChoice
refused to sign and therefore be bound by local regulations. The issue for
MultiChoice was that they would have to fulfil a 20 percent quota for local content
and local info-commercials. This would also set precedence in other African
countries where it operates, a financial investment it appeared MultiChoice was
not willing to shoulder. On t~e other hand, pressure was on the NBB to prove its
capacity to enforce compliance with regulations among broadcasters in
Botswana. The Board of Directors of MultiChoice Botswana threat~ned to take
the NBB to court, arguing that its jurisdiction was only limited to local
broadcasters. MultiChoice insisted they were not a broadcaster but a relayer and
packager of content on behalf of MultiChoice Africa. 177
Until December 2004, the NBB had only issued licenses to two private radio
stations, Yarona FM and Gabz FM and one commercial television station,
GBCTV. In a historic move, the NBB awarded the national radio broadcaster,
Radio Botswana a 10 year public service b~oadcasting license on 21 December
2004. This was in accordance with the Broadcasting Act of 1998. A P100 000
I
(USD 20 000) annual fee was paid by the broadcaster to BTA. BTV was not
176Supplement C - Botswana Government Gazette dated 29th October, 2004, Statutory
Instrument No. 97 of 2004
Broadcasting Act, 1998 (CAP. 72:04) Broadcasting Regulations, 2004
(Published on 29th October, 2004)
177 Botswana Guardian, 11 November 2005:3
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licensed. A chief broadcasting officer of Broadcasting Services, Banyana Segwe
explained that the delay in licensing BTV was due to the fact that it did not fall
within any of the categories of broadcasting services that NBB licensed, Le.
public service broadcaster, community and commercial broadcaster. She defined
BTV as a state broadcaster. The NBB with the technical assistance of BTA was
apparently drafting regulations for the licensing of the Botswana Television. 178
Botswana is overdue for a broadcasting policy. A Botswana National
Broadcasting Policy Draft for Public Consultation (2003), if passed, promises to
be the most equitable and progressive media regulatory instrument in Botswana.
The draft policy envisions an independent regulator, diversity in broadcasting,
universal access and a public broadcasting service that is accountable to the
public. It would promote high quality Botswana originated content in
programming, giving an equal chance to all to participate in the national
discourse; It would also meet high professional standards agreed upon in a
common code of ethics. 179
The Draft recognized the crucial role of broadcasting in providing citizens with
informatio.n so that they can make informed choices. The Draft Broadcasting
Policy detailed among other things that the NBB would ensure that no entity
owns one television and radio station that serve the same local market; that there
. ..
was diversity.of News, opinions and entertainment, with local News constituting
. , . . . .
~ •.". the···bulk of the operators News content. News bulletins would not to be.. '
sponsored, and for sponsored programmes the licensee would retain ultimate
editorial control that uphoJds impartiality and accuracy of content. Political parties
would not sponsor programmes; and licensees would broadcast a minimum local,
content of 20 percent for television and 40 percent for radio, spread across the
178 Botswana Daily News, December 22,2004 NO.244
179 Botswana National Broadcasting Policy, Draft for public consultation, 2003: 14-16
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genres excluding News. 18o In May 2006, a summary version of the Draft was
produced.181
Hampering local visual media production: The Cinematograph Act
[CAP.60:02]
The Cinematograph Act [CAP.60:02] has under increased criticism as a local
television and film production grows, for hampering the development of local
visual media production. The Act stipulates that no films shall be made in
Botswana without written permission of the Minister responsible. Section 10 of
the Act also establishes a board of censors. "No person shall exhibit any film at
an exhibition to which the public are admitted unless the Board [of Censors] has
issued acertificate of approval in respect thereof approving it for such exhibition."
Among other things, the board may not approve films and posters that
impersonate the President in an offensive manner, ridicule the Botswana Police
Force or that disparage public characters. The board may also refuse permission
to films and poster that are calculated to hurt religious convictions of and sections
of the public, that are racist, suggestive of immorality and indecency, show
executions, murders and other revolting scenes, debauchery, drunkenness, show
successful execution of crime or violence or deemed to prejudicial to be peace,
order or good govemance. Local independent film and television producers have
called for this Act to be repealed. In May 2006, Press Secretary to the President
Jeff Ramsay once again stood up to defend govemment and blame the media for
the continuing existence of the Cinematograph Act [CAP.60:02]. He insisted that
. .
the Mass Media Advisory Council had failed to bring in anything on the table as
how the law may be reformed.182
180 Sections 3.1 - 12 Draft Broadcasting Policy, 2003.
181 Botswana Broadcasting Policy Draft, 30 May 2006, Ministry of Communications, Science and
Technology: Government Printer, Gaborone.
182Mmegi, 10 May 2006
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The 2002 Draft Mass Media Bill I~
In 1997, P.H.K Kedikilwe, then Minister responsible for mass media in Botswana
tried to impose a draconian Mass Media Bill, which was strongly resisted by the
media in Botswana. Following the ratification of a SADC Protocol on Culture,
Information and Sport, which reiterated the call for self-regulatory media
complaints councils, a 'Draft Mass Media Communications Bill' was tabled in
Parliament in 2002. The Bill proposed accreditation of journalists by the Director
of Information and Broadcasting. No foreign journalist would be allowed to cover
or report any incident in Botswana without accreditation and local journalists
would not report or cover local stories without press cards issued by the said
director. Bugalo Maripe (2004) in the 2003 edition of "So this is democracy?"
explained the Bill as prescriptive and prohibitive in the sense that anything
outside the accreditation standards set by government would constitute a
violation and deserve censure. The 'Minister of External Affairs, Lieutenant
General Mompati Merafhe wanted it passed into law without delay.183 Private
media institutions and civil society were able to successfully put pressure on the
legislature to halt the Bill. Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Centre for Human Rights
objected to the Bill on several grounds, including that it had a limited definition of
Newspaper, appointment of Press Council by Minister, registration only for 80
percent citizen owned companies and accreditation., In August 2003, an array of
media stakeholders such~s film" producers, local journalists, the MISA Regional
~ ~ . ..
Information Manager, writers;' editors, academics, musicens',' MISA Botswana
and other members of the civil society were involved in Cl consultation process to
review the Bill, and it was hoped that a revised Bill-will go to Parliament in
2006.184
183 Mmualefhe Raditladi, country report for Botswana for the 2002 edition of the Media Institute of
Southern Africa's annual publication, "So this is democracy?"
184 Discussion papers compiled by the Press Council of Botswana, presented at the
'Consultations on the the Mass Media Communications Bill', Friday 22 August 2003.
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The Press Council of Botswana
An arguably positive outcome of the Draft Mass Media Communication Bill was
the establishment of a self-regulating Press Council of Botswana. The then
Minister of Communications, Science and Technology, Sebetela challenged the
newly formed Press Council to come forward with legislation to replace the
unpopular Mass Media Communications Bill. The Press Council has produced
the much disdained 'Code of Ethics', which has been well received by
govemment. Press Councils have to be received with some scepticism, for they
have historically served as platforms for govemments to co-opt the media
towards self censorship, when coercion by legal instruments either fails or is not
deemed politically expedient. Press Councils are often a reaction to conditions of
excessive govemment interference (Tomaselli and Tomaselli, 1987:101). In
apartheid South Africa for instance, the Registration of Newspapers Act (No 92 of
1982) offered Newspapers to choose to either be under the direct control of the
Q
state censorship machinery or the code of conduct and disciplinary powers of the
Media Council.
In the case of the Botswana Press Council, the Minister of Science,
Communication and Technology has the power to make appointments to the
executive council and also appoints the chairperson. The Minister is also
empowered to appoint an unspecified number of members of the general public
into the council. A similar situation exists in Malawi where Board members otthe.
• r
Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority are selected by the President, and
the Minister of Information can exempt any particular radio station from
complying with the legal requirements of obtaining an operating license.185 Self-
,
regulation, though highly welcomed by the media in Botswana as progressive,
including MISA, could prove to be a kind of catch 22. Both the Executive
185 Media Institute of Southern Africa, 'Licensing and Accreditation - the threat to media freedom
in the SADC region, analysis and commentary on the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and
Sport, 2001
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Secretary of the Press Council of Botswana, Nametsegang Sebego and the
Director of MISA Botswana, Modise Maphanyane, expressed concern about lack
of trained manpower among local journalists, which makes them easy target for
government chastisement and thus more pressure of the self-regulatory machine
to enforce tighter self censorship. The idea of self-regulation is thereby
immediately compromised by the dominant role of the state in determining
members of a body that is already a product and a symptom of compromise.
On an adjudication meeting of Friday 16 December 2005, the Media Complaints
Committee of the Press Council of Botswana reviewed a complaint "Complaint
05/012: AIM Corporation v Mmegi Newspaper". In November 2005, Mmegi
published a story, apparently informed by contents of an open letter from some
'concerned' local producers. According to the story, the letter contained
complaints from these producers that evaluation of commissioning tenders had
not commenced at BTV a month after the submission date of October 12. The.
letter also apparently accused the Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Communications, Science and Technology of holding secret meetings with some
four local producers who had also bid for the commissions, Basadibotlhe Lethola,
Eunice Wadikonyana, Golden Bafana and Billy Kokorwe. One of them Golden
Bafana wrote an opinion letter to the Newspaper denying the alleged secret
meeting. A complaint was also presented to the Press Council. They complained
that the story was not balanced, and that they needed to know the author of the
story. Their complaint was deemed valid by the Press Council, and a notice of
complaint sent to both the complainants and the Mmegi Newspaper.
Acknowledging r~ceipt of the complaint, acting Editor of Mmegi, Gideon Nkala
informed the Press Council that his paper had run another story by the same. .
author that told the other side of the story. This time it gave her name and not the
previous title of staff writer. The Newspaper had also received another notice
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from a law firm purporting to represent the complainants, which raised issues as
to whether the matter was still open for arbitration by the Press Council.186
Civil Society and media regulatory in Botswana: From Activism to
toeing the party line
Other than the state and its institutions per se, civil society organizations played
a role in the shaping of BTV. A number of non-governmental efforts have
emerged in the media landscape of Botswana to lobby for a free media in
Botswana. Among the NGOs that have at one point fought for media freedom
including the now defunct Botswana Media Consultative Council (BMCC), the
defunct Botswana Journalists Association (BOJA), the Botswana chapter of the
Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), the Press Council of Botswana, the
Botswana Media Women Association (BOMWA) and recently a Botswana Media
Workers Union. The budding independent Qdvertising, film and television
production industry has also sparked the formation of a number of associations.
The period from 1998 saw a growth in the number of media freedom advocacy
groups compared to earlier epochs, and also the most blatant floor crossing, as
former media activists came to toe the ruling party line. The classic case was that
of Jeff Ramsay, a founder of the Botswana Media Consultative Council who was
to become a first Press Secretary to the President. Censoring of the content of
the Department has a long history. The C.N. Lawrence Report of 1978 could not
ascertain whether government's secretiveness about some issues was always by
_ intent or merely a product of inefficiency on the part of officials or journalists.
-Lawrence cited an incident where the Botswana Defence FQrce had shot one
Briton and two South Africans in Gaborone. The then Director of Information was
reported to have said he had received explicit instructions from the President's
office that he was to make no mention of the incident at all (1978:18). The only
186 Adjudication Meeting of the Media Complaints Committee, Press Council of Botswana. Held at
MISA Board Room at 10.00am on Friday 16 December 2005. Courtesy of Nametsegang Sebego,
Executive Secretary of Press Council of Botswana.
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report other than foreign reports and rumour that the people of Botswana
received was press release from the President's office four days later. This was
not a one off incident.
The Botswana Media Consultative Council
The Botswana Media Consultative Council was founded by among other, Jeff
Ramsay in 1998, and sought to 'promote and preserve the further development
of a multi-media industry in Botswana which is free, ethical, democratic,
pluralistic and productive' .187 It started off on a very high note which was however,
short-lived. Starting with a few members at its public launch on 20 October 1998,
the BMCC grew to become Botswana's largest, as well as most diverse and
inclusive, media NGO. By the end of April 1999 the membership incorporated
over forty institutions and seventy individuals. In its hey days, BMCC saw to the
establishment of a Media Advisory Council and a proposition to parliament for a
Freedom of Information Act. They argued that the lack of such legislation was
creating an environment of unnecessary secrecy within government about
information that the public had a right to know. They called for government to
repeal the Cinematograph Act of 1970, which they blamed for hampering the
development of local visual media production for decades. They also appeal for
amendment or repeal of such other regressive legislation as the National
Security Act of 1986, which gives the state potentially repressive po~~r to
penalize legitimate reporting, the Anthropological Act of 1967, which restricts
research and limits access to information, and Section 59 of the Penal Code,
which provides for penalties for causing public alarm. 188
The former chairperson of BMCC, Jeff Ramsay, has since become Press
Secretary to the President. BMCC now exists only in name, with Beata Kasale as




journalists and columnist and managing director in the fastest growing tabloid
Newspaper, in Botswana 'The Voice'. She however made it clear that there was
not much happening with BMCC. Ramsay had shifted from being a stalwart
champion and friend of a 'free and dynamic media', to being the mouth piece of
state power. He had become a producer of the Tautona Times (TT), a weekly
electronic press circular from the Office of the President (OP). The TT mainly
communicates scheduling of public activities of this Office to government-owned
media and other interested domestic and international media. It has come to
define the core business of the BTV Newsroom; the engagements listed in it
being its priority.
At the time of the formation of the BMCC in 1997 Ramsay was at the heart of the
opposition of the state's efforts to circumvent the independence and autonomy of
the media. He was opposed to a proposed Botswana Mass Communications Bill
of 1997, which tried among other things to introduce accreditation of journalists
~ .
and control the work of foreign and local journalists. He later participated in the
successful negotiations for the Botswana Broadcasting Act of 1998 that created
space for private broadcasters. In 2003 his main job had become exactly the
opposite, to make heard the state's voice.. Tautona Times no 27 of 2005 largely
castigated the media in Botswana for leaving out or omitting the voice of the state
in favour of less powerful voices. He questioned the definition of Newsworthiness
in Botswana when an official visit of the President to Brazil made more News in
Brazil than in Botswana.
A former champion of the, voice of the voiceless was now championing for more
space for the voice of pO,wer. In 2001, as chairperson of the BMCC, Ramsay was
celebrating victory with the Botswana Guardian and Midweek Sun for court order
that reversed a decision by government to cease advertising in the two papers.189
In 2003 he was accusing the two papers and their mother company CBET
189Botswana Daily News, http://www.gov.bw/cgi-
bin/news.cgi?d=2001 0919&i=Court_order_pleases_media
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Company for simply being led by the profit motive and carrying content that was
clearly calculated to undermine the good name of individuals and institutions
(BOPA, 2003). The two papers ran stories that the President could have given
clemency to Lehlohonolo Kobedi, sentenced to death for murder. The most
disappointing development moment for activists of a free media in Botswana had
to be the attendance by outgoing chairperson of MISA, Amilia Malebane of a
function of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party in full party colours. While
MISA, the public and civil society organisations distanced themselves from the
incident, Jeff Ramsay used the Tautona Times to try to justify Malebane's
conduct, arguing that MISA leadership had appeared at functions of opposition
parties, and that MISA had no right preventing members from party activities. "If
MISA Botswana is so fastidious about protecting its supposedly non-partisan
credentials, why was this year's national overview of Botswana chapter drafted
by an individual who is a well known participant of opposition party politics?"l90
MISA went on to question the role of Tautona Times and ~ho it spoke for. They
contended that it was an unjustified expense to the public considering that its
mandate overlapped with that of the existing government-owned press. It was a
serialised 'Newspaper' and yet had no editorial committee or Board. In a
complaint directed to the Office of the President, the acting chairperson of MISA,
Zwide Mbulawa, sought clarity from the Office of the President on whether the
sentiments expressed in Tautona Times, were those of the President, the Office
of the President or those of the Botswana Democratic Party.191
The Botswana Media Workers Union (BOMEWU) was officially registered in
Februa_rY in 2005. The aim of BOMEWU was "to promote the role of the 'press
and ';111 media institutions in enhancing the achievement of human rights as
•
stated in the United Nations Charter, to secure complete organisation of all
eligible members employed by the Botswana Media Industry and to promote
190 Mmegi, 17 May. 2006
191 Mmegi, 17 May, 2006
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industrial, social and intellectual interest of members".192 Journalists Against
HIV/AIDS in Botswana (JAHABO) was officially registered in May 2005, with the
objective to write more and better about HIV/AIDS and to enhance campaigns
about the disease. Many other media organisations and associations exist in
Botswana, some more successful than others, including the Editors Forum,
advertisers associations and writers associations.
1991 Windhoek Declaration
Repression of media freedom in southern Africa has not gone unchallenged. Civil
society and media activists have particularly in the 1990s, challenged states to
improve their record of media freedom. The 1991 Windhoek Declaration on
'promoting an independent and pluralistic Africa press', although it specifically
dealt with print, was the first major step towards a joint effort for greater media
freedom. The Declaration called for theoend of state media monopolies and the
promotion of pluralistic, liberalized, diverse and accountable media. It recalled
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN General Assembly resolution
59(1) of 14 December 1946 asserting that freedom of information as a
fundamental human right and among other documents, the UNESCO General
Conference of 1989 on the promotion of "free flow of ideas by word and image
among nations and within each nation". Through the Declaration, Africa
expressed a hope to reduce repression of journalists, remove all kinds of
censorship, to end any kind of media monopoly, and to free the media from
governments.193
Adopted by the African Union heads of state as well as'the United Nations and
UNESCO, the Windhoek Declaration described "the establishment, maintenance
and fostering of an independent, pluralistic and free press" as "essential to the
development and maintenance of democracy in a nation, and for economic
192M1SA Forum, January - June 2005:10
193 MISA Southern African Media Directory, 2004/5
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development". The Declaration defined independence as "independence from
government, political or economic control". The Media Institute of Southern Africa
(MISA) was launched in 1992 in accordance with the Declaration as the
watchdog that guards observance of the Declaration by each of the SADC
countries towards free, independent and pluralistic media. The core business of
MISA is to monitor the state of media freedom in the region, towards a conducive
environment for a free and independent media in southern Africa. There are
chapters in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Secretariat is in
Windhoek, Namibia. They record incidents of media freedom violations in an
annual publication of entitled "So This Is Democracy?: State of media freedom in
Southern Africa". 194 The Windhoek Declaration was a culmination of efforts
among media practitioners in the Frontline states of southern Africa. In
December 1989, for instance, Botswana hosted a seminar on Democracy and
the media in southe~n Africa, totally opposed to apartheid in South Africa and
seeking greater freedom of expression (van Rensburg, 1989).
On the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Windhoek Declaration, an
African Charter on Broadcasting was passed in 2001. The Charter recognized
~hat ttie Windhoek Declaration focused on freedom of print media, and it sought
_ to specifically set broadcasting standards for Africa. It stated that,
All State and' government controlled broadcasters should be transformed
into public service broadcasters, that are accountable to all strata of the
people as represented by a~' independent board, and that serve the
overall public Interest, avoiding one-sided reporting and programming in
•
regard to religion, political belief, culture, race and gender (African Charter
on Broadcasting, 2001 :2).195
194 'So this is democracy?' online, http://kabaso.misa.org/documents/stid2003.pdf




2001 SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport
Ten years after the Windhoek Declaration in 2001, SADC adopted a Protocol on
Culture, Information and Sport adopted in Blantyre, Malawi in August 2001.
"Member States agree to create a political and economic environment conducive
to the growth of pluralistic media" (Article 18 [4]), and commit themselves to the
"promotion, establishment and growth of independent media, as well as free flow
of information" (Article 17 [a]). The Protocol marked a new era in the regional
political economy away from uniting against South Africa to integrating her into
regional efforts. SADC had to transform when South Africa obtained majority rule
from 'a purely defensive military alliance, against apartheid and settler colonial
minority regimes, into an economic and political alliance'.196
MtSA heralded this protocol as 'undoubtedly a very bold step by governments in
the region to harmonise their laws and policies". MISA has also strongly called
for the scrapping in their entirety, Articles 21 and 22 of the Protocol on Code of
Ethics and Lice"nsing (and accreditation) of Media Practitioners respectively. The
articles were meant to define regionally and commonly accepted standards for
practitioners in the fields of culture, information and sport. MISA however is
.9d~mant that lessons from countries like Zimbabwe where government has
repeatedly used licensing and accreditation laws to harass~private Newspapers
and arrest journalists show the negative effects of legislation of the media.197 This
is exactly the reaso,n that the United States of America had advanced in refusing
to recognize the UNESCO calls for a New World Information and Communication -
Order. It gave state actors in developing countries a stronger hand in regulating I
196 Media Institute of Southern Africa. Licensing and Accreditation - the threat to media freedom
in the SADC region: Analysis and commentary on the SADC Protocol on CUlture, Information and
~~ort, ~001" ~p77 " ."" " "
Media Institute of Southern Africa, Llcensmg and Accreditation - the threat to media freedom
in the SADC region, analysis and commentary on the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and
Sport,2001
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information flows, and thereby threatening the ability of the profession of
journalism to self-regulate. Botswana was the first country to ratify the Protocol
in 2001, but the Protocol had not entered into force by 2004 as the number of
countries that had ratified it was still under nine, the required minimum. South
Africa was among the countries that had not ratified it. l98
Sout~ernAfrican Broadcasting Association (SABA)
Botswana is a member of the Southern African Broadcasting Association
(SABA), one of the initiatives towards regional cooperation on broadcasting in
SADC. Member countries decided on the need for SABA after a meeting in 1992
where Chief Executives from broadcasting organisations in the region had met in
Zimbabwe for the first time, to discuss licensing for foreign broadcasters. In 1993,
after several meetings, first in Zimbabwe, then Namibia and Tanzania, SABA
was launched in Gaborone, Botswana. Ted Makgekgenene, then Botswana
Director of Information and Broadcasting, was elected first president of SABA.
SABA was formed with objectives to harness News exchange and coverage of
important events; production exchange/ co-production and training; commercial
broadcasting; new technologies and broadcasting laws and media politics.
SABA's most important document, "On the Move", adopted in 1995, recognized
that change was the order of the day in southern Africa and that broadcasters
must be in the forefront of development and custodians of constitutional rights
the region had to adjust to emerging free-market policies, the SADC regional bloc
had greater potential for cooperation, globalization required for the region to be. .
_more competitive, that public service broadcasting needed to be_more protected,
• that the airwaves must be liberalized more to increase choice for audiences, and
198 Media Institute of Southern Africa, Licensing and Accreditation - the threat to media freedom
in the SADC region: Analysis and commentary on the SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and
Sport, 2001. pp. 77
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that ultimately the media must serve more than the market and legal frameworks,
but development, identity and democratic values. 199
SABA also pledged commitment to universal access to a wide range of
information and ideas; freedom of speech irrespective of religion, political belief,
culture, race or sex; reliable, varied and balanced informative, educational and
entertaining programming; promoting national cultures and identities. SABA is yet
to be felt as a powerful contributor to the regional political economy· of
communication. The association speaks of public broadcasters, hardly a hold all
category for broadcasters in the region. An undifferentiated use of the concept of
public broadcasting is misleading - southern African countries operate under
diverse state-media-market permutations. It may be that SABA's potential is
undermined by the tension between residues ·of state ownership of the media
within the region at a time whEm the bigger, older members like SABC are eyeing
the continental and international markets. Television broadcasting in particular at
<
this point remains highly discordant and unfavourable for a unified approach.
SABA is linked among others to the Commonwealth Broadcasting Association
(CBA). A number of media workers in Botswana benefited from Botswana's
membership to the CBA photographic competitions, short story Competitions,
bursaries, and awards for good journalism. In 2003, Seamogano Mosanako of
BTV wa.s. granted a CBA postgraduate bursary at Westminster University in the. ,
l::lK:· C?~si Thothe, also of BTV,' won a CBA travel bursary for the year 2006-
2007.200
"
199 Southern African Broadcasting Association (SABA)
http://www.saba.co.za/pages/info/anniversary.htm
200 Commonwealth Broadcasting Association, http://www.cba.org.uklbursaries/2006-
7TravelBursaries .htm
250
BTV and Media regulation, between free market and protecting local
cultures
From the preceding, it emerges that, on paper BTV was born within one of the
most enabling media environments in Africa. More than before in the history of
Africa, the 1990s and the early 21 st century ushered in a new era that placed
freedom of media as both a basic human right, and saw the establishment of civil
society organisations that guard against threats to that freedom. BTV also
emerged at a time when the global function of capitalism pressurised cultural
industries the world over to churn out profits or perish. The tension between
market liberalisation - deregulation of cultural products and protectionism to t
support ailing national cultural products - re-regulation (Thompson, 1997) is at its
worst.
Media regulation is at the core of debates about how states can best 'govem
cultures' a~d 'governing by culture' (Hall, 1997), at a time of the global pressures
on them to privatize industries and dismantle barriers to free trade and
communication, Le. to de-regulate. On the frontier of culture, the Third World and I
First World are similarly threatened, for the threat on culture is a threat on 't
national identity and what Stuart Hall calls 'the final frontier', personal subjectivity. '
The European Union demanded exemption of cultural products at the 1993 round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). Canadians, French and
others also made futile attempts to protest against the commoditization of culture
(Thompson, 1997:1). For developing countries, the new media technologies, and
their ability to compress space and time, both threaten to widen the information
divide, and to expose their already challenged 'nation-building' projects to further
j
attack. The Third World is under threat from 'a syndrome' which has been termed
'McDonaldization', the homogenized, westernized 'world culture' (Hall, 1997:210)
as television stations like BTV have to rely heavily on foreign content to fill up
their schedules. U[C]ultural exports of the technologically over-developed 'West'
weakening and undermining the capacities of ...emerging societies to define their
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own ways of life and pace and direction of their development" (Hall, 1997:211).
This is where as Kenneth Thompson aptly pointed out, govemment become torn
between media regulation and media 'de-regulation'. The former refers to policies
that promote notions of the national interest and citizen participation and the




The state of democratic communication in Botswana
Raymond Williams (1962, 1976) said about democratic communication that it
was "firmly against authoritarian control of what can be said, and. against paternal
control of what ought to be said" (Williams, 1962, 1976:133). In a true
democracy, citizens enjoyed the right to transmit and the right to receive. These
were basic rights, and decision making in a democracy ought to happen only
after open and adequate public discussion, to which all were free to contribute
and the decisions remained open to challenge and review (Williams, 1962,
1976:134). Speaking more directly to the Third World situation, a momentous
report to UNESCO by Irish jurist Sean MacBride (1980), reiterated the danger for
any government being the sole judge of What people need to know and even less
of what they have to say, because no form of indoctrination was without fault
(Masmoudi, 1992:35).
The distinction made by Graham Murdock (1982) between financial control and
management when dealing with questions of media control was a good starting t
point for understanding power and control at BTV. The state, the financier, made
significant attempts to define how BTV oughtto operate - in defence of state
policies and in praise of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The
producers, journalists and technical management at BTV, did not always exploit
the significant freedom they enjoyed compared to other countries in the region to
the best advantage of their profession. Public debate suffered and so did
Botswana's standing as the beacon of democracy in the continent. Often in
Africa, public service broadcasting is reduced to one common denominator,
universal access.
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The source of funding for public service broadcasters has historically been the
strongest challenge against commercial broadcasters. The largest, the BBC,
obtains its funds strictly away from advertising. On the other hand, by 2005,
SABC received a whooping 85 percent of its income from advertising, and only 3
percent from the government for very specific educational programmes. BTV that
often attempted to Jive up to the model, received 100 percent of its funding from
the Botswana government, something John Reith, the first Director General of
the BBC would have found an anathema (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005). ·It became
more confusing when Radio Botswana was licensed a public service
broadcasters by the NBB and BTV was not, at the end of 2004. It was said that
BTA was drafting regulations for the licensing of BTV,201 but by the end of 2006,
BTV was still unlicensed. However, it did not seem that a public broadcasting
license had changed anything about the operation of Radio Botswana. There
was no evidence of a process of reform to ensure that it worked differently from
before it obtained th7 license. It remained firmly under state ownership and
control. There was no political will on the part of the state in Botswana to realise
public service broadcasting.
Lessons from South Africa
In neighbouriJig:$outh Africa, when a newly-democratic Board of the SABC was
"
instituted in·1993,. it set about transforming the SABC into a better public service
broadcaster. Interestingly, it was the imminent victory ot" the African National
Congress (ANC) in the 1994 elections t,hat led the then ruling National Party (NP)
to establish an Independent Broadca~ting Authority (IBA) as a matter of urgency
in 1993 (Bamett, 1999:281). The Triple Inquiry, established by the IBA Act,
launched an investigation into the state of editorial independence at the SABC
because they appreciated the fact that 85 percent of South Africans relied on
SABC as their main source of News. Bodies such as the Freedom of Expression
201Bolswana Daily News, 22 December 2004
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Institute (FXI) made submissions on better News production, focusing in how
best journalists could remain true to stories, not party or racial lines (FXI,
1999).202 Consultation had its limitations, for although civil society organisations
agreed that the SABC should reduce its dependence on advertising revenue as
this would compromise its public service broadcasting role, this did not happen.
IBA was incorporated into the Independent Communications Authority of South
Africa (ICASA) that prescribes specific conditions with regard to programming
and quotas for local content (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005).
As in South Africa, the licensing of Radio Botswana into a public service
broadcaster should have been accompanied by a shift from state control and
censorship towards a redefinition of the role of the state to that of ensuring
effective regulation. Changing the role of the state in broadcasting, particularly in
developing contexts such as Botswana where there is no vibrant alternative
br~adcasting is a major risk. Clive Barnett (1999) showed that whe~ the reform
process of the SABC reorganising it into commercial business units in 1991,
those on the left saw this as a strategy by the state to break up the national
public broadcaster and shift responsibility from the state to the market. South
Africa was able to put in place important safeguards to ensure that the market did
no displace public service broadcasting ethos. In Botswana, the NBB could not in
2005 compel the international pay - per - subscriber television network,
MultiChoice Botswana, to meet any local content quota. Local c~ntent quotas
encourage a variety of programming, sourced not only from abroad, but also from
indigenous producers (Teer-Tomaselli, 2004).
Whereas in Botswana, the nation-building role of mass media was understood by
•
the BDP government as constructing a single, overarching national culture of
identity, premised on the Tswana dominant culture, in South Africa according to
Bamett, policy makers conceptualised it primarily as facilitating processes of
202 Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) (1999) Submission to the SABC Board's enqUiry into
editorial independence and other matters. July 1999. Johannesburg, South Africa.
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exchange and dialogue between the different cultural, regional, and linguistic
communities (Barnett, 1999:275). The distinction made by Graham Murdock
(1982) between financial control and management when dealing with question of
media control was a good starting point for understanding power and control at
BTV. The state, the financier, made significant attempts to define how BTV ought
to operate - in defence of state policies and in praise of the ruling Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP). The producers, journalists and technical management
at BTV did not always exploit the significant freedom they enjoyed compared to
other ,countries in the region to the best advantage of their profession. Public
debate suffered and so did Botswana's standing as the beacon of democracy in
the continent.
Capitalism, state authoritarianism and communication for
democratisation in a global context
In the Anglo-American media debates, broadcasting is often projected as
endangered in the increasingly capitalistic global context. The media is owned by
fewer and fewer hands, and audiences bombarded with content that promotes
consumerism rather than critical engagement with matters of governance. Hamid
Mowlana (1997) pointed out that at the global scale, "the call for equal access to
information and resources has been replaced by a worldwide movement towards
a market economy and capitalis":!, headed by the U.S and the E.U" (Mowlana,
1997:8). Third World efforts towards balanced information and communication
flpws disintegrated. The 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union as a major
~competitive power made it even more politically and economically difficult for
'smaller countries to inject themselves into the increasingly global
communications (Mowlana, 1997:19). Robert McChesney, Edward Herman and
Noam Chomsky have also shown how in the U.S, the media was getting richer at
the expense of democracy,
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Our era rests upon a massive paradox. On the one hand, it is an age of
dazzling breakthroughs in communication and infmmation technologies...
on the other hand, our era is increasingly depoliticized; traditional notions
of civic and political involvement have shrivelled (McChesney, 1999:1-2).
However, writing about a liberal authoritarian and paternalistic state similar to
Botswana, Eric Kit-wai Ma (2000) showed how media analysis for such situations
as China could not be understood through these same radical Marxist Anglo-
American discourses that privileged economic power in media politics. Similar to
Botswana, the Chinese state is a bureaucratic regime that maintains its power by
legal and administrative means than strong coercive apparatuses. However, the
post 1989 China media environment is one of a state-led market transformation.
Like the U.S, China also takes advantage of the market by promoting a
consumer culture that satisfies social desire, "in China, lively and commercially
vibrant media are actually es~ential to the continued governance of the state"
(Kit-wai Ma, 2000).
If political and economic contexts are different between countries, there is a
single similarity; citizen participation in important decision-making is suffering
across the world as a result of concentration of ownership and control of the
media, either in a few corporate magnates or on governments. Voter apathy is a
concern in Botswana as it is in the U.S. The 2002 Democracy Research Project
under the auspices of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) found that p~rticularly young
~ .'
people and women in Botswana abstained from voting in large numbers.203 In
China and Botswana, state authoritarianism alJd not purely market concerns was
limiting available views, but effectively avoiding what Antonio Gramsci called a,
'crisis of authority'. With the help of strong bureaucratic machinery, both
governments were able to command a social consensus without haVing to resort
to coercive force to maintain dominance. Chinese state authoritarianism takes
advantage of both bureaucratic controls and the market to enhance its
203 http://botswana.fes-international.de/02aPoliticaIReforms.htm
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dominance, The Botswana state prefers media state monopoly and has done
very little over the forty years of independence to encourage diversity in the local
broadcasting landscape. Botswana has a rich national media, with BTV
possessing some of the best television technology. Yet BTV, even more than
Radio Botswana, does not enjoy editorial independence from government,
thereby weakening democracy. Authoritarianism can only for a time, suppress
the imminent crisis of democracy that media control eventually will lead to.
Solly Nageng's (1997) rather vulgar Marxist position that, "the media in
Botswana, as elsewhere, are an ideological instrument that disseminate the
dominant ideas of the ruling class", is to a large extent true. Like many vulgar
Marxist postulations though, Nageng did not unpack the said ruling class, it
remain undifferentiated and ·unanimous. Theories of power, such as those by
Louis Althusser (1984) on Ideology, Antonio Gramsci (1972/1992) on Hegemony,
have often been applied simplistically to arrive at far reaching conclusions such
< •
as that the media is a mere tool of ruling political interests. The ruling elites in
Botswana have held differing views of the quality of service of its broadcasters.
Cabinet ministers have disagreed about Radio Botswana and the same should
be true for BTV. In 1984 during a session of parliament, Cabinet Minister
Chapson Butale was to have a heated exchange with the then minister
responsible for Radio Botswana. Butale castigated Radio Botswana for being a
'gumba-gumba' service, filled up with foreign bubble gum music and failing to
reach out to villages and inform people about useful government programmes,......... ~. ..-
'We dish out a lot of money to connect government to the people...they should
interview people out in vill~ges and hear how people feel...[feature] things like
roundtable rather and foreign music. ,.it must be traditional" (Botswana Hansard,
I
February 1984:19). The Member of Parliament echoed sentiments similar to
those of John Reith when he envisaged the BBC. The rebuttal by Minister
Kwelagobe, then the man in charge of broadcasting was very protective of his
department. "Radio Botswana is a vulnerable condition, they don't have
cupboards to hide their mistakes, if they make a mistake, that mistake will be
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.. .'
known in a matter of minutes or hours, but [for other departments] mistakes are
stuffed in drawers and cupboards...1 am the type of person, if you criticize my
department and I know there is no malice in it, I admit it...there are some people
who are ready to jump on criticizing other people's departments whilst theirs are
also in a mess" (Botswana Hansard, February 1984:24).
Local content in the understanding of Members of Parliament back in 1984 was
interviews with people in all parts of Botswana about how policies are applied,
how they are affecting them and how they can get involved particularly in
agricultural policies. In the words of an Honourable Peter Mmusi, "radio, an
information department in a developing country is a very important instrument of
development" (Botswana Hansard, February 1984). By development, particularly
in these early days of Botswana's economic success story was a top-down
patemalistic dishing out of resources especially to farmers through programmes
such as Services to Livestock Owners in Communal Areas (SLOCA) and the
Q
Agriculture Arable Land Development Programme (ALDEP). Much debate
occurred in Botswana regarding, government's efforts to modernize agriculture.
Many of the efforts did not success as they had failed at inception to involve the
beneficiaries. In effect, political leaders in Botswana expected of mass media to
earn them support from the electorate (Botswana Hansard, February 1984).
The link between media or more eroadly communication and development is a
tenuous one. Development has meant diff~J.ent things at different epochs; from. .
civilizing or modernizing presumably backward communities (Boadu, 1981), to
cultural )mperialism of the Third World by developed economies (Schra!rim,
1981), to participatory engagement between citizens and development agencies. •
(Servaes, 2002). Jan Servaes (2002:275) warned that there is no one way to
understand the link and that "the attempt by local power elites to totally control
modern communication channels - press, broadcasting, education and
bureaucracy - no longer ensures ... support of controlling forces, nor for any
mobilization around their objectives, nor effective repression of opposition".
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Youth and Africa's second liberation struggles: Unpacking the 2001
Botswana National Policy on Culture
Edwin Wilmsen (1988) showed that, from around 1843 to the tum of the 20th
century, some Tswana chiefs, especially of the Bangwato and Kwena, and later
Tawana, were able to recruit other small disparate ethnic groups including the
San, Bakgakagadi, Pedi, Kaa, and others into a critical mass and consolidate
their position from the periphery to almost uncontested dominance in the region
Through methods like kgamelo or mafisa, of systematic dispossession and
mortgaging of assets of the poorer ethnic groups like cattle, Tswana chiefs
established the formative stages of Botswana's modem state (Wilmsen, 1988:).
However, it was the first President of Botswana and heir of the Bangwato
chieftainship, Sir Seretse Khama that championed the nation-building project in
the early independence period. Khama spoke at many forums about the need for
kagisano, unity among local cultures to Botswana's future. One of his famous
statements, made at a BDP conference inoFrancistown in 1972 was,
Our aspirations, our goals, our politics, our principles must be identified
and expressed in terms, which our people understand. This means that
we must build them on the foundations provided by Botswana's culture
and by Botswana's values and traditions.204
From the point of nation-building, culture was seen by the state as central to the
imagining of citizenship, so that the people of Botswana seem themselves as
glued together by a shared "Botswana's culture" (NPO, 2001). Nationalism,
referred to as 'culture', by Khama, dominated the early iri"stependence years, but
as in other parts if Africa, nationalism was soon to be overtaken by national
development plans and policies that concentrated more on infrastructure and
modernizing the then predominantly rural economy (Nyamnjoh, 2002). Botswana
was not unique in the growing relegation of 'culture' as nationalist slogans of de- )
204 Foreword of the Botswana National Policy on Culture (NPC), Ministry of Labour and Home
Affairs, approved by Cabinet on 4th April 2001 - Directive No. CAB 17/2001.
260
colonization were replaced by growth the many failed attempts to economic
development. Perhaps as a result of this failure, the late 1980s witnessed what
Francis Nyamnjoh and others often referred to as the second wave of liberation
struggle, of obsession with belonging and questions of ethnic identity (Nyamnjoh,
2002). In the case of Botswana, the 1990s saw unprecedented panic, about
moral and cultural decay among both traditional and political elites. Culture re-
emerged, and came back to the centre, hence the drawing of a National Policy
on Culture (NPC) in 2001.
Encounters with other cultures, the policy document laments, may enrich or
weaken the indigenous cultural values and social norms, hence the need for the
development and stimulation of the national culture which will undoubtedly
endow the people of this land with· the capacity for selective assimilation of
cultural values, norms and practices from foreign lands (NPC, 2001 :6). The main
objective of the policY"is thus to facilitate a strategy for building the fragmenting
and fragmented nation and forge a Botswana identity that is distinct from other




The policy document operates rather uneasily on two notions of culture; as ideal
and idealized commonly held indigenous repertoires or stock of knowledge that
all the citizens of Botswana ought to know and as certain artistic performances
and practices. The first notion, strongly connected to the idea of nation building,
calls on mainly the youth, to find their way back to traditional institutions for
'enculturation' and 'cultural transmission'. The document acknowledged indirectly
that it however does not exist and ~ould have to be invented. To start the
process of inventing nationhood, the pelicy draws on dead and dying institutions,
of the dominant ethnic majority native Setswana speaking groups. The policy
speaks of diversity and yet shows a clear bias towards dominant Tswana
cultures, making their repertoire such as bogosi, mephato, bojale, bogwera,
meila, patio, bogadi, seem commonly shared. As a result, the policy document is '
itself a weapon of cultural imperialism and parochialism, entrenching not only
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prescriptions of what culture ought to be, but also inequalities in the ownership of
whatever it is that could become 'Botswana's culture' is. Not enough effort has
been made in the policy document to reflect Botswana's cultural diversity or to
draw from it.
The second notion is that of culture as a set of very few practices, mainly artistic
but also found in traditional medicine. Culture becomes mainly an activity,
epitomized in cultural festivals, song and dance, traditional and contemporary
music and arts. Interesting about this perspective about culture is the need the
policy identifies; of commoditizing this aspect of culture. The emphasis is on
'packaging' cultural activities for the market as part of the 'Buy Botswana'
initiative that started in the 1980s. Section 5.6 goes "Assert our own cultural
values, publicise -and popularize our cultural products both nationally and
- .
internationally through vigorous and varied programmes of artistic performance
and marketing" (NPC, 2001 :08). This would be done by among other things. .
'providjng training for cultural practitioners... [with] skills to produce cultural
goods and services which can be exchanged for cash'.
Paradoxically, it is not the performers of 'culture' in this second use that are
named the 'key role players' by the policy document. These are instead noted as
the Central Government, Botswana National Cultural Council, local authorities -
it does not say who these are, diKgosi - the Chiefs, and Non Governmental
Organizations. The 'performers' of culture themselves, who appear to be mainly
perceived to be the youth; local artists, creators, writers and the media, are only
referred to as key tClrgets of funding, educations and marketing by the policy.
Emerging from the policy document is the tension gripping developing nations in
the arena of culture, between the youth, undeniably the performers of culture,
and the 'key role players', its custodians. They youth may perform culture, but
they are obviously not to be trusted to preserve it, hence the need for more
'authoritarian' key role players in this highly endangered sphere called culture.
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This I suggest, encapsulates the paternalistic official policy in Botswana about
citizens; they are not decision makers, but rather, recipients of whatever goodies
the government has in store for them. The government is Santa Claus, and they
the children. The need for custodians of culture who are not the youth
themselves·, and more specifically, the identification of 'traditional' institutions that
embodied culture is very interesting. DiKgosi, the traditional chiefs, are intensified
as key on the preservation of culture. In fact, the modern state machinery, having
stripped them of much of their traditional powers via its institutions such as the
courts, the police, the army, Parliament and the Presidency, has relegated them
to simply being the custodians of culture. The documents identify them together
with dying and dead traditional institutions such as mephato (tasks forces made
of males of the same age groups), bogwera - initiation ceremonies for boys) and
·bojale - for girls.
The discourse of youth as the main targets of cultural imperialism rather than
<
agents for cultural production is pervasive. A study done by Blake L10yd and Julia
Mendez (2001) for example on Batswana Adolescents' Interpretation of f,
American Music Videos, concluded rather uncritically that although a significant
number of adolescents in the capital city of Botswana, more than two thirds, had
access to television, and spent a substantial amount of time each week watching
American videos, adolescents from Botswana seemed to perceive images on the
surface, ~racking a deeper understanding of culturally specific language and
symbol usage. This statement makes it seem as if it were to be expected that
they did, when the adolescents in fact· were not, beyond watching American
t~levision, a part of the American society and therefore not to ge expected to
'deeply understand' a language and symbol use that was culturally specific to
, I
America. New communication technologies such as television appear to be
giving younger generations a platform to be both custodians and performers of
culture.
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At the deep-end: Women and the birth of Botswana Television
Women made a tremendous output towards the media as we know it in
Botswana. Rare in Africa where women remain at the margins of decision-
making, the birth of BTV was unique. According a study by Gender Links in
collaboration with MISA, the Gender and Media Baseline Study (GMBS), done in
12 SADC countries during September 2002, there is "evidence that women are
both under-represented and portrayed in limited roles in the News".205 In
Botswana, the study showed that BTV included more women sources than other
broadcasters, Radio Botswana and Gabz FM. It also beat local Newspapers like
the Botswana Daily News, The Voice, and Mmegi. Women more than men, made
News relating to their relation~hip status, such as wife, mother, daughter. They
also spoke more about issues affecting children, gender violence and HIV/AIDS
than sports, politics or development. The percentage of women joumalists at
BTV stood at 48 percent, higher than the regional average of 38 percent. Radio
Botswana, at 41 percent also had twice the number of women journalists
compared to the regional average of 22 percent (GMBS, 2002).
Even in the United States, by 1988 it was 'still being debated whether a woman's
voice could hold the nations' attention in the anchor position on the CBS Evening
News', (Sanders and Rock, 1988; Lafky, 1995). Television was a new powerful
medium in Botswana, very political and little understood, but women were at the
helm of it. Producing was crude and learned by rote. Besides two people, none of
the first crop of producers had done any audio yisual production. Those that had,
had only ever done video production, never television production. The same was
I
for other portfolios such as directing, editing, camera, and script writing. All
producers had never been assistant producers, directors that had never worked
under any director, editors that had never been editing assistants. BTV
programme production was both pioneering and gambling with the reputation of
205 Gender Links, http://www.genderlinks.org.za/page.php?p_id=236
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the Station. At the beginning of 2001, about five months since it had gone on air,
a newly appointed Director of the Department, Sesinyi, was convinced the station
should have not gone on air when it did, especially looking at the in-house
programmes offering.
Despite the many mistakes and challenges, BTV became a national
phenomenon largely because of the courage of women. From interviews with
them, women at BTV had to keep the station running in spite of the chaos that
the project was right from the beginning. Felicitus Mashungwa and later Kitso
Mosiieman had to self-teach the role of a Channel Controller, often with very little
guidance. Matida Mmipi was de facto Assignment Editor for the Newsroom in the
first three years of the station. Mpho Kgosidintsi, and now Polly Mosate procured
both local and foreign content for the station, often dealing with tedious tendering
. .
processes and the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board. Lerato Ntuara
and Maggie Mabechu made sure the schedule was filled up on a daily bases and
< •
on time. Ntuara at some stage also did News reading and Mabechu continuity
presenting on top of their other responsibilites. Keneilwe Segopolo, Doreen
Moapare and Mosetsanagape Maribe were some of the first reporters, producers
and editors of the BTV Newsroom, defining the roles for those that came later.
In 2003, much to her-' own surprise, Mosiieman was redeployed to Channel
,~.. .
Controller, a very demanding position which in the beginning she had no idea
what it entailed. She learnt through many mistakes auq although she continued
to learn new things, had grown more confident about what she was d01ng. She
called it the last and most 9rucial point of gate-keeping. It is the final point for f
self-censorship, for once programmes go on air, the station has to wait for the I
I
public and government reaction. Everything that goes on air at BTV is ultimately
the responsibility of the Channel Controller, both foreign and local content. The
schedule has to be well balanced, correct content for the targeted audience,
which also has possibility of attracting advertising. Mosiieman had to prevent a
presenter of children's programme from appearing in an advert of a brewery. She
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had to prevent a xenophobic public information advert going on air. A Channel
Controller decides that fate of both in-house and extemally sourced programmes,
particularly if they do not comply with official state policy on certain issues. The
station was also instructed to cut down the number of times First Peoples of the
Kalahari activist, Roy Sesana appeared on BTV. The deported former University
of Botswana Politics Professor Kenneth Good appearing together with Roy
Sesana in a documentary could not be allowed on air. Some of her decisions
were not well received by the producers. At one point, Mosiieman was assaulted
by one of the BTV producers. Channel Control also covers imaging and branding
of the station, commissioning, archiving, and in-house productions (Interview with
Mosiieman, 2006).
Felicitus Mashungwa was Head of News and Current Affairs at Radio Botswana
and was redeployed to the position of Channel Controller for BTV. In 2003, there
was a major reshuffling of staff between the Departments of I~formation Services
and Broadcasting Services. Mashungwa was moved from Channel Control to
Head of News and Current Affairs when Norman Patlakwe was relocated to the
newly established section of Public Affairs in the Department of Information
Services. Mashungwa was not happy with the re-deployment, but in her new
position, she started to establish a working system in the Newsroom. She began
by giving all editors a. _~hance to act as assignment editors so that the best at the
job could be .recorl)JTl_;m~ed· to take up the substantive position. Bureaucracy was
to g1ve..the position on an" actiilg capacity to the longest serving member of the
Newsroom who had previous experience j;om· Radio Botswana against
Mashung~wa's recommendation. Mashungwa was the last substantive Heag' of
BTV News and Current Affairs for the next two years. During her tenure, the
I I
Newsroom was better organized. She reduced the amount of overtime claims by
introducing a shift system. The system for leave days was also better
administered. BTV News coverage of political campaigns in the run up to the
2004 elections was less restrained. BTV organized two live public campaigns
bringing together all the political parties (Interview with Mashungwa, 2004),
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although the debates were never to go on the scale originally planned.206 At the
beginning of 2005, there was once again a reshuffling exercise that took her back
to Radio Botswana. A reporter, Badumedi Matsetse said in 2006 that the BTV
Newsroom had become a mess,
About the News room here in Gaborone, the structure looks dilapidated.
We used to have assignment desk, but it is now defunct and no
communication to reporters has been given. It is a struggle to go to a
story, one has to follow and literally beg camera section and transport for
help. It is so unprofessional (Matsetse, email, 2006).
Phetlhu in particular can be celebrated for pioneering local television content in
Botswana, both in-house and commissioned. When the BBC came, she was
made the first Head of Production. She headed and guided the production team
on the first generation of in-house prod~ctions. Many of producers had no
previous experience in television and although they had great ideas, needed
close assistance to bring the ideas into practicable programmes. Phetlhu later
became the first woman General Manager of the station, taking over at a very
.turbulent,period of the station. Oshinka Tsiang took over from Simon Higman as
.' the. first 10ca.1 to be General Manager. Tsiang was pushed to resign from the
position in 2002 amidst allegations that he was pro-opposition parties. Simon
Moilwa took. over until his untimely death in May 2003, and Phetlhu was, ~ . ..
appointed"on an acting capacity. Her two year reign, the longest anyone had..
served in the position since the birth of BTV, was marred by allegations of
corruption from local independent producers and lack of eqitorial freedom.
In 2006, she was basically demoted from Acting General Manager of BTV to a
Principal Officer in a different government department of Sports and Recreation.
In spite of the hard work she invested in the birth of BTV, some colleagues, local
producers and some political leaders had successfully cast suspicion on her
206 Botswana Guardian, 15 October 2004
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ability to run the station. When interviewed, Phetlhu listed a number of
achievements she was proud of. She had developed a Commissioning Strategy
from scratch. She travelled abroad and within the region, learning from among
others the Canadian Banff Film and Television Festival, SABC, the Copperbelt
regional channel of the Zambian Broadcasting Corporation, and the Namibian
Broadcasting Corporation. Phetlhu appreciated the unique position that BTY was
at; a free to air channel where there was no advertising industry or' local
television production industry. The station had to cope without trained personnel,
but had to find its niche in the regional economy of television production. Efforts
to commission had previously failed, but she was able to successfully lead the
first round of commissioning in 2004. Ten million pula (USD2 million) worth of
locally produced programmes successfully went on air between 2005 and 2006,
and every penny could be accounted "for. She was replaced by another woman
with a wealth of expe"rience in radio broadcasting, Banyana Segwe.
In the main, women in media practice in Botswana have consistently shown
resilience in the face of aggressive patriarchal cultures in the country. Radio
Botswana has for a long time produced programmes targeting women such as
Tsa bo mmaetsho - women's corner, and Tsa boitekanelo, on primary health
care. Yet gender blind reporting, blatant and subtle stereotyping of women
remain as some of the challenges facing the media in southern Africa. In
conjunction with MISA, Gender ~Links carried out a gender and media baseline
study (GMBS) 2002 in SADC countries. The s4Jdy.revealed that overall women
. ~ .. :. .
made only 17 percent of News compared to 83 percent for men. Women were
visible in the media mostly as presente~s and reporters. They were however very
vocal on gender equality, gender based -violence and HIV/AIDS issues.
j
A Botswana version of the study showed that women's views and voices were
grossly underrepresented in the Botswana media, including BTY. Women
constituted only 16 percent of News sources. BTY had the highest proportion of
women sources at 24 percent. Radio Botswana only had 11 percent women
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sources. In comparison with other countries in the region, where women in the
media workplace feature mostly as presenters, at BTV 48 percent of reports were
from women. Electronic media in Botswana also seemed to be biased towards
youthfulness. The majority of BTV journalists fell within the age category of 20-34
years, very few in the 35-49 category and none in the 50-64 categories. 207 Other
countries in the region such as South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe have had
media women association for some time, but in Botswana, the Botswana Women
in Media Association (BOMWA) was only launched in 2003.208
BTV and communication for democratisation
From preceding c.hapters, it became apparent that although the state in
Botswana did persistently attempt to control the media, ultimately,' it was the
personnel of mass media institutions that by their day to day decisions, defined
role Q of the media towards or against development. From the Newsroom to
TalkBack to the commissioning process, BTV undertook to define its role in the
developme':lt of Botswana. News contributed sometimes in a small way but
sometimes in important ways to public policy. TalkBack sought to set the agenda
for effective communication about HIV/AIDS. The commissioning process sought
to develop an 'independent' local film and television production industry. In the
process, local media managers were often caught in local politics of power and
control.
The Newsroom was first guided by Chris Bishop to define itself. Bishop was to
leave under allegations of state interference in his work and that of the
Newsroom. From that point on, working in the Newsroom was to be a test of wits;
to succumb to the ill-defined state control or not to. One manager quit because it
was hard to know where the buck stopped; another argued her allegiance was





as gate keeping. Eventually all the middle management of the Newsroom until
2005 had left it under some kind of pressure, redeployed to other departments
and sections or all together quit the Department of Broadcasting. The Newsroom
at BTV will continue for a foreseeable future to battle for legitimacy and to battle
to circumvent hegemonic tendencies; whatever they may be at every disjuncture.
TalkBack presented a different kind of power dynamic. Its subject matter being -
HIV/AIDS and its audience being teachers and students, TalkBack was never
under a state directed crisis of hegemony. The Ministry of Education was an
important partner, but through its bureaucratic machinery, not by direct
instructions on editorial content from the Minster of Education. It was perhaps the
best educational programme that BTV ever had, taking advantage of the new
communication technologies such as short message texting to interact with its
audiences. When producers are not under constant purview from state power, it
is possible to look beyond structural challenges of hegemony to discern producer
<
subject relations.
The commissioning process gave BTV a leverage to be the locus of power. The
commissioning editor, the channel controller, the general manager and the
tender evaluation committee made decisions that made and broke hopeful local
producers. A very high standard of programmes was expected from the
inexperienced local production hotJses. Producers were left with little choice but
to venture into partnerships' with more experienced South African production
companies like Ochre Media. Local producers continue to wait for the next
c9mmissioning morsel from the broadcaster, which has bee~' delayed by
allegations of corruption in the first round.
j
The procurement of content, from the local and the international market was yet
another locus of power for the broadcaster. It was a platform that it could use to
make its mark towards the development of Botswana. It became a platform to
frustrate the ambitions of the local producers. Very few local productions were
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licensed in the five years that the station had been operating. Under Phelthu,
local producers were in a way expected to meet the standards of neighbouring
broadcasters like SABC and ETV. As already noted, Press Secretary to the
President Jeff Ramsay said that cheap productions from America. and the United
Kingdom were on the other hand tolerated by BTV.
African journalists, producers and independent television and film producers
operate partly by their professional training, the dictates of institutions they work
for, and the cultural capital of the societies they exist within. In the particular
context of Botswana, where institutions that should protect the media from
government control are either absent or weak, universal ideals were often not
enough. Media practitioners were more likely to find support in the local
discourses, repertoires and cultures that call upon all, regardless of status, to
tolerate opposition. Once evoked, kgotla and similar rnetaphors commanded all,
including political leaders, if they wished to claim affinity to the national to
<
observe them. Failure to do so was tantamount to 'losing one's culture', worse,
being 'neo-colonialist', and a traitor to the imagined shared Botswana community
(Kerr, 2001).
Indigenising theory: The kgotla meets the state, television and
freedom. of expression.
'Indigenizing' theory for the particular context of Southern Africa and the Third
World is a necessity (Tomaselli and Dunn, 2001): Particularly the media in Africa,
has to be understood within Africa's unique history with colonialism, capitalism,
race and racism, nationalism, democracy, one partyism, ethnicity, patriarchy,
civic participation, indigenous knowledges, gender, and the global flow of
communication. At turn of the century, the project to de-westernize media
studies, and de-parochialise universalistic observation of the media based on
Western media experiences was revived (Curran and Park, 2000). Western
theories of the media are mainly premised on media-state relations in a largely
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de-regulated environment. In Botswana, the divide between the state and
national media is less clear. BTV and other national media are state-owned.
Beyond political economy questions, it is increasingly being recognised that
media practice by Africans cannot totally be understood from Westem
perspectives of the trade. Louise Bourgault (1995) highlighted the fact that 'the
media in Black Africa or sub Saharan Africa were unique because in no other
region of the world had peoples been so quickly shifted from face-to-face
communication to electronic communication (Bourgault, 1995:2). To indigenize
theory does not mean to ignore important contributions that have been made by
critical theorists from the West. It is an acceptance that, while useful, they are
simply inadequate - populations in Africa post colonialism, post apartheid and
post the Cold War live within an entirely different set of worldviews and
cosmologies, histories, and cultural and political experiences (Tomaselli, Muller
and Shepperson, 1996:xii). Jurgen Habermas was committed to the removal of
, .
restrictions on communication as the b,psis of an ideal future society. His critical
departure from Karl Marx was that communicative action (speech acts or
equivalent nonverbal expressions), more than purposive-rational action (work), if
left to occur undistorted, could bring about a rational society (Ritzer,1996:293-
294). With the origin of stock markets, postal services and routine production of
News, communication became channelled mainly to the needs of merchants
rather than for a participating public. Very soon after, the press was
systematically made to serve the interests of the state, forever displacing a
former vibrant public sphere of face-to-face undistorted communication. Late
seventeenth and early ninet~enth century Paris and London was, according to
Habermas, the golden age. of an unfettered public sphere that was more.
representative of the mood of the public. Private individuals, middle class males,
read News sheets and Newspapers and met as equals at salons and coffee
houses, to openly discuss issues of public concern, and could criticise the
actions of government through face-to-face open debate. Privatisation of mass
media had displaced this sense of communal mutual responsibility with politically
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calculated public spectacles that manipulated public opinion. The majority of the
population was now excluded from public debate (Habermas, 1989).
To the extent that Habermas locates the possibility of a healthy public life on the
availability of reciprocal speech - unconstrained communication where citizens
can critically interrogate the state, his project has universal appeal. Also, by
observing how media historically came to serve vested interests, his project has
universal appeal. In the specific case of Botswana, where there traditionally
existed a space of face-to-face interface between ordinary citizens and the
political leadership, Habermas' nostalgic gaze at Europe of old has a strong
resonance with traditional forms of public debate in Botswana at the kgotla. The
kgotla transcended the ideal type public sphere remembered by Habermas. At
the kgotla, not only men of property, but commoners also came face-to-face with
their leadership. There was direct interface between the public, albeit the male
public, and decision making,
All matters of public policy are dealt with finally at an assembly open to all
men of the tribe, and variously termed pitso, lebatla, or phutego, Such
assemblies are held very frequently, at times almost weekly, and they
usually meet early in the morning in the tribal council-place, close to the
chiefs residence. Normally only the men present in the capital attended,
the business discussed and decisions reached are communicated, if
necessary, to the inhabitants of outlying villages through their
headmen...Since everyone present is entitled to speak, the tribal council
provides a ready means of ascertaining public opinion. The decisions- -
reached are generally those already formulated by the chief and his
I j
personal advisers, who because of their standing are able to persuade the
others to support them, but it is not unknown for their wishes to be
overruled. The discussions are characterised by considerable freedom of
speech, and, if the occasion seems to call for it, the chief or his advisers
may even be severely criticised (Maundeni, 2004a:620).
273
In the case of BTV, which only started in the age of direct satellite broadcasting,
in no other epoch did a service skip that many technological stages. Yet
compared to many African countries, Botswana appeared by many international
measurements, to be doing very well in terms of its democracy. In the specific
case of Botswana, several perspectives have been offered to explain why
Botswana was able to succeed where many other African countries failed. As
. shown in chapter one, the most common explanation has been to liken Botswana
to developmental states of Asia and Latin America. The state in Botswana is
presented as benevolent, transforming material lives of people, protecting human
rights and practicing political democracy through policy intervention (Edge, 1998;
Tsie, 1998; Maundeni, 2004a). An increasingly popular postulation is that, the
modern state emerged out an ancient kgotla tradition, which compelled political
leaders to rule by consent from their publics. David Kerr (2001) and Deidre
Donnelly (2001) argue that in order to und~rstand the way that media practioners
in African contexts are straddling the tension between western liberal demands
and values, and the cultural capital on which they are subjectively positioned.
They both suggested that it was important to examine indigenous structures of
communication in Africa, and in the case of Botswana, the tradition of kgotla.
Whereas Habermas saw·mass me.dia as the enermy to a past golden age of a
healthy public sphere., ·.~b~ni MaO~deni (2004a), was more .optimistic about
.-~ . .- ..~-
change. Habermas argued that, what we got from contemporary media was all
staged, non of it reflected public opinion, so that mass media re-feudalised,
cancelled out the strides that had been made to bring in t~e era of open rational
debate among equals. Mass media was taking society backwards, to the feudal
•
period of 'feudal courts' and other spectacles. Maundeni on the other hand
sought to show how, the kgotla - a feudal structure, had revitalised, not re-
feudalised the public sphere, particularly the civic culture. The kgotla - both in its
physical actual form, and as a symbol of ancient tolerant local political cultures of
Botswana were drawn from to explore home-grown alternatives to blue prints
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borrowed from other cultures. The tradition of the kgotla, is placed in this chapter,
at the heart of the modicum of the freedom, limited as it was, that BTV enjoyed,
especially in its early days.
The kgotla and new sites of cultural production: a counter hegemonic
discourse
'Mafoko a kgotla a mantle otlhe' - all opinion expressed at the kgotla is precious,
and 'mmualebe 0 bua la gagwe' - even a discordant opinion has a right to be
heard. Yet another local proverb goes, kgosi ke kgosi ke batho; a chief obtains
his authority from the people. These resonate with Western cornerstones of a
modem democracy; of majority rule and pluralism. In the post-independence
period, the kgotla was appropriated both a site of romanticism and critique. It
took on the modernization process in its stride. As modem Botswana negotiated
its nationhood, the kgotta often provided the meeting point between tradition and
modernity. The kgotla tradition and form took in newer forms of mediation such
as print, radio and television and Internet to further its own agendas. In the 21st
century, the kgotla was integral in direct and indirect ways to most contemporary
spheres of conversation and decision making, from boardrooms to classrooms to
Internet communities to mass media communication. University of Botswana
Internet community, and the e-dumela Botswana Internet community for students
at tertiary level, among others, directly referred to the tenets of the kgotla as
guiding principles of their output. Media, independent or government-owned and
controlled also drew from the kgotla, besJdes the conventional norms and ethics
of journalism and cultural production. 1t also advanced these platforms. Very
often they threatened to render it obsolete.
The very proliferation of new sites of cultural production rendered the kgotla an
increasingly necessary gatekeeper of what 'culture' is. The Botswana National
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Policy on Culture (NPC)209 for instance, placed it at the centre for the 'promotion,
protection and preservation of culture' (NPC, 2001 :32), and as the grass root
authority on culture. DiKgosi - traditional chiefs, were charged among other
things with the responsibility of "maintaining the environment of peace and
democracy through the promotion of participation and tolerance at grassroots by
men, women and youth through the concept of 'mmualebe', and preservation of
the kgotla system" (NPC, 2001 :33). The NPC revealed a developing nation's
struggle to balance between the global and the local, between modemity and
tradition, culture and technology, the future and the past, the youth and the
elders. The kgotla came out in the NPC, as both a site of cultural production and
the site for preservation and protection of cultural capital. The NPC operated
rather uneasily on two notions of cultural capital; as an ideal and idealized set of
commonly held indigenous repertoires that all citizens of Botswana ought to
share and as an arena of artistic performances and practices. The first notion,
strongly connected to the idea of nation building, called on mainly the youth, to
~ ~
find their way back to traditional institutions for 'enculturation' and 'cultural
transmission' (NPC, 2001).
Towards 'preserving, protecting and promoting' culture, the policy called on the
nation to recall local discourses such as the kgotla, diKgosi - chiefs, mephato -
age regiments, bojale - adolescent girls initiation schools, bogwera - adolescent
boys initiation schools, meila - negatively sanctioned social norms (NPC,
2001 :33). The policy tended to privilege institutions and repertoires of the
dominant majority Setswana speaking groups perhaps at the expense of the
multiple other rich idis>ins and philosophies from the diverse cultures in Botswana
that could contribute to enriching the national cultural capital.
•
209 National Policy on Culture (NPC) put in place in 2001 by the Ministry of Labour and Home
Affairs, approved by Cabinet on 4th April 2001 - Directive No. CAB 17/2001
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Romanticising the kgotla
By its rootedness in the past and culture, the kgotla had the possibility of better
harnessing a sensibility towards respects oppositional voices than 'foreign'
constructions. Besides the kgotla, other texts from the local cultural capital could
also be invoked, such as maitseo and botho - respect and humaneness towards
elders, for a better media environment in Botswana. A trap often encountered in
looking at traditions to understand the present, is a tendency to romanticise and
sometimes even exaggerate its contribution. This was apparent in Habermas'
lamenting of the dearth of the public sphere. Traditions are often held sacred and
benevolent. Maundeni went on so much as to argue that, the kgotla tradition of
open non confrontational discussion was so entrenched in modern Botswana that
the state, media and community were united in their disdain for the very
uncultured 'street encounters'. He opposed suggestion by lan Taylor (2002:8)
that "the Botswana government has exhibited highly undemocratic teng.encies to
portray those organs of civil society it deemed beyond its control as foreign
stooges, and has not' been shy to play the race card against any foreign
supporters of civil society in adversarial relationship with Gaborone (Maundeni,
2004a:621)". True to Taylor's observation, Maundeni went on to argue that a
Survival International (SI) campaign outside the Botswana High Commission in
London in 2001 was violent and could not enjoy 'moral and media support'
locally. "The staging of street encounters .~y Survival International fundamentally
misunderstands the country's political culture, in which criticism in each other's
pre~ence in highly regarded and passionately promoted by the civil society, state,
and the media" (Maundeni, 2004a:621). SI was protesting against Botswana
diamonds that they claimed were not going towards development l!>u't genocide of
the San peoples. By Maundeni's own admission, taking to the street was not
unknown in Botswana, but in order to demonstrate that the West did not always
have to be the point of reference on democratic discourses, he tended to
exaggerate the possibility of local indigenous alternatives. Suddenly Botswana's
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myriad of civil society organisations and mass media were all swept under the
same carpet with state hegemonic discourses.
P.T. Mgadla (1998) was more reserved in his praise of the kgotla - "before taking
major decisions...the chief had to consult his advisers...but history is replete with
Batswana leaders who designatedly deviated from it. There were leaders who
were autocratic, who did not consult, and who attempted to solve problems of the
polity single-handedly (Mgadla, 1998:9-10). History repeats itself. Like any
practice, the kgotla came under immense pressure as postcolonial realities of
contradictory capitalist development began to challenge the cultural moral fabric
of the Botswana state and the media. The kgotla was not an unproblematic
space, it was both progressive and exclusionary. Like the kgotla, BTV and most
forums of 'open debate', were gendered spaces. Issues pertaining to indigenous
minorities, children and women enjoyed much less visibility compared to male
dominated arenas of party politics and sports. Men made most of the News
<
bulletin. Even Internet communities that regard themselves as kgotla tend to be
male dominated.
However, the kgotla tradition often transcended particular individuals' views and
attitudes towards open debate. As an indigenous discourse for freedom of
expression and by its rooted-ness in 'local culture', the kgotla has often been
evoked metaphorically to hamess a sensibility among political leaders and a kind
of moral obligation towards respect for oppositional voices. All called together to
this forum, including political leaders, if they also wish to claim affinity to 'our
national culture' were inherently trapped b~tween restricting freedom of
expression in cultural production and legitimizing and rationalizing their actions
I
within a cultural framework. Once kgotla traditions of tolerance were evoked,
failure to observe them was tantamount to 'losing one's culture', worse, being
'neo-colonialist', a traitor to the imagined shared Botswana community (Kerr,
2001). At the kgotla, even Presidents came not just as first citizens, but also as
'traditional' and ordinary 'children' bom and bred in Setswana cultures. A
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government-owned television did not have the same leverage to approach the
President other than as the first citizen. At a kgotla meeting, ordinary people,
especially if they are older than the President, expected him to tolerate open
criticism, which BTV could hardly expect. Minister of Science, Communication
and technology, Legal Advisor to the President or acting General Manager of
BTV could try to limit debate or close discussion, just in the way that some
diKgosi and ma/ope a kgosing - the Chiefs right hand persons historically did.
This has never stopped the kgotla from favouring open debate, to the extent that
inequitable access to the forum permitted. For its repertoire of culturally
entrenched written and oral traditions, the kgotla had the most potential to
escape censorship by state power in the manner that other new forms of media
could not. For this reason, it was also quite possible that for as long as newer
spheres of cultural production aligned their roles closely to that of the kgotla, they
could better stretch the tight economy of freedom of expression in Botswana by
the State. They stood a better chance by calling on the kgotla, to be more
<
effective public spheres. The kgotla could be the source of their re-vitalisation.
BTV and invoking the kgotla
A national broadca...ster" in. the view of former Acting General Manager of BTV,
Kesholofetse Phetlhu was that Botswana's journalism needed to reflect qualities. ,-
of a well behaved and well rounded child in it's dealing with senior government
officials. It had to show respect at all times. Phetlhu felt that journalists such as
Outsa Mokone, a local privatE? Newspaper journalist renowned for his fearless
reporting, needed to show respect to elders. Her guiding principle as she went
about her work was the way 'she has been brought up in her family, to respect
elders. In her opinion, the attitude of a journalist to authority reflected their bad
up-bringing. They at BTV were guided by botho more than anything else, she
said. 'We are moral beings, from birth," after all, Phetlhu insisted.
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The kgotla has traditionally encouraged opposing views. For this reason,
decision-making forums of every scale in Botswana were often rich with proverbs
about freedom of expression, drawing from the kgotla tradition. BTV, as with
other spheres of conversation and decision making in Botswana, appropriated
the kgotla in ways that were at the same time oppressive, instrumentalist,
paternalistic as they were liberating, open-minded and progressive. The kgotla
was at once as an emblem of freedom of expression and of constraint and
unequal access. In the absence of legally protected editorial independence and
an independent broadcasting regulator between the state and BTV, it was
apparent that such a 'traditional' 'shared' metaphor as the kgotla contributed
significantly to provide the checks and balances against covert disregard of
dissent and difference. Without the kgotla metaphor, editorial control of media
content by the state of the media it owned could have been worse. Althol:Jgh
section 12 of the Constitution of Botswana provided for freedom of expression,
government media policy was not as transformative as policies for social welfare
4
programmes. Nor could BTV could rely on protections found in Western
discourses of freedom of the media. It was daunted instead by oppressive state
apparatus - legal and hegemonic, that pushed journalists and producers towards
self-censorship. Without a supportive traditional discourse that celebrated
tolerance towards oppositional opinion and open debate to fall back on, the task
of cultural production for BTV would be much more difficult.
For BTV, starting off with the best technology and the least trained human
resource, studio talk shows were a must right from the beginning. Besides two
commissioned dramas and a documentary series that were aired between 2005
~ ~
and 2006, BTV local content comprised mainly of studio-based programmes.
I j
Talk shows brought people into discussion, and this misled a Botswana political
scientist, Zibani Maundeni (2004b) to assume that they were an 'enormous
contribution ... to participatory democracy' in Botswana (Maundeni, 2004b:48).
Jean Seaton's response to such misplaced optimism was to warn that 'some
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groups - stronger and richer, and with better access - are always able to secure
more attention than others" (Seaton, 1997:1).
Botswana Television invoked the kgotla as its metaphor for open debate and the
philosophy behind some of its content. "Programming is based on and aims at
reflecting the democratic tradition of Botswana by adhering to the principle of
balanced reporting, showing both sides of the story and adhering to objeqtivitY,"210
according to a former director of the station. The weekly studio debates on
politics and governance in particular emulate the ideals of the kgotla.
Matlhoaphage, a political match between the ruling party and opposition parties
was intended to expose Botswana's politicians and their party manifestos to
citizens as a way of enhancing political awareness.211 'Matlhoaphage'is part of a
Setswana proverb that translates to the necessity of direct confrontation in
resolving issues. The Eye, carried similar intentions as Matlho-a-phage. In fact
they both drew from the literal eye as an optical organ to emphasise face-to-face.
communication as well as seeing for oneself. The now defunct Mmualebe - the
programme that gets you talking, was a 3D-minute studio-based discussion that
aimed to get people to discuss mainly social issues of governance and politics.
Mmualebe 0 bua la gagwe is a Setswana proverb that loosely translates to there
being no right or wrong opinion' in the kgotla, as encapsulated the concept of
democracy, whicll tbe..country is renowned for. 212.. '" .
A lesser invoked tenet of the kgotla, mo laa kgosi 0 a bo a itaela - those that
encourage tyranny of a kgosi - the chief, do so at their own peril, might be useful
for calling the government towards a less stifling position Yls-a-vis the media it
owns. It could serve as a reminder for a government currently in power that, a
I
culture of fear it instils in the media can and will work against it if it ceases to be
in power, and future governments are likely to follow the same tradition. In 2003,
the Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology that BTV undertook a




decision that BTV would desist from covering political rallies. The reason
advanced was that the station did not have enough resources to give all political
parties equal coverage. Since then, in the words of a leader of one of opposition
parties; the station became red. Red is the official colour of the ruling party. BTV
is to always cover public meetings attended by the President and Vice-President
meetings. In the run up to 2004 general elections, these addresses were mainly
the ruling party's political rallies and the supporters would be wearing the party
colours; red, black and white, while the opposition party colours became less
visible.
Observing BTV bulletins of the week of December 1 2003, however, it became
clear that the ruling party would also not totally escape the wrath of the tyranny of
its own making. Results of "Bulela ditswe" the ruling party's primary election had
come out. They were headline News for all the Newspapers and radio stations in
the country. The BTV N~ws bulletins had nothing on them. One of the reporters
asked at an editorial meeting if they would simply ignore the results even as they
knew they were of public interest. He was reminded by colleagues that the
Minister Boyce Sebetela h~d .stated categorically that political parties were not to
be covered by the station. They also added that BTV had not reported results of
other political parties, notably the unexpected loss by a very popular Robert
... '. Mole~abangwe of opposition Botswana National Front. The resolve not to budge
:- '. by the N"ews' team was hardened by aQ' iqcident where the Minister personally
threw out the BTV camera and reporting crew from Parliam~nt when they came
to cover its proceedings. A few weeks before he had ordered the national radio
broadcaster, Radio Botswana to stoP).:1 call-in segment of a morning show
allegedly being a platform of anti-govert;lment propaganda.
As a physical space, in its idealized form, the kgotla provides for a Habermasian
idea of co-presence; face-to-face straight talk where the best argument wins. It
can thus be seen as an alternative to the more 'staged' new forms of mediation,
which Habermas argues have turned what used to be unfettered public exchange
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into an orchestrated spectacle. The kgotla though, as the following section
shows, has not totally been able to escape becoming part of the media
spectacle. The kgotla was sometimes a kind of genre in its own right in BTY
local content. BTY almost religiously broadcasts kgotla meetings when the
President or Vice President is addressing communities at their local dikgotla.
Habermas saw this appropriation of the public sphere by broadcasting as a re-
feudalisation of the public sphere. Public spheres are rendered sites of spectacle
to ensure that the nation was constantly aware 'of state power. Kenneth
Thompson, on the contrary maintained that precisely because new media
expands visibility of face-to-face debates such as kgotla meetings to citizens that
would not have been physically present at these debates, it enables them to join
in conversation. Co-presence of face-to-face communication under new
information technologies ceases to be spatially bound.
<
The kgotla turned into a spectacle: BTV and the Mogoditshane
demolitions
An interface between television and the kgotla in Botswana tended to prove
Habermas' re-feudalization theses. The disparity between a kgotla version and
the television version of the same event personally witnessed by the researcher
.. was startling. The State President Mogae, had come to address the community
of Mogoditshane, a village in the outskirts of the city about government's
uncompromising stance against illegal land self-allocation that the village had
become notorious for. ,Government was demolishing all homes built on illegally
occupied plots. Some members of the public were asking for a more humane
, -
solution, of government providing necessary paperwork to legitimise the
occupations because the homes housed children and their poor families trying to
make a living under harsh conditions of high unemployment and a skewed
economy.
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When the President ended his speech on an unrelenting note, a member of the
crowd remarked aloud "ga re go ut/we" - we can't hear you, indicating his
disapproval of the President's hardline position. The President heard this and
retorted in Setswana, "ga 0 sa nkutwe ke tla go kabolola ditshokaf", if you can't
hear me, I will have to clean out your ears! In Setswana, as in En,glish, it can also
mean to teach someone a lesson. Although he meant it literally, the President
played right into those opposed to his position. At the question and answer
session, a number of speakers successfully tumed this comment from being
towards a particular individual. They used his very own words to caricature him
into a boastful and uncaring President against a helpless nation - which was to
some extent true. However, the moment came to pass and the meeting ended as
is the norm on a calm note; the President was thanked for coming and food and
entertainment provided for him and his entourage.
Mogoditshane is infamous for being something of a melting pot and a site of
<
crime, lack of traditional values such as botho - respect for authority, and general
disrespect for the law. It is a village known in popular discourse as a place where
swear words and obscenities are exchanged over fences between neighbours,
betwe~n children and their parents, where age and authority do not command
respect. The television News bulletin successfully made a montage of the actual
eve!)t .Jmd stereotypes about Mogoditshane to create an even more heated
~ spectacle than the actual kgotla meeting. There was no longer a sense of a bell
curve that the meeting took; slow start, a heated middle and a calm end. The
two-hour meeting was reduced into a series of hostile accusations and counte" .. ' •
acgusations between the President and members of the public, '~ogoditshane
style'. Most fascinating was how the editing had been used to further electrify the. ,
'heated exchange'. Questions and responses to them were not left in sequence
they had come at the kgotla. They were rearranged during editing so to match a
comment to a question best suited to it. Television did not merely mirror the
kgotla meeting as it has unfolded. It took advantage of techniques available to it
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such as editing and juxtaposition to fashion it to its own conventions of
communication.
The kgotla and other local philosophies have a lot of scope to circumvent other
threats to freedom of expression such as the Cinematograph Act of 1970
[CAP.60:02]. It stipulates for instance that "no film shall be made within Botswana
for public exhibition or sale either within or outside Botswana except under and in
accordance with the terms and conditions of a filming permit issued by the
Minister under this part." Further, "No person shall exhibit any film at an
exhibition to which the public are admitted unless the Board [of Censors] has
issued a certificate of approval in respect thereof approving it for such exhibition"
[CAP.60:02, 60:24]. The Cinematograph Act has been blamed for hampering the
development of local visual media production for decades. Thokolosi, one of the
two dramas that BTV commissioned at the end of 2004 and produced by Norman
Moloi brought about important issues about creative freedom, editorial control on
<
the part of BTV, public opinion and state intervention. It started showing in
February 2006, and within the first months, stirred an uproar that generated
much public debate on radio, television and print media (Mmegi, Thursday 9
March 2006; MISA, March 2006). Thokolosi was based on an existing myth
about the village of Bobonong in Botswana. The myth was that the people were
masters of witchcraft and could turn corpses into 'matholwane', - Thokolosi,
superhu.man sl~ve~. A number of people including the Member of Parliament for
: . the"area ·:·~nd -aCademics took up issue complaining that the drama would., .. .
perpetuate negative stereotypes about some ethnic groups in·Botswana and was
counterproductive for nation-building (Mmegi, Thursday 9 March 2006).213 It
appears that the BTV Commissioning Editor and his team had not found any
I
problem with the drama, since it went on air. It was only when it got to the public
that they faced criticism. The initial reaction by Minister Pelonomi Venson was
that the whole thing was drama, and that there was no need to take the
exploitation of local myths personally. The matter gained more momentum such
213 Mmegi online, http://www.mmegLbw/2006/MarchlThursday9/266470321427.html
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that, the producers had to add, midway, a disclaimer that events and people
depicted in the drama were all fictitious (MISA, March, 2006).214 Venson later had
to apologise to the public for BTV's 'oversight', most likely under pressure from
Cabinet. A delegation was sent to the kgotla of Bobonong to apologise to the
villagers, few of whom had actually seen the drama for lack of television sets.
There was a need therefore to go beyond official utterances about the kind of
service that Botswana Television was or ought to have been. By looking at the
encounter between the medium and the operational and qualitative productive
processes within the station, a better understanding of cultural production under
government was made possible. Operative discourses about television at BTV
revealed the ways in which some actors more than others inventively
appropriated and exploited television technology towards greater editorial
freedom, under the same conditions of government control. BTV also had to
endure a high~y charged but infantile independent local production industry that
looked upon the station as the source of their bread and butter. Many a time, the
lack of relevant training on television militated against .efforts to run the station in
spite of limited experience. At key moments the station personnel used the
limited resources in their disposal with varying effort and success to escape
complete control by any force, private or government. There appeared to be
more room than was currently exploited for BTV to be a greater public sphere in
spite of the immense constraints; of government relentlessly seeking to control it,
a lack in human resources, organisational incapacity, and the challenges on the
cultural production in the developing world.
Conclusion: BTV and the' crisis of public service broadcasting
An attempt has been made through empirical research to map a theoretical
framework for the understanding of television and cultural production for
developing contexts such as Botswana. Charles Manga Fombad (2002) qualifies
214 MISA, http://www.misa.org/cgi-bin/archives.cgi?category=1 &view=3-06
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Botswana's government owned national broadcasting as public service
broadcasting or as he calls it, 'public service media' (PSM). "PSM in almost all
African countries was taken over and controlled by the state and used merely as
instruments of propaganda for the ruling parties, rather than a medium for
transmitting the knowledge and information which people need to know to make
informed decisions". Fombad pushes an argument that, Botswana is a special
case in Africa where media has been free since 1972-1973 (Fombad, 2002:651)
while under government. Botswana continues to perform more than many other
Third World countries in so far as international development and democracy
indicators, whilst national television and radio broadcasters are state-owned and
controlled. This thesis showed, first with Radio Botswana but principally with BTV
that cultural production could occur productively under the paternalistic liberal
authoritarian" Botswana state. A freer media environment especially of national
media would have ensured Botswana an even higher standing in the continent.
The case of Botswana, of state control of media seemingly co-existing with
exemplary democracy, has a potential to entrench state authoritarianism in
Africa, particularly in aspects of media freedom. The lesson to newly
democratizing African countries such as Mozambique and the Democratic
Republic of Congo could be that a totally free media may not be all that
necessary to achieve stability. In fact, since Botswana's stability was achieved by
using national media to project government policies and th~.. ~ule of the BDP as
the only available alternative to the anarchy that any other dispensation would
otherwise bring, we may see a greater linking of internal stability to media
control. Th~s'is particularly so when government media was also often labelled ~y
its management, political leaders, academic and popular discourse, as public
I •
service broadcasting. Former Botswana Communications Minister Lephimotswe
Sebetela was largely unheeded in 2004 in his attempt to explain to the nation
that government media, BTV and Radio Botswana, were not public service
broadcasters.
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Public service broadcasting according to Ruth Teer-Tomaselli (2005:199) is a
term frequently used but seldom understood. In Botswana, the term has been
used to mean media managed by public or civil servants, run on govemment
funding, and geared at promoting government policies. The two government
broadcasters, radio in particular, are the most relied on sources of information in
Botswana. Considering that broadcasters have often been faced with either
making a profit or going under, government ownership of national broadcasting in
Botswana protected it from market failure. To the extent that the Botswana
government funded the expensive production of local News, in-house
productions and commissioned independent productions for BTY, it contributed
to the perception that governments have a potential to serve citizens better than
markets,
Typically, markets don't produce sufficient quantity or quality of
programming in education, research, children's programming, dramas in
~
[local] languages and other specialised programming...commercial
broadcasters don't provide for the poor, the old, the uneducated or for
those who live in remote areas, far away from the urban centres (Teer-
Tomaselli, 2005:202).
It is however, 'generally perceived as the best broadcasting model, "the chance
for ordinary "pe6-pie to .re_ceive unbiased information, and be able to voice their
..." ...."':":.. ..
own con~erns,··:~ot si~ly the concerns of the politicians" (Teer-Tomaselli,
2005:204). The September 2002 conference on public service broadcasting in
West Africa held in Accra, Ghana, agreed that the corners!one of a true public
service broadcaster included providing balanced, accurate and relevant
•
information and programmes to the public that reflect the peoples' voice. To this
end, public service broadcasters required to be legally defined, to operate under
legally protected independent regulatory bodies, and to enjoy editorial
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independence guaranteed by law and respected in practice.215 The 1991
Windhoek Declaration, the 2001 African Charter on Broadcasting and
subsequent civil society efforts in the southern African region also heralded
public service broadcasting as the best broadcasting model towards democracy.
As Teer-Tomaselli aptly made the point, parameters of public service
broadcasting are largely normative - they were about how broadcasters 'ought to
act', but in practice, it is largely not the case (Teer-Tomaselli, 2005:199).
Seamogano Mosanako aptly summarised the challenge facing BTV when she
wrote, "BTV has to prove that apart from patriotism, there are many reasons why
Batswana should watch it. Such ~ justification should be based on the provision
of quality local programmes that capture Tswana values, attitudes, opinions, and
ideas and develop national unity" (Mosanako, 2004:60). Maggie Mabechu
(2001:101) captured the reality of BTV,' when she wrote, "the calm depicted in
daily transmission belied the storm..." resulting from the station's relationship with
government. In actual fact, the situation has so deteriorated since she wrote in
~
2001, that, even the transmission is no longer smooth.
The encounter between state - control and cultural production at BTV was
mitigated by informal subcultures that emerged from the very early days of the
station, or collusion, resignation and resistance with or against the status quo.
The productions were fashioned under an environment of state - control and
self-censorship. This did not occur in a sterile environment without faces; BTV
did have faces that steered it in one direction and not the other. The faces and
television technology operating under state - control were held together by what
Vincent Mosco (1998) called mutual con~tftutiveness; each sphere was mutually
determinant and determining of the other's actions and utterances. When all
•
sides were taken to impact on each other in a two way fashion, the question
becomes not only the extent to which government interfered with or controlled
BTV; but also the extent to which the BTV staff shaped the nature of such
215 Recommendations: Public Service Broadcasting in West Africa,
http://www.africafilmtv.com/pages/features/NF174recommendations.htm 7 November 2006
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control. BTV was fully government funded, it was a government department and
thus, it was almost pointless to speak about state interference. To ask this
question was to force a different broadcasting model upon BTV that was not a
state - propaganda machine, to pretend it was some kind of 'public service
broadcaster'. What made the discussion worthwhile was that, while for all
institutional and legal intends and purposes, BTV was a government department,
the employees' themselves never completely gave up on some level of
journalistic professional ethics. They could never accept direct intervention by
government Ministers on content as normal course of business. They wish to do
their work 'professionally', by which they said meant following the norms and
values of independent, watchdog journalism rather than being dictated for by the
state how to do their work. To see beyond official structural restrictions imposed
on BTV by state ownership can help towards a better understanding of whether
. .
the staff at BTV operate according to 'he who pays the piper picks the tune'.
Alum Mpofu also contended that "it is not necessarily the origin of funds, but. .
rather principles, philosophies and mechanisms of programme selection and
commissioning that influence the integrity of .[broadcasting]" (Mpofu,1996:12).
With specific reference to BTV, which is government owned and controlled and
yet endeavours to be a site of cultural production and a kind of public sphere, the
kgoUa metaphor had much more potential than was exploited. Without a 'local'
diseourse that promoted tolerance towards open debate, cultural production at
the station would be hindered not so much by commercialisation as by the
dominant position of the state vis-a-vis civil society and producers of cultural
products. Together wi~n received Western discourses on freedom of expression
and democracy in Africa, the kgotla metaphor could create a leverage for the,
station to negotiate some kind of legitimacy to include in their content, criticism of
government. Discourses on rights in Africa such as the right to freedom of
expression therefore, although undeniably Western in origin, "did not start
scribbling on a tabula rasa" Donnelly, 2001 :267). The role of watchdogs and
objective informers is tested by the fact that, in the process of producing cultural
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capital, media practitioners in the developing world have to survive governments
that often own and control most of the resources. On the other hand they have to
work within the constraints of the global information technology divide. Most
important, their output can only be of relevance if it settles textually and
contextually within local cultures, discourses and repertoires (Bourgalt,1995;
Donnely, 2001; Kerr, 2001). The kgotla came to shape even one of Africa's most
technologically advanced and new television station, BTV. Like every other
institutions in the rapidly changing post-colonial African context, broadcasting has
to constantly be "critically examined and re-shaped to concur with new political
and social values and new norms of public accountability" (Mpofu, 1996:6) and
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Growth Competitiveness Rankings (Source: World Economic Forumjl14
Growth Competitiveness Macroeconomic environment
1 Botswana 1 Botswana
2 Tunisia 2 Tunisia
3 South Africa 3 South Africa
4 Mauritius 4 Morocco
5 Namibia 5 Gambia
6 Gambia 6 Alqeria
7 Egypt 7 Namibia
8 Morocco 8 Egypt
9 Tanzania 9 Mauritius . . ..
10 Seneqal .. -
~ - -10 Ghana . - • - .
11 Alqeria 11 Ghana
.,
~
12 Malawi 12 Uganda
13 Senegal 13 Niqeria
14 Uganda l 14 Tanzania
15 Kenya 15 Kenya
16 Nigeria 16 Cameroon
17 Zambia 17 Madagascar
18 Cameroon 18 Ethiopia
19 Ethiopia 19 Mali
20 Mozambique 20 Mozambique
21 Madaqascar 21 Chad
22 Zimbabwe 22 Zambia
23 Mali 23 Malawi
24 Angola 24 Angola
25 Chad 25 Zimbabwe
Public Institutions and Technology Rankings
Public Institutions Technology
1 Botswana 1 South Africa
2 Tunisia 2 Mauritius
3 Malawi 3 Tunisia
4 Gambia 4 Botswana
5 South Africa 5 Namibia





... '"'.: ;.~ '.
.
- -' ....-.......
7 Namibia 7 Morocco
8 Egypt 8 Kenya
9 Tanzania 9 Zimbabwe
10 Ghana 10 Uganda
11 Algeria 11 Gambia
12 Morocco 12 Tanzania
13 Zambia 13 Nigeria
14 Ethiopia 14 Ghana
15 Senegal 15 Senegal
16 Mozambique 16 Zambia
17 Mali 17 Mozambique
18 Uganda 18 Cameroon
19 Zimbabwe 19 Malawi
20 Angola 20 Algeria
21 Kenya 21 Madagascar
22" Cameroon 22 Angola
23 Madagascar 23 Mali
24 Nigeria 24 Ethiopia
25 Chad 25 Chad
~..











Attention: Ms Felistus Mashungwa
Dear Madam,
Re: Assistance for Field Research at Botswana Television
... ,.,-
I kindly request cooperation, facilitation, and assistance from your office towards the
undertaking of field research by myself. This is towards complete fulfilment ofa PhD in
Media and Culture with the University ofNatal in Durban entitled "State control, nation-
building and commercialisation as detenninantS ofBotswana Television." The process
involves participant observation of the process of News and Current Affairs production
and documentary analysis of any available material surrounding the production. Find
attached a copy of the research pennit issued to me by the Ministry of Communication,
Science and Technology. .
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F CULTY OF SOCIAL SCIE CES
Private Bag 00705
Gaborone, Botswana
Telephone: (267) 355-0000 Switchboard
Telephone: (267) 355 + Extension Fax.: (2~7) 355-2543
~ (267) 2429 BD Telegraph: Umverslty Gaborone
From: SethW1ya Tshepho Mphinyane African Scholars Program [asp@fivecoIIeges.edu]
Date: 19 May 2004
To: Kesholofetswe PhetIhu, AcJiqg General Manager, Botswana TelevIsion
." .....
Subject: Mphinyane's research on Programmes Procurement at Botswana
Television,
Greetings,
I kindly ask to be permitted to spend a few hours with the Programmes Procurement
Division of Botswana Television and to ask questions where necessary to understand how
programmes are selected and procured. This is part of my on-going PhD research project
that I have already sort permission from the Ministry to undertake (find copy ofIetter of
permission attached).
SethW1ya T. Mphinyane.
Cc: Programmes Procurement Division, Botswana Television
/
MPHINYAT
From: George Eustice [george@redstonefilm.comj
Sent: 17 November 2004 12:48
To: MPHINYAT
Subject: RE: Interview with local producers


















sent: 17 November 2004 11:49
To: george@redstonefilm.com
Subject: Interview with local producers
Hello to you,
I am Sethunya Mphinyane, a student studying the local production industry. I need to have a chat with
you to understand how local producers relate with the commissioning project that Btv is undertaking at
the moment. Some of the key issues we will need to chat about are: whether commissioning is likely to
make a difference for local producers; whether or not local producers are capable at present to produce
high quality work; the partnerships that you maybe engaged with more experienced outside producers;
the challenged of the industry; the future of production in Botswana, and many other related issues.
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Botswana. Te1 00267 72406951 (cell)
002673185315 (h)
ernai1 mphinyat@mopipi.ub.bw; sethunyamphinyane@hotmail.com
Incoming mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
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18 November 2004 15:44
MPHINYAT
Subject: RE: Interview with local producers
I am attending the Sithengi World Cinema Festival in Cape Town and thus I will not be able to meet




RE: Interview with local producers
MPHINYAT
From: ernst engels [engels@info.bw]
Sent: 18 November 2004 13:42
To: MPHINYAT
Subject: RE: Interview with local producers
Mug and Bean, Game City?!
Thank you, where about do I see you on Tuesday 23 Nov, 12 am?
.. .
Sethunya Tshepho Mphinyane
P. o. Box 1671 Mogoditshane,
Botswana. Tel 00267 72406951 (cell)
00267 3185315 (h)
email mphinyat@mopipi.ub.bw; sethunyamphinyane@hotmail.com
From: ernst engels [mailto:engels@info.bw]
sent: 17 November 2004 22:10
To: MPHINYAT
Subject: Re: Interview with local producers










From: Dipolelo Video Arts (pty) Ltd [storyline@botsnet.bw)
Sent: 17 November 2004 13:21
To: MPHINYAT
Subject: Re: Interview with local producers
Hi, Sethunya -
We're insanely busy right now, but I'd be happy to talk with you by phone.
Our landline is 3167336.
_.~. regards· ..... ',.•
john
DIPOLELO VIDEO ARTS (PTY) LTO
STORYLlNE TELEVISION [tm]
John Clement & Renee Gilbey, Partners
P.O. Box BR-40037
Gaborone, BOTSWANA
TEL (+267) 316 7336
EMAIL storvline@botsnet.bw
--- Original Message --
From: MPHINYAT
To: storyline@botsnet.bw
Sent: Wednesday, November 17, 2004 12:00 PM




-. .; ...::-'O'''. '-... -
I am Sethunya Mphinyane. a student studying the local production industry. I need to have a chat with you to
understand how local producers relate with the commissioning project that Btv is undertaking at the moment.
Some of the key issues we will need to chat about are: whether commissioning is likely to make a difference for
local producers; whether or not local producers are capable at present to produce high quality work; the
partnerships that you maybe engaged with more experienced outside producers; the challenged of the industry;
the future of production in Botswana, and many other related issues. Anytime during working hours this week
and next week will be good for me. Please make time for this at your earliest convenience.
Thank you.
Sethunya Tshepho Mphinyane
p.a. Box 1671 Mogoditshane,
Botswana. Tel 00267 72406951 (cell)
00267 3185315 (h)
26/11/2004
Page 1 of 1
MPHINYAT
From: Jafta Serero Userero@hotmail.com]
Sent: 17 November 2004 18:15
To: MPHINYAT
Subject: RE: Interview with local producers
Hello Sethunya,
I'm sorry I do not take any media interviews. The best person to talk to is Mr G. Eustice of REDSTO EFilm, he's also the President of Botswana Producer's Association. His e-mail address is
(george@redstonefilm.com)
...







Subject: Interview with local producers
Date: Wed 17 Nov 2004 11 :56:43 +0200
Hello to you,
• I am Sethunya Mphinyane, a student studying the local production
industry. I need to have a chat with you to understand how local
producers relate with the commissioning project that Btv is undertaking
at the moment. Some of the key issues we will need to chat about are:
whether commissioning is likely to make a difference' for local
producers; whether or not local producers are capable at present to
produce high quality work; the partnerships that you maybe engaged with
more experienced outside producers; the challenged of the industry; the
future of production in Botswana, and many other related issues. Anytime
during working hours this week and next week will be good for me. Please
make time for this at your earliest convenience.
Thank you,
Sethunya Tshepho Mphinyane
p.a. Box 1671 Mogoditshane,
Botswana. Tel 00267 72406951 (cell)
00267 3185315 (h)
email mphinyat@mopipi.ub.bw;sethunyamphinyane@hotmail.com
FREE pop-up blocking with the new MS Toolbar MS Toolbar Get it now!
26/11/2004
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MPHINYAT
From: mike proctor [procmike@hotmail.com]
Sent: 18 November 2004 10: 11
To: MPHINYAT
Subject: RE: InteNiew with local producers




>Subject: Interview with local producers






>1 am Sethunya Mphinyane, a student studying the local production
>industry. I need to have a chat with you to understand how local .
>producers relate with the commissioning project that Btv is undertaking
>at the moment. Some of the key issues we will need to chat about are:
>whether commissioning is likely to make a difference for local
>producers; whether or not local producers are capable at present to
>produce high quality work; the partIierships that you maybe engaged with
>more experienced outside producers; the challenged of the industry; the
>future of production in Botswana, and many other related issues. Anytime
>during working hours this week and next week will be good for me. Please






>P.O. Box 1671 Mogoditshane,
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Page 2 of2
small local film companies indeed, the big guys came, asked for information and help and next produced
the Discovery Network and other films. And indeed the South Africans. A good company like Red
Stone nearly folded which with all the hard and dedicated and Quite professional labour from George
Eustice was telling me that Camelthom had to brace itself for a tight. We have still a couple of other
projects, two Water films; one on awareness and conservation, hanging with DWA and Water Utilities,
just waiting for that one promise of 7 months old and now with the absurd low waterlevel in the
Gaborone Darn, becoming vast a hot issue and one with Geol. Surveys, Free University of Amsterdam
and others on the Past ofthe Kalahari Water.
Thanks again, I must provide a full update for our Trustees and call for a meeting, much is changing at








It's Sethunya at the Dept of Sociology. As you may be aware, I am doing my PhD on media and culture. The
recent commissioning exercise by Btv is of particUlar interest to me as perhaps the biggest milestone towards a
proper local film industry in Botswana. I learnt from George Eustice that his Redstone is working with Camel
Thorn Media for Development Trust that you are a member of on a drama Btv has awarded. I would therefore like
to have a chat with you, besides the fact that you are the one person who has chronicled the development of film
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t---~- Chebani, Clement [Clement.Chebani@debeersgroup.com]
. --
W""' - 17 November 2004 20: 18
MPHINYAT
1:. RE: Interview with local producers
,jeC .
ethunya
unfortunate that I won't be able to meet with you since I am engaged du
ring the requested weeks
edryhave v.ery much 1l+'Led to share my
opin~on with .you ~ut the timing is not right for me. .
lJ' \y 'be available from 28th November, which I believe IS not 900d for you. .'.
\ on
- . _
d may I recommend one of the best local Producer/Director, Shike Olsen
:









ro~o 17 November 200411:55
:e~Chebani, Clement; c1ement.chebani@debeeersgroup.com
OOb-ecto Interview with local producers;u J °
--"'-"'-"-
HellO to you,
sethunya Mphinyane, a student stu?ying the 10c~1 ~ro~uction.industry. I n
~ed to have a chat with you t
I a~erstand how local producers relate with the commissioning project that
Btv IS undertaking at the mom 0
un me of the key issues we will need to chat about are: whether commissioning
is likely to make a differenent.
s~al producers; whether or not local pro?ucers are ca~able at pre~ent to p
roduce high quality work; the Ce for
\0 rtnerships that you maybe engaged with more experrenced outSide pro
ducers; the challenged of the ind
pae
future of production in Botswana, and ma~y other r~lated issues..Anytime
during working hours this w ustry;
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Do you think you consider yourself to by now understand the individual personalities of
the ews and Current affairs desk?
You have said that you think it is unjustified for outsiders to doubt the editorial
independence ofBtv, why?
What difference do you think it would make for Btv to operate outside government?
Where do you see yourself going in Btv in terms of personal growth and professional
growth?
How do you think working for government media differs from working for private media,
if at all?
: .
What was been the most fulfilling moment of your stay at Btv?
Do you see yourself being with the station for the next two or more years?
Explain to me the coming of the Swedish to the station, for the newsroom in particular,
what will that entail? . .
Thank you.
Interview Questions for Montlenyane Baaitse
. .. . •
Interview Questions for Kesholofetse Phetlhu
Dear Ms Phetlhu,
My research at Btv is so far going on very well. In order to substitute my personal
observations, I would like you to answer a few questions below for me. You are at
liberty not to answer all or some of the questions. Except for the most senior staff, no
name will be attached to the information provided on any of the drafts or the final
product. I will very much appreciate your participation.
When and why did you join the media industry?
What portfolios have you served in dUfing the time?
How does your stay here compare to your time with RB I?
Where do you see yourself going in Btv in terms of personal growth and professional
growth?
What do you think are the major challenges facing Btv currently?
How do you think working for government media differs from working for private media,
if at all?
What do you think about Btv having the same editorial practices and editorial meetings
with BOPA and other government news agencies?
You have said to me that you think it is unjustified for outsiders to doubt the editorial
independence ofBtv, kindly explain to me why this is the case.
What difference do you think it would make for Btv to operate outside government?
What was been the most fulfilling moment of your stay at Btv?
Do you see yourself being with the station for the next two or more years?
Thank you for your time.
'. .,-.
Dear Monty,
My research at Btv is so far going on very well. In order to substitute my personal
observations, I would like you to answer a few questions below for me. You are at
liberty not to answer all or some of the questions. Some of the questions are based on
observations made on actions you took and statements you made. Except for the most
senior staff, the information provided will not be attached to any name on any of the
drafts or the [mal product. I will very much appreciate your participation.
When and why did you join the media industry?
What portfolios have you served in during the time?
When did you join Btv?
Why?
What positions have you served in at Btv?
How does your stay here compare to your time with RB 1?
How do you compare the news room of Radio Botswana to that ofBtv?
What do you think about Btv having the ame editorial practices and editorial meetings
with BOPA and other government news agencies?
Is reporting for television any different from reporting for radio?
What do you think are the major challenges facing Btv currently?
You have said that you think it is unjustified for outsiders to doubt the editorial
independence of Btv, why?
What difference do you think it would make for Btv to operate outside government, if at
all?
You are the second after Mosetsana as the assignment editor in the exercise to find who is
most suited for the job. What do you think about the exercise?
What are the challenges you are facing as an assignment editor?
You have expressed concern on the lack of trained manpower at Btv. In what ways do
you think this affects the output of Btv?
eC"-'1(V0 J ~'k10' ~)fO~Questions for Mr Seisa. Date:.................. }-:::J M 1~.DN~ ..rL
Part 1: Commissioning at Btv:
As part of my PhD process, I have to understand the role of Btv in the promotion of alocal content production industry in Botswana.
You were in charge of commissioning at Btv until early this year; explain to me thenature and scope of your work during your time as the commissioning editor?
Why was a commissioning section established by Btv, i.e. provide the history ofcommissioning by Btv and what prompted it. Kindly map out for me the initial missionand vision when commissioning was conceived.
What steps and activities were undertaken towards ensuring the success of -::commissioning during your time as the commissioning editor? Kindly provide anydocuments that can help me to better appreciate the commissioning process.
At some stage you contracted a South African company, Underdog Productions, to helpyou develop a commissioning strategy. Why, and what were the results?
Who did you consider as relevant stake-holders as you jumpstarted the project?What was the response of the stake-holders to your proposals?
What adjustment if any, have been made as the process unfolded?
What kind of budget has been allocated for this project?
How do you see commissioning contributing to the success ofBtv and the nation?
What are the major challenges facing the project of commissioning?
Where do you see the project in five years?
Part 2: Question for Mr Seisa as the current Head Production
From the position of Commissioning Editor, you became the Head of Production; myresearch also entails appreciating the production of local content by Btv. This makes itnecessary to as well interview you on issues relating to in house local content production.
What is the nature a11d s(;ope of your current position as Head of Production? Kindly mapout for me how the Production department of Btv is organized. How is it eonnected toother sections within the station?
How do you define local content at Btv? Do you have any guidelines or documents thatguide how you come to define content as local?
How many productions are you at the moment heading?
What are the benefits of producing in house?
What are the challenges of producing in house?
What are the key areas of concern regarding producing in house?
How is commissioning likely to affect in house production?
Production of local content in the Third World, which is expensive, is often feared to bethreatened by cheaper foreign content. How are you at Btv handling the dilemma betweencheap and easy access to foreign content and expensive but necessary local content?
What is the future of in house production in the face of commissioning? Are we likely tosee a reduction in in-house productions?




I would like an interview with the former Director ofDIB, Mr Ted Makgekgenene. Doyou have any idea how I can get in touch with him?
Republic of Botswana
Ministry of Communications Science and Technology
Private Bag 00414, Gaborone, Botswana, Tel: (+267) 3907230 Fax: (+267) 3907236
,
Ref: CST 16/9 I (17)
Ms Sethunya Tshepho Mphinyane




~ ......- .. .4
09 October 2003
RE: APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH PERMIT
Your application to carry out research in Botswana from October 2003 - December
2005 under the title "State control, nation-building and commercialisation as
determinants of Botswana Television" is hereby approved.
YOll are reminded that copies of your research report must be deposited with the
organisations listed in Annexure 1 as well as Ministry of Communications, Science and






This Ministry supports the Vision 2016 in terms of creating "an
educated and informed nation", "a prosperous, productive and
innovative nation" and "an open, democratic and accountable
nation"
•
Coverage by foreign television stations in Botswana (Studio Hamburg Report)
l' L.....
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In Table 18 on page 21 above, town residents (62.2%) are more likely to have at least one
radio set at home than in Cry (56.5%); Urban Village (60.4%) and Village (52.4). However,
those who live.mthe Gry are more likely than either Village or Town dwellers to own more
than one radio sets.
.....
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In Table 19 above we observe, on the other hand, that Gry dwellers are more likely to own
television sets than either Urban Village or Village dwellers. In fact Gry (12.6%) and Town
(10.8%) dwellers are more likely to own two television sets than both Urban Villages (10.5%)
and Villages (3.3%). In' terms of video machine ownership, more Village (89%) than Cry
and Town dwellers do not have video machines at home.
On the other hand, more Cry (45.8%) than Town or Villages dwellers have at least one
video machine. And with respect to car radio ownership, regardless of the number of sets,
Grydwellers are more likely than either Town or Village dwellers to have car radios.
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Ensure that stories, news items and programmes offer viewers,
listeners and readers an intelligent and informed account of issues
that enables them to form their own views.
Forbid our editorial staff from accepting gifts, favours, special
treatment or privileges which may compromise their professional
integrity.
Ensure that during political and election broadcasts the publiG is
fully informed about the policies and programmes of ,?II political
players.
Be responsible for all editorial decisions and directions and resist
any form of external influence.
Ensure that news or programmes do not c~ntain hate sperc
expressions likely to incite, hatred and conflict. J
Not broadcast or publish material which is likely to in~it
perpetuate hatred against or gratuitously .II.i1i~ any?erso.n or sectr~
of community on account of race, ethniCity, nationality, g ~;.
sexual preference, age, disability, religion or culture. __I
• Avoid any conflict of interest during their duties be it p
commercial or otherwise.
~eek balance through the presentation of all sides to a controversy
and ?t the same time recognizing that this may not always be
possible in a single' programme .or news bulletin, but should be I




Respect the right of listeners', viewers and readers to hear and
read a variety of views by not suppressing or distorting facts through
wrong or improper emphasis.
Base programmes on fairness, openness and straight dealing.
Contributors'will be treated honestly and with respect. From the
start, programme producers will be as clear as they can about the
nattlre of the. programme and its purpose. They will be open abo
their plans and honest with everyone taking part in a programme.
Report and present news, current affairs and programmes honestly
by disclosing all essential facts.
Provide Batswana with quality ooverage and analysis of events
taking place in their country, the SADC region, Afdca and the world
without fear or favour. '
Afl.'e .... t.!, ::,-
These procedures are for all employees of the Department of Broadcasting Services and Department of Information ~ervic~s who
deal with news, current affairs and programmes - journalists, broadcasters, camera persons, photographers, graphiC designers,
marketing officers, DJs and all freelancers falling within these categories. All concerned are expected to' strictly abide by thes,e
procedures.
As employees of the Department of Broadcasting Services and Department of Information Services we recognize the fact that sta~e
media organs - Botswana Television, Radio Botswana, Daily New~, Kutlwano and Botswana Press Agency - are funded by the pUbll~
and therefore exist to serve the pUblic. We also believe that to effectively serve the public we need editorial independence back d
a high degree of responsibility and accountability. This calls for ~he adoption of editorial guidelines and co~es of ethics.
To uphold principles of editorial independence and the right of the pUblic to know, state media employees Will;
Provide leadership in broadcasting and print media in Botswana Ensure that news will not contain 9bscene language or grau~
through quality news, current affairs and programming free of sexual exposure. ~
political, commercial' or any other interference.
Present editorial decisions on news merit by investing on the
editorial staff the authority for all editorial decisions and directions
without any external influence.
Recognize.thaftairness does not mean being unquestioning, or
that every side .of an issue should receive the same amount of
time.
Ensure that compiling reports, our editorial staff check their facts
and editors take proper care not to pUblish or broadcast inaccurate
material.
Ensure that content of news and programmes is accurate and in
context, impartial and balanced.
Uphold the journalistic principle 'of the protection of sources.
• Take care in the presentation of brutality, violence, atrocities ~nd
personal grief.
Respect a person's legitimate right to privacy .and not intrude into
private grief and distress, unless it is justified by overriding
considerations of public interest. Reporting of a person's private
life will only be justified when in the public interest and this includes
detecting or exposing criminal conduct, detecting or exposing
seriously anti-social behaviour, protecting public health and safety,
and preventing the public from being misled where such a person
is doing something in private which he/she is publicly condemning.
Not allow advertising, commercial, political or personal
considerations to influence edit<;lrial decisions and directions.
Not take any editorial position in reporting and programming.
• Be insensitive in reporting HIVlAIDS related issues and dealing
with victims of disasters such as f1dods, veldt fires, earthquakes,
bombings, etc.
Ensure that interviews are well informed. prepared for and may
be searching, sharp, skeptical but not partial, discourteous or
showing an attachment to one side of an argument.
Ensure that no programm~ should be planned; commissioned or
broadcast for commercial purposes, except insofar as programming
over!311 may attract appropriate advertising
Ensure that programmes are made solely for audiences and
listeners .and no programme should be aimed at attracting
advertising revenue from a particular advertiser, company or
individual. \
. Ensure that in phone-in programmes the presenter ,or moderator
takes special care to maintain fairness, impartiality and balance
and .allow a wide range of views to be broadcast.
Recognize religious sensitivities, and ensure that offence is not
caused unwittingly by needles use of profane language. Factual
programmes may question some aspect of a religion but comedy
and entertainment programmes should avoid poking fun at religion,
causing real distress and offence.
• S.how sensitivity in reporting stories and issues involving children,
disadvantaged communities and women.
Not broadcast or publish material 'WhiCh is likRlv In in"ito ",-J
Give prompt replies to complaints even if initially it is simply an









• Double-check key fact~:
• Attribute or document all facts.
• Ensure that all the factual statements in your story or
programme reflect the truth.
• Ensure that you have a high level of confidence about facts
in your story or programme and sources that provide them.
To enhance the quality of stories and programmes journalists should always research to get the necessary and
relevant background. The Mass Media Complex has a rich reference library which is available to journalists seven
days a week. Newspaper cuttings and bound newspapers are a rich resource for research. Another research institution
is the Botswana National Archives. There are also private libraries for institutions and schools. ~ ..
The Botswana Press Agency Stylebook provides guidelines on how to practice ethical journalism. It advises ~.~
"Botswana journalists have a responsibility to practice ethical journalism. The three tenets of journalism: accuracy,
balance and fairness, should be a'dhered to in each story published or broadcast. No journalist has the ri~~
publish anything that is not accurate, balanced or fair. Instead, they have the obligation to balance truth-telJ~
remain independent and minimize harm. Ethical journalism can be learned, just as writing and reporting skil)s
learned. It relies on' individual responsibility, accountability and truth-telling." ~
• Present quotes in your story fairly and in context.
• Do not quote anonymous sources unless you are prepared
to defend them publicly.
• Do not use objectionable language or pictures in your story.
• Present your news story, current affairs and any programme
honestly by disclosing all essential facts.
• Treat contributors to your programme on fairness, openness
and straight dealing.
• Treat contributors to your programme honestly and with
respect.
• Be clear about the nature'of your programme and its purpose
right from the beginning and be honest with everyone taking
part in the programme.
• Balance your story or programme by presenting all sides to a
controversy.
• Confirm and verify all possibly defamatory material.
• Uphold the journalistic principle of the protection of sources.
• Do not try to sneak in defamatory material by suggestion with
words such as allegedly or reported.
• Respect a person's legitimate right to privacy by not intruding
into private. 9'rief and distress, unless th'ere is an overriding
considerati?n of public interest. •
.
• Do not allow advertising, commercial, political or personal
interests or :considerations to influence your story or
programme,
• Do not colour your story with opinions.
• Be careful of statements made by police or court officials
outside court.
• Be careful of arrest reports. damage suits and criminal court
hearings.
• Be sensitive in reporting HIV/AIDS related issues and in
dealing with victims of disasters.
• Double-check everything that can be double checked.
• Be sensitive when reporting stories and issues involving
children, disadvantaged communities and women.
• Never falsely identify yourself to gain access to persons or
places and then write stories on the experience. '
• Ensure that your story or programme reflects the culturpl
diversity of Botswana and avoid stereotyping.
• Do not include obscene language or gratuitous sexual
exposure in your footage or story.
• Keep biases and opinions out of the news stories.
• Do not engage' in shameful reporting methods. Hidden tape
recorders. extorting informatioQ. or paying for information are
repugnant practices.
• Ensure your story or programme does not contain hate speech
or expressions likely to incite hatred and conflict.
• Avoid conflict of interest be it political, commercial or otherwise.
• Exercise caution in set-up photographs or pictures.
• Ensure that your captions do not suggest something that the
picture is not.
• Do not accept gifts, favours, special treatment, lifts or privileges
that might comprise your professional integrity.
• Do not change or alter photographs or pictures in any way
other than cropping to mislead readers or viewers.
• Do not accept money to do a story or programme.
• Ensure your photographs or pictures are accurate
f I representations of the situations they portray.
• Always prepare for interviews by researching 't~ ensure that, . • When in doubt do not broadcast or publish.
Original sketch programme schedule159






Government's campaings to tell its side of the story on t
he
Relocation of Basarwa have been long, and more often than
not,set back by statements made by Survival International
.
However, they continue to explore avenues in which they c
an
win this campaign. In 2002 they launched a Website mainly
set to address the issues of the relocation and to
counteract statements by Survival International.
Government's efforts are beginning to bear fruit.
Clip- Maribe
In the latest of their approach to this problem, they ._
recently took a group of Journalists and Members of Non
Governmental Organisations to both the old and new
settlements. Observations made by the Journalists and the
Civil Society could make a difference to the Campaigns.
Clip- VOX
The reality on the ground has seen many change their stan
ce
on the matter, including the head of NGO's.
Clip- ~oletsane
Government does not undermine the impact of statements ma
de
by Survival International , especially that they link the
-
relocation to the Backbone of Botswana's economy, diamonds
.
Clip- Maribe
As the campaign continues, perhaps with support from NGO
's
and all those who tell the truth the way it is, this issu
e
will finally fade off, and let Basarwa enjoy the services








National Television Advert (Mmegi/ The Reporter 15-21 May 1998 Vol.15 No.
9, pp B/14 Courtesy Of the Botswana Press Agency Library)
Republic of Botswana
Department of Information and Broadcasting
National Television Service'
Applications are invited from suitably academically qualified Citizens of
Botswana - Diploma level and above - for training positions (regard-
less of age or experience) with impending National Television Service.
Although it could be useful in some areas. previous working expertence
is not essential, but the candidates most likely to succeed will exhibit a
high degree of self-motivation. plus a strong Interest and aptitude for
working in television: coupled with a desire and willingness to learn -
and to keep on learningl
Application forms can be obtained from the Information Office in
Gaborone and the follOWing District Information Offices - Molepolole/
Kanye/ Tsabong/ Ghanzi/ Maun/ Serowe/ Kasane/ Francistown/
Hukuntsi.
Completed forms. accompanied by a brief handwritten leter and a
succinct CV. must be returned to The Director. Ref. 'IV 002. Department
of Information and Broadcasting. Private Bag 0060. Gaborone.
Botswana NO LATER than Friday 29th May. 1998. l
NB Since we are anticipating a substantial response we shall be con-
tacting QI!J.y success1U1 potential candidates. Therefore. regretfully. if
you have not heard from us within 21 days of the closing date you mtl~t
consider your application to have been unsuccessful.
This covers the following:




• All mandatory text books, course notes and supporting course
materials· ,'v
Accommodation charges
















• Students may wish to purchase additional study materials at their discretion
and cost. The Sony Training centre may be able to negotiate discounted
prices on the students' behalf.
2 On-site pre on-air training and rehearsals
Six days pre on-air training and rehearsal - £6j OOO






At list rate of £700 per day plus expenses.
4 Specialist technical engineering training
Price and content to be negotiated separately and dependent on the mix of
equipment type and manufacture used in the installation, It is expected that
this training will be delivered on-site and may be in conjunction with the pre-on
air training in which case a substantial discount to list prices will be applied.
Invoices will be raised in Sterling or Euro as appropriate and will be payable
within 30 days of the invoice date. Late settlement will attract an additional
administration fee of 2.5% of invoice total.
SONY Broadcast & Professional Europe
The Training Proposal Pricing
.'....
This includes accommodation and transport in the UK for phase 2 and also flights






5 weeks Basingstoke based training
£8225 per student,
•
On-site pre on-air training and expenses
..
£3500 + subsistence
Prices valid until 31 st July 1998
Additional Consultancy
£700 per day + expenses
Invoicing
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ROB GRAY VISUAL ARTS AND MEDIA









I feel it my responsibility to report my observations regarding the Botswana Television Training Project. If .
one looks at the enormity of the project as a whole, it is confusing to say the least , at how little emphasis
,or so it seems, is placed on the success of this programme. Any training programme of worth relies on
adequate teaching aids as well as the people and facilities relating to the programme. I would like to point
out three areas that need attention.
a) The facilities contract with SABC.
b) The teaching aids and secretarial staff on band.
c) Recruitment and Evaluation.
a) I have little Imowledge of the exact deal that was done "ith the SABC regarding the hire of BOP-TV
television facilities. What 1do know however is that I was consulted from time to time regarding
requirements and methods for training television personnel. In fact it was me that suggested to David
Millard that he contact BOP studios as a possible training venue. Jmust note that I was not under
contract at this stage and my advise was given free, with imminent contracts dangled as a carrot. It
appears that either the SABC is not meeting it's contractual obligations or the facilities were hired on a
" you make do with what you get" basis. If the former, the origin of the problem is clear. Negotiations
leading up to November 23,1998, with the SABC, were conducted by persons with little or no
understanding of training needs and related logistics within the television environment To date, other
than the studio, the rest of the facility ( cameras and editing suites) crucial to the successful
implementation of the course, have not been functional. There is almost an air of « It's just another
third world COWltry, they will accept whatever comes their way". The first month of training was also
hindered by SABCIBOP TV internal politics. This caused difficulty in commtmicating with the BOP-
TV staff, contracted by Botswana Training Project, together with the facilities. This caused frustration
amongst the delegates from Botswana and the contracted lecturing staff.
I must add that for someone of my experience and the responsibility designated to me by your
government, I find it strange that I was not included in any type of decision making in terms of facility
acquisition.
b) I realize that saving money is important, but if one looks at the overall budget and expenditure, the cost
of a few computers, a data projector and an administrative secretary as, discussed and requested
months before, is comparatively low. The lack of these has somewhat minimized the potentialleaming
possibilities and generally slowed the process. There have also been complaints about the facilities
supplied for news training. The scary thing is, that apparently news was an after-thought as far as
training is concerned.
c) Recruitment and evaluation has been some\vhat of a hit and miss affair. Your consultants instructed a
policy of multi-skills training. This has caused untold confusion amongst delegates and tutors. When
questioned on the training approach, the ball is conveniently thrown back into our court. It seems that
no proper research or planning took place. I am trying to rectify this problem by creating actual job
functions for students within the training process. I hope to achieve this by running a five hour a day
I .>
broadcast from the BOP-TV studios. I reiterate that at the time of writing the necessary facilities are
still not available. Also, why is there a double evaluation process for recruitment? The students are
interviewed and selected on merit. They are then put on an "evaluation course" and then sent to me for
further evaluation, under the impression that the job they will eventually do is their choice. The way it
should be done is by categorizing the broadcast job functions and selecting prospective employees
according to their respective aptitudes. The broad categories are Production, Opemtions and
Engineering. It seems ludicrous that someone taken on a an engineer is given the choice to be a
director. Also worth noting is that the introduction course run at the Botswana University does not
meet broadcast criteria. A simple quiz has proved my point
I have the success of this project and my professional reputation at heart. If this letter gives the
impression that I am protecting myself, then I have succeeded in my communications. I believe in
prevention rather than cure. I would ask you please not to discuss this matter until I am granted an
interview with your goodselves.
Yours Sincerely
Robert P.C. Gray
ROB GRAY VISUAL ARTS AND MEDIA















6. Training in Hotel
7. Secretary for January
8. Information regarding new equipment
9. Invoices (Rob, Martin)
Rob Gray
'.
Once again, Hunt kept out of important proceedings, Hunt only appeared at his
convemence.
2
35nun Camera plus stock
See letter to Richard Makgotlbo
Student plac~ents for January 1999
To date the students have grasped the essential fundamentals of broadcast television. Through
consultation and evaluation the foilowing aiiocations have been effected. These selections are n01










































The students experiencing career problems are the engineering students, Doreen and Evelyn. The
engineering students need hands on experience. I believe that there are negotiation underway, Let me know
if I can be of any help.
Summary
The lack of facilities have caused a lot of anxiety amongst students. lbis reflects an lmfair
attitudes towards the intentions, capabilities and endeavours of Botswana management and
lecLUnng slall'. Also, lbe amounl 01' choire lbe sludenls an~ aiiowt:d is making somewhat of II
mockery of the intended broadcast infraslructure. The student should be told thllt placements
wrong or right, ",ill be made as follows: News and Production immediately after the assessment
tiour~~ ~J. Bt}t~...v;.ma. Th.~ r~~~ :.;ucn u:.; cam~r..1mt:n, ~uunu editing and olht:r opt:ralionul 'lrt.z:i "",ill
be placed by myself and staff in BOP, Those chosen as News and production will still be given
the induction course with the rest at BOP-TV. These placements can be changed if warran ted and
at he &.:cretinn of the Training ..Jfananement Tf'.am, Treque.<.:t that management i~su" ~mne ~nrt of
directive to this effect Two last points. I cannot emphasize enough how important it is for Richard
to sort out the facilities by the end of December 1998. Another trainer is required to help cope
\\-ith the uNG work load. I have already investigated this in the light ofmy meeting with Mrs.
M.l Sayed
ROB GRAY VISUAL ARTS AND MEDIA
TBding as Dill: nn~l() L I A(;4f)t:M~
'.
BOT 1 Television Training
Dummy Broadcast
Further to discYlSsions ~th Botswana Television Project Management, it has become a matter of urgency to
n.m Dtlmmy Jiiroadcasts"as a fast track training method. I have been intOnDed that"ail delegates are on
probati~ with Dill and that final allocations will be-made on metit. The responsibilities assigned below
serve as a departure point for the Dummy Broadcast exercise, and have.been made after du~.considemtion"




















Morning Show Producer I Director
Amelia
Leroto












Email on BTV 'rankings' t:
From: kgopisi Sylvia [kgopisisylvia@yahoo.co.uk] N.B. The researcher requested
a copy from one of the journalists
Sent: Wednesday, December 31,2003 11 :38AM
To: news@BTV.gov.bw
Cc: sphetlhu@BTV.gov.bw
Subject: HOW YOUR REPORTERS RATE
END OF YEAR RATINGS- UP TO 10 MARKS
1. SYLVESTER
He is a man of good ideas and has outsta,nding grasp of both the international
and local issues. But he should work on improving his communication skills 7
2. KAGISO
Has not yet shown his true reporting colours though he seems to~posses some of
the admirable ingredients of a good journalist. He should work on his shyness to
gain full confidence of himself. But he looks better on the screen 7
3. KEFILWE
Has demonstrated passion and skill in her career. With little or more
improvement she can make it to the top. She is not a pushover on many issues 8
4. L1NET
She is naturally intelligible [intelligent] but her talents seem to lie somewhere
outside this profession. I think a special desk should be created to cater for her
abilities 6
5. DITLHOKWA
He seems to be a bit shy though he remains one of the most analytical and
passionate reporters. He also possesses leadership skills 8
6. CHRIS
Chris is intelligible [intelligent] and hardworking.....possesses all the qualities of a
good journalist though he can be nusty [nasty] at times. His strengt~ lies in his
. .
ability to express himself in the Queen's language 8
7. JANET
. I •
She is an energetic reporter who likes her job as well as exposure. But .s.hbUI(l •
work on her temper and public relations skills 7
. ~
8. JOHN
This man should understand the difference between the public and private
media. He is a typical journalist but suited in a private set up. He is fearless,
trouble seeking and manipulative reporter 6.
9. MOROKE
Is a talented, energetic and passionate reporter though he is a bit pompous. He
should learn to appreciate other people's abilities and strengths. But he is one of
the most articulate and conversant individuals 8
10. LENTSWE
Should work on attaining full confidence of himself. He is an improved presenter
with seemingly sound leadership skills 8
11. BEAUTY
A well behaved individual who isn't experimentative. He [she] can do better in
the field of marketing and public relations 8
12. JULlUS
Appears to be a bit riskful and trouble-seeking though he remains an ordinary
and down-to-earth individual. 7
13. ZIMONA




Every person has a meeting place, whether it's a town square, an
acropolis, a kgotla, a parliament or around the fire. Sedibeng is one such
meeting place. Literally translated, Sedibeng means "at the welL" You see
the well provides precious water. It's where people meet to not only draw
water, but to exchange stories, greetings, ideas etc. Therefore our
magazine programme Sedibeng taps on this theme to showcase diverse
.'4 ... experiences by Batswana from all walks of live. It has featured Botswana's
heroes and heroines from the 1999 Miss UAiverse Mpule Kwelagobe to ._.
the first woman High Court Judge Unity Dow and some of the artists and
unsung heroes of the past. It also showcases some of the interesting
places in Botswana. The programme Sedibeng, aims at giving a family
audience a change of pace and lighter mood following Setswana News
bulletins. Sedibeng format includes short films, primarily profiles of
individuals and other light features on a variety of subjects. It also features




Mantlwaneng is a local magazine program for children. Its target audience
is Pre School to primary school children. Mantlwaneng in Setswana
means "children's play ground". It is a forum that nurtures future leaders,
in line with national traditional values as epitomized by Setswana proverb
"mmangwana [mmamotse] 0 bonwa Mantlwaneng", meaning a mother can
be identified at Mantlwaneng. At Mantlwaneng children imitate the roles of
elderly people and family life with the view to making them responsible. .
future leaders. Mantlwaneng's format reflects the ideals that -are reflected
in daily: Kids star: this segment showcases talented Batswana children
around the country. These talents vary, and include music, dance, sports,
entrepreneur skills etc. Demonstration: In this segment, children are
taught on how to make various things using materials that are available at
home, including trash, as well as teaching children how to keep their
surroundings clean and organized. For instance, making desk tidy by
creating containers such as moneyboxes from plastic bottles. How things
are made: school holidays are usually school trips for most children.'They
tour various factories to see how various items are made.
Hence in this segment, we feature a field video in which we show
production processes of certain goods and services. The segment is
informative and educational. Fun segment: In this segment we showcase
games, events etc. Give away: Mantlwaneng is an interactive programme
that allows kids at home to write letters, on any subject of their choice.
Children, who have written outstanding letters, win themselves prizes such
as books, scratch pad or are invited to the studio.
Synopses of Matlhoaphage
(http://www.BTV.gov.bw/locaLprogrammes_matlho_a_phage.html)
This is a programme that features political debate between Botswana's
political parties in order to grant them the opportunity to air their respective
political philosophies without clouding news and other regular BTV
programmes. The programme brings along the ruling party together with
opposition parties and topics are selected with the intention to seek
political accountabilay'ffOm th~ ruliQg party whilst at the same time giving
. .. ~..~ .
.... oppositil;m parties the ~opportunity to sell their political programmes. Ever. ....
since the launching of BTV it has become evident that politicians
recognise the power of the audio-visual medium as more and more of
them demanded increased air time to communicate their philosophies to
their electorate and constituents. Inevitably, more air time was demanded
by politicians in the news and other BTV programmes. In order to avoid
the politicisation of the news and regular programming of BTV,
management deemed it appropriate to introduce an exclusive programme
that will give the politicians the platform or forum to air their political
philosophies exclusively without interfering with the rest of BTV
programming and editorial content. Matlhoaphage is a political match
between the ruling parties and opposition parties and its main target or
audience, are viewers of all ages who are interested in party politics. It
exposes Botswana's politicians and their party manifestos, enhances
political awareness, will possibly reduce voter apathy and redirects the
energies from seeking more air time on BTY programmes intended for
other purposes. The programme is based on the philosophy by
Management that the Public Service Media can never win a battle for the
limelight once politicians engage in a concerted fight for greater exposure.
The limelight is the politician's lifeline. Matlhoaphage is thus an
appeasement programme for the politicians, an informative forum for the
electorate and a special forum for entertaining heated political exchanges
among party politicians. It is a reflection of the political complexion of






Synopses of The Eye
(http://www.STV.gov.bw/locaLprogrammes_the_eye.html)
The Eye is STV's flagship current affairs show that goes behind the news
headlines to give you an in-depth perspective to major local and
sometimes regional issues. The maxim is what is the real picture and how
does it affect people.The programme is broadcast every Tuesday evening
from 8.00 - 8.45pm. We also feature studio discussions with top
newsmakers and people affected by stories we cover. Our weekly
newspaper review has proved a hit with our audience.
•
Synopses of What's the score?
(http://www.BTV.gov.bw/locaLprogrammes_whats_the_score.html)
This is a cool show which came out of an original idea to feature weekend
events on the Friday edition on Sedibeng. When Sedibeng was scaled
down from five days to two, we realized we were not Govering the
weekend sports and entertainment scene. So the pr9ducer, Sam
Ngwenya approached the then Channel Controller Oshinka Tsiang with
the idea and the rest as the cliche goes, is history. What's The Score?
features weekend sports previews; reviews, news and. gossip. On the
. - .
showbiz side the emphasis is on the weekend gig guide around the
country, major entertainment social events as well as entertainment news.
If BTV has ever been confident about the future of a show, What's The
Score is it. So keep watching this space because it's going to get cooler.




We have an obligation to expose the best of Botswana's music talent.
Mokaragana (fun) is where we keep this promise. It is an interactive studio
base programme with audience and record groups as they perform. We
also interview the performers to find out what challenges they meet in their
careers and hopefully enable budding musicians to learn from them. The
programme is broadcast on Saturday's 0715 hrs. •
Synopses of Flavourdome
(http://www.BTV.gov.bw/locaLprogrammes_fJavourdome.html)
Flavourdome is an international music show with on location links. The
vivacious Sithandwa Mmopi has hosted the show since it started. She
conducts interviews with local and sometimes international entertainment
personalities to add more value to the show. The show is broadcast every
Friday after the seven o'clock news. Regular features include: WHO IS.
DAY - which allows viewers to write in and wish friends happy birthday
and anniversaries if it falls on a Friday. FAME SPOT - is a celebrity c'orner'




The programme that gets you talking goes on air each Monday and
Thursday night at 8.30. Mmualebe is a 3D-minute studio-based discussion
that gets people to discuss mainly social issues affecting Batswana. This
show thrives on a clash of opinions over pertinent social issues.
Mmualebe is a concept that lies at the core of Botswana's social behavior.
It encapsulates the concept of democracy, which the country is renowned
for. Tl'le word literally means you are entitled to voice your opinion even if
it's w~ong. With this programme BTV seeks to spread social debates as
widely as possible. We believe that only through the contest of views and
opinions can socially harmony emerge. Plans are underway to transform
the look of the show to make it more interactive and exciting.
Synopses for Sports Hive
http://www.BTV.gov.bw/locaLprogrammes_sports_hive.html
Sports Hive is a weekly programme that brings to you sports highlights,previews, reviews as well as discussions of various sport issues -complex, controversial and otherwise. It is an educational and entertaining
I
'programme for both the light and serious minded sports followers. Sports
#
.Hive updates you on the most recent developments and we strive to go
"
beyond the headlines and bring you quality programmes. sports Hivepositions itself in the mainstream of sport development and we unearthindigenous efforts to take sport to a great height. We show you both youngand old talent through features and profiles. For much more watch yourpremier sports programme Sports Hive every Wednesday at 2030 hours.
\
Synopses for Tshamekang(http://www.btv.gov.bw/loca.-programmes_tshamekang.html)
At BTV we believe that without sports we are dead. Tshamekang takes on
this challenge. It is the premier weekend, afternoon sports programme.
Featuring both live and recorded sports events with studio discussions
and live links broadcast from 1400 hrs to 1900hrs, Saturday and Sunday.
We talk to leading sports personalities to help analyze sports issues and
events. Ninety per cent local content is our ultimate aim balanced with an
offering of top international sporting events. Our current menu includes the
Botswana Premier league football, volleyball and boxing. Our foreign
content features the English Premier league, NBA and sports magazine
programmes such as Gillette World Sport Special and Football Feva. The
name Tshamekang is deliberately coined to instill and promote a sense of
participation in sports. Thanks to the Producer Ray Tsheko and a host of
talented young men and women who man our outside broadcast facility,
Tshamekang has not missed a day. on the air since the station was
launched. There are great days ahead for this show. So come on sports
fans play ball.
\
PPADB approved payments for foreign programmes - 2005 (Courtersy
of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB),
http://www.ppadb.co.bw)
Tender No: TB: 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: DBS Request for
Iauthority to purchase television progr~ms from Sports Brand Media Group
@ USD31 460.00 and Upton International Sports and International @
USD77 475.00 for a period of one (1) year. Bid Award Decision:
Approved. Submission Date: 27.01.2005
" •
•
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Departmen.t.of-Information
Services' request to purchase Childern's television' programmes from the
•list of approved list of TV producers as follows:Kohinoor Promotions @ USD50 830.00Fairmead Consultancy @USD105 865.00Transworld Television Corporation @ USD115 750.00Berjaya Distribution @ USD33 637.00Daro Film Distribution @USD79 200.00Sandon Associates @ USD8 400.00Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date:06.06.06.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Service's request to purchase the next three episodes of
"Political Assassination" from Seed Entertainment @ USD1 800.00. Bid
Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 29.09.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Service's request to purchase the next series of the District
(SR 2) and Sesame Street (SR 36) from Transworld Television @ USD11
\
000.00 and USD13 000.00 respectively. Bid Award Decision: Approved.
Submission Date 29.09.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Service's request to purchase the two television Talk ShowsI
namely, Oprah Winfrey and Or. Phil from Berjaya Distribution @ USD74
750.00 and USD149 500.00 respectively. Bid Award Decision: Approved.
Submission Date: 29.09.2005
.
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of~ ~ .. ,
Broadcasting Service's request to purchase the next 260 episodes of "The
Bold and the Beautiful" from Ensemble Trading @ USD78 000.00. Bid
Award Decision~ Approved. Submission Date: 29.09.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Service's request to purchase the next series of FBI Files •
(30), Friends (73), Smallville(22) and Fame LA from Berjaya Distribution
all @ USD58 477.50.Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date:
29.09.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase Children's Programmes as
follows:
5 from Richard Stewart Enterprises at US$51, 200.00
7 from Fairmead Consultancy at US$60, 425.006 from VGI Entertainment at US$32, 000.005 from Berjaya Distribution at US$58, 075.002 from Daro Film Distribution at US$7, 425.002 from Ensemble Trading Company at US$14, 170.00
1 from Kohninoor Promotions at US$299.00Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 04.11.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase TV Documentaries from the
following companies:
7 from Daro Film Distribution @ USD 34 965.005 from Film Resource Unit @ USD 2 400.003 from Fairmead Consultancy @ USD 34 100.001 from VGI Entertainment @ USD500.00Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 04.11.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/1 0/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase one TV Music Programme
from Richard Stewart Enterprises @ USD 26 700.00. 2 from Daro Film
1Distribution @ USD800.00. Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission
Date: 04.11.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase TV programmes in the
category of Sports:
4 from Upton !nternational at US$72, 025.00;4 from Sports Brand Media Group at US$77, 610.00
1 program from Kohinoor Promotions at US$14, 300.00.
Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 04.11.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase TV Filler Programmes from
the following companies: 5 from VGI Entertainment at US$6, 960.00 and
from Richard Stewart Enterprises @ USD3 120.00.Bid Award Decision:
Approved. Submission Date: 04.11.2005
\
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase from Movies and mini series
the following companies:87 from Berjaya Distribution @ USD 78 300.003 from Daro Film Distribution @ USD 7 700.002 from VGI Entertainment @ USD 3 200.001 from VGI Entertainment @ USD 500 00.00Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 04.11.2005
.
.; ~.... ..
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request to purchase five TV Drama Programmes
,
in the category of Social, documentary and action dramas for the 21 :20
hours slot; science fiction for the 19:20 hours slot; family drama for the
)
19:20 hours slot and youth series for the 17:30 hours slot from Daro Film
Distribution @ $70,400.00. Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission
Date: 04.11.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request for a waiver to renew the programs
supplied by Berjaya Distribution as follows:Comedies-Moesha, Jamie Foxx, Steve HarveyDramas-Strong Medicine and West WingBid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 21.10.2005
Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001-2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Services' request for authority to renew the following
Television Programmes:
BBC World from BBC World Distribution LimitedAmerican Chart Show from JCA TVVibes and Rewind from World Wide EntertainmentWorld Wide Entertainment (Wrestling)
\
· .....
Bid Award Decision: Approved. Submission Date: 22.12.2006
PPADB approved payments for local canned programmesFigure x: Tender No: TB 2/5/10/2001·2002: Tender Title: Department of
Broadcasting Service's request to purchase unsolicited television
programmes from independent producers, Bid Award Decision: Approved.
Submission Date: 24.06.2005
Name of Programme Original Negotiated
Price PriceAV Communications- P222 P126225.00
Portrait of a Leader 750.00Leading
Edge P295 P90000.00
Technologies - Legends 515.00of Democracy
TM Pictures - P174 P114400.00
Crossroads of Healing 025.50Rano's Pictures - P180 P36000.00National Eisteddfod 000.00
Figure X: Tender No: TB 21511012001·2002: Tender Title: Department
of Broadcastings' request to unsolicited television programmes, Bid















Selelo Sa Malema BWP10 000.00
Ditiragalo Media
Molenza




Botswana Life - Choral BWP180000.00

































Blocks Technology Group Fish Keitseng
BWP42 000.00











Botswana TV BuildingSeboni DriveGABORONE
Botswana
• ....... f:: ,_4. ~ ....
5. TITLE/S OF PROGRAMMESLICENSED:
6. MAXIMUM NUMBER OFRUNS:7. LICENCE FEE:
8. LICENCE PERIOD:
9. PAYMENT TERMS:
10. LICENSED RIGHTS &TERRITORY:
FORWARDINGINSTRUCTIONS:
REMAINING TFRMS ANDCONDmONS OF CONTRACT:
2 (two).
1. USD ....per episodeOne thousand US Dollarsfee shall be net of any and all taxes and bank charges.2 years commencing 1 January 2004 until 31 December 2(
Total licence fee payable to:Bank:
Account Name:
Non-exclusive free terrestrial television rights for BotswaniMasters to be supplied on loan for a period of 60 days, by Licensor an
couriered at Licensee's cost.
This Agreement shall be subject to the terms and conditio






















no :.. .;.. ..




Billy Kokorwe and Ken
Barlow Pictures
Puni MapiniI~ 3902720.l.a1gg711i ...Mraining@it.bw
BillyKokorwe ~~?4-0b'1l'ld-b2:>I<+74-
no
Basement Media David Moepeng









Phil McCowen (Freelancer) 72250052
phil mccowen@valioo.com




















Botswana Film, Video, Television Producers
































Red Stone George Eustice
Creative liquid Shike Olsen
AV Communications Golden Bafana
Tsa Motshikinyego Eunice Wadikonyana
Pictures
Africa in Motion Prods. Bibi lethola
Boma Prods. Maungo Mooki
Soul Power Mike Proctor
~2-~ Matinee Media Pascar Proctor
Counter Attack Dwyan Alford
Counter Attack Clement Chebani
Camel Thorn Media Emst Engels 3938537172108511 engels@into
.bw
4tl () a~ do"" I- ~-e-..;) rtve'J v(l ht"'>~~~~, lA c.G-O 5""" )e.S ,"E,o Flame Power T uso itslle 3939740/71221155 thuso@meqa.bw-
Sequence Jafta Serero 3626300/72247149 jserero@hotmail
.com
Spectrum Multimedia O. Letsididi 39226,79/71610217 projahcob@yahoo.co
m
Feni Gasenelwe (Freelancer) 71891788
Ndipo Mokoka (Freelancer) 71302502 ndipo@redstonefilm
.com
Morati Molosiwa (Freelancer) 71510933










erobuo@yahoo.com fCI-f{J" -, 'f~ ~'-'~' V
Dipolelo Video Arts John Clement & 3167336/722313971
Renee Gilbey 72639825
Econ Network Obi Erobu 3951870/71553377
Vivid Vision Tumelo Mokgosi 71673231










EVALUATIO SCORE SHEET FOR FAMILY GAME SHOWS,
RELIGIOUS PROGRAMME & CHILDRE 'S GAME SHOW
What follows is a sample of criteria for the submission of a drama treatment and proposal. These
criteria can be used by broadcasters and producers.
Criteria
Tile following criteria will apply to the evaluation of submissions:
.







T.echnical Input value 10%
Treatment 15%
Competence 10%

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































~ ~ Worship rpt
1------,-,+--.,---+:-:--;----+:--:---;----+-:-;--:-;-...".-:... .;..'---i~-'-:-;--"" ~he Ele rpt \->-(r->:lgn,--<-)-----I
13.00 Mantlwanen Moomin Mantlwaneng Mantlwanen Mantlwan Melodi ya
g g eng kgalaletso


























Jacob two two C-bears &
Jamal
Bey blade
































19.00 DIKGANG DIKGANG DIKGANG DIKGANG DIKGAN
G
DIKGANG DIKGANG
























21.20 Passions Passions Passions Passions
Passions Brotherhood DanielIe steel:
of murder The ring part 2
(Movie) (movie)
22.00 The Bold The bold The bold The bold
The bold
22.20' FBI files Strong Chocalat The District Don't
MERIBO BBC WORLD
medicne look down
23.00 Stingers The OceanAve
Simpsons
,
00.00 BBC BBC BBC BBC BBC
BBC
,
,
•
